Thucydides. With an English translation by Charles Forster Smith

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EDITED BY
+ T. E. PAGE, c.z., LITT.D.
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PORTRAIT OF PERIKLES.
BRITISH MUSEUM.

THUCYDIDES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
CHARLES FORSTER SMITH

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

IN FOUR VOLUMES
I

HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
BOOKS I anp II

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
MOMLYI

First printed 1919
Revised and Reprinted 1928
Reprinted 1935, 1951, 1956

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Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS

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INTRODUCTION

TuREE ancient biographies} of Thucydides have
come down to us, but they are of little value. They
are derived from ancient commentaries, and the bio-
graphical details which they contain, wherever they
do not rest upon inference from the text of the
history itself, are often confused and contradictory.
These are supplemented by scattered statements of
several ancient writers—Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
who wrote two treatises on Thucydides (De Thucy-
didis historia tudictum and the Second Letter to Am-
maeus)y-Plutarch (Cimon iv), and Pausanias (1, xxxii.).

The-only authentic facts about the life of Thucy-
dides are gathered from casual mention in the History.
He was the son of Olorus (iv. civ. 4); commenced
the compilation of materials for writing the History
at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (1. i. 1);
and lived through the whole war, ripe in years and

1 One of these, compiled in three distinct portions ‘‘ from
the commentaries,” passed under the name of Marcellinus,
who is probably to be identified with the author of Scholia
on Hermogenes 7rep) oracewr, who seems to have lived in the
fifth century A.D.; another was by an anonymous gram-

marian ; and the third is a short notice in Suidas, s.v.
@ovnvdldns.

A2 vii

INTRODUCTION

judgment, following it with close attention, that he
might acquire accurate information (v. xxvi. 5). He
suffered from the plague of 429 B.c. (1. xlviii. 3), of
which he wrote his famous account (1. xlvii-—liv).
Elected one of the ten generals in 424 B.c., he was
sent to the coast of Thrace (where he enjoyed the
right of working certain gold mines) to operate
against Brasidas. Failing to relieve Amphipolis, he
was exiled in 424 B.c., and remained in banishment
for twenty years, and thus was able to become ac-
quainted with affairs on both sides (v. xxvi. 5).

For other facts we are dependent largely upon
inference ; some are reasonably certain, others less
so. The name of his father was identical with that
of the Thracian prince Olorus, whose daughter He-
gesipyle was married to Miltiades, and his tomb,
having the inscription ®ovxvdiSys ‘OAdpov “AAmovcros,
was in the suburb of Athens known as KoiAn Medc-
rides, adjoining those of Cimon and Miltiades (Plut.
Cim. iv). We may therefore assume that Olorus,
the father of Thucydides, was a near kinsman of the
Thracian prince Olorus. If, as Marcellinus says (§ 2),
Thucydides’ mother was named Hegesipyle, like
Cimon’s mother, that would be confirmation of the
relationship ; but Plutarch makes no mention of this.
It seems likely, then, that Thucydides was of near
kin to Cimon, younger perhaps by one generation.
His father Olorus was probably a full citizen of
Athens, as is indicated by the fact that, mentioning

viil

INTRODUCTION

himself as orparyyds (iv. civ. 4), he writes @ov«vdisnv
rov "Odcpov; for only as an Athenian citizen could
his father be mentioned in this official style.

As to the date of Thucydides’ birth, the only
ancient statement that seems worthy of credence
was made by Pamphila, a woman writer who in the
time of Nero made a great compilation of the results
of learning. Aulus Gellius (N.A. xv. 23) quotes
from Pamphila that, at_the beginning of the Pelo- \
ponnesian War, Hellanicus was sixty- -five years of |
age, Herodotus fifty-three, Thucydides forty. Pam- /
phila’s dates were probably taken from the chrono-
logical handbook of Apollodorus (second century B.c.),
which was generally accepted among the Greeks and
Romans. The term forty years used by Pamphila
doubtless meant the dxuy or prime of Thucydides,
and may have been fixed on the basis of his own
assertion that he began to collect material at the
opening of the war (1. i. 1) and was then in full
maturity of mind (v. xxvi. 5). At any rate his own
statement, taken with Pamphila’s date, has led to
the general assumption that the historian was born

en

somewhere about 472 B.c. —

It is indicated by Marcellinus (§ 46), and is prob-
able in itself, that the decree for Thucydides’ ban-
ishment was adopted on the motion of Cleon, ‘who
was then at the heigl ight of his power; and it is
probable that the charge brought against him was
treachery (zpodocia), as stated by Marcellinus (§ 55)

ix

INTRODUCTION

and the anonymous biographer (§ 2), and apparentiy
implied by Aristophanes (Vesp. 288). His own words,
EvveBn por detyew, admit of this interpretation; and
the~statement of Pausanias (1. xxiii. 9) that he was
later recalled from exile on the motion of Oenobius!
is best understood on this basis. If he had been
banished by a simple decree of the people, the
general amnesty that followed the capture of Athens
by Lysander would have been sufficient for him as
for other exiles; if the sentence was more severe,
a special decree would be necessary. But it is
possible, of course, that the motion of Oenobius
antedated the amnesty of Lysander’s peace by a
few months,

As to Thucydides’ death, jthere was a persistent
tradition that_he was assassinated and the fact that
the History breaks off suddenly in the midst of ex
citing events of the Decelean War seems to suppor
the tradition.) Plutarch (Cim. iv. 3) says that it was
eommonly- reported that he died_a violent death at
Scapte Hyle;) Pausanias (1. xxiii. 9), that he was
murdered on his journey home from exile; Marcel-
linus (§ 10), that after his return from exile he died
and was buried in Athens. But whether he died in

1 The name, which is a rare one in the fifth century, is
found as that of a general commanding in the neighbourhood
of Thasos in 410-9 z.c. and we hear somewhat later of one
Eucles, son of Oenobius; hence it has been conjectured that
the father of Oenobius was Eucles, who was Thucydides’
colleague in Thrace in 424 B.o. (Lv. civ).

INTRODUCTION

Thrace or in Athens, it seems clear from his own
words that_he outlived the term of his banishment
(v. xxvi. 5, EovéBy por pevyew tiv euavtod ery etkoor)
and that he returned to Athens, since his description
of the wall of Themistocles, whose remains “ may
still be seen at the Peiraeus”’ (1. xciii. 5), shows that

he was there after the destruction of the walls -2

Lysander. If he had lived tos see ce the re: restoration of >

med it. mafia is another reason,
too, for supposing that he did not live to this year:
in m1. cxvi. 2 he says that the eruption of Aetna,
which occurred in the spring of 425 B.c., was the
third on record ; hence the one mentioned by Dio-
dorus (xiv. lix. 3) for 396 B.c. could not have been
known to him. It seems reasonable, then, to assume

ee
There is a pretty and oft-repeated story! that

Thucydides, as a boy, heard Herodotus recite a
portion of his History at Olympia and was moved
thereby to tears, whereupon Herodotus said, “ Olo-
rus, your son’s spirit is aflame with a passion for
learning.” But Lucian, when telling of the powerful
effect of Herodotus’ recitation at Olympia,? would
surely have mentioned this circumstance had he
known of it; besides, chronology is in the way, it

1 Suidas s.v. dpyav and @ovxvdisns; Photius, Bibl. 60;
Marcellinus, § 54.
2 Herod. i.

xt

7

INTRODUCTION

we hold to Pamphila’s testimony. But if he did
not as a boy hear Herodotus recite at Olympia, he
must have known him later as a man at Athens.
The period of his youth and early manhood fell in
the time when Athens was most prolific in great
men. It is clear that he had heard and admired Pe-
ricles, and he must have seen Aeschylus and known
Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Anaxagoras, So-
crates, Gorgias, Antiphon, Pheidias, Polygnotus,
Mnesicles, Ictinus, Callicrates, and Hippocrates.
Association with such men and the atmosphere of
Athens at such a time best explain the development
of his genius; but the limits of his subject, as he
conceived it, precluded any mention of any of these
except Pericles, so that for any personal influence of
theirs upon him we are left to inference. The first
seven years of the war, before his banishment, were
doubtless spent in large part at Athens, where he
must have heard the speeches of Pericles, the dis-
cussions about Mytilene and about Pylos, as well as
about other matters of which we have accounts in
this History. But the twenty years of his exile he
probably passed largely on his properties in Thrace,}
engaged in the task of compiling materials for his
work about the war, as indeed we are told that he

1 It was his family connection with Thrace which led to
his acquiring the right of working gold mines in that region
(rv. ev. 1), which is all that he himself says, though his

biographers state that he was the owner of gold mines at
Scapte Hyle.

xii

INTRODUCTION

did by Plutarch (De Ezil. xiv.) and Marcellinus (§§ 25
and 47).

From Thucydides’ opening statement, that he
began the composition of his History at the out-
break of the war, expecting it to be a great one
and more noteworthy than any that had gone before,
we should naturally infer that he continued the
compilation and composition throughout the war,
and in fact—as it is clearly unfinished—until his
death. Again, as it was never completed, so it was
never completely revised, and it is natural that one
can find traces of the different dates at which the
several portions were composed. Evidence of this
kind has been brought forward in support of differ-
ent hypotheses as to the composition of the work.
The most famous of these was that put forth by
F. W. Ullrich in his Beitrage sur Erklérung des Thu-
kydides,.Hamburg, 1845, in which it is maintained
_that. Books I-V. xxvi, which contain the history ot \>
the Archidamian War (432-421 B.c.), formed a sepa- _

. rate treatise composed between the Peace of Nicias ,
‘and the Sicilian Expedition, | “and that the phrase
“this war” in the earlier books refers to the Ten
Years’ War only.

In v. xxvi Thucydides does make a fresh start with
the words, “The same Thucydides recorded the
events in order, reckoning by summers and winters,}

1 His division of the year corresponds to the actual con-
ditions of the carrying on of war in ancient times: summer

xiii

INTRODUCTION

until the fall of Athens.” But he adds, “The
war lasted for twenty-seven years, and anyone
who declines to count the interval of truce as war
is mistaken;’’ which sounds very much like the
opening of a second volume of a work that falls
into natural divisions. It is quite likely, as Ullrich
maintains, that the account of the Archidamian War
(I.-v. xxvi.) was composed mainly in the interval
between 421 and 416 B.c.; but that it received im-
portant additions after the fall of Athens seems
certain, e.g. 1. lxv. on the career of Pericles. So
much may well be admitted for Ullrich’s hypothesis,
but it is not necessary to admit more. Even the
story of the Sicilian expedition, the finest part of
the whole work, need not be considered to have
been originally a separate treatise, but only to have
received especial care. As for the rest, a paragraph
from Classen’s introduction to Book V outlines a
probable order for the growth of the history which
seems reasonable : “Though I am convinced that
the whole work was written in the shape in which
we have it after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian
War, and that Thucydides was called away from life
when engaged in the last revision and combination
of the portions which he had noted down and
sketched in outline from the beginning of the war,

—the larger half, including both spring and autumn—cover-
ing the time approximately from March to October, winter
from November to February,

xiv

INTRODUCTION

yet I do not believe that all parts of the work re-
ceived an equally thorough review. I think that the
masterly introduction, which makes our First Book,
was completed with the full knowledge of the disas-
trous result of the twenty-seven years’ war; that
then the history of the ten years’ war and the Si-
cilian Expedition, for which it is likely that the
results of laborious inquiry were already at hand
more or less perfectly worked out, received their
final touches; and that after this, before the thread
of the narrative was taken up again with the Ionic-
Decelean War, the intervening period of the cipjvy
UrovAos was described.”

The most interesting testimony as to the recog-
nition of the power of Thucydides in ancient times
is Lucian’s statement (adv. Indoct. 102) that Demo-
sthenes copied out the history eight times. Dio
Cassius constantly imitated and borrowed from him,
and among others of the later historians who emu-
lated him were Philistus, Arrian, and Procopius.
There is internal evidence that Tacitus was influ-
enced by him, and Sallust often imitated him. Quin-
tilian’s oft-quoted characterization, Densus et brevis et
semper instans stbt Thucydides, shows his appreciation.
In modern times his greatest panegyrist is Macaulay:
“There is no prose composition, not even the De
Corona, which | place so high as the Seventh Book
of Thucydides. It is the ne plus ultra of human
art”; again, “The retreat from Syracuse—Is it or

XV

INTRODUCTION

is it not the finest thing you ever read in your life?” ;
and still again, “He is the greatest historian that
ever lived.” John Stuart Mill said, “The most
powerful and affecting piece of narrative perhaps
in all literature is the account of the Sicilian cata-
strophe in his Seventh Book.” The Earl of Chatham,
on sending his son William Pitt to Cambridge, “left
to professional teachers the legitimate routine in the
classic authors, but made it his particular desire that
Thucydides, the eternal manual of statesmen, should
be the first Greek which his son read after coming
to college.” And the Earl of Chatham's estimate is
well supported by Sir G. Cornwall Lewis: “ For
close, cogent, and appropriate reasoning on political
questions, the speeches of Thucydides have never
been surpassed ; and indeed they may be considered
as having reached the highest excellence of which
the human mind is capable in that department.”

In the ordinary narration of events the style of
Thucydides is clear, direct, graphic. In strong con-
trast with this generally simple and lucid form of
statement is his style in describing battles and other
critical events, in generalizations, and especially in
the speeches; here the statement is often so concise
and condensed as to become very difficult. Thucy-
dides was not the first to use speeches as a means
of vivid presentation of important crises and the
actors in them; for that he had the precedent of
Homer and the Attic drama, But he used this

xvi

INTRODUCTION

means with such impressive effect and success as to
induce frequent imitation in later historical writing
in ancient times. He does not pretend to give the
exact words of the speakers, but says frankly in the
Introduction (1. xxii. 1): “ As to the speeches that
were made by different men, either when they were
about to begin the war or when they were already
engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with
strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for
me as regards that which I myself heard, and for
those who from various other sources have brought
me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the
language in which, as it seemed to me, the several
speakers would express, on the subjects under con-
sideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion,
though at the same time | have adhered as closely as
possible to the general sense of what was actually
said.” As a natural result the language of the
speeches has a uniform character, both in the struc-
ture of the sentences and in particular expressions—
in other words it is that of Thucydides himself; but
at the same time the character and mode of thought
of the assumed speaker are clearly manifest in each
speech. In the hands of Thucydides such a means
of presenting to us a critical situation is extraordin-
arily effective; here, as in his most striking narra-
tions, his readers become spectators, as Plutarch
expressed it. Oras Classen said, “ Without our own
choice we find ourselves involved in the conflict of

XVii

INTRODUCTION

interests, and are put in the position to form judg-
ment for ourselves from the situation and the feeling
of parties. Very seldom does the historian himself
add a word of comment.”

We are accustomed to admire among Thucydides’
great qualities as historian, his impartiality, his
trustworthiness, vivid description, sense of contrast,
conciseness, epigrammatic sententiousness, reserve,
pathos. We come to approve heartily his way of
leaving facts clearly stated and skilfully grouped to
carry their own judgments. He is never a partisan,
and the unsophisticated reader might at times wonder
what his nationality was did he not frequently sub-
scribe himself ‘Thucydides the Athenian.’’ Histo-
rians sometimes criticise his attitude, but they all
accept his statements of fact. His descriptions of
battles read as if he himself had been present. He
dramatises history by placing events in such juxta-
position that a world of moral is conveyed without
a word of comment; for example, when the funeral
oration with its splendid eulogy of Athens is followed
by the description of the plague, the disgraceful
Melian episode is succeeded by the Sicilian disaster,
the holiday-like departure from Athens is set over
against the distressful flight from Syracuse. He
packs his language so full of meaning that at times
a sentence does duty for a paragraph, a word for a
sentence. ‘Of all manifestations of power, restraint
impresses men most,’ and however much we regret

XViii

INTRODUCTION

his reserve, since for much that he might have told
us we have no other witnesses, we come more and
more to regard this as great art. As for pathos, no
historian ever excelled such passages as those where
the utter defeat of a hitherto invincible navy is por-
trayed (vu. lxxi), or the misery and dejection of the
departing Athenian host is described (vu. ]xxv), or
where the final catastrophe in the river Assinarus
seems to occur before our eyes, preparing us for the
final sentence: “Fleet and army perished from the
face of the earth, nothing was saved, and of the
many who went forth few returned home.”

xix

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Of Thucydidean manuscripts the following are, according
to Hude, the most important :—

Monacensis, Library at Munich (228), paper, 13th century.
Britannicus, British Museum (11727), parchment, 11th
century.

A Cisalpinus sive Italus, now in Paris (suppl. Gr. 255),
parchment, 11th or 12th century.

B Vaticanus, Vatican Library at Rome (126), parchment,
llth century.

C Laurentianus, Laurentian Library at Florence (69, 2),
parchment, 11th century.

EK Palatinus, Library at Heidelberg (252), parchment, 11th
century.

F Augustanus, Library at Munich (430), parchment, 11th
century.

G

M

No one of these manuscripts is of such age or excellence as
to deserve preference before all others; but of the two
families which may be distinguished, Laurentianus leads the
one, namely, C and G, Vaticanus the other, namely, ABEF.
Britannicus holds a sort of middle ground between the two.
Hude’s preference is for Laurentianus ; Classen’s, following
Bekker, for Vaticanus. From vi. xciv on Vaticanus has a
special value as coming perhaps from a different copy.

ComPLETE EDITIONS

Aldus: Editio Princeps, Venice, 1502, folio; scholia 1503.

Stephanus: Paris, 1564, folio; with scholia and Valla’s Latin
version made in 1452. The second edition (1588) is the
source of the Vulgate.

I. Bekker: Oxford, 1821, 4 vols., with scholia and Duker’s
Latin version. Also Ed. ster. altera, Berlin, 1832
(746, ’68).

xxi

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Poppo: Leipzig, 1821-40, 11 vols. (prolegomena, commen-
tary, etc.).

Poppo: Minor edition, Leipzig, 1843-51, 4 vols.; revised
1875-85 by Stahl.

Goeller: Leipzig, 1826 and 1836, 2 vols., annotated.

Arnold: London and Oxford, 1830-39, 3 vols., annotated.

Didot : Paris, 1840, text with Latin version by Haase.

Bloomfield : London, 1842-43, 2 vols., annotated.

Kriiger: Berlin, 1846-7 and 1858-61, 2 vols., annotated.

Boehme: Leipzig, 1856 and 1871-75, annotated ; new edition
revised by Widmann.

Classen: Berlin, 1862-76 and 1875-85, 8 vols., annotated ;
revised by Steup.

Stahl: Editio ster. Leipzig, 1873-74, 2 vols., introduction,
text and adnotatio critica. .

Van Herwerden: Utrecht, 1877-82, 5 vols., text with critical
notes.

Jones: Oxford, 1898, 2 vols., text.

Hude: Leipzig, 1898-1901, text with critical notes.

EpITIons oF SINGLE Books

Shilleto: Books I and II, London, 1872-3, with critical
and explanatory notes.

Schoene: Books I and II, Berlin, 1874, text and critical
notes.

Croiset : Books I and II, Paris, 1886, annotated.

Rutherford : Book IV, London, 1889.

American ‘‘ College Series,” Boston, based on Classen-Steup :
Morris, Book I, 1887; Fowler, V, 1888; Smith, III,
1894; VI, 1913; VII, 1886.

Lamberton: Books VI and VII, New York, 1886; II and
III, 1905.

Holden: Book VII, Cambridge, 1891.

Goodhart : Book VIII, London, 1893.

Marchant: Book II, London, 1893; VI, 1905; VII, 1910.

Spratt: Book III, Cambridge, 1896; IV, 1912; VI, 1905.

Fox: Book III, Oxford, 1901.

Tucker: Book VIII, London, 1908.

Mills: Book II, Oxford, 1913. e

xxii

THUCYDIDES

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1 The Greek text used for this translation of Thucydides

is that of Hude. Variations from his text are indicated in
footnotes.

2

THUCYDIDES

BOOK |

I, Tuucypipes, an Athenian, wrote the history
of the war waged by the Peloponnesians and the
Athenians against one another. He began the task
at the very outset of the war, in the belief that
it would be great and noteworthy above all the
wars that had gone before, inferring this from the
fact that both powers were then at their best in
preparedness for war in every way, and seeing the
rest of the Hellenic race taking sides with one state
or the other, some at once, others planning to do so.
For this was the greatest movement that had ever
stirred the Hellenes, extending also to some of the
Barbarians, one might say even to a very large part
of mankind. Indeed, as to the events of the period
just preceding this, and those of a still earlier date,
it was impossible to get clear information on account
of lapse of time ; but from evidence which, on pushing
my inquiries to the furthest point, I find that I can
trust, I think that they were not really great either as
regards the wars then waged or in other particulars.

II. For it is plain that what is now called Hellas
was not of old settled with fixed habitations, but
that migrations were frequent in former times, each
tribe readily leaving its own land whenever they were

3

Rea

THUCYDIDES

e A > , / e > ea
€auT@v atrondeltrovtes, Bialouevor bd tTivwy aiel
a ¥,
TAELOVOV. THS yap euTopias ove ovans ovd
> / > a bd / ” \ a +
EripyvuvTes ade@s GAANXOLS OUTE KATA YHV OUTE
f / \
d1a Oardoons, vewouevoi Te TA éEavTa@V ExacTOL
dcov atrolny Kal trepiovaiav ypnuatwv ovK éxovtes
PNB o~ 4 ¥ x e / >
ovde ynv hutevovtes, adnrov Ov omoTE Tis éeA-
, \ > / ¢ vy BA > /
Gov, Kail atevyictwv dua dvTwy, ddXos adatpn-
getal, THs Te Kal uépav avayKaiov tpodis
TavTaxov av nyovpevor étrixpateivy ov yareTras
> / \ ? > \ x / ,
aTavicTavtTo, Kal dt avTo ovTe peyéOer TrodEwY
yy yd a yy fol / \
l\oXUOV OUTE TH ANAN TapacKevy. paddoTta Oe
cal QC \ “

THS ys % aploTn alel Tas petaBoras Tav oiKn-
, es C4 a 4 / \
Topwy elyev, ) Te vUV BMeccadia Kadovpévy Kal
Borwtia IleXomovyncov te Ta TOAAA TARY’ Ap-
Kadlas THS TE GAANS boa HY Kpaticta. Sia yap
apeTnv yas ai te duvdpes trol pelfous éryryuyvo-
pevat atucets evetroiovy €& wv épGeipovTo, Kal
dpa UTO aNoPUA@Y “AadAOv erreBouAEVoVTO. THY
a ’ \ b foe eee a \ \ /
yoov “Artixiy éx Tov éml mreioTtov ba TO NETTTO-
yewv aotaciactov ovcav avOpwiro. wKovy oi
> \ Bris \ / ’ a , >
aUTOL Alel. Kal Tapddevywa TOdE TOU Adyou OvK
2 Y / b ni \ / \ »” \
EXaYXlaTov €oTe Ova TAS peTOLKHoELg1 Ta AAXa pI)
opoiws avénOjnvary éx yap Tis 4AXns ‘EAAdSos of
ToNéu“w 7 oTacer éextrimtovtes trap >AOnvatous
€ / id / A > , \
ol duvatwrato. ws BéRatov dv aveywpouy, Kal

r f > \ > \ lal / By
ToNtiTaL yuyvomevot evOUS ato TaXaLod pelw ET/

1 So Ullrich: peroixias és Mn.

BOOK I. um. 1-6

forced to do so by any people that was more numer-
ous. For there was no mercantile traffic and the
people did not mingle with one another without fear,
either on land or by sea, and they each tilled their
own land only enough to obtain a livelihood from it,
having no surplus of wealth and not planting orchards,
since it was uncertain, especially as they were yet
without walls, when some invader might come and
despoil them. And so, thinking that they could ob-
tain anywhere the sustenance required for their daily
needs, they found it easy to change their abodes, and
for this reason were not strong as regards either the
size of their cities or their resources in general. And
it was always the best of the land that was most
subject to these changes of inhabitants—the districts
now called Thessaly and Boeotia, most of the Pelo-
ponnesus except Arcadia, and the most fertile regions
in the rest of Hellas. For the greater power that
accrued to some communities on account of the
fertility of their land occasioned internal quarrels
whereby they were ruined, and at the same time
these were more exposed to plots from outside tribes.
Attica, at any rate, was free from internal quarrels
from the earliest times by reason of the thinness of
its soil, and therefore was inhabited by the same
people always. And here is an excellent illustration
of the truth of my statement that it was owing to
these migrations that the other parts of Hellas did
not increase in the same way as Attica; for the most
influential men of the other parts of Hellas, when
they were driven out of their own countries by war
or sedition, resorted to Athens as being a firmly
settled community, and, becoming citizens, from the
very earliest times made the city still greater in the

5

THUCYDIDES

> , / > / \ / cA
éroincav wAnbe avOpwTav THVY TOALY, WOTE
kal és “lwviav totepov ws ovX iKaVis OVENS THS
> a > ‘ ge/

Attikns atrotkias e€eTreunrpav.

III. Androl &€ pos Kai Tdde TOY Tada@v acGE-
veav ovx HKloTa* mpo yap TaV TpwiKay ovdéev
/ , A > / oie ,
daiverar mpotepov Kown épyacapyevn n EAdas*
Soxet 8€ pot, ovdé Todvopa TodTo Evymaca Te
elyev, GAXA TA ev TPO” EAAnVOS Tod Aeveadio-
vos Kal mdvu ovdée Elva Hh érikANoLs avTN, KaTAa
GOvn S¢ ddXa@ TE Kal TO HeAacyiKov ert wreia Tov

J je A \ bd] , / a
ad EQAUTO@Y THV ETMVULLAY Tmapéye Gan, EAAnVvos
88 kal Tav Taidwv avtod év TH POi@tids iayu-
/ \ DJ , > \ b] > 2] / >
cdvTwv, Kal émayopuévwv avtovs ée7 whedia es
\ v / ’ ec / \ ” a
Tas GNAas Tones, Kal’ Exadotovs pev dn TH
éutdia padrov KareicGar “EXXqvas, ov pevtor
ToAXOD Ye Xpovou edvvaTO Kal GTacWW exVLKHCAL.
a \ / ad a \
Texpnptot o€ padioTa Ounpos. TorAAo yap
Botepov ere Kal Tov TpwrKady yevopevos ovdapod
ef 1 \ / Inf 1S ” 7
ottw! tovs Evpravtas wvopacey ovd addouUS
i rods peta “Ayirréas ex THs POcw@tL60s, oltep
\ n i ae! \ \ > a
Kat mpa@to.” EdAnves Hoav, Aavaovs 6€ &v Tots
v ». Cy J / Vi \ > A >
reat Kal Apyelous cat “Ayatovs avaxanel. ov
unv ovdé BapBdpovs ecipnxe Sia TO pnde “EX-
Anvds Tw, os éuol Soxei, avtimadov és év dvopa
; , e > = € Y 7
dtoxexpic0at., of & ovv ws Exactor “ EdAXAnves
KaTa TONELS TE OoOL GAAHAwY EvViecay Kal Evp-
mavtes batepov KrAnOévtes ovdev mpo TaV Tpat-
nav d¢ acbéveray Kal aperkiav GdAdAnA@Y aOpoot

1 Added by Reiske.

BOOK I. n. 6-1. 4

number of its inhabitants; so that Attica proved too
small to hold them, and therefore the Athenians
eventually sent out colonies even to Ionia.

III. The weakness of the olden times is further
proved to me chiefly by this circumstance, that before
the Trojan war, Hellas, as it appears, engaged in no
enterprise in common. Indeed, it seems to me that
as a whole it did not yet have this name, either, but
that before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion,
this title did not even exist, and that the several
tribes, the Pelasgian most extensively, gave their
own names to the several districts ; but when Hellen
and his sons became strong in Phthiotis and were
called in to the aid of the other cities, the clans
thenceforth came more and more, by reason of this
intercourse, to be called Hellenes, though it was a
long time before the name could prevail among them
all. The best evidence of this is given by Homer;
for, though his time was much later even than the
Trojan war, he nowhere uses this name of all, or
indeed of any of them except the followers of
Achilles of Phthiotis, who were in fact the first
Hellenes, but designates them in his poems as
Danaans and Argives and Achaeans. And he has
not used the term Barbarians, either, for the reason,
as it seems to me, that the Hellenes on their part
had not yet been separated off so as to acquire one
common name by way of contrast. However this
may be, those who then received the name of
Hellenes, whether severally and in succession, city
by city, according as they understood one another’s
speech, or in a body at a later time, engaged
together in no enterprise before the Trojan war,
on account of weakness and lack of intercourse

7

THUCYDIDES

,
érpafav. adda Kal TavTny THY oTpaTelav Oa-
Aadoon On TAELW Ypw@pevor Evv7TrOov.

IV. Mivws yap wadaitatos @yv axon topev
% 5) / x nr a € nf
vauTLKOV exTHTAaTO Kal THS voy EAAnWKHS Oa-
/ > \ “ b / \ A“ /
Adoons etl TrelaoTOv éexpatynce Kai THV KuKXa-
/ \ \ A n
dav vnowv hpEe Te Kal olKLoTNS TP@TOS TOV
/ > / na > / \ \
mretoTov éyéveto, Kapas éfeXadcas Kai Tovs
~ r , /
éauTov Taidas Hye“ovas éyKaTacTHaas* TO TE
z ! e Seles l 2 A / 24?
AnoTLKdY, ws elKos, KAOnpEL Ex THS Oaddoons ép
ef 29 7 a \ a 7
dcov édvvaTo, TOD Tas Tpocddous paAXov Lévat
auT@.
7 \ A
V. Of yap “EAXAnves TO dAa Kai TaV Bap-
Bdapwv of te év TH HITrelpw Tapaladdcoton Kal
4 / > > \ A a
Scot vicous elyov, érerdn npEavTo wadXov Tre-
cal \ 3 b] 3 4 > ‘h \
patovaGar vavolv é7 adXAnXOUS, ETPATTOVTO TpOsS
/ a cal
AnoTEelayv, NyouMev@v avdpav ov TaV advvaTaTa-
n / nm lal
TwY Képdous TOD apETEepov avTa@V veka Kal Tots
/ a \ /
acbevéot tTpobis, Kal Wpoomimtovtes ToXETLY
\ > 4
ATELXLTTOLS KA KATA KOpmas OlKoUMEVaLs HpTraloy
Kal Tov weloTov Tov Blov évTevGev étroLovYTO,
> / / fal
ovK €xovTOs Tw alayUYnY To’TOU Tov Epyou,
/ \ / a A a
hépovtos O€é Te Kal ddEns warrov: Snrovor 5é TOV
TE NTELPWTAV TIVES ETL Kal VOY, Ols KOTMOS KAADS
TovTo Opav, Kal of madatol TOY ToLnTa@V Tas
fal / fal
MUCTELS TOV KATATAECOVTMY TravTaYOU opOLws
a / e =
épwTavtes el ANTTAL EloLV, WS OUTE MY TuVOavoV-
/ \ > D4 U
tat atakiovvTwy To Epyov, ols TE EmLpEdes En

8

BOOK I. 11. 4-v. 2

with one another. And they united even for this
expedition only when they were now making con-
siderable use of the sea.

IV. Minos is the earliest of all those known to us
by tradition who acquired a navy. He made himself
master of a very great part of what is now called
the Hellenic Sea, and became lord of the Cyclades
islands and first colonizer of most of them, driving
out the Carians and establishing his own sons in
them as governors. Piracy, too, he naturally tried
to clear from the sea, as far as he could, desiring
that his revenues should come to him more readily.

V. It should be explained that in early times both
the Hellenes and the Barbarians who dwell on the
mainland near the sea,! as well as those on the islands,
when once they began more frequently to cross over
in ships to one another, turned to piracy, under the
lead of their most powerful men, whose motive was
their own private gain and the support of their
weaker followers, and falling upon cities that were
unprovided with walls and consisted of groups of
villages, they pillaged them and got most of their
living from that source. For this occupation did not
as yet involve disgrace, but rather conferred some-
thing even of glory. This is shown by the practice,
even at the present day, of some of the peoples on
the mainland, who still hold it an honour to be suc-
cessful in this business, as well as by the words of
the early poets, who invariably ask the question of
all who put in to shore, whether they are pirates,?
the inference being that neither those whom they
ask ever disavow that occupation, nor those ever

1 e.g. Phoenicians, Carians, and probably Epirots.
2 cf. Homer, y 73; « 252,

VOL. 1. cde

THUCYDIDES

3 eldévar ovK overdifovtwv. édAnfovto S€ Kal Kat
/ / la nr
HTELpov GNANAOUS. Kal MEYPL TODOE TrOAAA TIS
e777 / A A / / “4
EddAddos TO Tadkalw TpoTwM VvéweTaAL TeEpi Te
>’ U
Aoxpovs tovs ‘Oforas wal AitwXdods cal ’Axap-

al / a
vavas Kal THY TAUTN NTrELpoV' TO TE TLONpOpopel-
aQat TovTOLs TOis NTELPWTaLs aTrO THS Tadalas

, b] /
ANTTELAS EMMEMEVHKED.
a \ \ ,

VI. aca yap 7 ‘“Enndas éordnpodope Sa Tas
> / 3 / \ > b] A >
apapKTous TE OlKNTELS KAaL OVK achadrels Trap

\
adAnrous éepddous, Kal EvvyOn thy diartav pel
cd > / iA e / rn
2 OTAwY éroincavTo WoTrep of BapBapot. onpetov
na a er € — sme
8 éott\rabra ‘ris “EXdddos ets ob Two vepoueva
a Fi
3 (T@V ToTeE Kal)és TaYTAas Opoiwy SiatTNnUaT@V. év
Qn cal N rn / /
tois mpatot O€ "AOnvaio: Tov te aldnpov KaTé-
/ A / \
Gevto Kal avetpévn TH Siaitn és TO TpUpEepw@Tepov
peTéoTynoav. Kal ot tpeacBuTEpot avTois TaV Ev-
4 \ \ e / > \ ,
Sarmovev 1a TO aBpodiattov ov ToOAVS YpoVOS
érrelon XIT@VAS TE ALVODS éeTTavaaVTO dopodvuTES
Kal ypvo@v teTTiyov évépoer KpwRUov avadov-
lal ’ lal n an > , Ka \
pevot TOV Ev TH Kehadryn TpLXa@V' ad ov Kal
"lever tov o BuTépou a To Evyyeves em
vy TOUS Tpe pous Kata To Evyyeves €tr
4 TON avTn 1 oKEUV? KaTécXeEV etpia & av
nH y xev. per pla
n \ r U lal
écOAntt Kal és Tov viv TpoTovy mpato. Aaxkedat-

, b] / » Naw 2 Ye oF \ \

foviol EXPNTAVTO Kal Es TA AXA TPOS TOUS TOA-

\ ,
Aovs of Ta pellw KEeKTHMEVOL icodialTOL wadLOTA
5 KatéaTynoav. éyupveOnoay TE TPMTOL Kai es TO

Io

BOOK I. v. 2-v1. 5

censure it who are concerned to have the informa-
tion. On the mainland also men plundered one
another ; and even to-day in many parts of Hellas
life goes on under the old conditions, as in the region
of the Ozolian Locrians, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and
the mainland thereabout. And these mainlanders’
habit of carrying arms is a survival of their old
freebooting life.

VI. Indeed, all the Hellenes used to carry arms
because the places where they dwelt were unpro-
tected, and intercourse with each other was unsafe ;
and in their everyday life they regularly went armed
just as the Barbarians did. And the fact that these
districts of Hellas still retain this custom is an evi-
dence that at one time similar modes of life pre-
vailed everywhere. But the Athenians were among
the very first to lay aside their arms and, adopting an
easier mode of life, to change to more luxurious
ways. And indeed, owing to this fastidiousness, it
was only recently that their older men of the wealthier
class gave up wearing tunics of linen and fastening
up their hair in a knot held by a golden grasshopper
as a brooch;! and this same dress obtained for a
long time among the elderly men of the Ionians
also, owing to their kinship with the Athenians.
An unpretentious costume after the present fashion
was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians, and in
general their wealthier men took up a style of living
that brought them as far as possible into equality
with the masses. And they were the first to bare
their bodies and, after stripping openly, to anoint

1 The mode of wearing the hair in a knot on the top of
the head with the insertion of a pin in the form of a cicada

seems to have persisted long at Athens, a mark of antiquated
manners as characteristic as the queue or pig-tail with us.

II

THUCYDIDES

\ > , / \ A /
davepov aroduvtes Nima peta tod yuyvalecBat
nrelavtTo. TO dé wadat Kai ev TO ‘OdvpTLK@
5] a , ” \ \ > a G49
ayave Sial@pata éyovtes TeEpt TA aldota ot aOdn-

{> 2 / \ > bE A bp] \ /
Tal nywvilovto, Kal ov TONG ETN ETrELOH TETTAUD-
by4 \ \ > nn / »” ? aA
Tat éte 6€ Kal év tots BapBapois eotww ols vo,
Kal padusta Tois "Aclavois, TuypHs Kal wads
GOXa tiPerat, cat SveSwpévor TodTO Sp@awv. ToAXa
/ \
8S dv cal adda Tis atrodeiEeve TO Tadatov “EX-

\ € / a a lal /
AnVLKOY OmoLOTpoTTAa T@ vdv BapRapix@ srartw-
MeVOD. |

a /
VII. Tay S€ roXewv doar péev vewtata oKicOn-
/ ’ / aA
cav Kal On TAWLLOTEPwWY OYTwY TrEpLoVaLaS Lan-
> al al lal
Rov éxovcat ypnudtov, éw avTols Tots aiyrarots
> / \ / \ > \ > /
éxtiCovto Kal Teiyeos TOUS LaP uous ateddpBavov

, a \
éurropias Te Evexa Kal THS Tpos TOUS TpoTotKoUS
4 > 4 € \ \ \ \ /
éxactot iayvos: ai 6€ tadaal dua THY AnoTELaY
s \ \ > / > \ / lal
éml woAv avTicxyovoay amo Oaracons waddov

7 a lal
wxiaOnacav, at Te €v Tais vycos Kal év Tais
/ 54 \ > rn
nretpors (Epepov yap AAXAjAOUS TE KaL TOV AXrOV
7
Scot bytes ov Oadacolot KATW @KOUY), Kal MEX PL
al /
TovoE ETL AV@KLTLEVOL ELoLY.
\ aA
VIIL. Kal ody jocov AnoTai Hoav oi vnotwTat,
ra , 2
Kapés te dvtes cal Poivixes. obTot yap bn Tas
TrEloTAS TOV viTwY @KnTaVY. papTUpLov Oé
/ \ / ¢ va? / > a
Anrov yap Kabapouévns vo “AOnvaiwr év TOS5¢€
a / \ al “ > n 4
T@ ToAcu@ Kal TaV Onka@v avatpeOeca@y, daar
Roav tav teOvewtwyv €v TH ViTw, UTEP Husov

12

BOOK I. vi. 5—vitt. 1

themselves with oil when they engaged in athletic
exercise; for in early times, even in the Olympic
games, the athletes wore girdles about their loins in
the contests, and it is not many years since the
practice has ceased. Indeed, even now among some
of the Barbarians, especially those of Asia, where
prizes for wrestling and boxing are offered, the con-
testants wear loin-cloths. And one could show that
the early Hellenes had many other customs similar
to those of the Barbarians of the present day.

VII. However, the cities which were founded in
more recent times, when navigation had at length
become safer, and were consequently beginning to
have surplus resources, were built right on the sea-
shore, and the isthmuses! were occupied and walled
off with a view to commerce and to the protection of
the several peoples against their neighbours. But
the older cities, both on the islands and on the main-
land, were built more at a distance from the sea on
account of the piracy that long prevailed—for the
pirates were wont to plunder not only one another,
but also any others who dwelt on the coast but were
not sea-faring folk—and even to the present day
they lie inland.

VIII. Still more addicted to piracy were the
islanders. These included Carians as well as Phoe-
nicians, for Carians inhabited most of the islands, as
may be inferred from the fact that, when Delos was
purified by the Athenians in this war” and the graves
of all who had ever died on the island were re-
moved, over half were discovered to be Carians,

1 7.e. fortified cities were established on peninsulas, con-
nected with the mainland by an isthmus, which was then

walled off as Epidamnus (ch. xxvi. 5) and Potidaea (Iv. exx. 3),
2 In the sixth year of the war, 426 B.c. cf. III. civ.

13

THUCY DIDES

Kapes éfavycar, roo Oevres TH TE of agi TOD
Orrov EvyvteOaupévn Kal TH TpoT@ G viv Ett
Oamtovowv.

Kataortaytos be tou Mivw vavtixov Teoipe-
TEPAa eryeveTo map: adda rous (0 yap €x TOV DIT OY
KaKkoupyol avéoTnoay UT avrov, Ore Ep Kal Tas
TOANAS AUTOV Kar@eice), Kal ol Tapa Oddaccav
dvOpoT ot paAAov On Tv KTHOW TOV Xpnparav
TOLOUMLEVOL BeBavorepov @KOUV, KAL TLVES KAL TelXn
mepteBadrovTo 1 @s TOV LMTEPOL EauT@V cpeyve-
pevot’ ep lépevo yap T@VY KEepo@v ot TE HaaoUS
Umrépevov TOV Kpelac ovey dovAelav, of te Suva-
TOTEPOL ‘mrepiovatas EXOVTES mpoo-eT oLovvTo vmn-
KoouS TaS €AdaooUS TONES. Kal EV TOVT® TO
TpOT@ paddov dn Ovtes UoTepov Ypovw emt
wien eoTpaTevoay.

. Aya pepvov Té you SoKEl TOV TOTE Suvapel
Slt Kal ov TOTOUTOY TOS Tuvddpew bpxous
KaTehnppevous tous Enevns punoThypas dy@v TOV
otoXov ayerpalt. éyovar Sé Kal of Ta Gadeatata
TleAorrovynciov pin mapa TOV TpoTepov de-
Serypevor) Tlédomd TE ™ parov mwAnOEL XPnHaTOV, &
ArOev ex THS Acias éxov és dvOpwrrous am Opous,
Ovvapl TepuToung apLevov Thy erovupiay THS xo
pas émnduv dvta buws axel, Kal toTepov Tols

1 Aude reads zepieSddovro with C,.

EID ee) SS SSS ee

1 According to the post-Homeric legend, all who paid
their court to Helen engaged to defend the man of her

14

BOOK I. vu. 1-1x. 2

being recognized by the fashion of the armour found
buried with them, and by the mode of burial, which
is that still in use among them. |

But when the navy of Minos had been established,
navigation between various peoples became safer—
for the evil-doers on the islands were expelled by him,
and then he proceeded to colonize most of them
—and the dwellers on the sea-coast now began to
acquire property more than before and to become
more settled in their homes, and some, seeing that
they were growing richer than before, began also
to put walls around their cities. Their more settled
life was due to their desire for gain; actuated by
this, the weaker citizens were willing to submit to
dependence on the stronger, and the more powerful
men, with their enlarged resources, were able to
make the lesser cities their subjects. And later on,
when they had at length more completely reached
this condition of affairs, they made the expedition
against Troy.

IX. And it was, as I think, because Agamemnon
surpassed in power the princes of his time that he
was able to assemble his fleet, and not so much
because Helen’s suitors, whom he led, were bound
by oath to Tyndareus.! It is said, furthermore, by
those of the Peloponnesians who have received the
clearest traditional accounts from men of former
times, that it was by means of the great wealth
which he brought with him from Asia into the midst
of a poor people that Pelops first acquired power,
and, consequently, stranger though he was, gave his
name to the country, and that yet greater things

choice against all wrong. ef. Isoc. x.40; Paus. 11. xx. 9;
Apollod. m1. x. 9.

¥5

THUCYDIDES

, , 4 a
exyovors ete peifw EvveveyOjvat, Evpvabéws peév
’ A b lal € \ ¢ fal ’ ,
év tH ’Attixn v7o0 “Hpaxredav azrofavortos,
"Atpéws O€ pntpos adeXdhod dvtos av’T@ Kal ért-
pews O€ NTPOS S$ QUT® Kal é7t
/ > / 23 > / /
tpéyravtos Evpuvadéws, or’ eotpateve, Muxnvas
\ > a ’ al
Te Kal THY apXnV KaTa TO oiKelov 'ATpet (TUYXa-
\
vew 5€ avTov devyovta Tov matépa Sia Tov
Xpucinmov Oavatov), Kal ws OvKETL avexwpnoeV
Evpuadevs, Bovropévor cat Tav Muxnvaiorv PoBo
“ ¢ lal \ ee \ lal >
tov ‘Hpaxrerdav cal dua duvatov doxovvta eivat
\ fal , ral ,
Kal TO TAHGos TeEPepaTrevxoTta TaV Muxnvatov Te
\ x .
Kat dcwv Evpuabevs jpye tHv Bacireiav “Atpéa
maparafPely kal tov Ilepoedav tovs Hedomidas
na wee
peifous KatactThvar. & pot Soxet “Ayapéuvwv
\ \ aA \ iA 3 \ / lal
TapadaBov Kal vavTiK@ € Gua emt TrEOY TOV
” > “2 \ / > / \ /
arrwv layuoas THY TTPATELAY OV YapLTL TO TEOV
a / \ / , \
i bobo Evvayayov tromoacGa. gaivetar yap
\ 4 >
vavol Te TAElaTaLs AUTOS AdiKopevos Kai ApKact
, / lal
mpootapacyav, ws “Opunpos TovTo ded7jwxer, et
la ’ n z
Tw ikavos TeKuNpla@oat. Kal €v TOD GKNTTPOV
¢ a f ” IEtN “ce 3 a /
dua TH Tapadoce elpnxey avtov “ ToAAHaL v7)-
cowor Kal “Apyei wavtl avacce’ ovK« ay ov
/ y” rn / 2 \ > A
vicwv é&~ TeV Teplotkidwy (avTat bé€ ovK ap
\ 3 > / x > / > / \
TOAAAL Elev) NITELPWTNS WY EKPATEL, EL LN TL KAL
x / a
vauTixoy elyev. elxdtew S€ ypn Kal TavTn TH
\ \ a
gTpaTela ola Hv Ta TPO AUTH.

1 Chrysippus, his half-brother, son of Pelops and Axioche,
was killed by Atreus and Thyestes at the instance of their
mother Hippodameia.

16

BOOK I, ix. 2-5

fell to the lot of his descendants. For when Eu-
rystheus set out on the expedition that resulted in
his death in Attica at the hands of the Heracleidae,
Atreus, his mother’s brother, who chanced to have
been banished by his father for the death of Chry-
sippus,' was intrusted by Eurystheus with Mycenae
and the sovereignty because he was a kinsman; and
when Eurystheus did not return, Atreus, in accord-
ance with the wish of the Mycenaeans, who feared
the Heracleidae, and because he seemed to be a
man of power and had won the favour of the mul-
titude, received the sovereignty over the Mycenaeans
and all who were under the sway of Eurystheus. And
so the house of Pelops became greater than the house
of Perseus. And it was, I think, because Agamemnon
had inherited all this, and at the same time had be-
come strong in naval power beyond the rest, that he
was able to collect his armament, not so much by
favour as by fear, and so to make the expedition.
For it is clear that he himself brought the greatest
number of ships, and that he had others with which
to supply the Arcadians,? as Homer testifies, if he is
sufficient witness for anyone. And he says, in the
account of the delivery of the sceptre,? that Aga-
memnon “ruled over many islands and all Argos.”
Now, if he had not had something of a fleet, he
could not, as he lived on the mainland, have been
lord of any islands except those on the coast, and
these would not be “many.” And it is from this
expedition that we must judge by conjecture what
the situation was before that time.

2 cf. Homer, B 576 and 612,
3 cf. Homer, B 101-109.

17

THUCYDIDES

Le \ = VAe Al a
X. Kat éte pev Muxivar pixpov nv, 7) et TeToV
: a \ > f a s
rote TOALo La vov pH aioypewr SoKEl Eivat, ovK
tal , 4 3 / ‘
axpiBel av TLS TNMEL@ KpwpEVvOS aTLaTOLN BN
rn e -
yevérOat Tov aTdNOV TOGODTOY GaoV ol TE TOLNTAl
¢ , /
cipykact Kal 6 Aoyos KaTéxet. Aaxedatpoviwy
A / /
pevt yap ei 4 rods epnuwbetn, AerpOein dé Ta
e \ \ rn ips \ b / \ x
Te (epa Kal THs KaTacKEUNS Ta Ebaby, TOAAHY av
s > / fol / / al
OlUaL ATLA TLAV TNS Suvapews TpoeNGovTos TOAOV
rat , fal
ypovov Tois érerta Tpos TO KAEOS aUTOY elval
a / \
(kaitot TleXorovvijcov tov mévte Tas dvo potpas
fol / la) la
vépovras THS Te EvpTrdans tyyobvTar Kal ToV Ew
/ A a Pi BA /
Evpuayov Todkdwy: o“ws dé, ovTe Evvoltxiaberons
n e ad \ rn
THs? wodews OTE Lepols KaL KATATKEVALS TONU-
/ \ nr lal
Tedéor Yonoaperys, KATA Kopas € TH Tara@
rt ¢€ / , ’

Tihs ‘EdAdbos tpoTe@ oixicBeions, haivorT av vTro-
, > / \ \ > \ lal ,
Scectépa), AOnvaiwy dé 76 ato TovTO TadovTwy

, x \ , Wee Mae A
Surraciav av thy Svvamy eixalecPar ato THs
lat > a / /
pavepas drvews Tis TOAEws 7) EoTLY. oOvKOUY aT L-
lal Dy "% »9\ \ ” a / al
oTely elkos ovde Tas ders THY TONEWY paXXOV
a /
oxotrel %) Tas Suvapuers, vopitew bé Thy oTpatelav
/ / a fol
éxeivny peyioTny pev yevécOar THY TPO avTijs,
/ 5 4 we ,
Revrropévny Sé TaV viv, TH “Opnpov ad Trouncer et
lal \ al
Te xpy KavTadOa moTeveEL, HY elKos éml TO metfov
\ n <4 \
pev ToLnTHY OvTa KOTMHTAL, OMwS dé dhaivetat
/ \ ,
Kal otTws évdeecTépa. TeToinke yap XLALwV Kai
a \ a
Staxociwy veav tas pev Borwtav elxoot Kal
e \ > 8 a \ be Mir / /
éxatov avdpav, tas b€ DidoxtyTov TevTnKovTa,
1 Added by Hude. 2 Added by Stephanus.
18

BOOK I. x. 1-4

X. And because Mycenae was only a small place,
or if any particular town of that time seems now to
be insignificant, it would not be right for me to treat
this as an exact piece of evidence and refuse to
believe that the expedition against Troy was as great
as the poets have asserted and as tradition still main-
tains. For if the city of the Lacedaemonians should
be deserted, and nothing should be left of it but its
temples and the foundations of its other buildings,
posterity would, I think, after a long lapse of time,
be very loath to believe that their power was as great
as their renown. (And yet they occupy two-fifths
of the Peloponnesus and have the hegemony of the
whole, as well as of their many allies outside ; but
still, as Sparta is not compactly built as a city and
has not provided itself with costly temples and other
edifices, but is inhabited village-fashion in the old
Hellenic style, its power would appear less than it
is.) Whereas, if Athens should suffer the same fate,
its power would, I think, from what appeared of the
city’s ruins, be conjectured double what it is. The
reasonable course, therefore, is not to be incredulous
or to regard the appearance of cities rather than
their power, but to believe that expedition to have
been greater than any that preceded it, though
falling below those of the present time, if here
again one may put any trust in the poetry of Homer;
for though it is natural to suppose that he as a poet
adorned and magnified the expedition, still even on
his showing it was evidently comparatively small.
For in the fleet of twelve hundred vessels he has
represented the ships of the Boeotians as having
one hundred and twenty men each, and those of

19

THUCYDIDES

a e > \ n \ / \ /
dnA@v, ws euoi Soxel, Tas peyiotas Kat édayxi-
» nr / lal
otas' G\Xwy yor peyéOous mépt ev veay KaTa-
Noyo ovK euvycOyn. avtepérar b€ OTL Hoav Kal
/ / > A ® / \ /
paxlpor Tavtes, ev Tats DiroxTHTov vavat Se67-
/ \

AwKev' TOECTAS yap TaVTAas TeETOINKE TOUS TpOT-
, / \ > : \ cal
KWTOUS. Treplvews O€ OVK ElKOS TOANOUS EvsTrAELY

lal f, lal
é€w Tav Baciiéwy Kal TOY pwddLOTAa év TédEL,
, / ,
GArXws TE KaL péANOVTAS TEAAYOS TEpatwaed Oat
rn lal \ al
feTa TKEVO@Y TONEMLKG@Y OVO av Ta TOLA KaTAa-
yy > \ a a ,
hapKTa eYovTas, AAA TM TAaNAL@ TpoTw@ ANHOTL-
, / \ \ Ps >
KWTEpOV Taped Kevacpéva. Tpos Tas peyioTas 6
/ nr \ nr
ovv Kal éhaxiatas vats TO fécov oKOTOUYTL Ov
, / \ lol
moAXoL haivovtar éovtes, WS ATO TaaHS THS
¢ Los
EdAd6os Kowh TEUTOMEVOL.
> ? eS lal
XI. Aitiov & Hv ovy 7 OrAvyavO pwria ToToUTOV
/ a \ a > / ’
dcov nH axXpnuatia. THS yap Tpopys amopta Tov
Te oTpaTov éAdoow iyayov Kal doov ATLfOY
avtobev TodenodvTa Biotevoey, érrerdn 5€ adu-
, al / \ \
KOMEVOL ayn expaTynaay (Ojrov Sێ- TO yap Epupa
rn / ,
TO OTPATOTEOW OVK ay ETELXLZaYTO), PatvovTaL &
ovd évtatv0a Tacn TH Suvdper ypnodpuevol, adda
an Ty /
mpos yewpylav Ths Nepoovncov tpaTopevor Kat
AnoTElay THS Tpodpiys amopia. Kal padXov ot
not is tpopis amopig. 3 Kal padrov oi
rn lal / \ / ” r
Tpaes av’tav dueovrappévon ta déxa ETN avTEtyov
rn e ,
Bia, tois aiet vToXeTTOpmevols avTiTaXoL GVTEs.
‘ / \ > Ss fed »” lal \ Vv
meprovalay dé e 7Gov ExovTEs Tpopijs Kal dvTES

20

BOOK Vitex, 4421, 2

Philoctetes as having fifty,! indicating, it seems to
me, the largest and the smallest ships ; at any rate,
no mention as to the size of any others is made in
the Catalogue of Ships. But that all on board were
at once rowers and fighting men he has shown in
the case of the ships of Philoctetes; for he repre-
sents all the oarsmen as archers. And it is not likely
that many supernumeraries sailed with the expedi-
tion, apart from the kings and those highest in office,
especially as they were to cross the open sea with all
the equipment of war, and, furthermore, had boats
which were not provided with decks, but were built
after the early style, more like pirate-boats. In any
event, if one takes the mean between the largest
ships and the smallest, it is clear that not a large
number of men went on the expedition, considering
that they were sent out from all Hellas in common.2
XI. The cause was not so much lack of men as
lack of money. For it was a want of supplies that
caused them to take out a comparatively small
force, only so large as could be expected to live on
the country while at war. And when they arrived
and had prevailed in battle—as evidently they did,
for otherwise they could not have built the defence
around their camp—even then they seem not to
have used their whole force, but to have resorted to
farming in the Chersonese and to pillaging, through
lack of supplies. Wherefore, since they were scat-
tered, the Trojans found it easier to hold the field
against them during those ten years, being a match
for those who from time to time were left in camp.
But if they had taken with them an abundant
1 Hom. B 510, 719.
2 The number would be 102,000, #.e. 1,200 ships at 85 men
each,
21

THUCYDIDES

€ ¥ / \ / lal \
aOpoo. avev AnoTElas Kal yewpylas Evveyas Top
ar Py / 4 bi xa / an
Torenov Siépepov, padiws av mayn KpatodvTes
” \ > c , ; \ , A >A
elhov, of ye Kal ovy aOpoo, adda péper TO aiel
, > A / ’ x /
TapovTt avtetyov, Todtopxia 8 av mpooKabefo-
/
pevolt €v éXdooovi TE XPOVw Kal aTrOVwTEpOY THY
/ > \ ? , /
Tpotav eldov. adda bt aypnuatiav(td Te po
4 > nan > \ > / \ la) b]
ToUTwY) acbevh Hv Kai avTa ye 52) TadTa, dvoma-
U lal Vs A a
oTOTATa TaY Tply yevoueva, dnrODTAL Tois Epryots
UTodeéaoTEpa OvTAa THS Pyuns Kal Tov viv Trepl
lal \ Ae
avTov Sia TOUS TroLNnTasS NOYOU KATETYNKOTOS,
\ \ 3
XII. ’Evei cal peta ta Tpwixa 4 “EXXas Ett
, /
HETAVLTTATO TE KAL KAT@OKLCETO, WATE LN OVYG-
> a“ oe \ / an €
caca avénOnvar. Te yap uvaywpnots Tov “EX-
/ /

Ajnveav €& “I\tov ypovia yevouévn Tordra évedy-
woe, Kal oTaces ev Tais TOdEoW ws ert TO
\ ey 4 > > > 3 / Fy /
Toru EeylyvoVvTO, ap wy ExTLTTOVTES TAS TrOAELS

” / \ e a e : a

extiCov. Bowwrtot te yap o. viv éEnkooT@ éTet

peta “IXiov Gdwow é€& “Apyns avactdytes vd

Occcarav thy viv pév Bowtiav, mpotepov bé
4\

/ a / v \ > al
Kadpunida,yiv carovpévnv wxnoay (Rv S€ avtav
Kal atrobac mos ev TH YR TavTyn TpoTEpov, ag’ wv

en > / a ? a

kat €s "INov €otpatevoav), Awpins Te oydonkosT@
/

érer Evv ‘Hpaxretidars IleXorrovvncov Exyov. uo-

b] a / id a e € \

Ais TE Ev TOAAD® yYpovw novyacaca n EdXXas

, \ > , ’ / > / > /

BeBaiws Kal (ovxéTe aviatamevn) amroixias é€e-

22

BOOK I. x1. 2-xu. 4

supply of food, and, in a body, without resorting to
foraging and agriculture, had carried on the war
continuously, they would easily have prevailed in
battle and taken the city, since even with their
forces not united, but with only such part as was
from time to time on the spot, they yet held out;
whereas, if they could have sat down and laid siege
to Troy, they would have taken _ it in less time and
with less trouble. But becausé_of lack of money not
only were the undertakings before the Trojan war
insignificant, but even this expedition itself, though
far more noteworthy than-any~befores-is.shown by
the facts to have been inferior to its fame and to the
tradition about it that now, through the influence
of the poets, obtains.

XII. Indeed, even.-after vere war Hellas

was still subject to migrations and in process of
settlement, and hence “HE-HSE pet rest and wax
stronger. For not only did the return of the Hel-
lenes from Ilium, occurring as it did after a long
time, cause many changes; but factions also began
to spring up very generally in the cities, and, in con-
sequence of these, men were driven into exile and
founded new cities. The present Boeotians, for
example, were driven from Arne by the Thessalians
in the sixtieth year after the capture of Ilium and
settled in the district now called Boeotia, but formerly
Cadmeis; only a portion of these had been in that
land before, and it was some of these who took part in
the expedition against Ilium. The Dorians, too, in the
eightieth year after the war, together with the Hera-
cleidae occupied the Peloponnesus. And so when
painfully and after a long course of time Hellas
became permanently tranquil and its population was
no longer subject to expulsion from their homes, it

23

THUCYDIDES

A 8 \ ’ r \ nw
meute, Kat “lwvas pev “A@nvaios kat vnotwTov
Tovs Toddovs wxicay, “Itadias 8€ Kal LiKedias

‘ ol ¢
To mAéov IleXotrovynaton tTHS TE GAANS “EXAdOos
éoTw & xYwpia. mavta b€ TavTa voTEepovy TaY
Tpawixav éxticOn.
= €
XIII. Avvatwrtépas 5é yiryvomévns tis “EAXddos
nr fol al a
Kal TOV YpnuaTov THY KTHOW ETL wadAov 7 Tpo-
f al
TEpov Tolovpevyns Ta TOAAA TuUpavvides ev Tals
A / 5
Todeot KabioTaVTO, TOV TpoTodwY perlovwv yi-
yvouevwv (mpotepov d€ Hoav émlt pyntols yépact
matpikal Bactdetat), vauvTikd te é&nptveTo 7
€ n la
EAXAds xal THs Oaddoons paddXov avTetyovTo.
mp@tor dé KopivOsor Aéyovtar éyyvtata Tov viv
\ cal
TpoTov petayelploa Ta Tepl Tas vavs Kal TpLN-
lal , an ¢
pets mpa@tov év KopivOe tis “EXXdbos éevvauTn-
ynOjvar. daivetar 6€ Kal Laptows ’Apewoxrdijs
KopivO.0s vaurnyos vats Toujcas Téeooapas: ETH
8 éotl uddtota TplaKkoota és THY TeNEUTHY TODSE
lo > a /
ToD modéuov, dte “ApervoxAfs Laptous HrOev.
vavpaxia Te TadaTtaTn wv topev yiryvetat Ko-
/ N / 4 \ / \
pwOiwy mpos Kepxupaious: étn 6€ wadtota Kai
tavtn é€nxovta Kal Siakdotd éote péexXpL TOV
fal la) \ /
avtov ypovov. oixovvTes yap THY TOW Oi Ko-
pivOcor émt tod icOuod aiei 8) rote éurropiov
= fal ¢ / \ / \ a \ /
etyov, TOY EXAnvwy TO Taal KaTAa yn Ta ThELw
a \ / fal b Nw /
}, kata Odraccav, TOV Te EvTos IleXoT7rovYHaoV
\ n ” \ Alyse —? 3) ¥5 ,
kal tov é&w, d1a THs exelvywy Tap addANoOUS
ETLLLTYOVTMV, XpHnwacl TE OvvATOL Hoav, ws Kal

24

BOOK I. xu. 4-xm1. 5

began to send out colonies. The Athenians colonized
Ionia and most of-the7islands ; the Peloponnesians,
the greater part of Italy and Sicily and some portions
of the rest of Hellas. And all these colonies were
planted after the Trojan war.

XIII. As Hellas grew more powerful and con-
tinued to acquire still more wealth than_ before,
along with the increase of their revenue tyrannies )
began to be established in most of the cititewherexs~
before that there had been hereditary kingships
based on fixed prerogatives. The Hellenes began to
fit out navies, too, and to apply themselves more to
the sea. And the Corinthians are said to have been
the first of all to adopt what was very nearly the
modern plan as regards ships and shipping,! and
Corinth was the first place in all Hellas, we are told,
where triremes were built. And it appears that
Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, built four ships
for the Samians, also ; and it was about three hundred
years before the end of the Peloponnesian war that
Ameinocles came to the Samians.? The earliest sea-
fight, too, of which we know, was fought by the
Corinthians against the Corcyraeans ;? and this was
two hundred and sixty years before the same date.
For as the Corinthians had their city on the Isthmus,
from the very earliest times they maintained there
a market for the exchange of goods, because the
Hellenes within and without the Peloponnesus, in
olden times communicating with one another more by
land than by sea, had to pass through their terri-
tory; and so they were powerful and rich, as has

1 The reference seems to be to the construction of har-
pours and docks as well as to the structure of the ships,

e.g. providing them with decks (ch. x. 4).
8 704 B.O. > 664 B.C.

25

THUCYDIDES

Tols maXaLots Tointais dednrAwTaL’ adveoy yap
? , \ / > / & fh,

eTwvopacav TO ywplov. émrevdyn Te ot “EAANVES
cal ” \ a / \

padXXdov émAwlov, TAS VAUS KTHTAaMLEVOL TO ANTTL-
\ / Ui

Kov KaOnpovr, Kal éwTOpLoy TAapEeKXoVTES aupoTEepa

»” /
Suvatiy éoyov Xpnuatov tmpocod@ THY Tod.
¢ \ ,

6 Kat "Iwow Uotepovy TorV yiyveTat vavTLKoY él
Kupou Iepcav tpetov Bacidevovtos kai Kap-
Bvcov tov viéos avtov, Tis Te Kal’ éauTovs
Garacons Kip morepmotvtes expatnoay twa
ypovov. Kal Ilodvepatyns, Ldpouv tupavyay ért
* a / v lal ,
KapBvcovu, vavtiK@ toyvav adrXas TE TOV VHNTwY
e / 3 / We / id \ > /
UmnKoous éToijncato Kal Prverav éehwv aveOnxe

re wed a / a
T@ Amod\XAove TO Anrio. Bawxats te Maccanriav
, geld lal
oixifovtes Kapyndovious évixwy vavyayoortes.
4 % cal an cal
XIV. Avvatetata yap tTavTa TeV vavTiKaoY
2 / \ % la) a a
hv. gaivetar 6€ Kal Tavta, moddais yeveais
/ lal lal
votepa yevoueva TOV TpwlLKav, TpLnpEect pev OXé-
/ >] \
yals Yp@meva, TEVTNKOVTEpOLS O ETL Kal ToLOLS
2 waxpols éEnptupéva HoTeEp Exeiva. OALYOV TE TPO
eC r \ lad / / A \
tav Mnédixev cat tod Aapetov Pavatou, ds peta
/ nr /
KapBvonv Iepoav éBacirevce, tpinpers epi TE
Yixedlayv toils Tupavvots és TAGs éyévovto Kal
n \ al \ r —
Kepxupaios tadta yap Tedevtaia mpo THs Eép-
, / A
Eou otpatelas vauTiKa a&iodoya év TH “ENXaOu
, a \ \ ’ rn
3 xatéoTn. Aiyiwwhtar yap Kat “A@nvaiot, Kal

1 cf. Hom. B 570; Pind. Ol. xiii. 4.
2 559-529 B.c. 8 532-522 B.c. Cf. Tit. Civ.
5 Marseilles, founded 600 B.c.

26

BOOK I, xu. 5—x1v. 3

been shown even by the early poets, who called the
place “ Wealthy Corinth.”! And when navigation
grew more prevalent among the Hellenes, the
Corinthians acquired ships and swept the sea of
piracy, and offering a market by sea as well as by
land, raised their city to great power by means of
their revenues. The I[onians, too, acquired a power-
ful navy later, in the time of Cyrus,” the first king of
the Persians, and of Cambyses his son; and waging
war with Cyrus they maintained control of the sea
about their own coasts for some time. Polycrates,
also, who was tyrant of Samos in the time of Cam-
byses,? was strong in sea-power and subdued a num-
ber of the islands, Rhenea among them, which he
captured and consecrated to the Delian Apollo.‘
Finally the Phocaeans, when they were colonizing
Massalia,® conquered the Carthaginians in a sea-fight.

XIV. These were the most powerful of the fleets ;
and even these, we learn, though they were formed
many generations later than the Trojan war, were
provided with only a few triremes, but were still
fitted out with fifty-oared galleys and the ordinary
long boats,® like the navies of that earlier time. In-
deed, it was only a little before the Persian war and
the death of Darius,’ who became king of the Per-
sians after Cambyses, that triremes were acquired in
large numbers, namely by the tyrants in various parts
of Sicily and by the Corcyraeans ; and these were the
last navies worthy of note that were established in
Hellas before the expedition of Xerxes. As for the
Athenians and Aeginetans and any other maritime

§ wAoia, usually contrasted with war-ships (tp:qpes), but
here marked as ships of war by the epithet uaxpa, though

probably differing little except in size from trading- vessels.
7 485 B.C,

27

THUCYDIDES

/ v / a \ 4 \
oitives addot, Bpayéa €KEKTHVYTO Kal TOUTWY TA
> ’ A
ToAAa TeVvTNKOVTEpoUS’ Oe TE a ov 'AOnvaious
ol 7 > / r
OcuictoKANs enercev Aiywntats modenovvtas,
rn / % \
kal dua tov BapBapov mpocboximov dvtos, Tas
vavs Toincaclal, alomep Kal evavpaynoay: Kal
3 \ ,
avTat ovTw elyov dia Tdons KaTATTpwLaTa.
\ =
XV. Ta peév ody vavtixa Tov ‘EXXANvev Tot-
a \ o
avta Hv, Ta Te TadXala Kai Ta VaTEpoy yevopeva.
ioyuv O€ TEpleTTOLnTAaVTO Guws OVK ELayioTHY Oi
, > a , , \
TPOTTXOVTES AUTOLS ‘YpHUdTwY TE Tpocddw Kal
v > ia) > / LY \ /
adrwv apyn eTLTAEOVTES YAP TAS VHTOUS KAaTE-
/ \ ee a
otTpépovto, Kal pddiota door un SiapKh elxor
/ \ cal \ / i<4 x /
ywopav. Kata ynv de TOAEMOS, OOev Tis KaV OUVA-
\ /
pls TrepleyéveTo, ovdsis Evvéctn: wavtes b€ Hoar,
\ / \ e / \
dgoL Kal eYEVOYTO, TPOS OMopovs TOvS aoeETépousS
ExadoTols, Kal exdnuous oTpatelas TOAV ATO THIS
€ lal > , ” lel > 3 lal e
éauT@v ém addwv Katactpodn ove é&joay oi
a > \ / \ \ ,
EdAnves. ov yap EvverotnKecav pos Tas peyi-
, . , 23 > > <3 \ “a.
oTas ToAELS UTIKOOL, OVD av avTOL aTO THs lons
\ , > a ae , \
KOWaS OTpaTElas ETrOLOUVYTO, KAT GAXAous 6é
cal id 4 4 ’ / 3 /
HaGAAOV ws ExXaTTOL OL AaaTUYELTOVES eTTONELOUY.
/ + FS \ ( / \ ‘ /
pdriota O€ és TOV TdNaL TOTE YEvopEvov) TOAELOV
, a
Xarkidéwy cai ’Epetpidv cat To aXXo “EAXANviKOv
és Evppaytiav éxatépwv SueoTn.

1 Referring to Xerxes’ invasion. This Aeginetan war ig
referred to in ch. xli. 2,

28

BOOK I. xiv. 3-xv. 3

powers, the fleets they had acquired were incon-
siderable, consisting mostly of fifty-oared galleys ;
and it was only quite recently that the Athenians,
when they were at war with the Aeginetans and
were also expecting the Barbarians,! built their fleet,
at the instance of Themistocles—the very ships
with which they fought at Salamis. And these
vessels were still without decks throughout their
length.

XV. Such were the navies of the Hellenes, both
those of early and those of later times; nevertheless
those who gave attention to such matters acquired
not a little strength by reason both of revenue of
money and of sway over others. For they—and
especially the peoples whose own territory was insuffi-
cient—made expeditions against the islands and sub-
jugated them. But by land no wars arose from which
any considerable accession of power resulted; on the
contrary, all that did occur were border wars with
their several neighbours, and foreign expeditions far
from their own country for the subjugation of others
were not undertaken by the Hellenes. For they
had not yet been brought into union as subjects of
the most powerful states, nor, on the other hand,
did they of their own accord make expeditions in
common as equal allies; it was rather against one
another that the neighbouring peoples severally
made war. But it was chiefly in the war that arose
a long time ago between the Chalcidians and the
Eretrians,? that all the rest of Hellas took sides in
alliance with the one side or the other.

2 The war for the Lelantine Plain (cf Hdt. v. xcix.; Strabo,
x. i. 11); usually placed in the seventh century, but by
Curtius in the eighth (see Hermes, x. pp. 220 ff.).

29

THUCYDIDES

XVI. ’Emeyéveto 5€ addols TE AXOOL KwAU-
pata py avénOhva, cal “loot mpoxwpnoavtoy
éml péya Tov Tpaypatwov Kodpos cai n Lepoixn
é£ovoia Kpoicov cabedodca Kal boa évtos” AXvos
Tmotauov pos Oddaccay, émETTPATEVGE Kal TAS
év TH Hreipw ToAELs ebovAwoe, Aapetos Te VaTEpov
T@ Dowixv vavTiK@ KpaTav Kal Tas vycous.

XVII. Tépavvol te 6001 Hoav év tTais “EXAnu-
Kais ToOAEct, (TO ef EavT@Y LOVvOV) TpoopwpeEVoL ES
Te (TO c@pua),Kal és TO Tov idiov oiKov afew be
dodarelas Ocov édvvavtTo pddtoTa Tas TOXELS
@Kouv, empaxOn Te ovdev an’ adtav Epyov ak.o-
Royov, ef a El TL TPOS TEpLolKOUS TOUS aUTaY
éxdotots.: ovtw tavtaxobev 7 EndXas eri trodvv
Ypovoy KaTELYETO NTE KOLWH Pavepov pNnoev KaT-
epyalecOal, Kata TOdELS TE ATOAMOTEpA ElvaL.

XVIII. ’Ezrecd2) S€ of te “AOnvaiwy tupavvot
Kal of €x THs addAns “EAXdbos ert TOAD Kai Tplv
TupavvevOeians of TAEloTOL Kal TeAEUTALOL TAY
Tav év Suedia vd Aaxedaipovioy KatedvOnoav:}
» yap Aaxedaipov pera Tv KTiow \TaV voP
évorxovvtov ait Aawpiav) él mreiatov av
icwev Xpovov oTacidcaca Guws ex TAaXaLTAaTOV
Kal nuvouynOn Kal alel atupdvvevtos Hv: ETN Yap

1 After éxaorois the MSS. have of yap év SixeAia em) wrelorov
éxépnoay Suvduews, for those in Sicily advanced to a very
great degree of power, which Wex deletes, followed by most
editors. 2 Hude omits with E.

30

BOOK I. xvi.-xvin. 1

XVI. But different Hellenic peoples in different
localities met with obstacles to their continuous
growth; for example, after the Ionians had attained
great prosperity, Cyrus and the Persian empire, after
subduing Croesus! and all the territory between the
river Halys and the sea, made war against them and
enslaved the cities on the mainland, and later on
Darius, strong in the possession of the Phoenician
fleet, enslaved the islands also.?

XVII. The tyrants, moreover—whenever there
were tyrants in the Hellenic cities—since they had
regard for their own interests only, both as to the safety
of their own persons and as to the aggrandizement
of their own families, in the administration of their
cities made security, so far as they possibly could,
their chief aim, and so no achievement worthy of
mention was accomplished by them, except per-
chance by individuals in conflict with their own
neighbours. So on all sides Hellas was for a long
time kept from carrying out in common any notable
undertaking, and also its several states from being
more enterprising.

XVIII. But finally the tyrants, not only of Athens
but also of the rest of Hellas (which, for a long time
before Athens, had been dominated by tyrants)—at
least most of them and the last that ever ruled,
if we except those in Sicily—were put down by the
Lacedaemonians. For although Lacedaemon, after
the settlement there of the Dorians who now inhabit
it, was, for the longest period of all the places of
which we know, in a state of sedition, still it obtained
good laws at an earlier time than any other land,
and has always been free from tyrants; for the

1 546 B.O. 2 493 B.c,
31

THUCYDIDES

b / U Pre / / > \
€OTL LANOTA TETPAKOTLA KAL OALY@ TAELW ES THY
\ ral lal / ? > z
TedeuTIY TODSE TOU TroAéuov, ad ov Aaxedar-
A a / aA
pOvloL TH AUTH ToALTELa Yp@vTaL’ Kai dv aUTO
, \ yi a vy U ,
duvapevot Kal Ta €v Tals adXaLs TOAEGL KaOLaTA-
\ A
gay. peta O€ THY TOV TUPavYwWY KaTaddVoOW EK
Ths “EXXdSdos ov ToAXOls ETeow Botepov Kai % ev
an \ ? ,
Mapadau payn Mydwv rpos APnvatous éyéverto.
5 u be ” , SE LA Wal e Ba B a
ext O€ eres peT avTny addis 0 BapBapos TO
/ > \ /
peyaro otorw ert THY “EdXddda SovAwoopeEVos
x \ / / > f
nrOev. Kal peyaddrouv Kivdvvou émixpewacbevTos
/ / A , ¢
of te Aaxedatpovioe Tov EvpToNeunoavTwy ‘EX-
/ ’
Anvov nyncavtTo Suvapet TpovyorvTes, Kal ot AOn-
vaio. érriovt@y TaV Mndwyv dvavonOévtes éxdi7rEiv
TY TOL Kal avacKevacdpevor és Tas vais
éoBavtes vauTiKol éyévovTo. KOWn TE aTTwod-
\ / ef % A ,
pevot TOV BapBapov vVaTepoyv ov TOAX@ rex plOn-
/ / \
cav mpos Te “AOnvatous cai Aaxedaipovious\oi Te
7
amooravtes7Bacthens “EAAnves kal ot Evptrone-
paoavTes) Suvdper yap TavTa meyiora Seepavy’
3 (ayvor yap ol ev KaTa yhv, of 6é vavaiv. Kal
Odiyov pwév Ypovov Evvépervev 1) Oparypia, eTvTELTAa
dueveyOévtes of Aaxedatpoviot Kai of ‘AOnvaior
b / \ a / \ ? ,
eTONEuNnoay peta TOV EvpLLaywY POs aAAnXoOUS,
\ na v ¢ / ” é al
Kal Tov ad\A@v EXAnvwv ef Twes Tov dtactatep,
, ev lal
Tpos TOUTOUS On EXYWpoUY. WaTe-.aTo TaV Mnéu-
K@V €S TOVOE Al€el TOY TOAEMOY TA eV OTEVOOMEVOL,

1 The legislation of Lycurgus, thus placed by Thucydides
at four hundred years or more before 404 B.c., would be about
804 B.c. (Eratosthenes gives 884).

32

BOOK I. xvin. 1-3

period during which the Lacedaemonians have been
enjoying the same constitution! covers about four
hundred years or a little more down to the end of
the Peloponnesian war. And it is for this reason
that they became powerful and regulated the affairs
of other states as well. Not many years after the
overthrow of the tyrants in Hellas by the Lace-
daemonians the battle of Marathon? was fought
between the Athenians and the Persians; and ten
years after that the Barbarian came again with his
great host against Hellas to enslave it. In the face
of the great danger that threatened, the Lacedae-
monians, because they were the most powerful,
assumed the leadership of the Hellenes that joined
in the war; and the Athenians, when the Persians
came on, resolved to abandon their city, and pack-
ing up their goods embarked on their ships, and
so became sailors. By a common effort the Bar-
barian was repelled; but not long afterwards the
other Hellenes, both those who had revolted from
the King and those who had joined the first con-
federacy against him, parted company and aligned
themselves with either the Athenians or the Lace-
daemonians; for these states had shown themselves
the most powerful, the one strong by land and the
other on the sea. The defensive alliance lasted only
a little while; then the Lacedaemonians and the
Athenians quarrelled and, with their respective
allies, made war upon one another, and any of the rest
of the Hellenes, if they chanced to be at variance,
from now on resorted to one or the other. So that
from the Persian invasion continually, to this present
war, making peace at one time, at another time

2 490 B.O.
33

2

THUCYDIDES

rf a ~ an

Ta S€ ToANEmouYTES GAAHAOLS H TOIS EaUTaD

\

Evupaxyows adpictapévols ev TapecKkevdoavto Ta

\

ToNéula Kal éutrerpoTepoe eyévovTo meTa KLVOUV@D
TAS MENETAS TOLOUMEVOL.

, a

XIX. Kal of wév Aaxedatpovior ody vrotenets
éyovtes popou Tovs Evpudxous yyobvto, Kat OXL-

al / /
yapxiav 5€ dict avtols povoy éemiTndelws OTrws
“ee a la)
TodiTevoovat OepatrevovTes,, AP@nvatos dé vavs TE
lal / A , Ud \ /
TOV TOMMY TO YPOvO Taparafovtes, TANV Xiwv
/ \ / lal al
cal AecBiwv, Kal ypipata Tols Tact TakarTes
dhépev. Kai éyéveto autos és Tovde Tov TONEMOD
‘ \
% idia TapacKeun pelfwv 7) WS TA KpaTLOTA TOTE
rat a / ”
peta axpaipvods THs Evppayias HvOnoav.

XX. Ta pév ody Tadata ToradTa nipov, yadeTra
wv \ Con / na rd \
édvTa tavtl é&fs Texunplo TioTedoal. ol yap

\ > \ al /
avOpwirot TAS AKOaS TOV TPOYEYEVNMEVOV, Kal HV
id , /
eTrex wpla chicw 7%, ouoilws aBacavictws Tap
’ a fol
adAnrov Séyovtat. “AOnvaiwy yovv To TAHOVos
ed ” ei? & 7. | ,
Immapyxov olovtat vp’ “Appodiov kal “Apiotoyet-
Tovos TUpavvoy 6vTa aToUavely Kal ovK icacL
ef ¢€ / \ 4 x > ge)
éte Immias pev mpecButatos wy npyxe Tav Ierou-
/ cs / \ \ \ >
otpatou viéwy,” Immapyos 5€ Kai Oeccanros aber-
a / a
hol joav avtov, Urototyicavtes O€ TL exelyn TH
a € / ,’
nuepa Kal tapaxphua “Apuddtos cal “Apiotoyet-
> a / / ¢ / 7
twv ex Tov Evvedotay apiow Imria pweunviocba,

1 of. Vis ixxxy.(2,5 Vo. lyvii.4,
2 Lost its independence after the revolt of 427 B.c.
cf. 111. L 3 i.e. as if they took place in some distant land.

34

BOOK I. xvur. 3-xx. 2

fighting with each other or with their own revolted
allies, these two states prepared themselves well in
matters of war, and became more experienced,
taking their training amid actual dangers.

XIX. Thé Lacedaemonians maintained their hege-
mony without kééping-theirallies tributary to them,
but took care that these should have an oligarchical
form of government conformably to the sole interest
of Sparta; the Athenians, on the other hand, main-
tained theirs by taking over in course of time the
ships of the allied cities, with the exception of
Chios 1 and Lesbos,” and by imposing on them all a
tax of money. And so the individual resources of
the Athenians pvailable for this war became greater
than thosé of themselves and their allies when that
alliance was still unimpaired and strongest.

XX. Now the state of affairs in early times I
have found to have been such as I have described,
although it is difficult in such matters to credit
any and every piece of testimony. For men accept
from one another hearsay reports of former events,
neglecting to test them just the same,? even though
these events belong to the history of their own
country. Take the Athenians, for example ; most of
them think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he
was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton.4 They
do not know that it was Hippias, as the eldest of
the sons of Peisistratus, who was ruler, and that
Hipparchus and Thessalus were merely his brothers ;
further, that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspect-
ing, on that very day and at the very moment of
executing their plan, that information had been con-
veyed to Hippias by one of their fellow-conspirators,

*514.B.c. On this digression, cf. Hdt. v. lv.; vi. exxiii.;
Arist. ’A@. Tod. 17 f. 35

THUCYDIDES

ra A ’ / e / , \
Tov pev aTéayYovTo ws mpoeLdoTos, BovrAopuevor bé
a \ i
mow EvrrAnPOjvat Spacavrés Te Kal Kwdvvedoa,
fal \
tT ‘Immapy@ TepituxXovTes Tapa TO AewxKopeov
kadrovpevoy thv Iavabnvaixny toumnv é1ako-
3 opoovte améxteway. Trodda &€ Kal ddXa Ett Kal
fal /
viv ovTa Kal ov ypovm apvnoTovpeva Kal ob
adrot“EAAnvEes ovK OpPas olovTal, W®aTEP TOUS
Ld / \ al ,
te Maxedaipoviwv Bacihéas un mid Whd@ tpoc-
tiOec Bat Exatepov, adra Svoiv, Kal Tov Letavatny
/ > val = a 3533 / , icf
Oyo avtois eivat, Os OVS eyéveTo TWTOTE. OUTWS
atanraitwpos tois todXots 7 EntTnats THS adn-
Geias cal érl Ta éToiwa madXov TpéTTOVTAL.
XXI. Ex b€ Tov eipnuévayv Texunpiwv Guws
an ” / / a iol >
TolavTa av Tis voulfwv padiota & dindOov ody
apyaptavot, Kal ovTE @S ToLNnTAal UuvyKact Tept
aUuTa@YV éTl TO EelCov KoTMODVTES AANOV TLETEVOY,
” e /, / b] \ \
ovTE ws Aoyoypada EvvéGecayv éml TO Tpocaya-
, Cal > / x > / v > ,
yoTEpov TH akpodcet 7) adnOéaTEpor, dvTa ave&é-
AeyxTA Kal TA TOAAG UTO Yporov aUT@Y aTiaTwsS
Sack \ \ a > / e a Ar oe /
éml TO uwvOM@bes ExverixnKoTa, nupnabas SE Nynod-
ral /
pevos €k TOY ETLPAVETTAT@Y ONMELWY WS TadaLa
2 elvat aToYpwrvTws. Kal O TOAEMOS OUTOS, KaiTrEp

1 In the inner Ceramicus near the temple of Apollo
Patrous.

2 Herodotus is doubtless one of the Hellenes here criti-
cised. cf. vi. lvii., referring to the two votes; rx. liii.,
where he seems to have applied a term belonging to a deme
(cf. Hdt. 111. lv.) to a division of the army.

36

BOOK I, xx. 2—xx1. 2

held off from him as forewarned, but wishing to do
something before they were seized and then take
their chances, fell in with Hipparchus, who was mar-
shalling the Panathenaic procession near the sanc-
tuary called Leocorium,! and killed him. There
are many other matters, too, belonging to the
present and not forgotten through lapse of time,
regarding which the other Hellenes? as well hold
mistaken opinions, for example, that at Lacedaemon
the kings cast not one but two votes each, and that
the Lacedaemonians have the “ Pitana company ” in
their army, which never at any time existed. So
averse to taking pains are most men in the search
for the truth, and so prone are they to turn to what
lies ready at hand.

XXI. Still, from the evidence that has been given,
any one would not err who should hold the view
that the state of affairs in antiquity was pretty
nearly such as I have described it, not giving greater
credence to the accounts, on the one hand, which
the poets have put into song, adorning and amplify-
ing their theme, and, on the other, which the
chroniclers have composed with a view rather of
pleasing the ear® than of telling the truth, since
their stories cannot be tested and most of them
have from lapse of time won their way into the
region of the fabulous so as to be incredible. He
should regard the facts as having been made out
with sufficient accuracy, on the basis of the clearest
indications, considering that they have to do with
early times. And so, even though men are always

3 Public recitation was the ordinary mode of getting
the works of the poets and early logographers before the
people.

37

THUCYDIDES

a > , > ? \ A la \ ,
TOV avOpwray ev @ Mev AV TOAEM@CL TOY TApOYTA
DEON / , / \ \ >
alel péyloTov KpwovTwV, Tavoapévwy bé Ta ap-
al a / > > > lal lal yy
yata waddov GCavpalovtwr, amt avTav tov ép-

la] , e a /
yov oKxoToval Snrtoce Ouws pelCwv yeyevnuévos
auTav.
\¢a@ / s
XXIT. Kai 60a pév ovo elroy Exactor f pér-
) Pe * A A
AovTEs TOAEUNTELY 1 EV AVTO HON OvTES, YadeTrov
\ > / > \ A / al
THY axpiBerayv avTny TaV AEXPEvTwY Siapynmoved-
2 > 4 b di bene) vw \ a LY /
TAL HV E“OL TE WY AUTOS HKOVCA Kal TOls ANXOOEV
e >
mo0ev éuol atrayyéAXovow* ws © av eddoKavy pot
7 \ ‘a 2 AN , \ / / .
ExaoToL Tepl TOY alel TapoYTwY Ta SéovTAa wadiaT
’ la 3 / 7 b] / al E / ,
ELTELVY, EXOMEVM OTL EyyUTaTA THs EvpTaoNs yvo-
A > la) / e/ ” \
ns TOV AANOAS NeYOevTwWY, OUTwWS ElpnTaL Ta
Iu a , > lal / > >
5 épya tTav mpaxGevtwy €v TH TOdeUw OVK eK
rat / / > } /
Tov TapatuxovTos TUVOavopevos nELwoa ypadeuv
BOF ae > Lon FO > ’ = Se am an \
ovo ws éuol édoKxer, GAN ols Te avTOS Traphy Kal
an oe y
Tapa tov addwv\ dcov Suvarov axptBeia rep)
/ ,
Exaatou émeceNOwv. emitovws O€ nUpta KETO, S.i0Tt
lal 3. \

oi TapovTes TOIs Epyols ExdoToOLs OV TaUTAa Tepl

lal b ] lal »- > ’ e e / > /
T@Y avTwY EdEeyoV, GAN WS EXATEPWY TLS EVVOLAS
ny / ” Las \ > r ” \
7) pvnuns Exot. Kal €s pev AKpoacwW lows TO

un pv0@des avT@v ateprrectepoyv paveitar’ daot

38

BOOK I, xxi. 2-xxn. 4

inclined, while they are engaged in a war, to judge
the present one the greatest, but when it is over
to regard ancient events with greater wonder, yet
this war will prove, for men who judge from the
actual facts, to have been more important than any
that went before.

XXII. As to the Epacchen that were made by
different men, either when they were about to begin
the war or when they were already engaged therein,
it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy
the words actually spoken, both for me as regards
that which I myself heard, and for those who
from various other sources have brought me re-
ports. Therefore the speeches are given in the
language in which, as it seemed to me, the several
speakers would express, on the subjects under con-
sideration, the sentiments most befitting the occa-
sion, though at the same time I have adhered as
closely as possible to the general sense of what
was actually said. But as to the facts of the
occurrences of the war, I have thought it my duty
to give them, not as ascertained from any chance
informant nor as seemed to me probable, but only
after investigating with the greatest possible ac-
curacy each detail, in the case both of the events in
which I myself participated and of those regarding
which I got my information from others. And the en-
deavour to ascertain these facts was a laborious task,
because those who were eye-witnesses of the several
events did not give the same reports about the same
things, but reports varying according to their cham-
pionship of one side or the other, or according to
their recollection. And it may well be that the
absence of the fabulous from my narrative will seem

39

THUCYDIDES

\ / A , \ \
5€ BovAjcovtat TOV TE yEevowéevwv TO cages
a lal /
oKoTrEly Kal TOV peAXOVTMY TrOTE avOLS KATA TO
,
avOpwrivov ToLovTwY Kal TapaTANnciwy EcecOat,
> t , “a vG.| > id Y A /
opera Kpivery av’Ta apKxovvtas fer. KTHpa
Te €5 alel wadrov 7) aywovicpa. és TO Tapayphpua
axovew EvyKeiTat.
XXTII. Tav 6€ mpotepov Epywv péyiotov érpa-
, x a lal /
xOn TO Mndckov, Kal TOVTO Ouws dvoiv vavpaytaw
s Lal /
Kal TeCowayiaw Tayelayv THY KpLaL Eayev. 7100-
a“ iol ,
tov 5€ ToD Todéu“ov pHKOs TE péya mpovBn,
/ / / / > > n a
TaOnuata te EvynvéxOn yevéoOar év ai’T@ TH
¢€ / a > 4 > ” Ud LA \
EdXabe ola ovy Etepa év iow Xpovw. ovTE yap
/ /, al .
ToAes Tocalde ANdUcioas nonuwoOnoay, ai pev
e q / e ’ e \ ~~ ’ a 3
imo BapBapwv, ai S vro chav adtav avtitrone-
/ 2 pee”. § 3 Pay \ - , ,
povvtav (eat & ai Kal otxyjtopas petéBadov
e / bd \ / > / \
addioKopevat), ovTe Puyal tocaide avOpoTav Kai
Ul e \ ’ b) \ % , ¢ \ \ \
hovos, 0 wey KAT AUTOV TOV TrOAELOY, O dé Sta TO
, n
otaciavey. Ta TE TPOTEPOY akon meV AEyouEVa,
, 4
épyo O€ omavwtepov BeBatovpeva ovK amiocta
lal / ¢ ral
KATEOTN, TELOU@V TE Tépl, Ol ETL TAELTTOY Gua
a /
pépos ys Kal toxupoTatos ot avtol éméaxor,
e~ / ? sf A \ Ee fal
HALou Te €xrElers, al TUKVOTEPAL Tapa Ta éK TOD
’ Ul
mplv “povov pynuovevopeva EvvéBncar, avypot TE
€oTt Tap ols peyddo. Kal am avTav Kal ALpol

1 Artemisium and Salamis.
2? Thermopylae and Plataea.
3 As Colophon (111. xxxiv.), Mycalessus (vil. xxix.)

40

BOOK I. xxi. 4-xxi1. 3

less pleasing to the ear; but whoever shall wish to
have a clear view both of the events which have
happened and of those which will some day, in all
human probability, happen again in the same or a
similar way—for these to adjudge my history profit-
able will be enough for me. And, indeed, it has
been composed, not as a prize-essay to be heard for
the moment, but as a possession for all time.

XXIII. The greatest achievement of former times
was the _Persian war) and yet thiswas quickly
decided in_ two” sea-fights*)and two land-battles.*,
But the Peloponnesian War was protractéd™to™a
great length, and in the course of it disasters be-
fell Hellas the like of which had never occurred
in any equal space of time. Never had so many
cities been taken and left desolate, some by the
Barbarians, and others by Hellenes* themselves
warring against one another; while several, after
their capture, underwent a change of inhabitants.5
Never had so many human beings been exiled, or
so much human blood been shed, whether in the
course of the war itself or as the result of civil
dissensions. And so the stories of former times,
handed down by oral tradition, but very rarely
confirmed by fact, ceased to be incredible: about
earthquakes, for instance, for they prevailed over a
very large part of the earth and were likewise of
the greatest violence; eclipses of the sun, which
occurred at more frequent intervals than we find
recorded of all former times ; great droughts also in
some quarters with resultant famines; and lastly—

* e.g. Plataea (111. Ixviii. 3), Thyrea (1Vv. lvii.),

® e.g. Sollium (11. xxx.), Potidaea (1m. Ixx.), Anactorium
(tv. xlix.), Scione (v. xxxii.), Melos (v. exvi.).

VOL. I. C 41

THUCYDIDES ;

Kal 1) ovx HKicTa Brawaca Kal pépos TL POecipaca
4 AoLuwodNS VOTOS* TAaUTA yap TdvTAa wETA TODSE
4 Tou ToNéuou dua Evverréeto. ipkavto dé avtod
"AOnvaior cat [leXotrovynciot AVTaVTEs TAs TpLAa-
KOVTOUTELS OTrOVOaS al avTois éyévovto peta Kv-
5 Bolas adwouw. Ot & tte 8 EXvEaV, Tas aiTias
mpovypawa mpatov Kal Tas Svapopds, TOD pr
tia tnthoat Tote €& TOU TOTOUTOS TOAEMLOS Tots
6”’EXAnoe Katéotyn. THY mev yap adrnOectatny
mpobaci, apavertatny Sé hMoy@ Tous ‘APnvaious
Hryobpar pmeyddous ytyvouévous Kal poB8ov rapé-
xyovtas tois AaKxedatpoviols avayxdcas és TO TO-
Neuery? al & és TO havepov Aeyouevas aitiar aid
Aoav éxatépav, ap wv AVoaVTES TAS oTrOVdAS €5
TOV TOAEMOV KATETTHA AD.
XXIV. ’Esiésapvos éott TOMS ev Sef éare-
ovte Tov “lovioy KOoATOV* TpocotKodat S avdTiy
2 Tavrdytiot BapBapot, Idvpixov EOvos. TavTnv
an@xicay pev Kepxupaiot, oixiatns 8 éyéveto
Marios "EpatoxXeldov, KopivOtos yévos, Trav ad’
‘Hpaxdéous, cata 81 Tov madaLov vopov ex THs
untpoTrovews KaTakdnOeisy Evvexicay o€ Kal
Kopiv@iwv tives kal Tod &ddAov Awpixod yévous.
3 mpoedOovtos Sé Tod xpdvou éyévero 7) TOV ‘Ext-
Sapviov Svvapis peyadn Kat trodvdvOpeTros.
4 ctacidcavtes Sé é€v AXXAjAOLS ETN TOANA, @S
AéyeTal, ATO TOAEuOU TLVOS TOY TpocoLKwY Bap-
Bapev épOapnoar kai THs Suvvduews THs Todds
5 éotepnOnoav. Ta Sé TeXEUTALa Tpd TOvdE TOD
ToNemou 0 Onmos avTav e&ediwke Tovs SuvaTous,
of b¢ émeAOovtes peta Tov BapBapwy édAnfovTo

42

c 3
cs Oe OUI
1G) = ee Sane Wily :
i a ae UY

Lint

Wye.

O ene
=LOPONNESUS

Stanford Ltd. London

|
|

BOOK I. xxi. 3-xx1v. 5

the disaster which wrought most harm to Hellas and
destroyed a considerable part of the people—the
noisome pestilence. For all these dis ters fell upon

Sr ee

them simultaneously with this war. | And the war™
/ began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians broke

the thirty years’ truce,! pong ndce between them

after the capture of Euboea.! The reasons why they

broke it and the grounds of their quarrel I have first
set forth, that no one may ever have to inquire for
what cause the Hellenes. became involved in so great
a war. The truest explanation, although it has been
the least often advanced, I believe to have been
the growth of the “Athenians to ‘greatness, which
brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and _ forced

them to war. /But the reasons publicly alleged-on—

“either side which led them to break the truce and
involved them in the war were as follows.

XXIV. There is a city called Epidamnus on the
right hand as one sails into the Ionian gulf, and its
next-door neighbours are a barbarian tribe, the Tau-
lantians, of Illyrian race. The city was colonized
by the Corcyraeans, and its founder was Phalius, son
of Eratocleides, of Corinthian stock and a descendant
of Heracles, who was invited from the mother-city
according to the ancient custom ; but some Corinth-
ians and other Dorians joined the Coreyraeans in
establishing the colony. As time passed the city of
the Epidamnians became great and populous; but
civil wars ensued, lasting, it is said, for many years,
and in consequence of a war with the neighbouring
barbarians they were crippled and stripped of most
of their power. Finally, just before the Peloponne-
sian war, the populace expelled the aristocrats, and
they, making common cause with the barbarians and

1 445 B.0.; of. ch. cxv. 1. 43

THUCYDIDES

s , ral / , n 4 /
Tous €v TH TokEL KATA TE YyRV Kal KaTa Oddac-
cav. ot 6€ ev TH TONE OvTes “Emvddpuriot

)
em elon) emreCovTo, TEUTOVOW és TH Kepxupay
Tpea Bers ws unTpoTody odaay, Cedopevor pn ohas
Teplopav POerpouevous, ahha Tous Te hevyortas
Evvadradtar ohict Kat Tov TOV BapBdpev to-
hewov Katahtcat. taita oe ixérar cab elopevor
és To “Hpatov édéovto. ot 6€ Kepxupaior tn ixe-

7 > > / 3 ee 7 > /

Teiav ovk ed€Eavt0, GAN ampdKxtous atréTeprpav.

XXV. Dvovtes dé of "Emi dpvior ovdeuiay

adiow amo Kepxupas TYL@piay otcav ev aT op

elXovTo GécOat To Tapon, kal méprpavtes és
Acrdous Tov Jeov é eT npoToy EL mapacotev Kopw-
Giors Thy mohuy os oiKtoTais Kal Tuo play Twa
TE/p@avT amt avTav toveicOa. o 8 avrtois
aveike Tapadovvar Kal nyepovas TroveicOa.
éXOovtes 6€ of "Emiédyuviot és tTHv KopivOov xata
TO payTetov mapéoocav TH amouKiay, Tov TE
olKia THY dr obeLKvUvTEs opav éx KopivOov 6 ovTa
Kal TO XpneTpLov Onrodvtes, €O€0vTO TE pH
chas Teptopav POerpopevous, aX’ emapivar.
Kopiv@cou 6€ KaTd TE TO oikatov bmebeEavTo my
TLL@piay, vopilovtes ovux Hooov éauTov eivat
THY aTrouKiay 7 Kepxupatov, dpa 6€ Kai pices
TOV Kepxupaiwy, OTL avTov Tapnwehouv OvTES
GTOLKOL, ore Y4p ev Tavnyupect Tals Kolvais
éLbovTes yépa Ta voyulopeva ote KopivOiw avdpi

1 The xowal xavnyvpers are the four great games, here
doubtless referring especially | to the Isthmian Games held at
Corinth. The ‘‘ privileges” would be 7 of honour
(xpoedplas), animals for sacrifice presented by the colonies of

44

BOOK I. xxiv. 5—xxv. 4

attacking Epidamnus, plundered those who were in the
city both by land and sea. These, when they were
being hard pressed, sent envoys to Corcyra, as being
their mother-city, begging them not to look on and
see them destroyed, but to reconcile them with
the exiles and to put a stop to the war with the
barbarians. ‘This petition they made, sitting as
suppliants in the temple of Hera. But the Corcy-
raeans denied their supplication, and sent them
back unsuccessful.

XXV. The Epidamnians, recognizing that no aid
was to be had from Corcyra, were at a loss how to

settle their present difficulty ; so they sent to Delphi |

and asked the god whether they should deliver up
their city to the Corinthians as founders and try to
procure some aid from them. The god answered that
they should deliver it up to them and make them
leaders. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and
delivered up the city as a Corinthian colony, in
accordance with the oracle, showing that their founder
was from Corinth and stating the response of the
oracle ; and they begged the Corinthians not to look
on and see them utterly destroyed, but to come to
their rescue. The Corinthians undertook the task,
partly on the ground of right, because they con-
sidered that the colony belonged to them quite as
much as to the Corcyraeans, partly also through hatred
of the Corcyraeans, for the reason that these, though
Corinthian colonists, neglected the mother-city. For
neither at their common festival gatherings } would
they concede the customary privileges to Corinthians,
nor would they begin with a representative of

the mother-city, sending of delegates (@ewpof) to Corinthian
festivals, etc.

45

433 B.c

THUCYDIDES

U lal e a ¢ e ”
MPOKATAPYOMEVOL TOV lepwV, WaTTEp at addat
arotkiat, Tepibpovoovtes 6€ avTods Kav KpPNLG-

5) a / a
tov duvdper dvtes KaT exeivov TOY Xpovov omota
a ¢ a
rots ‘EXAjvev TOVELWTAaTOLS Kal TH eS TONELOV
TapacKkevn SvvaT@tepol, vauvTtK@ dé Kat Tod
/
mpovxyew éoTw Ste érraipomevol Kal KaTa THD
/ a /
Dardkawv tmpoevoixnaow ths Kepxvpas kdéos éxov-
x a e \ n
T@V Ta TEpt TAS Vads' 7 Kal MadAov éEnpTVOVTO
/
TO vaUTLKOV Kal Hoav ovK advvaToL TpLpELs Yap
elkoou Kal ExaTov UTHpxov avTols OTE HNpXoVvTO
TONE MELD.
/ /
XXVI. Ildvtwv odv tovtay éykAnpata éxov-
N
tes of KopivOsor émepmov és tiv ’Emidapvov
” \ ’ / > / / \ /
aopmEevol TV w@perlav, OuKNTOPa TE TOV BovxXo-
J a
wevov iévar KedevovTes Kal "Awmpaxiwtav Kal
Aeveadioy Kal éavtd@v hpovpovs. émopevOnaav
\ Pee | > / / = >
5é wetn és “AtroAXNwviav KopivOiwv ovoav aros-
"i a / \ /
clav, dée. Tov Kepxupaiwy pi K@AVw@VTAL UT
av’tav Kata Oadaccay Tepatguuevol. Kepxupator

% ?

Sé érrevdt) HoPovto Tovs TE olKYTOpas Kat ppov-

> / / ,
povs HKovtas és THY 'Enidauvov tTHy Te atrolKLay
/ / > / \ /
KopwOiow Sedoméevnv, exadretatvovy Kat mhev-
cavtes evOvs TévTE Kal ElkooL Vaal Kal VoTEpoV
U / /
étép@ atom Tovs Te Pevyovtas éxéNevoy KAT’
/ > / \
érnpecay SéyecOar avtovs (Gov yap es THY
a 2 /
Képxupay of Trav Eridapviwy duyades tapous Te
\ / aA “ ,
drrodecvuvtTes Kal Euyyéverav, hv Tpoicyopuevor
la /

édéovto ohas KaTayew) Tovs Te Ppovpovs ovs
ineecelep aie! Atenas MER Nancie oe eM me ake se
1 According to the custom obtaining in Hellenic cities,
whereby a stranger could offer sacrifice only through a
citizen who acted for hn. mpoxatapxéuevor, as the Schol.

explains, d:ddvres mpdrepor (sc. } Tots aAAots) Tas KaTapXaGS, 1.€.
giving the hair cut from the victim’s forehead to a repre-

46

BOOK I. xxv. 4-xxv1. 3

Corinth the initial rites at sacrifices,! as the rest of
the colonies did, but they treated them with contempt.
For at that time they were in point of wealth equal
to the richest of the Hellenes, and in preparation
for war even stronger, while in sea-power they some-
times boasted that they were greatly superior, just
because of the former occupation of the island by
the Phaeacians,? whose glory was in their ships. It
was for this reason that they kept on developing
their navy, and they were in fact powerful; for they
had on hand one hundred and twenty triremes when
the war began.

XXVI. So the Corinthians, having all these grounds
of complaint, gladly sent the desired aid to Epidam-
nus, inviting whoever wished to go along as settlers
and despatching as a garrison some Ambraciots and _
Leucadians and a detachment of themselves. They
proceeded to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians,
going by land through fear of the Corcyraeans, lest
they might be prevented by them if they should at-
tempt to cross the sea. But when the Corcyraeans
perceived that the settlers and the garrison had
arrived at Epidamnus, and that their colony had been
given up to the Corinthians, they were indizuant. So
they sailed immediately with twenty-five ships, and
later with a second fleet, and insolently bade the Epi-
damnians dismiss the garrison sent by the Corinthians
and the settlers, and also receive back their exiles; for
the exiled Epidamnians had gone to Corcyra, and
pointing to the sepulchres of common ancestors and

sentative of Corinth, that he might throw it on the fire
(Classen).

2 of. 11. lxx., where a sacred precinct of Alcinous in Corcyra
is mentioned. The ancient belief that Corcyra was the
Homeric Scheria has no support in the Odyssey.

47

THUCYDIDES

? / 3 /
KopivO.or éreuryav Kai Tovs oixntopas atomép-
‘ lal /
mew. ol 6€ Emiddpuvior ovdev avtav UTNKOVCAa),
’ \ / > >’ > \ e 7
aXXa aoTpaTevovow em avTovs of Kepxvpaios
\ lal
TegoapaKxovTa vavol peTa Tav guyddav ws
/
xatatovres, kal tovs “lAdupiovs mpocdraPovtes.
, * \ , fal 5
mpockabefouevor S€ THY TOodW TpoEitov ’Emt-
/ \ /
Sapviwv te Tov Bovdopevov kai Tous E€vous amra-
a / c / ,
Geis amriévar' et Sé uj, WS TOdEmLOLS yenoecOaL.
e > b > / e \ a v >
ws & ov« érreiGovto, ot wév Kepxupatos (€ote 5
> \ ‘ / > / \ /
ic@ wos TO Ywplov) éTOALOPKOUY THY TOKLY.
XXVII. KopivOi01 &, as avtots éx ths “Em-
/ > ” id Lal
Sdpvov 7AOov ayyedot OTL TOAOPKOVITAL, TApeE-
, e
oxevatovto aotpateiav, Kal Gua atroikiay és TH
> / I] / > \ aw \ € , \
Eidapvov cenpvoooy ei TH toy cal opoig Tov
BI \
Bovropevov iévar: et 6€ Tis TO TapavTixa peév
\ b] / a / \ / a
eOérer Evprrreiv, petéxerv b€ BovreTat T
Re , ¢ s be x \ eel B yee *
aTrotkias, TevTHnKOVTA Spaypas KaTabevta Kopuv-
e
Gias péverv. Hoav O€ Kal ot wréovTEs ToAXOl
Kal of Tapyvpiov KataBdrXrovtes. edenOynaav dé
kal tov Meyapéwy vavol odds Evutrpotréuyar
— :
> » , e 4s / a . \
el dpa KwAVoWTO v7 Kepxupaiwy mretv: ot dé
mapeckevatovto avtois oxT@ vaval Evpdeiy,
kai Iladf#s KeharrAnvev téccapow. xal ’Em-
Savpiov édenOncar, of tapésyov Tévte, Eppiovis
Sé uiav Kal TporSnvioe dv0, Aevxddsor O€ S€xa Kal
> a > , , \ , v
Aputpaxi@tat onto. OnBatous S€ ypyyata HTNn-
, > / \ lal ;
cav kal Prevacious, Hrelous 5€ vads Te Kevas
eer?

48

BOOK I. xxvi. 3-xxvir. 2

invoking the tie of kinship had begged the Corcy-
raeans to restore them. As the Epidamnians paid no
heed to them the Corcyraeans proceeded against them
with forty ships, accompanied by the exiles whom
they intended to restore, and taking along the II-
lyrians also. And sitting down before the city they
proclaimed that the foreigners and any Epidamnians
who wished might go away in safety ; otherwise they
would treat them as enemies. But when the Epidam-
nians would not comply, the Corcyraeans laid siege to
the city, which is connected with the shore by an
isthmus.

XXVII. But the Corinthians, when messengers
came from Epidamnus announcing the siege, pre-
pared an expedition and proclaimed at the same
time a colony to Epidamnus, saying that any who
wished might go there on a basis of equal rights for
all, and that if anyone was not inclined to sail at
once, hut wished to have part in the colony, he
might make a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmae!
and remain at home. The number that sailed was
large, as also of those who deposited the money.
Request was also made of the Megarians to convoy
them with ships, in case an attempt should be made
by the Corcyraeans to prevent their sailing; and
these were preparing to accompany them with eight
ships, and the Paleans, from Cephallenia, with four.
The Epidaurians, of whom a like request was made,
furnished five ships, the Hermionians one, the Troe-
zenians two, the Leucadians ten, and the Ambraciots
eight. Upon the Thebans and the Phliasians a
demand was made for money, and upon the Eleans

* The Corinthian drachma was about equivalent to 6d.,

but of course had greater purchasing power. The Attic
drachma = 93d.

49

\

2

THUCYDIDES

\ - > lal \ / ra
kal xpynuata. autav de KopivOiwy vives tape-
oxevalovto Tplakovta Kal Tptofyiduoe omAirat.
e lal
XXVIII. *Esresdy 5€ érvGovto of Kepxvpaio
\ / 5 , ? , \
THv tmapacxeunyv, €dOovtes és KopivOov peta
\ ,
Aaxedatpovioy kat Xuwxvaviov mpécBewr, ods
,
mapéraBov, éxéXevov KopivOtovs tovs év ’Emida-
\ > /
pv@ ppoupovs TE Kal OlKNTOPAS aTrayELY, WS Ov
nr > / > / lal
petov avtois ‘Emidauvov. et O€ Te avtiro.obvTat,
dixas OcXov Sobva ev IleXoTOvyNow Tapa To-
Aeow als av audotepo EvpSa@ow: orotépov &
x an 2 \ / — 4 p -
av SixacO7n eivat THY aTroLKLay, TOUTOUS KpaTety:
a a /
nOerov 6€ kal TO ev Aedois pavteiw émitpéwar.
U \ > v cal ? \ , \ > \
MOAEMOV O€ OVK ElwWY Toei: eb O€ LH, KAL avTol
wayKxacOncec0ar Epacav, éexeitywy Bralopée
avay n » eKELY bévov,
A A > / 4 , cal
dirous tovetcPar ods ov BovdovTat, ETEpous TaV
a n /
vov dvT@V parrov, @perias Evera. of 8 Kopiv-
Oot amrexpivavto avtots, Hv Tas TE VAS Kal TOUS
: / > x 3 / > / 7
BapBapous amo ’Emidauvov amayaywor, Bovdev-
/ >] lal
cec0at' mpotepov & ov Karas Exely Tods pev
cal \ \ /
modtopxetaOar, Eavtovs bé€ SixdlecPar. Kepxv-
cal de > / a ee a \ > > /
patos S€ avtéXeyor, hv Kat éxetvor Tovs év ’Emida-
vo atTayadywol, Tolncev TavTa: étoipor Sé
elvar Kal wate ahotépovs pévery KaTa Yopay
ba Oe 4 / @ Y x e bt /
otrovoas 6€! moincacbat Ews av 7 Sixn yévnrat.
1 Hude deletes 5é, after Poppo.

1 A threat of an alliance with the Athenians, ray viv
bvrwy referring to the Lacedaemonians and other Pelopon-
nesians, not to the Illyrians (cf ch. xxvi. 7), as Poppo
suggested,

5°

BOOK I. xxvit. 2—xxvinl. 5

for unmanned ships as well as for money. And the
Corinthians themselves, for their part, made ready
thirty ships and three thousand hoplites.

XXVIII. When the Corcyraeans learned of these
preparations they went to Corinth, with Lacedae-
monian and Sicyonian envoys whom they took with
them, and bade the Corinthians withdraw the gar-
rison and settlers at Epidamnus, on the ground that
they had no part in Epidamnus. But if they made any
claim to it they were willing, they said, to submit the
matter for arbitration to any states in the Pelopon-
nesus that both should agree upon, and to whichever
party the colony should be > adjudged to belong, these
should have it; and they were willing also to submit
the matter to the oracle at Delphi. War, however,
they warned them not to bring on; but if it must be,
they too would be compelled, if the Corinthians forced
the issue, to make friends with those for whom they
had no wish, others beyond their present ones, in order
to secure assistance.! The Corinthians answered that
if the Corcyraeans would withdraw their ships and
the barbarians from Epidamnus they would consider
the matter, but that meanwhile it was not proper
for them? to be discussing arbitration while the
Epidamnians were undergoing siege. Whereupon
the Corcyraeans replied that they would do this if
the Corinthians on their part would withdraw their
forces at Epidamnus; but they were also ready to
arbitrate on condition that both parties should re-
main where they were and that they should make a
truce until the decision should be given.®

2 4.e. the envoys and the Corinthians.

3 Or, omitting dé, ‘‘that they were also ready to make a

truce until the decision should be given, on condition that
both parties should remain where they were.’
5!

ie)

THUCYDIDES

\
XXIX. KopivOsor dé oddév tovtTwy wrHKovor,
> ’ > \ / > cad S e a \ e
GXWN érrevdyn TAYYELS AVTOIS NoaY al VIEs Kal ol
Evupayor Tapjoav, TpoTéuavtTes KnpuKa Tpd-
Tepov TOAELov TpoepouvTa Kepxupators, apavTes
/ e
éSdounxovta vavol Kal révte SurxtdLo1s TE OTNE-
>
tals émdeov emt THY "Emidapvoy, Kepxupators
évavtia TodeunoovtTes’ eoTpaTHyer O€ TOV pev
al e ,
veav “Aptotevs 0 TleAXiyou kat Kaddxpdtns o
r 4 a na
KadXiov cai Tindvop o Tiav@ous, tov 6€ mefov
? € id
Apyétios te 0 Evputiwou xat ‘Ioapyisas o
"Icapxyov. émerdn 8 éyévovto év ’Axtiw Tis
a e X ~ 3 /
"Avaktopias ys, 0 TO lepov tod *AroAd@VOS
A nw? fal
éotiv, ml TO GTOmaTL TOD ApmpaktKod Kodzrov,
oi Kepxupato. enpuxa Te tpovTeuwav avtois €&v
axati@ atepotvTa pn Treiv él odas, Kai Tas
la ¢ /
vads dua erdnpovv, CevEavtés Te Tas Tadatas
\
@ote TAwipous elvat Kal Tas addas eTLOKEYA-
? c a > /
cavtes. ws 6€ 6 KHpvE Te aTnyyetkey ovdev
nr \ rn 3 , rn A
eipnvaiov Tapa Tov KopivOiwv Kat ai vijes avtois
/
émeTApwvtTo ovaat oydonKovta (TeccapaKxovTa
/ /
yap "Emiéauvov éroXopKxovy), avtTavayayopevot
Kal wapatazapevor evavpdxnoav Kai éviknoav
of Kepxupaio. mapa Tov Kat vals TEVTE Kat
, / lal / An \ > lel
Séxa SiébOecpav tev KopivOiwv. 7H O€ auth
ec / > la / \ \ \ ID /
nuépa autois Evvé8n Kal Tovs THY Eaiéapvor
r / e /
modLopKovyTas TapacTncacVat omodroyia wate
\ \ b] / > / / \
Tovs pev émnyrvdas atroddcBat, Kopiv6vous dé
/ Y4 oe x by /
Sioavras éxew Ews av Addo Tt Oo€n.
/ r a
XXX. Mera 8 rHv vavpayiav ot Kepxupaior
tTpotaiov oticavtes emt TH Aeuxiuvyn THs Kep-
\ / e
Kupalas akpwTnpi@ Tods ev Grdovs ods EXhaBov

52

BOOK I. xxix. 1-xxx. 1

XXIX. The Corinthians, however, would not listen
to any of these proposals, but, as soon as their ships
were manned and their allies were at hand, they
sent a herald in advance to declare war against the
Corcyraeans ; then, setting off with seventy-five ships
and two thousand hoplites, they sailed for Epidamnus
to give battle to the Corcyraeans. Their ships were
under the command of Aristeus son of Pellichus,
Callicrates son of Callias, and Timanor son of Ti-
manthes; the infantry under that of Archetimus
son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas son of Isarchus.
But when they reached Actium in the territory of
Anactorium, where is the sanctuary of Apollo at the
mouth of the Ambracian gulf, the Corcyraeans sent
out a herald in a small boat to forbid their advance,
and at the same time proceeded to man their ships,
having previously strengthened the old vessels with
cross-beams so as to make them seaworthy, and
having put the rest in repair. When “fheir herald
brought back no message of peace from the Corin-
thians and their ships were now fully manned, being
eighty in number (for forty were besieging Epidam-
nus), they sailed out against the enemy and, drawing
up in line, engaged in battle; and they won a
complete victory and destroyed fifteen ships of the
Corinthians. On the same day it happened that
their troops which were engaged in the siege of
Epidamnus forced it to a capitulation, on condition
that the other immigrants! should be sold into
slavery but the Corinthians kept in bonds until
something else should be agreed upon.

XXX. After the sea-fight the Corcyraeans set up
a trophy of their victory at Leucimne, a promontory
in the territory of Corecyra, and put to death the

1 4.¢e. the Ambraciots and Leucadians ; ¢f. ch. xxvi. 1.

434 B.o

THUCYDIDES

, /
aixyuarwrtous améxtewav, Kopuvbious 6 dyoavtes
“ ? ef / nf \ e / \ e
elyov. tatepov dé, érretdn ot KopivOsor cat ot
Evupayor joonpévot Tals vavoiv aveywpnoav én’
oixov, THS Oadadoons amdons éxpatovy THs KAT
a \ / a
éxetva Ta ywplia,ot Kepxupaior, cal wrevoavtes
3 s Neate / ? , a na
és Aeuxdda thv KopivOi@v atrotkiay ths yhs éte-
\ / Ny 2 / ? 7, ey!
pov Kal KudAAnvny to 'HAelwv ériverov evérrpnoar,
nr / fal
OTL vals Kal ypnwata Tapécyov KopivOiois. Tod
\ a \
TE Ypovouv TOY TAEloTOV META THY VaUvLAYLaV
émekpatouv ths Oadaoons Kal tovs tov Kopu-
Oiwy Evppayous éemimréovtes EfOerpov,)wéeypt ov
/ 4 a / / lal
Kopiv@to. treptovtTe T@ Oéper TréeurpavTes vavs Kal
lal € 4 /
oTpatiay, evel ofav ot EVupaxor Errovovp, €oTpa-
> \ /
toTredevovto émi ‘Axtiw Kal mepl TO Xetpuépiov
a / a 4 a /
THs Oeot partidos, Pvrakis &vexa THs te Aevxados
A / , /
Kal TOV AAAwY TOAEWY Goat odict hirttat Hoav.
/ A
avtectpatoTedevovto O€ Kal of Kepxupaio: ért
A / A /
tH Aevkiuyvn vavot te nal melO. érrétdedv TE
\ \ fa)
ovdéTEPOL GAANAOLS, GAA TO Oépos ToUTO avTt-
, a > / >
KabeCouevor Yetw@vos On avexw@pnoav én’ olkou
EXATEPOL.
\ \
XXXI. Tov 5€ éviavtov wavta Tov peta THY
vavpaxiav Kal Tov vtoTtepov of KopivOror opyn
\
hépovtes Tov pos Kepxupaious oXemov évavTrn-
youvTo Kal TapecxevaloyTo Ta KpaTioTa veov
atodov, &k Te avTHs IleXoTovvyncou ayeipovtes
A © , a
Kal THs GAAS “EAAdSos Eepétas picO@ reiPovTes.
muvOavomevot 5€ of Kepxupaio: tiv tapacKevny
a a 7 \
avtav époS8odrTo, Kai (Haav yap ovdevos ‘EXAN-

54

BOOK I. xxx. 1—xxx1. 2

prisoners they had taken, with the exception of the
Corinthians, whom they kept in fetters. But after-
wards, when the Corinthians and their allies had
gone back home with their ships after their defeat,
the Corcyraeans were masters of the whole sea\in
that quarter, and sailing to Leucas, the colony of the
Corinthians, they ravaged the country and burned
Cyllene, the naval arsenal of the Eleans, because they
had furnished ships and money to the Corinthians.
And so for most of the time after the sea-fight they
had control over the sea; and sailing against the
allies of the Corinthians they kept harrying them,
until the Corinthians, as the summer was drawing
to an end,! seeing that their allies were suffering,
sent ships and an army and encamped at Actium
and near the promontory of Cheimerium in Thes-
protis, as a protection for Leucas and the other
cities that were friendly to themselves. And the
Corcyraeans encamped on the opposite coast at Leu-
cimne with both ships and infantry. Neither side
sailed against the other, but they faced each other
for the rest of this summer; it was not until winter
had come that they each went back home.

XXXI. During the whole year after the sea-fight
and the next year the Corinthians, being angrily in-
dignant about their war with the Corcyraeans, kept
building ships and preparing a naval armament with
all their might, and collected oarsmen from both
the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas by the in-
ducement of pay. The Corcyraeans, on the other
hand, were alarmed when they learned of their pre-
parations, and since they were without an ally among

1 wepidyrt (as the MSS. read) = repudyr:. But Ullrich
(Beitr. z. Kr. iii. p. 5) explains = év tG wepidvts tod Gépous,
‘‘in what remained of the summer.” So Boehme.

55

THUCYDIDES

” > as. 9 / e \ ” >
vov Evotrovoot ovde EveypaavTo EAUTOUS OUTE ES
\ ’ / \ ” > \ S
ras ’A@nvaiwy otovdas ovTe és tas Aaxedat-
poviwv) eo£ev avtois éMOodaw ws Tors “AOnvai-
ous Evpudyous yevécfar kal @pediav Twa TeLpa-

> ’ > lal e / e \ /

cOar am’ avTov evpioxea Oat. ot 6€ KopivOcor
muOopevot TAUTA mrOov Kal auto. és Tas A@nvas
mpeaBevoopevor, OT WS Hn opict mpos T@ Kep-
KUPalwY VAUTLK@ Kal TO aUTaV T poo ryevopevov
€uTr0OLov yevntas GécOar Tov TONE HOV 4 ©Bov-
NovTal. KaTaoTdons 66 éxKANGlas és avTiAoylav

ArAOov. Kal of wev Kepxvpaios édeEav tordde.
XXXII. “Alxatov, ® ’AOnvaiot, Tovs pyre
evepyetias peyadns unte Evppayias mpovderro-
Levys hKovtas Tapa Tovs TéXas émLKOUpLas, wo-
wep Kal jwels viv, Senoopévovs avadioagar Tpa-
/ Seat \ , / > O\
Tov, wadiaTa mev ws Kal Evudopa Séovtas, et dé
un, Te ye ove emitnpia, erecta S€ ws Kal THY
/ f ¢ ? \ 4 \ \
yapw BéBaov EEovow: ei dé TovTwY pndev cages
KataoTooUet, pn opyifec Oar hv aTUX@ow. Kep-
Kupator dé pera TNS fuppaxias THS aitnoews Kal
TavTAa TLOTEVOVTES exupa bmiv mapeter Oat amré-
OTELAAY 1)LGS. TETUNNKE d€ TO avTO emeribevpa

5 epat

mpos Te Upas és THY Xpetay ayer aroyov Kal és
Ta HyéeTepa avTov ev TO Tapovre a€vppopov.

Evppaxot Te yap obdevés TW €V T@ TPO TOV x°%

EXOUCLOL ‘YEvopevor viv addXwv TovTO Senoopevor
Koper Kal dua és TOY TapovTa Trodeu“ov Kopu-
Oiwv phot é0 avTo caléaTapen. Kal TEpte-
otnKev Soxodca Hua mpoTEepoy cwhpocvvn, TO

56

¢

BOOK I. xxx1. 2—-xxxit. 4

the Hellenes and had not enrolled themselves in
the alliance either of the Athenians or of the Lace-
daemonians, they decided to go to the Athenians,
become their allies, and try to procure some aid
from them. But the Corinthians also, hearing of
this, themselves sent envoys to Athens to prevent
the addéssion of the Athenian fleet to that of the

Corcyraeans, as this would hamper them in settling

the war as they wished. And when an assembly
was held opposing speeches were made, and the
Corcyraeans spoke as follows:

XXXII. “It is but fair, citizens of Athens, that
those who, without any previous claim on the score
of important service rendered or of an existing al-
liance, come to their neighbours to ask aid, as we
do now, should show in the first place, if possible,
that what they ask is advantageous, or at least that
it is not hurtful, and, in the second place, that their
gratitude can be depended on; but in case they
establish neither of these things ‘clearly, they should
not be angry if unsuccessful. Now the Corcyraeans
have sent us to ask for an alliance, and in full con-
fidence that they will be able to give you guarantees
on just these points. But it so happens that our
policy has been at one and the same time incon-
sistent, as it must seem to you, with our petition,
and is also disadvantageous under present circum-
stances to ourselves; for although heretofore we
have freely chosen to be allies of no one, we have
now come to ask others for an alliance, and at the
same time, in the face of the present war with the
Corinthians, we are, because of this very policy,
isolated. And so what was formerly fondly imagined
to be wise discretion on our part—to enter into no

57

a
438n,.0

THUCYDIDES

\ DJ AX / / a a a. ,
fn €v adXotpia Evppaxyia TH TOV Tédas youn
7 a“ > Zz \ > /
Evyxiduvevew, viv aBovria cat acbévera hai-

\
vouern. THY “ev OY yEevouernv vavpaxiay avTol
\ / > / / > \ \
KaTa povas atewoduela KopivOiovs: émerdy bé
pelCove. tapackevn amo IleXorovvncov Kal Tis
€ ’ a ral
Gdns “EAXddos éf’ Huds wpunvrat cal jpeis
b] ‘Af e la! ” a > / / /
GOvVaTOL Op@pev dvTES TH OiKEela povoy Suvdpet
~~ / \ we / e , eB /
mepliyevec Oar, Kal Gua péyas 0 Kivodvvos, €i éoo-
: ae ? a 1° % eon ee
peOa um’ avtois, avayxn Kal tuav Kal adXov
a \
mavtos émixoupias SetcPat, cal Evyyvopun, m1
\ / , \ 6 rng (ae ma ’
peta Kaxias, do—ns 6€ wadXov apapTia TH Tpo-
/ lal
TEPOV ATPAYLOTUYH evavTia TOALMpED.
XXXII. “Vevycerac Sé tyiv recOopévors
\ e / \ \ ol e /
Katyn 7 EvytTvylia KaTa Toda THS NweTéepas
xpelas, Tp@Tov pev Ste adixovpévois Kal ovy
étépous BAamTovet THY émixovpiav TroinoedOe,
évelTa TEpL TOV peyloTwy KWwduvevovtas beEa-
fevol ws Gv padioTa eT alelvynoToU papTupiouv
/
Tv xapiv KkatabnoecOe, vauvTixoy Te KEexTHwEOa
\ fal ’ e nw “~ 4 /
TAnY Tov Tap vuly TrELoTOV. Kal oxevadbe
/ a /
tis evmpakia oTaviwtépa Tis Tots ToNEpiols
. a \ lal
AUTNpOTEpA, EL HV UuEels AV TPO TOAA@Y Ypnpa-
Twv Kal yapiTos éTiunoadGe Suvamiy vpiv Tpoo-
v
yevécOar, attn Tadpectiv avTeTayyEeATOS, avev
Kiwdvvev Kal datravns didovca éavtny Kal mpoc-
, , 5) \ \ \. gf 9 , 2 82
eT. hepovoa €5 pey TOUS TrOAAOUS apETNHY, Ols O€
a a lal > a
évrapuveite yap, tyiv 8 avtois ioxvv: & ev TO

58

BOOK I. xxx. 4—xxxill. 2

foreign alliance, with the possibility of having to
take our share of the danger of our neighbour's
policy—has now, in the event, proved want of
wisdom and a source of weakness. It is true that,
in the sea-fight we have had, we repulsed the Co-
rinthians single-handed ; but now that they have set
out to attack us with a greater force, drawn from the
Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas, and we see
that we are unable to prevail with our own strength
alone, and since, further, our peril will be serious if
we come into their power, we are constrained to ask
help of you and of everyone else; and it is pardon-
able if we now, actuated by no baseness, but rather
acknowledging an error of judgment, venture upon
a course that runs counter to our former policy of
avoiding foreign entanglements.

XXXIII. “ For yourselves, if you concede what we
ask, by a happy concurrence of events Athens can
get both honour and advantage in many ways: first,
you will be giving your aid to those who are wronged
and not to those who injure others; next, by taking
into alliance men whose most vital interests are at
stake, you will lay up for yourselves a claim for grati-
tude with a record which will abide in our memories
for ever; and, lastly, we havea navy greater than any
but your own. Think of it now, what good fortune
could be rarer, more vexatious to your foes, than
this—that the power which you would have ac-
counted it worth much money and gratitude to
acquire should become yours unbidden, offering itselt
to you without danger or expense, and bringing you,
besides, a good name before the world, gratitude
from those wlio are to receive your help, and en-
hanced strength for yourselves? To few in all

59

THUCYDIDES

Tavtt ypovw ortyors 67 awa mayTa EvvéBn, Kal
OALyoL Evppaxias Seopevor ols emKarOvVTAL
ao paretav Kat Koo Lov ovx ‘acov dLoovTes 7
Ane opevor TapayiyvovTar.

3 “Tov € TOAEMOY, dv 6vTrep NENT WOU av elev,
el TUS UEOY fy) OleTaL éeveo Oar, yvOLuNsS dpaptaver
Kal ovK aia Paverat TOUS Aaxedatpovious poBw
TO UpeTépo TONE UN TELOVTAS KaL Tous Kopw-
Oious, CURE MELOUS Tap avtois Kal vuiv exOpous
ovTas," TpokaTadauPavovras meas vov é€> THY
UmeTepav em iXelpnow, iva 1) T@ Kow@ é&xOer
KaT avTovs eT adn ov oT Lev pnee évoiv
pbdcat auapTwciy, } Kak@oa Huas 7) chads av-

4 tous BeBaiwcacba. nuétepov 5é y av épyov
TpoTEpHcat, TOV jev didovtav, Uuav 6é deFape-
vov TV Evppaxiar, Kal TpoeTeBovrEvelw avTots
MaAXov 7) avtTemuBoureverv.

XXXIV. «Hp dé Neyoouy @s$ ov dixaLtov Tous
apeTepous aTroiKous: vpas déxeo bat, pabovrav
@S Taga aTrolKia ev pev TaaxXovea TULG THY
pnt porrorsy, adixoupevy dé @XoTptovrar ov yap
errl TO dodXot, aX €ml T@® Omotoe Tois NerTropeE-

2 vots Elva EKTEMTOVT AL, @S oe NOLKOUD cahées
cot” T poxrnbevres 1p. mept *Emiddpvou és
Kplolv TONEM@ AadXAOV h TO low EVovd nOncav Ta

3 éyxAnuata peTeNOetv. Kal Upiv Eotw TL TEKLN-

1 kat, before mpoxataAauBdvovras in the MSS., deleted by
Stahl.

1 This allegation is denied in the speech of the Corinthians,
ch. xli. 1

2 Or, retaining «af before mpoxataAauBdvortas, ‘‘and fails
to perceive that the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you,

60

BOOK I. xxximn. 2-xxxIv. 3

history have such opportunities fallen all at the
same time, and few are they who, when they beg for
an alliance, come offering to those to whom they
make their appeal as large a degree of security and
honour as they expect to receive.

“ Now as to the war which would give us occasion
to be of service, if anyone of you thinks it will not
occur he errs in judgment, and fails to perceive that
the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are eager
for war, and that the Corinthians, who have great
influence with them and are enemies of yours,} are
making a beginning with us now? with a view to a
subsequent attack upon you, in order that we may
not be led by our common hatred to take our stand
together against them, and that they may not fail,
before we unite, to attain their two objects—to
harm us and to strengthen themselves. It is our
business, on the other hand, to get the start of
them—we offering and your accepting the alliance
—and to forestall their schemes rather than to
counteract them.

XXXIV. “ But if they say that it is not right for
you to receive their colonists, let them know that
while every colony honours the mother-city so long
as it is well treated, yet that if wronged it becomes
alienated ; for colonists are not sent out to be slaves
to those who are left behind, but to be their equals.
And that they were in the wrong is manifest ; for
when challenged to arbitrate the case of Epidamnus
they preferred to prosecute their charges by war
rather than by equity. And let their present treat-
are eager for war, and that the Corinthians have great in-

fluence with them and are enemies of yours, and are making
a beginning with us with a view to a subsequent attack upon

WOE, <as.
61

bo

THUCYDIDES

a r lal 4
plov & tpos nuas tors Evyyeveis Sp@ow, Bote
aTaTn TE Ln TapayecOat UT avTav Seopévoss TE

a“ € al c , \
€x Tov EvOéos ut) UTroUpyelv: Oo yap éAayloTas TAS
peTaperelas €x Tod yapifecPat Tois évayTioss
LauBavav acdaréatatos av d:aTeXoin.

XXXV. “Avoete 5€ obdé Tas Aakedatpoviwr
omovoas Seyomevot nuas undetépwy dvtas Evypa-
\ r a ¢
yous. elpntat yap év avtais, tav “EdAnvidav
A an lal >
TOkewv Aris pndapod Evumayel, éEeivar wap
oToTépous ay apécxntar deity. Kai Sewwov e
Totade pev ATO TE TOY évoeTrOvowY ecTaL TANPOUY
\ a \ s Anis a ¥ ©) /
TAS VavS Kal TPOTETL Kal EK THS AAANS ‘EAXA6os
KQL OVX HKLTTA ATO TOV UpETEepoV UINKOwWY, HUaS
dé amo THs TpoKeméervns Te Evupayias eipEovar
\ > \ fol »” / Q ’ / s 1 >
Kal ato THS addOVEV Tofev @perias, eita! ev
adixnuate Oncovtat TweccbévtTwv vuav & deopea:

\ \ > , bey 4 e a \ / ~

ToAv O€ €v TrELoVL aiTia Tueis TeicavTeEs
cal a \ 4
vuas EEomev’ Huds wev yap Kwduvevovtas Kal ovK
€yOpovs dvtas ata@cecbe, tTavde Sé ovY STAs
Ko@\uUTAal éxOpa@v dvTwYv Kal étiovT@Y yevnoedbe,
adda Kal ao THS UpeTépas apyns SvvapLy mpoc-
lal ’

AaBetv meprovrecbe: jv ov Sixaiov, GAN 4 KaxKel-
vov KwAVELY TOUS Ex THS tweTépas picbodopous 7
\ e a / , a a ’ /
kat nuiv TeurTre KAO O TL av TEcOnTE @periav

/ \ > \ al fa) /
ddtota O€ ato Tod mpodavods deEapévous Bon-
Geiv. modda Sé, WoTrep ev apxR UTreiTOpEV, TA
Evudépovta amodetxvupev, Kal péytotov Ott of TE

2 With the MSS.; Kriiger conjectures ef re, followed by
Hude.

62

BOOK I. xxxiv. 3-xxxv. 5

ment of us, who are their kinsmen, be a warning to
you, that you be not misled by their deceit, or, if
they seek aid from you directly, that you may refuse
it. For whoever finds fewest occasions to regret
doing favours to his opponents will ever remain
most secure.

XXXV. “ Neither will you be breaking your treaty
with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us, who are
allies of neither party. For in this treaty it is stipu-
lated that if any of the Hellenic cities is a member
of no alliance, it is at liberty to join whichever side it
pleases. And it is monstrous if they are to be al-
lowed to recruit their navy, not only from their own
allies, but also from the rest of Hellas besides, and
particularly from your subjects, but are to debar us
from the alliance that should naturally be open to us
as well as from aid from any other quarter, and then
shall count it a crime if you are persuaded to con-
cede what we ask. Far more shall we hold you at
fault if we fail to win your consent; for you will be
repulsing us who are in peril and are not your enemies,
while as regards these men, who are enemies and ag-
gressors, you will not only not be thwarting them,
but will even be allowing them to get fresh forces
from your own dominions. To that they have no
right; but it is right that you should either prevent
them from raising mercenaries in places under your
control, or else send aid to us also, on whatever
terms you may be induced to make; but it would be
best of all for you openly to receive and help us.
And many, as we suggested at the outset,! are the
advantages which we can show you, and the most
important of all is this, that the enemies of both of

1 Ch. xxxiii. 1,

63

THUCYDIDES

tte | / e a 2 4 4,
avTol rodéutor nuiy joav (dTep capeoctaTy
, \ 2x > > a > OR 4 \
mTiaTls) Kal ovTOL oOvK aabeEvEis, AAX iKaVOL TOUS

/ / \ na \ >
petactavtas Prawar. Kal vavTiKhs Kal ovK
fa! 4 / e
hmetpwtioos THS Evppaytas didowevns ovy opoia
\ /
4 adXoTpiwais, GAA padLoTAa péev, Eb duvacbe,
rn r 4 >
pndéva addov éay KextHaVar vais, & O€ pm,
A / 54
Satis éyupwtatos, TovToV dirov ExeL.
XXXVI. “Kal étw tade Evpdhépovta pév Soret
ral \ \ > \ ,
Aévyer Oa, hoBetras 5é wy de’ avta TeLOopevos Tas
\ / , \ \ \ > os \
orovdas AVE, yUOTW TO pev dEedL0s aUTOD iaydY
a nr \ x
éyov Tovs évavtious wadrov hoBijaov, To dé Oap-
ra / \ a \ > s,
cobv pi deEapévov acbeves Ov pos toxXvVOVTAas
f /
tors €xOpovs abdeéctepov eaopevov, Kal awa ov
A a / fa) \ / a \ lal >
mept THs Kepxtpas viv To wAéov 7 Kal Tov ’AOn-
la / An
vav Bovrevdpevos, Kal ov Ta KpaTLcTa avTais
lal ev ‘\ /
mpovo@y, oTav €> Tov péANOVTA Kai Goov ov
/ \ , a
TapovTa TOAE“OY TO aUTIKa TEeploKOTT@V €v-
/ “ 4é
Sordtn xwpiov mpocdaSeiy 6 peta peyloTtwr
ad lal / a fol
Kalp@v olKELoUTaL TE Kal ToAEp“OUTAaL. THs Te
, /, a
yap “Itadias Kal ixedlas Kadk@s Tapdmdov
a la \ lal
KelTal, wate ponte éxellev vauTixov eacat IleXo-
movynotos émedOeivy To Te évTedDOEv pos TaKet
, /
TmapaTéurpat, Kal és TaXXA Evphopwtatov éotwy.

1 So jcay seems to mean here, where eiof was to be ex-
pected ; cf. ch. xxxiii. 3.

2 Sef or Eupdéper seems to be implied.

3 The thirty-years’ truce with Sparta; ¢/. ch. xxiii. 4,

64

BOOK I. xxxv. 5—xxxvi. 2

us are, as we see,! the same—which is the surest
guarantee of fidelity—and these are not weak, but
able to injure those who withdraw from them. And
furthermore, when the alliance that is offered is with
a maritime and not with a continental power, the
alienation of such an ally is not a matter of indif-
ference ; on the contrary, you should? by all means,
if possible, permit no one else to possess ships; but
if that is impossible, you should have as your friend
him who is strongest therein.

XXXVI. “If anyone thinks that this course is in-
deed expedient, but fears that if he yields to this con-
sideration he will be breaking off the truce,’ he should
understand that his fear, if backed by strength, will
make his enemies more afraid ;* whereas, if he re-
ject our alliance, his confidence ® will be unsupported
by might and will therefore be less formidable against
enemies that are strong. He should understand,
furthermore, that he is deliberating upon the in-
terests, not so much of Corcyra, as of Athens, and
that he is not making the best provision for her
when, in the face of the war that is impending and
all but present, he hesitates, through cautious con-
sideration of the immediate chances, to attach to
himself a country which is not made a friend or a
foe except with the most momentous consequences.
For Corcyra is favourably situated for a coasting
voyage either to Italy or Sicily,® so that you could
prevent a fleet from coming thence to join the Pelo-
ponnesians, or could convoy thither a fleet from here;
and in other respects it is a most advantageous

‘ te. of themselves breaking the truce.

5 i.e. in the security of the truce.

6 Ancient mariners preferred to hug the coast rather than
sail through the open zea.

65

THUCYDIDES

x, A / =
3 Bpaxyvtato & av xeparaio, tots te Evurrace kal
> ee a >A \ / € a /
Kal’ Exactov, TOD av pn TpoécOar Huas walouTe
/ ‘ v / ” lal vf ,
Tpla pev Ovta Aoyou afva Tots EXAnoe vautixa,
\ » Bea al \ \ = / \ \ ,
TO Tap viv Kai TO 7meTepov Kat TO KopwOtov:
/ \ 7 al
TovTwy dé et meptowerbe Ta dvo és TavTOV EOeiv
a /
kat KopivO:o. juas tmpoxatadnovtat, Kepxv-
/ \ /
paiows te Kal IleXorrovynctous apa vavpaynoerte
/ pt Bina by 4 \ > \ ,
deEauevor 6€ nuas e€eTEe TpOs avTOUs TAéELoCL
a / / E
vavol tals nwetépats aywviferbas.”
an a s
4 Towadta pev of Keprvpaios eirov: ot 6€ Kopiv-
>]
Oot eT avTovs Tordoe.
XXXVII. “’Avayxaiov Kepxupaiwv tavde od
/ a a bé Q a \ /
povov Tept Tod béEacOa ohas Tov oyov TroLnoa-
, ’ x ¢ 4.) se a a a \ oy \
HEVOV, ANN WS KAL NMELS TE AOLKOUVMEV KAL AUTOL
> / lal ral
OUK ELKOTWS TONELODYTAL, LYnoOévTas TpaToV Kal
€ a \ > / e \ b \ \ ”
Nas TEPL GupoTEepwY OUTW KaL ETL TOV AXXoV
/ v I ~ \ > ay ie an > / b]
oyov lévat, iva THY ad tuav Te akiwow acda-
a \ a
Né€oTEpov TpoElonTe KaL THY TwVdE yYpElay pH
aroyloTws atone.
, % ral
2 “acai dé Evppayiav bia TO cHdpov ovdevds
\ A
mw déFacbar: TO Oo éml Kakoupyia Kal ovK apeTH
> / 4 / > / / =
éreTnoevoay, Evppaxyov te ovdéva PovrAcpevor
/
Tpos TadiKnuaTa oUTE! wapTUpa ExELY OvdE Trapa-
3 KadouVTEs aicytvedOal, Kai 7) TONS aUTO@Y aya
avtapkn Oéow Keimévn Tapéxer avTovs SixacTas
/ ca) a
@v Brartovci tia padrdrgov Kata EvvOnKas
1 For ov5¢ of the MSS., Dobree’s conjecture. Hude reads
ovde. .. ovde.

66

BOOK I. xxxvi. 3—xxxvir. 3

place. And by one briefest concluding word, which
embraces both the whole issue and all separate facts,
you will be convinced that you should not abandon
us: The Hellenes have only three fleets that are
worthy of mention, yours, ours, and that of the
Corinthians; if, now, the Corinthians shall seize us
first and you thus let two of these fleets become
united, you will have to fight on the sea against
both Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians at once; but
if you accept us, you will be able to contend
against them with your navy augmented by our
own.

Thus spoke the Corcyraeans, and after them the _

Corinthians as follows: ae

XXXVII. “Since these Corcyraeans have not con-
fined themselves to the question of their admission
into your alliance, but have gone further and urged
that we are the wrong-doers and they are unfairly
attacked, we too must of necessity touch upon both
these points before we proceed to our general argu-
ment, in order that you may be more definitely
forewarned of the nature of the demand we have
to make, and may have good grounds for rejecting
their petition.

“They say that ‘a wise discretion’ has hitherto
kept them from accepting an alliance with anyone;
but the fact is that they adopted this policy with a
view to villainy and not from virtuous motives, and
because they wished in their misdeeds not to have
any ally as witness, or to be put to shame if they
invited his presence. Moreover, the insular and in-
dependent position of this state causes them to be
arbitrary judges of the injuries they do to others
instead of being judges appointed by mutual agree-

67

i

a
a

THUCYDIDES

, \ \ = > \ \ / > /
ryiyver Oat, dua TO HKLoTa él Todvs TéXAS ExT E-
\ , 3 1
ovTas “adtoTa TOUS addOUS aVayKNn KATALpovTas)
—
, uv \ lal \ = \ BA >
déyecOal.; Kai TOTO TO EvTpEeTés AoTTOVSOY Ov
SNARE eanase Cae =
© nA >
iva pn Evvadix@ow ETEpols TpoRBEBAnvTAaL, GAN
7 \ r ? A \ ¢ Nan sp. betta
OTWS KATA povas AOLK@oL Kal OTws \év © ev av
KpaTaot Bialwvrat,\ob 8 adv AaPaat Tréov Eyo-
ow, Hv “8é mod Te TporadBwow avaicyvvT@ciy’
KalTOL El Hoav avopes, BaTEP haciv, ayabol, bow
> / = lal / / \
aXnTTOTEpOL Hoav Tos Tédas, TOTW Se havepw-
/ IEA bd a \ 3 \ nr \ Z
Tépay €€hv autos THv apeTny OLdovat Kal Sexo-
4
pévols TA Sixata Serxvuvat.
XXXVIII. “’AXN’ ovTE rpds Tols GXOUS OvUTE
3 e al / > / Vv Lan 4 ’ a ,
és mas Tololde elolv, Atouor © dvTEs abectact
\ \ \ a a / e
Te OLA TAVTOS Kal VOY TroAELOvGL, NEVOVTES WS
ovK éTl TO KAKOS Ee? ise cxmeupietey. 7 [LElS
dé ovd’ avtot dapyev emi to (brO Tauren) WBpite-
aoOat KatToixioal, arr él TO Hyewoves TE elvas
, e cal
kal ta elkota OavyatecOar. ai yoov addrXat
ATOLKLAL TLL@TLY Nas KAL waNLOTA UTO aTroiKwY
, \ A o ’ a , > +
atepyouela: Kal Sjrov 6t1, et Tols TA€OTW apé-
rf >] , ’ lal
oKOVTES EgpEV, TOiTS dv povols OvK OpOas aTrapé-
TKOLMEV, OVO ETLOTPATEVOMEV EXTIPETTAS fH Kal
7
SiahepovTws Te adiKovpevot. Kadov & Hv, & Kal
/ nr st ‘ol a
Hwaptavouer, Toiade mev elEar TH HpeTépa opyn,
rn \ \
nuiv S€ aiaxpov Bidcoacbar tHv TovTwY peTpE-
68

BOOK I. xxxvil. 3—XXXxvIII. 5

ment; owing to the fact that they resort very
little to the ports of their neighbours, but to a
very large extent receive into their ports others
who are compelled to put in there. And mean-
while they have used as a cloak their specious policy
of avoiding alliances, adopted not in order to avoid
joining others in wrong-doing, but that they may do
wrong all alone; that wherever they have power
they may use violence, and wherever they can escape
detection they may overreach someone; and if, per-
chance, they can steal a march on anyone, that they
may brazen it out. And yet, if they were really honest
men, as they pretend to be, the less liable they were
to attack by their neighbours the more clearly they
might have demonstrated their virtuous motives by
offering and accepting proposals of arbitration.
XXXVIII. “ But neither toward others nor to-
ward us have they shown themselves honest men ; on
the contrary, although they are colonists of ours, they
have constantly stood aloof from us, and now they
are at war with us, claiming that they were not sent
out to be ill treated. But neither did we colonize
them to be insulted by them, but to be their leaders
and to receive from them all due reverence. The
rest of our colonies, at any rate, honour us, and
by our colonists we are beloved more than is any
other mother-city. And it is clear that, if we are
acceptable to the majority, it cannot be on good
grounds that we are unacceptable to these alone;
nor are we making war upon them in a way so
unusual without being also signally wronged. And
even if we were at fault, the honourable course for
them would have been to make allowance for our
temper, in which case it would have been shameful

69

THUCYDIDES

6 étTnTa: BBpe S€ Kal eEovcia wrovTOV TONKA és
c al »” e / \ eo (6 e /
Has dra Te HuapTHKact Kal Entdapvov nperte-

/ \ al
pav ovcav KaKovpéevnvy pev ov TpoceETroLoUVTO,
€rOovtwv b€ Huav emt Ttiyuwpia érovtes Bia
: hy peo pig ;
éyouow.

/
XXXIX. “Kal daci 67) dixn mpotepov €Ge-
a F. /

Ajoas KpiverOat, hv ye ov TOV TMpovYoVTA Kai EK
lal 5 la) / n
Tov aoharovs mpoKxadovpevov Eyer TL Soxeiv
ra > % \ ’ y / Bd e A \ \
def, AAG TOV €5 icov Ta TE EPYa OMOLWS KAL TOUS
/ \ , / Ag

2 royous mpl SsayoviterOar Kafiotavta. ovToL

x > \ a \ / > : A : e /
d€ ov Tpliv TONLOpKELY TO KWPLOV, AX érretdn y-
lal / /
cavto Huas ov Tepiower Oat, TOTE Kal TO EVTIPETTES
ol / \ n
ths Sixns mapécxovto: Kat Sevpo ‘Kova, ov
a /, \ a
TAKEL [LOVOY aUTOL GuapToVTEs, GAAA Kal vpas
a > rn b a b] \ a \
vov akvodvres ov Evppayeiv, adrAa Evvadixety Kai
/ v id va) / rn a ~
3 dsadopous dvtas npiv déyecPar ohas: ovs xXpHy,
/ / /
Ste aohadéoctato. Hoav, TOTE Tpocteval, Kal py
év & tpuets pwev HorknucOa, ovTOL Oé KLWdUVYEVOUGL
B Tels perv Hdcxijueba,
? ¢€ a n b] a ,
und ev @ vpeis THs Te Svvduews a’T@Y TOTE OU
, al >’ / lal / \
pevaraBovtes THs whedias vdv peTadwoeTe Kal
rn 5 a —" r lal
TOV GuapTnudtwyv amo Yyevouevor THS ad Huav
aitias To lcov é€eTe, Tadat 5é KOWwoaVYTAS THY
Sivamwy Kowa Kal Ta aTOBaivovta eye.
ae < \ > eae \ ,
XL. ‘6 Os pev ovv autol Te peTa TpocnKoVYTwY
’ / >’ f \ ~/ / \
eyxAnmatov épyowela kal olde Biarot Kat Teo-
1 eyeAnudtav 5& pdvwv auetdxous ol Tws Tay weTa Tas mpdtets
rovTwy wh Kowwveiv, ‘* As, however, you have had no share in
the accusations, you should not share in the consequences.”

This clause is omitted by all good MSS. except G, and by all
recent editors except Bloomfield.

7°

BOOK I. xxxvitl. 5-xt. 1

for us to outrage their moderation; but in the
insolence and arrogance of wealth they have wronged
us in many other ways, and particularly in the case
of Epidamnus, our colony, which they made no claim
to when it was in distress, but seized by force the
moment we came to its relief, and continue to hold.

XXXIX. “They pretend, forsooth, that they were
the first to agree to an arbitration of the issue;
but surely it is not the proposals of the one who has
the advantage, and occupies a safe position when he
invites arbitration, that ought to have weight, but
rather those of the one who has made his actions tally
with his professions before appealing to arms. These
men, however, bring forward their specious offer of a
court of arbitration, not before laying siege to the
place, but only after they had concluded that we
would not permit it. And now, not satisfied with the
blunders they have committed themselves at Epi-
damnus, they have come here demanding that you
too at this juncture, shall be, not their allies, but
their accomplices in crime, and that you shall receive
them, now that they are at variance with us. But
they ought to have come to you when they were
in no peril at all, and not at a time when we are
victims of their injustice and they are consequently
in danger, nor when you, without having had the
benefit of their power before, will now have to give
them a share of your aid, and, though you had nothing
to do with their at ea will have to bear an equal
part of the blame we shall bestow. For only if you
from the first had shared their power ought you to
share the consequences also now of their acts.

XL. “ Now it has been clearly shown that we have
come with proper grounds of complaint against

71

THUCYDIDES

\ /
véxtat eiot Sednrwtat: ws b€ ovK dv Sixatas
’ \ / a / ’ \ v >’
avtous déyocbe pabety yp. ef yap elpntac év
Tais otrovoais, e€etvar Tap’ omotépous tis Bov-
na / a n
AETal TOV aypadwy TorEewy edOEiv, Ov ToIs émh
BraBn étépwv lodow 7 EvvOnkn éotiv, adn
a \ yy e X\ > fal ’ ,
ooTls fn aXXoU EaUTOY aTrodTEepwYv aadandelias
ra oe \ an /
Settat Kal dotis pn Tois SeEapevois, eb swdpo-
lal ’ ’ / , a a
vovol, ToAELOV avT elpivNns ToLnceEl 0 viv bpels
pn TweOopmevor Huiv waPorte av. ov yap Tolade
4 > / 5 aN 4 bd \ \ Chie 3 \
fLovov €TLKoUpoL av yevotcOe, aNrAA Kal Huty avTl
€voTovOwY ToNeulol. avayKn yap, eb ite peT
la \ BA lal
avuT@V, Kal auvvecOat un avev UL@V TOUTOUS. Kal-
s ee HR. \ s \ > \ a
ToL Oikalol y €oTe paddtoTAa meV exTTOd@Y aTHvaL
> / ’ \ / > / 3 \ / ’
audotépols, eb d€ uy, TOUvavTiov él TovTOUS ped
e a 7 , / 4
npav tévart (KopivOios pév ye evotrovdoi éote,
\ > a , >
Kepxupaiows 6€ ovb€ bs avoxwyis teToTE éyé-
\ , XN ae o \
vecOe), Kal TOV vopov un KabioTavat Wate TOUS
el ye > / / > \ \ e “
étépwv adbiatapévous Séyer@ar. ovd€ yap nyeis
/ > / a / ?
Lauiov aroctavtwy Widov mpocebéueba évav-
a a /
tiav upiv, Tov addXwv IleXoTrovynciov diya én-
4 lal lal A
piopévav €b Ypn avTois apvvew, ghavepas 8é
\ ,
aVTETOMEV TOUS TpoTnKoVTas Evupupayous avTov
> \ \ al
Tiva KoNaberv. €b yap TOUS KaKov TL SpavTas
SeYyouevol TluwpHcete, haveltar Kal a TOV bpere-

1 7.e. ““who will permit peace to be maintained by their
new friends if they exercise ordinary discretion.” No new
allies should be received who will render ordinary discretion

72

BOOK I. xu. 1-6

them and that they are violent and overreaching ;
but you have still to learn that you have no right to
receive them into your alliance. For even though it
is stipulated in the treaty that any unenrolled city
may join whichever party it pleases, the provision is
not intended for those who apply to one side for
admission with a view to the injury of the other,

but for any one who, without defrauding another

state of his services, asks for protection, and any

one who to those who received him will not—if_

they are prudent—bring. war~instead of peace.}
But this is precisely what will be your fate if you
do not listen to us. For you will not merely be-
come allies to them, but also enemies to us instead
of being at truce with us. For it will be necessary
for us, if you go with them, to include you when we
proceed to take vengeance upon them. And yet the
right course for you would be, preferably, to stand
aloof from us both,—or else to go with us against
them, remembering that you are under treaty with
the Corinthians, but have never had with the
Corcyraeans even anarrangement.-to- refrain from
hostilities for a time,—and not to establish the
precedent of admitting into your alliance those who
revolt from the other side. Why, when the Samians 2
revolted from you, and the other Peloponnesians were
divided in their votes on the question of aiding them,
we on our part did not vote against you; on the
contrary, we openly maintained that each one should
discipline his own allies without interference. If you
receive and assist evil-doers, you will surely find that

unavailing to prevent war, as the Corcyraeans are sure
to do.
2 440 B.c. cf. ch. cxv.

VOL... D 13

——_
}

|

THUCYDIDES

; / con , \ \ , >4?
Pv OUK EAdaow ruiv TpocELcl, Kal TOV Vopov ep
¢ ca > al lal Al *.S ew 2 lal /
Upty avtols warrov 7 eh Hutv Oncoere.
/ \ \ al
XLI. “ Atvcar@pata pev ovv tTdde Tpos bpas
4 e \ \ \ ¢ / / /
Eyopuev, ‘Kava KaTa TouS EAXjVwY vo“ous, Tapal-
,
veow 6€ kai akiwow YapiTos ToLdvde, Hv ovK
4 / ? d
€yOpol dvtes Wate BXaTTEL ovd avd didor WaT’
> 6 3 an e Lal > An /
émixphoGar, avtTidoOjvar muiv év T® Tapovte
na lal \ lal ,
dayev Yphvar. vedv yap paxpav onavicavtés
\ \ > lal ¢e \ \ & \ »
mote mpos tov Aliy.ntav vu7ep ta Mnédixa
\ / fal ,
movenov tapa Kopiwéiwy eixoot vads édaPete:
/ ef \ /
Kal 7 evepyecia avTn TE Kab 1) és Laptovs, TO
’ ¢e al / > “ y a
62’ nas IeXotrovynatovs avtois pn BonOjcat,
a al \ f
mapecxev vuiv Aiywntov pev éetiKpatnow, La-
piwy 5€ KoAacLY, Kal Ev KAaLpOts TOLOVTOLS EyEVETO,
2 , ” aidsst> 25 \ \ D
ois partota avOpwrro. em éxOpovs Tovs oderté-
~ / /
pous lovTes TOV ATaYTwWY aTrEpLOTTTOL EloL Tapa
a J lal \ nr
TO viKav' hirov Te yap NYyoUVTAaL TOV UTOUpyourTa,
\ ? / \
hv Kal mpotepov €xOpos 7, TOAEmLOV TE TOV avTt-
/ a % 4 / ” > \ \ \ > lal
OTaYTA, WY Kal TUYN PlrAOS WY, ETEL KAL TA_OLKELA
A / a en Dh
yetpov TiWevtar dirovixias Eveka THs AUTLKA.
-. \ , ,
XLII. “*Ov évOupnevtes Kai vewtepos tis
\ / > ‘ \ > 4 lal
Tapa mpecBuTépov avuta pabwyv aktovtw Tots
a n / \ \ / ,
dpotors Huas apvverOar, Kal pH vouton OiKata
/ / > /
pev Tade rEéyecOat, Evudopa Sé, e6 Toreunoe.,
/ \ / b] ? A
ddXra elvat. TO Te yap Evyuhepov ev w av TIS

1 Sxtp 7a Mydixd Kriiger deletes, followed by Hude.

74

BOOK I. xu. 6—xin. 2

full as many of your allies will come over to us, and
the precedent you establish will be against yourselves
rather than against us.

XLI. “ These, then, are the considerations of right
which we urge upon you—and they are adequate ac-
cording to the institutions of the Hellenes; but we
have also to remind you of a favour and to urge a
claim based upon it; and since we are not your
enemies so as to want to injure you, nor yet your
friends so that we could make use of you, we think
this favour should be repaid us at the present time.
It is this: when once, before the Persian war, you
were deficient in battle-ships for the war you were
waging with the Aeginetans, you borrowed twenty
from the Corinthians. And this service and that we
rendered in connection with the Samians—our pre-
venting the Peloponnesians from aiding them—
enabled you to prevail over the Aeginetans and to
chastise the Samians. Both incidents happened, too,
at a critical time, when men, engaged in assailing
their enemies, are most indifferent to every con-
sideration except victory, regarding any one who
assists them as a friend, even if he was an enemy be-
fore, and any one who stands in their way as an
enemy, even if he happen to be a friend ; for they
even mismanage their own i ests. in the eager
rivalry of the moment.

XLII. “ Bearing these favours in mind—let every
young man here be told of them by one who is
older—do you consider it your duty to requite us
with the like. And do not think that this course
is indeed equitable to urge in a speech, but that
another course is advantageous if you come to war.
For advantage is most likely to result when one

75

THUCYDIDES

/ € / / e¢ \
erdyiota dpaptdvn pddiota emetat, Kal TO
/ lal 4 e lal ce lal
uédAov TOD ToAépov @ PoBodvTes Upads Kepxv-
patio. Kedevouow abixelv ev abavel Err KeiTaty Kab
> ” 5] Gé > a \ 4 a nO
ovK akiov érapOévtas avt@ pavepav exlpav non
\ > / \ / /
kal ov pédXovcav pos Kopuvdious KTHnocac0at,
n / X
ris 58 brapyovons mpotepov 61a Meyapéas vTro-
vrias cabpov vdereivy wadrov (7 yap TeNeuvTaLa
ydpis Katpov éxouca, Kiv éXdoowy 7, dwvaTat
a 4 lal J / lal
petCov eyKAnua AUcaL), Nd OTL VaVTLKOU Eup-
/ / U / > / .
paxlay peyarny b:8dacr, TovT@ eperAnerVau TO
a ¢ /
yap pr adixetv TOvS opolous ExUpwTépa SvVams 7)
ra cal / \ /
T® adtixa dhavep® éraplévtas bia Kivdvvwv TO
Tréov EXEL.
a / lol
XLII. “‘“Hpets 8& tepuettmxortes ois év TH
\
Aaxedaiuove avtol mpoeiropuev, Tovs odetépous
KB
/ > f / fa) ’ e lal
Evppadyous avtoy twa Kodalev, viv Tap vmov
X > ip > nn / \ \ ipl e ,
TO avTo akiodpev KopifecOar, Kal pn TH NMETEPA
/ 3 7 lal ec / € r Fr
wido apernGevtas TH vpeTEepa Nas Brawat.
/ lal lal
zo 8é loov avtaTobote, yvovTes TOUTOV éKeElvoOY
e 6
elvau Tov Kaipov, év @ 6 Te VToupyav pidos pa-
\ /
ALoTa Kal 6 avTiaTas exXOpos. Kal Kepxupatous
/ / 4 / / ¢ rn
ye tovode pate Evppayous déxecVe Big rjuov
unre auvvete avtois adixodow. Kal Tade Tol-
rn / \
obvTes TA TpoornKovTa Te Spdcete Kal TA apiota
a na 9
Bovrevoeabe vpiv avtois.
XLIV. Toratta 5€ xal of KopivOsou eitzov.
, al \ > / ’ / /
A@nvaior S€ akovoavtTes apPpoTepwv, yevomevns

76

BOOK I. xu. 2-xtiv. 1

errs least, and the contingency of the war, with which
the Corcyraeans would frighten you into wrong-
doing, is still uncertain; and it is not worth while
for you to be so carried away by it as to acquire
an enmity with the Corinthians that will be from
that moment on a manifest fact and no longer a
contingency. It would be, rather, the prudent course
to remove something of the suspicion which has
heretofore existed on account of the Megarians!;
for the favour which comes last, if conferred at the
right moment, even though a small one, can cancel a
greater offence. Nor ought you to be tempted by
their offer of a great naval alliance; for to refrain
from wronging equals is a surer strength than to be
carried away by present appearances and seek an
advantage by incurring dangers.

XLIII. “ But we, since events have brought us
under the rule which we ourselves proclaimed at
Sparta, that each should discipline his own allies, now
claim from you in return the same treatment—that
you who were then_aided by our vote should not in-

__ jure us by yours. ‘Pay back like with like, determining
that this is thé supreme moment when assistance is
the truest friendship—opposition the worst hostility.
We beg you neither to accept the Corcyraeans as
your allies in despite of us, nor to aid them in their
wrong-doing. And if you do this, you will not only be
taking the fitting course, but will also be consulting
your own best interests.” eS

XLIV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the
Athenians, having heard both sides, held a second

1 Referring apparently to the exclusion of the Megarians
from all harbours within the Athenian dominion and from
the market at Athens, ch. lxvii. 4.

77

bo

THUCYDIDES

\ 8 > Xx / a \ / > ?
kal Sis éxxAXnolas, TH ev TpoTepa ovyY Hocov

r /, ’ / \ / b] »* ~
tav Kopiw0iwv amedéEavto tovs Noyous, ev b€ TH

/
voTepata petéyvwmoav Kepxupators Evxpuaxiav pev
7
un tonoacbat wate TOUS avTous €xPpous Kal

f / ’ » > \ / > /
dhirous voutfew (Ee yap émt KopivOov éxéXevov

/ e 4 lal / ae! > an
odio ot Kepxupatos: Evytrdety, €XvovT’ av avtois

e \ / / > , \
ai mpos IleXotrovyncious otrovéat), émipayiav dé
> , A > / A 27 ro
erroinoavtTo TH AAAnAwY BonOeiv, Edv Tis ert

> \
Kepxupav in 1 AGjvas 7) TOUS TOUT@Y EvmpaXous.
edoxer yap oO ™pos IleAorovynaious TONELOS Kal
as écecOat avtois, Kal THV Képeupav éBovrovro
yn) mpoérbar tots Kopw@tois vavtixoy éyovoap
r / ev \
tocouTov, Evyxpovew S¢€ OT: puddAlaTa avTOUS
> / c/s > / Ss A /
arrAnroLs, Wa aclevertépors ovow, hv Te S€n,
Kopi@iors te Kat Tois adXots Tots! vauTiKoV
éxoval €s TOAE“Ov KabiaoTa@vTal. apa de THs TE
/ lal , al

"Iranias Kai Xuxedias Kad@s epaiveTo avTois 1
vijoos év TapaTA® Keto Oat.

XLV. Toravtn pev yroun ot ‘A@nvaior TOUS
Kepxupaiovs mpocedéEavto, cal tav Kopivbiwv
aTeNOovT@yv ov ToAv UaoTtepov Séxa vads avTois
> / / ’ / \ > nw”
anéatekav BonOovs: eotpatnye 6€ avt@v Aake-
in / / ec / \ , e
Sapovios te 0 Kipwvos cai Acotimos 0 Xtpop-

, \ / ng / a \
Bixov cat IIpwréas o ’Emixdéous. mpoetrrov dé

cal al / \
avtois pn vavpayeiv KopivOios, yv pn emt
/ /
Képxupav mAéwot kal péAdwowv avroPaivew 7 és

a /

TOV €xelvOV TL Ywpiwy: oUTw SE KwAVELY KATA
lal lal n \ 7
Sivapuv. tTpoettov d€ TavTa TOU pH AvELY Evexa

\ s
Tas oTOVOdS. y 4 aaeq by Bekker.
78

BOOK I. xiv. 1-x.v. 3

session of the Ecclesia ; and although at the earlier
one they were rather inclined to agree with the words
of the Corinthians, on the second day they changed
their minds in favour of the Corcyraeans, and decided,
not, indeed, to make an offensive and defensive
alliance with them, for in that case, if the Corcyraeans
then asked them to join in an expedition against
Corinth, they would have to break, on their own re-
sponsibility, the treaty with the Lacedaemonians—-
but they made a defensive alliance, namely to aid
one another in case anyone should attack Corcyra or

Athens or the allies of either..For they believed that.,_-,

in any eventsthe war with the Peloponnesians would /
have to be faced{ and they did not wish to give up

Corcyra, which had so large a fleet, to the Corinthians, ~~

but hoped to wear them out upon one another as
much as possible, in order that the Corinthians as
well as other naval powers} might be found weaker
in case they had to go to war with them. Besides,
the island seemed to them admirably situated for a
coasting voyage to Italy and Sicily.?

XLV. With these motives the Athenians received
the Corcyraeans into alliance and sent to their
-aid,soon after the departure of the Corinthians, ten
_ships commanded by Lacedaemonius son of Cimon,
Diotimus son of Strombichus, and Proteas son of
Epicles. Orders were given to these not to engage
with the Corinthians, unless they should sail against
Corcyra and attempt to land there, or to some ‘place
belonging to the Corcyraeans; but in that case they
were to thwart them if possible. The object of these
orders was to avoid breaking the treaty.

1 Referring especially to those mentioned ch. xxvii, 2.
2 of. ch. xxxvi. 2,

79

THUCYDIDES

\ fal an
XLVI Ai péev 8) vies adixvodvta és TH
Képxupav. oi 8& Kopiv@tot, érretdn avtots mape-
oKevacto, érAeov él THY Képxupay vavat TevTN-
J >
Kovta kal éxatov. joav be "Hrelwv pev déxa,
/ ,
Meyapéwv 5é SHdexa cai Aeveadioy déxa, ’Apu-
a BY >
mpaxiotav dé€ émta Kal elkogt Kal “Avaxtoplov
pia, avtav é KopiwOiev évevnxovta: otpatnyot
/ /
Sé tovTwV hoav pev Kal KaTa TOES ExdoTOD,
— €
KopwOiwy S¢ Bevoxreidyns 0 Evdudéous réurtos
a \
avtos. é7evd1 5é mpocéuerEav TH Kata Képxupay
/ \ / id ,
nreip@ amo Aevxddos mréovtes, oppilovTat és
Xecpéprov ths Oecompawridos vis. éarte dé App,
nr al \
Kal mods UTép avToD KeiTar amo OadXacons ev
th Eraratide ths Oca pwridos Edvpy. €&inar de
’ Ce tee , , . ; \
Trap avtnv Axepovoia ripyn és Oaraccav: dia
S¢ ths Oecrpwridos “Axépwv Totapos péwv
b] t I] > £ > ’ n \ \ > _4
ésBadrer és auTnv, ap ov Kal THY eTTMVUMLAY
cr / \ ec
yer, per S€ cal Ovapis rotapes opifov thy
7
Wcorpawrida xal Keotpivny, av évtos 7 axpa
/ fol
avéyer TO Xeupépiov. ot pev ov KopivOrot tis
lal c
Hareipov évtav0a oppuitovtat te Kal otpatomredov
€TOLNCAVTO.
aA v
XLVII. Of 8 Kepxupatos @s na8ovto avtous
TpocmdéovTas, TANpwaavTEes O€KA KAL EKATOV
rn > * 4 \ > , \ eons
vais, av Apye Mixradys cai Aloiutdns kat Evpv-
Batos, éotpatoTedevoavTo ev puad TOV VHTwY at
o > a
Kadovvtat SUBora, kal ai Attixai déxa Taphoav.
éxl 88 7H Aevxipyy abtois TO axpwtnpio o Telos
/ € al
iv cal ZaxvvOiov yidvot oditar BeSonOnxores.
» \ \ a , ’ nw >, / \
Aoav b€ Kal Tois KopwOiows év TH nTEelpw TOAXOL
rn / Ul e \ /
tav BapBapwv tapaBeBonOnxotes: of yap TavTy
nr , / lal
rep@tat aiel Tote pidou avTOIs Elo,
80

BOOK I. xtvi. 1-xtvu. 3

XLVI. These ships arrived at Corcyra, and the
Corinthians, when their preparations had been made,
sailed against Corcyra with one hundred and fifty
ships. Of these ten belonged to the Eleans, twelve

to the Megarians, ten to the Leucadians, sememteen!.....

to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and ninety
to the Corinthians. themselves. The several cities
had each its own general, but Xenocleides son of
Euthycles and four others commanded the Corin-
thians. They sailed from Leucas, and when they drew
near the mainland over against Corcyra, anchored at
Cheimerium in the territory of Thesprotia. It isa
harbour, and above it lies a city away from the sea in
the Eleatic district of Thesprotia, Ephyra by name.
Near it is the outlet into the sea of the Acherusian
lake; and the river Acheron runs through Thesprotia
and empties into the lake, to which it gives its name.
There is also the river Thyamis, which separates
Thesprotia and Cestrine, and between these rivers
rises the promontory of Cheimerium. It was at this
point of the mainland then that the Corinthians cast
anchor and made a camp.

XLVII. The Corcyraeans, when they became
aware of their approach, manned a hundred and ten
ships under the command of Miciades, Aesimides,
and Eurybatus, and encamped on one of the islands
which are called Sybota, the ten Attic ships being
alsopresent. Their land-forces were at the promon-
tory of Leucimne, and also a thousand hoplites of
the Zacynthians who had come to aid the Corcy-
raeans. The Corinthians, also, had the aid of many
barbarians who had assembled on the mainland ad-
jacent; for the dwellers on the mainland in that
region have always been friendly to them.

81

THUCYDIDES

XLVIII. ’Eevd1) 6€ mapecxevacto tots Kopw-
4 an a ,
Giows, NaBovTes TPL@Y HuEPp@V CLTia aVvyyoVTO
2 ws éml vavpaxyla ao Tov. Xetpeplov vuKTos, Kal
lal \ Qn
dua Em TA€ovTES KaABopHat Tas TOV KepKupatov
4 , a /
3 vais meTewWpous TE Kal eTTL ohas TAEOVGAS. WS
\ al b] / > yA > %
5€ xateldov aAXANAOUS, aVTLTApETaoCOVTO, ETL
\ \ \ , , ents \
pev TO SeEvov Képas Kepxupaiwy at “Attixal
r \ \ v > \ ’ lal / / /
ves, TO O€ AXAO AUTOL ETELYOY TPLa TEXAN TOLN-
al lal * » Lal Lal
CAVTES TOV VEO, @Y ApPYE TPLOVY OTPATHYOV
\ A
Exdaotov els. ovTw sev Kepxupatoe étaéavto.
\ \ \ / e
4 KopwOiors dé TO ev SeEvov xépas at Meyapices
yes elyov Kal. al "Apmpaxiwtioes, Kata Sé TO
v / ,
pécov of adXAoL Evppmaxyor ws ExacToL, EevMVYUpOY
x Pr / a / lal a
dé Képas avtol ot Koptv@.or tals apiota TaY vewv
/ \ \ > / \ \ \
mreoveats Kata Tovs A@nvaiovs Kat To dekov
al / s »
tav Kepxupawy etyov.
3 — / lal
XLIX. Euppeiéavtes 6é, éredn Ta onpueta
e / ” bd / \ \ e /
EXATEPOLS PCN, EvavLAaYouV, TONAOUS LEV OTALTAS
, \ lal
ExovTes aupoTEepor ETL TOV KATATTPWLUTwY, TOA-
‘ lol al
ovs 6€ TofoTas TE Kal UKOVTLOTAaS, TO Taral@
, > , ” , 2
2 Tpom@ ameporepoy éTL TapEecKevaapEvoL, Hy TE
c a \ / > e 4
1) VavLAYLa KAPTEPa, TH meV TEXVN OVY oOpLolws,
/ x \ / \ 2 > \
3 Tweloua\la dé TO TA€Ov TpoaddgeEpis ovaa. érrEeLd7)
yap mpoaBaXotev addXnXoLS, OV padiws aTredvoVTO
© a ‘ \ r an rn
UmTo0 Te TOU TAIOOUS Kal OXAOU THY Ve@V Kal Lar-
ov TL TLaTEVOVTES ToOls ETL TOU KaTATTPwLATOS
€ / e
omTAlTals €s THY ViKHY, ol KaTaTTaVTES éuayoTO
novyalovea@y tav vewv: SiéxtAoL O€ OK Hoar,
> \ A << \ , > , a
G\rXa Oup@e Kal pwn TO TWAEOV Evavayouy 7H
82

BOOK I. xiviu, 1-xLix. 3

XLVIII. When their preparations had been made,
the Corinthians, taking provisions for three days,
put off by night from Cheimerium with the intention
of giving battle, and at daybreak as they sailed along
they descried the ships of the Corcyraeans out at sea
and sailing to meet them. And as soon as they saw
one another, they drew up in opposing battle lines,
the Attic ships on the right wing of the Corcyraeans,
who themselves held the rest of the line forming
three divisions, each under the command of one of
the three generals. So the Corcyraeans arrayed them-
selves; but the right wing of the Corinthian fleet
was held by the Megarian ships and the Ambracian,
in the centre were the other allies with their several
contingents, while the left was held by the Corinth-
ians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed
to the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcy-
raeans.

XLIX. When the standards were raised on either
side they joined battle and fought, both having many
hoplites on the decks as well as many archers and
javelin-men, for they were still equipped rather
rudely in the ancient fashion. And so the sea-fight was
hotly contested, not so much by reason of the skill
displayed as because it was more like a battle on land.
For when they dashed against one another they could
not easily get clear, partly by reason of the number
and throng of the ships, still more because they
trusted for victory to the hoplites on the decks,
who stood and fought while the ships remained
motionless ; and there was no cutting of the line,! but
they fought with fury and brute strength rather than

1 SiéxmAovs was a breaking of the line so as to ram the
enemy’s ship in the flank or astern.

83

THUCYDIDES

emer My TAVvTany pevy ovv Tous GopuBos
Kal rapaxoons ay ” vaupaxia év 7 ab “Arrixal
VES TaparyyVomeval Tots Kepxupaioss, el 17
meCowvTo, poBov jev Tapetxov Tots evavTiows,
payns 6€ ovK Hpxov OEOLoTES Ob oTparnyot TH
Tpoppnaw TOV “AOnvaiov. padaora dé To deEvov
KEepas TOV Kopw Gian € eTrovel. ol yap Kepxupaios
elKogl vaval auTous TpeWapevor Kal KaTaoL-
Eavtes omopadas €s Ti ym evpov Kal béype Tov
oT patoméedou TAEvoayTeEs aut av Kal emrex BavTes
évéTTpnaav TE TAS oKNVaS epmjwous Kal Ta Xprpara
éiunptTacayp. TAUTD ev ovy ol Kopiv@tot Kai ot
Evppaxor HoT@vTO Te Kab ot Kepxupaios €7T€-
KpaTouv: m 6€ avtol HoaVv ob Kopiv@.00, éTl TO
EVOVULO, TORU evik@Vv, Tots Kepxupaious TOV
elKOoL vEe@Y ato Xda ovos mnGous € €k THS 610 -
Eews ov TApouT@v. of dé "AOnvaior o op@vres TOUS
Kepxupatous TLeComevous padhov 760 aT popa-
clots errexoupour, TO pev T™ P@TOV amex ouevor
@oTe pn euBarrew twit érerdn Sé 4 TpoTn
evyiryveto Lap pas Kal eVEKELVTO ot Koptv@cot, Tote
én Epyou TAS €LYETO 76n Kab OveKEK pLTO ovdev
ETH, aXra Evverecev és TOUTO avaryKns WOTE
emruxyelphoat addAnAols Tovs KopivOiovs cai ’AOn-
vatous.

L. Tis 6€ tpomis yevouévns ot KoptvOro ta
cxabn pev ovx elAKov avadovpevot TOV VEeaV as
KATAOUGELAY, TPOS OE TOUS avO porous ETPATrOVTO
povevew Ovex TAEOVTES padXov y Corypetv, TOUS Te
aAvT@V pirous, ovK noOnpevot 6 OTL HooHVTO OL em
T@ SeEL@ Képa, AyvoodvTes ExTEWov. TOAAMY Yap

84

BOOK I. xuix. 3-1. 2

with skill. Accordingly there was everywhere much
tumult and confusion in the sea-fight. The Attic
ships, if they saw the Corcyraeans pressed at any
point, came up and kept the enemy in awe; but
their generals would not begin fighting, fearing to
disobey the instructions of the Athenians. The right
wing of the Corinthians suffered most; for the
Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them and pur-
sued them in disorder to the mainland, and then,
sailing right up to their camp and disembarking,
burned the deserted tents and plundered their
property. In that quarter, then, the Corinthians and
their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans pre-
vailed ; but on the left wing where the Corinthians
themselves were, they were decidedly superior, for
the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were fewer to begin
with, had the twenty ships away in the pursuit. But
the moment the Athenians saw that the Corcyraeans
were being hard pressed, they began to help them
more unreservedly, and though they at first refrained
from actually attacking an enemy ship, yet when it
was conspicuously clear that they were being put to
flight and the Corinthians were close in pursuit, then
at length every man put his hand to work, and fine
distinctions were no longer made; matters had come
to such a pass that Corinthians and Athenians of
necessity had_to attack one another. _

-L. After the rout of the Corcyraeans the Corinth-
ians did not také in tow and haul off the hulls of the
ships which had been disabled, but turned their
attention to the men, cruising up and down and
killing them in preference to taking them alive; and
they unwittingly slew their own friends, not being
aware that their right wing had been worsted. For

85

THUCYDIDES

ve@v ovcaVv apudotépwy Kali emt modv THs Oa-
Adoons éTexXovear, erred) EvvéwervEav GAANXOLS,
ov padiws Thy Sidyvwow é€rrotovvTO OTrotoL expd-
Tovy 7) ExpaTouvTo’ vavpayia yap avtn “EdXnot
mpos “EXAnvas ve@v TAINO peyiotn 51) TOV TPO
3 avTns yeyévntar. éredyn b€ KatediwEav Tovs
Kepxupaious ot KopivOsor és thy yhv, mpos Ta
vavayla Kal TOUS vexpovs TOUS aeTépous EeTpa-
TovTo, Kal TOV TWrEeloTwWY EexpaTnoaY WaTE
Tpockopicat Tpos Ta LVBota, ov avtois o KaTa
yiv otpatos tav BapBdpwv mpoceBeBonO Ker:
éote 5€ Ta LvBota THs Oeowpwridos Asn
éphymos. Tovto O€ Toincavtes avOis aOporcBévtes
4 érémAeov Tots Kepxupaios. ot d€ tais mAWLpOLS
Kal doar Hoav otTal peta TOV “ATTLK@Y vedv
Kal aUTOL avTeTémAcor, SeicavTes mn es THY YH
5 cdav Teipwow atoBaivev. dn O€ Hv oe Kal
€TETALAVLOTO aUTols ws €$ éTrimAOUY, Kal ol
Kopiv@ror €Eatrivns tpvpvav éxpovovto, KaTLOOVTES
elxoot vats ‘AOnvaiwy tpocrXeovaas, as tatepov
tav d€xa BonJovs é€émreuWav of "AOnvaion, det-
TAVTES, OTTEP eryevETO, UH ViKYO@ TW of Kepxupaior
Kal at opétepar O€xa ves OrALyYaL apuvELY WoL,
LI. tavtas otv mpoidovtes of KopivOior Kat
urotomnaavtes am “AOnvav eivar, ovy boas
2 éEwpwv adda TELOUS, UTaVveYwpouV. Tois dé Kep-
Kupato.s (€rémeov yap wadrov éx Tov adbavods)

1 Thucydides makes allowance for Salamis, for example,
where Greeks had fought against Persians,

86

BOOK I. L. 2-11. 2

since the ships or the two fleets were many and
covered a great stretch of sea, it was not easy, when
they joined in combat, for the Corinthians to
determine just who were conquering and who were
being conquered ; for this sea-fight was in number of
ships engaged greater than any that Hellenes had
ever before fought against Hellenes.! But as soon
as the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the
shore, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead,?
and they were able to recover most of them and to
fetch them to Sybota, an unused harbour of Thes-
protia, whither the land forces of the barbarians had
come to their aid. When they had accomplished
this, they got their forces together and sailed once
more against the Corcyraeans. And they, with such
of their vessels as were seaworthy and all the rest that
had not been engaged, together with the Attic ships,
on their part also sailed to meet them, fearing that
they would attempt to disembark on their territory.
It was now late and the paean had been sounded for
the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly began to
back water; for they sighted twenty Attic ships
approaching, which the Athenians had sent out after
the ten as a reinforcement, fearing just what
happened, namely that the Corcyraeans would be de-
feated and their own ten ships would be too few to
help them. LI. So when the Corinthians sighted
these ships before the Corcyraeans did, suspecting that
they were from Athens and that there were more of
them than they saw, they began to withdraw. For the
Corcyraeans, however, the Athenian ships were sailing
up more out of view and could not be seen by them,

2 The bodies of the dead which were on the disabled
ships.

87

THUCYDIDES

b e a“ \ b] 4 \ ,
ovy éwpavto, kat eBavpafov tots Kopiwiious
/ / cd
mpuuvav Kpovopévous, mpiv tives LOovTes etmov
Ste vhes éxetvar emimdéovow. Tote 61 Kal avTOL
> , / x A A e /
aveywpouv (Evverxotale yap 76), kat ot KopivOcoe
3 atotpaTomevot THY biddvoW ETTOLNTAVTO. OVTM
\ c > b, tee. / > / Vict /
pev 1) ATTAANAaYN EYEVETO AAANAD, Kal 1 VaVPLAXLA
/ a \ /
4 éTedevTa és vUKTAa. Tots de Kepxupatots oTpato-
rf / % rn
medevomevors emt TH AevKipyn at eixoot vies at
> a cy a z 2 = / ©
éx tav A@nvav atta, wv npxe lAavewy Te o
, RPS / ¢ / \ r
Aedypov cai “Avdoxidns 0 Aewyopov, dia Taev
nr / a“
vexp@v Kal vavaylwv TpocKoma0elioar KaTETEOV
és TO oTpaToTedov ov TOAA® baTepov 7) wPOnaar.
rn \ / /
5 of 6& Kepxupaio (Hv yap vv&) épo8nOncav pn
TONeULAL MOLD, ETTELTA OE EyVWOAY KA WpuloarTo.
a / /
LIL. TH 6é torepaia avayayouevar at te’ Arti-
, a \ a
kal tpidxovta vies kal tov Kepxupaiwy doar
TrMLLOL Hoav eTéTAEVGAY ETL TOV ev TOIs LuBo-
/ b] e e / vw u
tows Atméva, ev & ot KopivOtor wpuovy, Bovdo-
>?
2 evor eldevar eb vavpaynoovow. ot dé Tas pev
S \ ral A \
yavs dpavtes amo THS ys Kal wapatakapevor
, / /
petewpous navyafov, vavpaxias ov dravoovpevor
dpyew EXOVTES, OPAVTES TpoTyeyernuevas TE VAUS
, r > nr ’ lal \ / x \
éx Tov AOnvav axpaipvets Kat opiot Toda TA
v / 3 , \
aropa Evx~BeS8nkota, aiywadwrtov Te Tepl puda-
Ks, ods év Tals vavaoly elxyov, Kal émiaKevnY OvK
a lal / lal
3 ovcay TaV veav ev ywpio épyjuw: Tod b€ olkade
ToD parrov SecKoTrovy 67n Ko“icOnoovTat, de-
/ a /
Sudtes un) of “AOnvaior vouioavtes AedXVaBaL Tas
/ lal = loa ~
otrovéas, SuoTt és yetpas HdOov, ovK eWar ohas
arom Nelv.
lal ¥
LIII. "Eéofev ody adtois avdpas és KeXnTLOV

88

BOOK I. ut. 2-Lul. 1

and so they wondered that the Corinthians were
backing water, until some of them caught sight of the
ships and said, ‘‘ Yonder are ships sailing up.” Then
they too retreated—for it was already getting dark ;
whereupon the Corinthians put their ships about and
broke offthe action. Thus they separated, the sea-fight
ending at nightfall. And while the Corcyraeans were
encamping at Leucimne, the twenty ships from
Athens, under the command of Glaucon son of
Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras, having made
their way through the corpses and the wrecks, sailed
down to the camp not long after they were sighted.
And the Corcyraeans—for it was night—were afraid
they were enemies; but afterwards they recognized
them and the ships came to anchor.

LII. On the next day the thirty Attic ships and
as many of the Corcyraean as were seaworthy put
to sea and advanced against the harbour at Sybota,
where the Corinthians lay at anchor, wishing to see
whether they would fight. But the Corinthians,
although they put out from shore and drew up in
line in the open sea, kept quiet: for they had no
thought of beginning a fight if they could avoid it,
as they saw that fresh ships had arrived from
Athens and that they themselves were involved
in many perplexities, both as regards guarding the
captives whom they had in their ships and the im-
possibility of refitting their ships in a desert place.
What they were more concerned about was the
voyage home, how they should get back, for they
were afraid that the Athenians would consider that
the treaty had been broken, since they had come to
blows, and would not let them sail away.

LIII. Accordingly they determined to put some

89

THUCYDIDES

éuSiBaoavtas avev KnpuKeiov Tpoo me ura Tols

2 “A@nvaios Kal Teipav mouncac Gar. TEMA AVTES
Te éheyou * Totabe* “ ‘Adixcite, @ o avd pes ‘AOnvaior,
TONE LOU apxovres Kal omoveas AvovTeEs” nly yap
TONEULOUS TOUS MLETEPOUS TL pOUMEVOLS éuTrodwy
istacGe oTXa VT ALpopevot. et O° viv youn
€oTl KwAVELY TE Nas emt Képxupav 7 adXoceE et
an Bovropeba TrELY Kal Tas oToVdas RUETE,
nas Tovcde mpwrovs AaPovtes yYpHncadbe as

3 modemios.” of pev 67 ToLlavdTa eEitrov' TaV Se
Kepxvpaiwy To wey otpatotredov bcov émnKkouvaev
aveBoncev evOvs XaBety Te avTOVS Kal aTroKTEtvat,

4 of 6€ “A@nvaios To.doe atrexpivavto: “ Ourte ap-
Xopev TONE LOD, @ avopes Tedorovyncror, ouTeE
Tas omoveas Avouer, Kepxupators bé Tota be Evp-
payxos ovat Bono iAGouev. et pev odY AdroGE
mot BovrecGe rely, ov K@hvopev" et Oe ent
Képxupay Trevaeiabe 7; i) és TOV EXELYWY TL YWpLOD,
ov mepiowopeOa Kata TO duvaTov.”

LIV. Toratdta tav ‘AOnvaiwy atroxpivapévov
of pev KopivOtor Tov Te TAOUY TOV ew oiKoU TapeE-
axevalovto Kal TpoTatov Eotnaay év Tois ev TH
HT E(p@ LuBoros: ol O€ Kepxupaior Td Te vavayla
Kal VEKPOUS avethovTo 7a KaTa opas, efevex Oev-
TOV vmo Te TOU pov Kal avémou, ds YEVOMEVOS TIS
VUKTOS dueaxébacev auTa TAVTAXh, Kal TpoTtaiov
avtéstncay €v Tois ev TH VD 2uBorous @sS

2 vevixnxotes. yvopun 6€ Tordde Exatepos THY VviKnV
mpocerotnaavto’ KopivOsor pev KpaTicavtes TH

1 To bear a herald’s wand would have been a recognition
of a state of war, whereas the Corinthians were anxious not
to be regarded as enemies by the Athenians,

go

BOOK I, tui. 1-tiv. 2

men, without a herald’s wand,! into a boat and send
them to the Athenians, to test their intentions.
And these men bore the following message: “ You
do wrong, men of Athens, to begin war and break a
treaty ; for by taking up arms against us you inter-
fere with us when we are but punishing our enemies.
But if it is your intention to hinder us from sailing
against Corcyra or anywhere else we may wish, and
you thus break the treaty, first take us who are here
and treat us as enemies.”” Thus they spoke; and
all the host of the Corcyraeans that was within
hearing shouted : “ Take them and kill them!” But
the Athenians made answer as follows: “ We are not
beginning war, men of the Peloponnesus, nor are we
breaking the treaty, but we have come to aid the
Corcyraeans here, who are our allies. If, then, you
wish to sail anywhere else, we do not hinder you ;
but if you ever sail against Corcyra or any place of
theirs, we shall not permit it, if we are able to
prevent it.”

LIV. When the Athenians had given this answer,
the Corinthians began preparations for the voyage
homeward and set up a trophy at Sybota on the
mainland ; and the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks
and dead bodies? that had been carried in their
direction by the current and by the wind, which had
arisen in the night and scattered them in en!
es and set up, as being, the victors, a rival _
troph n the island. \ Each side claimed )

| the —_ on the following grounds: The Corinth- /
~ Jans™set up a trophy because they had prevailed in

2 Taking up the dead bodies without asking permission of
the enemy indicated that the field was maintained, and was
therefore a claim of victory.

gI

THUCYDIDES

vaupaxia HEXpL VUKTOS, OOTE KAL vavdya TreloTa
Kai vexpous TporKkouicad Gat, Kal avopas ¢ EXOVTES
aly LaXwTous ovK éXaoooUS Xo vaus Te KaTa-
dvcavtes Trepl éBoounkovta éoTnoav Tpotatov: }
Kepxupaior é€ TplaxovTa vavs pardtoTa ova Oet-
partes, Kal emeon "AOnvaior 7Oov; aVENO EVOL
Ta KaTa opas auToUS vavayla Kal vexpous, Kal
OTL avtois TH Te 7 potepata Tpvpvav KpOvOopLevot
UTeXwpnaav OL Kopiv@voe “iSévtes Tas ‘Artikas
vaus, Kat eed) HAGov ot "AOnvaiot, ovK avTereé-
TEov €x TOV LUBdTwr, dia TadTa TpoTaiov éoTN-
cav. oUTw mer ExaTEpor ViKav HELovYS

LV. Oc 6€ KopivO:oc aroméovtes é’ oixou
"Avaxtopiov, 6 éotw éri TO oTopate ToD “Ap-
TpaKlKOU KONTOV, elAOv amatn (AY Oe KoLVOY
Kepxupaiwr Kal exeivav), Kal KaTaoTicavres
év avT@ KopwOtous oLKnTropas avex@pno ay em
olxou" Kat Tov Kepxupaiwy OKTAKOTLOUS bev ov
oa dovA0L arédovTo, TEVTHKOVTA b€ Kai dLa-
_Koclous Ojoavres epvhaccoy Kal év Jepareta
elov TONAH, OTWS avTots THY Képxupav ava-
Xopnravres Tpoomonceray” eT UY Xavov o€ (Kal
Ouvapet avTay ot Welous Tparor ovTes Ths
TONEWS. 7) ev ovv Képxupa ovtT# Tepuyiyverat
TO TONE MD TOV KopwOwr, Kal a pijes TOV
"AOnvaiay a avexopnoay é€ aur is. aitia &é abrn
Tporn éryéveTo Tou TONELOU Tobs Kopivdtous és
TOUS ’A@nvaious, 6Tt odiow év orovdais peta
Kepxvupatwv evaAU LAX OUY.

LVI. Mera tatta & etOis cali rade EvvéBn

1 Zarnoav tooraiov bracketed by Hude, following Kriiger.

92

BOOK I. tiv. 2-.vi. 1

the sea-fight up to nightfall, and had thus been able
to carry off a greater number of wrecks and dead
bodies, and because they held as prisoners not less
than a thousand men and had disabled about seventy
ships ; and the Corcyraeans, because they had de-
stroyed about thirty ships, and, after the Athenians
came, had taken up the wrecks that came their way
and the dead bodies, whereas the Corinthians on the
day before had backed water and retreated at sight
of the Attic ships, and after the Athenians came
would not sail out from Sybota and give battle—
for these reasons set up a trophy. So each side
claimed the victory.

LV. The Corinthians, as they sailed homeward,
took by stratagem Anactorium, which is at the mouth
of the Ambracian Gulf, a place held by the Corcy-
raeans and themselves in common, and establishing
there some Corinthian colonists returned home. Of
their Corcyraean prisoners they seld eight hundred
who were slaves, but two hundred and fifty they
kept in custody and treated them with much con-
sideration, their motive being that when they re-
turned to Corcyra they might win it over to their
side ;! and it so happened that most of these were
among the most influential men of the city. In this
way, then, Corcyra had the advantage in the war Ss
with the Corinthians, and the ships of the Athenians — ~
withdrew from it. {And this was the first ground |

‘which the Corinthians had for the war against the\
| Athenians, because they had fought with the Corcy- ~
raeans against them in time of truce.
“~~LVI. Immediately after this the following events

r

1 cf. 111. lxx. 1, where the carrying out of this plan of the
Corinthians leads to the bloody feud at Corcyra.

93

THUCYDIDES

ryeréa Oat TOIS: "AOnvaiows Kat TleXorovvncios
dtapopa es 70 TONEMELY. TOV yap Kopibiwr
pac covT@v Tas TLLOpnTovTaL avuTous, UroTo-
mnoavtes THY ExOpav avTav ot “A@nvaios Tlorter-
deatas, of oikovoty emt T® toOue@ tHS ladrAnvns,
KopivOiwv atroixous, eauTav 6€ Evppaxous opou
UTroTenets, exe NEVOV To €s Iladdnvnv tetyos Kabe-
Aely Kal OmmpOUs dovvat, Tous TE emvdnpoupryous
extreme Kal TO NoLTTOY wn SéxecOaL ods KATA
étos éxactov Kopiv@tor. émeurrov, deicavtes pn
aTooT@aL vTrd TE Tepdixxou TrevBopevor Kal
Kopw0iwv, Tous Te GAXdous Tovs é7l Opaxns
EvvaTootTnowat Evppaxous.

LVII. Tadta 6€ epi rods Tlotevdedtas of
"A@nvaior TpoT aper KevalovTo evdus peta TV év
Kepxvpa vavpaxiay’ ol TE yap Kopiv@tor pavepas
dn Sidhopor Haar, Tlepdixcas te 0 AneEavépou,
Maxedovev Bacrrevs, _EMET ONE MOTO Evupaxos
TpoTepov Kat piros OV. erro ew dé, OTL
Dirinre TO éavTob AOENG@ kat Aépda xow7
T pos | avTov evavTLOULEVOLS ot "A@nvator Evupayiav
€moincavTo. Sediws Te ETpaccey és Te THV Aake-
Saipwova TéuTOV OT WS TONE LOS yévntar avtois
™ pos Tledorovyya ious, Kal TOUS Kop ious T poa-
ETOLELTO TIS [orevdatas évexa aTOcTagEws*
TpoaEepepe dé Aovyous Kal Tots el Opakns Nah«e-
dedot nat Bor TLatoLs Evvaroarivat, voter, et
Evppaya tavta ێyxot, duopa ovTa, Ta yopla,

1 Son of Alexander, who had been a friend of the Hellenes
in the Persian war. Perdiccas, who originally ee
only Lower Macedonia, had deprived his brother Philip of

94

*

7 7 by a ie b fad
eq ~— tek ak orn o>
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We: we. ’ ehh a
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: x ‘
‘ad

BOOK I. tvi. 1-tvn. 5

also occurred, which caused differences between the
Athenians and the Peloponnesians and led to the
war. While the Corinthians were devising how they
should take vengeance on the Athenians, the latter,
suspecting their enmity, required of the Potidaeans
(who. dwell on the isthmus of Pallene and are

‘colonists of the Corinthians but tributary allies of the”

Athenians), to pull down their wall on the»side of
Pallene and give hostages, and, furthermore, to send
away and not receive in the future the magistrates
whom the Corinthians were accustomed to send
every year. For they were afraid that the Poti-
daeans, persuaded by Perdiccas! and the Corinthians,
would revolt and cause the rest of the allies in
Thrace to revolt with them.

LVII. These precautions the Athenians took with
regard to the Potidaeans immediately after the sea-
fight at Corcyra; for the Corinthians were now openly
at variance with them, and Perdiccas son of Alexander,
king of the Macedonians, who had before been an
ally and friend, had now become hostile. And he
had become hostile because the Athenians had made
an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas,
who were making common cause against himself.
Alarmed at this he kept sending envoys to Lace-
daemon, trying to bring about a war between Athens
and the Peloponnesians. He sought also to win
over. er Sir with a view to the revolt of

Potidaea;)and, furthermore, he mad@“overtures to”

the Chalcidians of Thrace and the Bottiaeans to join
in the revolt, thinking that if he had as allies these
countries, which bordered on his own, it would be

Upper Macedonia, and now was king of all Macedonia.
See, further, 11. xcix. ff.

95

—- :

THUCYDIDES

fa A \ f ? » aes a 2
6 pdov av Tov TOAEMOoV peET a” TaV TroLetcBaL, wY
€9 A > , 1 € ,
ot A@nvator aicPouevoe Kat BovNopevot TpoKaTa-
a \
AapBavery TOV TOAEWY TAS aTroTTAacELs (ETUYOV
la / /
yap TplaKovTa vavs aTroaTédXoOVTES KAL YLALOUS
e , RES, \ a ? nm ? / fal
omiTas eml Thy iv avTov Apxeotpatov TOU
AvKopnoous peT AXNWY Teccdpwy oTpaTHYyOUN-
val Yi lal lal
TOS), émlaTéAXOVGL TOs apxYovat TOV vewv IloTeL-
5 e a \ ° cal
SeaT@v TE opnpous AaBEiv Kal TO TeLyos Kabenety,
la / \ ty
TOV TE TANGLOV TOAEWY hUAAaAKIY EXELY OTTWS [M1
aTOCTHOOVTAL.
lal \
LVIII. Tlotededtar 5€ méuravtes pev xal
, /
map ’A@nvaiovs mpécBes, ei Twas TELcELaY pH
n / / / / \ \
odhav mépt vewtepifew pndév, éeXovtes dé Kal
; on Neate SoM wii Oi tiks
és tHv Aaxedaipova peta Kopiv6iov,! ores
/ A
éToluaocawto Tiuwpiav, nv én, émerdn Ex TE
"AOnvav €k ToAXOD TpacaovTes ovdEY NUpoOVTO
’ , 2 D) e a Cs RN , \
€mitndeov, GAN ai ves ai emt Maxedoviay Kal
> \ a e / ” \ \ / lal
él odas omoiws émEov Kat Ta TEAN TOV Aake-
/ a
Saimoviwv. UTécxeTo avTots, Hv emi Lloreidarav
ral > \ a
iwow "AOnvaio, és thy Attixny écBarelv, Tote
57 KaTa TOY Kalpoyvy ToUTOY adiotayTaL peta
r \ , A
Xar«idéwv cai Bottiatwv xown Evvopocartes.
t y / \
2 «al Ilepdixcas 7reiGer Nadkidéas Tas evi Oadacon
/ , ,
TOAELS E€XALTTOVTAS Kal KaTtaBarXovTas avotKi-
> v , , , 5) \
cacbat és “OdvvOov piav Te Tod TaVTHY LoxUpaY
a ’ fal / a fal
moincac@ar Tols T ExALTTOVGL TOUTOLS THS EaUTOU
al a / \
yns THs Murydovias mepi tiv BorBnv Xipuvny
” / ¢ bal e \ ’ / /
édwKe véwerOat, Ews av 0 Tpos ‘A@nvatous TroXe-

1 %xpaccov, before drws in all MSS., deleted by Poppo.
96

BOOK I. tvi. 5-Lvi. 2

easier, in conjunction with them, to carry on the
war. But the Athenians became aware of these
designs, and wishing to forestall the revolt of the
cities, ordered the commanders of their fleet (since
they happened to be sending against the country of
Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under
the command of Archestratus son of Lycomedes
and four others) to take hostages of the Potidaeans
and pull down their wall, and also to keep a watch
upon the neighbouring towns and prevent them
from revolting.

LVIII. The Potidaeans, on the other hand, sent
envoys to Athens, to see if they could persuade
them not to take any harsh measures with reference to
themselves; but envoys of theirs went also to Lace-
daemon in the company of the Corinthians, with
the object of having assistance ready to hand in
case of need. From the Athenians, with whom they
carried on protracted negotiation, they obtained no
satisfactory result, but on the contrary the ships
destined to attack Macedonia proceeded to sail
against themselves as well, whereas the magis-
trates of the Lacedaemonians promised them to
invade Attica if the Athenians went against Poti-
daea; so they seized this opportunity and revolted,
entering into a formal alliance with the Chalcidians’
and Bottiaeans. Perdiccas at the same time per
suaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull dowr
their cities on the sea-coast and settle inland at
Olynthus, making there a single strong city; and
he gave them, when they abandoned their cities, a
part of his own territory of Mygdonia around Lake
Bolbe to cultivate as long as they should be at war

s.e. the Chalcidians of Thrace,

9?

THUCYDIDES

5 a eece \ : , , a
pos . Kal of pev av@xifovto te KaParpodytes
Tas odes Kal és ToAE“ov TaperKevafovTo:
LIX. ai S€ tpraxovta vies TOV “AOnvaiwy adgi-
Kvoovtas és Ta et Opaxns Kai katadapBavovor
tiv Te Ilotetdacav Kal TAXA adeotynKOTa. vopt-
cavtes 5& of ctpatnyot abvvata eivat pos TE
Tlepdixxav Todeuety TH Tapovon Suvdper Kai Ta
Evvadeot@ta ywpla, Tpérovtar emt THY Maxe-
Soviav, édb’ Owep Kal TO mpa@Ttov é£eTéwTrovTo, Kal
KaTacTavtes €mroNguouv peta DiritT0v Kal TOV
AépSou aderpav avabev otpatid ésBeBXnKOTMV.

LX. Kai &v tovt@ ot Kopiv@to1, ths Motedatas
adectnkvias Kai Tov “Attixov vedv tept Make-
Soviav ovadr, Sed.oTes TEpl TO Kwpio Kal oiKetov
Tov Kivduvoyv Hyovpmevoe TéuTOVoW éavT@Y TE
eOeXovTas Kal TOV a\Xov IleXoTOVYnGiwy p1cO@
metcavtes 飀axocious Kal ytdXiovs TOUS TavTas
OmAitas Kal wWidovs TeTpaKkoclous. éaTpaTHyeL
Sé aitav ’Apiotets 0 'Adetpavtou, kata pidiav
TE QUTOD OvY HKLoTa of Teiatoe €x KopivOou
otpati@tat eGerovtal Evvéctrovto: Av yap Tots
Ilorevdedtais alei Tote émitndelos. Kai adixvovr-
Tal TeccapakooTH nuepa vaotepov ert Opaxns 7
Iloreiéara atréaTn.

LXI. "HA@e 8€ Kal trois ’"AOnvatois evOvs 7
ayyedia TaV Tokewy OTL apectact, KaL Tépu-
qmovow, ws noGovTo Kat Tovs peta ‘AptoTtéws
érimapiovtas, Suaxidiovs éauT@v omAiTas Kal
TEegaapaKoVTa vads Tpos Ta adeoTata, Kai Kad-
Aiav tov Kaddiabdov réurtov avtov atpatnyov
of adixopevor és Maxedoviay rp@tov KatadapBa-

98

BOOK I. tvur. 2-Lx1. 2

with the Athenians. And so they proceeded to
dismantle their cities, move inland, and prepare for
war. LIX. But when the thirty ships of the
Athenians reached the coast of Thrace, they found
Potidaea and the other places already in revolt.
Whereupon the generals, thinking it impossible with
their present force to wage war with both Perdiccas
and the places which had revolted, turned their
attention to Macedonia, which was their destination
at the start, and when they had got a foothold
carried on war in concert with Philip and the
brothers of Derdas, who had already invaded Mace-
donia from the interior with an army.

LX. Thereupon the Corinthians, seeing that
Potidaea had revolted and the Attic ships were in
the neighbourhood of Macedonia, were alarmed
about the place and thinking that the danger came
home to them, dispatched volunteers of their own
and such other Peloponnesians as they induced
by pay, in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four
hundred light-armed troops. The general in com-
mand was Aristeus son of Adimantus; and it was
chiefly because of friendship for him that most of the
soldiers from Corinth went along as volunteers; for
he had always been on friendly terms with the Poti-
daeans. And they arrived on the coast of Thrace
on the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidaea.

LXI. The news of the revolt of the cities quickly
reached the Athenians also; and when they learned
that troops under Aristeus were also on the way to
support the rebels, they sent against the places in
revolt two thousand of their own hoplites and forty
ships, under Callias son of Calliades with four other
generals. ‘These first came to Macedonia and found

99

THUCYDIDES

yougt TOUS TpoTépous xirtous B€punv apte 7Hp1-
KOTAS KQL Ivdvay ToNopKobVTas, mpockabe-
Copevor 6€ Kal avtol THY IIlvdvav emoMopenaav
pév, erecta b€ EvpBaow TOLNTALEVOL al Eup-
paxiav avaryKatay T pos TOV Lepéixcar, & @S aUTOUS
KaTHTELYEV a Ilote(éata Kai o Aptotevs mapehn-
AvG@s, atTavictavtat €K THS Maxedovias, Kal
apicopevor és Bépovay KaKelOev ert =rpéyar! Kal
TEelpacayTes Tp@TOv 7 TOU X.@ptov cal ouyx édovTes
eT OpevovTO KaTa yiv Tpos Ty Tlote‘éavav
TpLaYXLALOLS bev omAiTaus EAUTOV, Xepls d€ TOV
Evppaxov Todos, iTTEVTL be é€axooious Make-
Sovev Tots pera Dirimrov Kai Haveaviou: apa
dé vies TapémAcov EBSdSourKovta. Kat’ odtyov 6é
mpoiovtes tpttaio. adixovto és Tiywvov «al
éoTpatoTredevaavTo.

LXII. Iotededtar 6€ nat ot pera *"Apiotéws
TleXorrovynciot mpocdeyopuevotr tovs “A@nvaious
éotpatotedevovto mpos ‘OduvvGov ev TO tcOu@
Kal ayopav é&w THs TONEwS ETTETTOiNVTO. aTpa-
THOU bev ovv TOU melod TAVTOS Ob Evupaxor
7pNVvTo "Apiotéa, TAS 66 trmou Tlepdixxay: aTtéaTn
yap evOUs Tad Tov ‘AOnvaiwv Kat Evvewayet
Tols Tlorededrais ‘lohaov av? avtov KaTacTHoas
apxovTa. av d€ 7 yvoun Tov "Apia téws, TO ev
pe” EaUTOU OT pPATOTrEOY ExOvTL® év TO icOuod
emeTnpely tovs A@nvaious, hv ériwat, Xan«udéas
dé kal Tos &€w icO pov Evppaxous Kal THY Tapa
Ilepdicxov Staxociav immov év ’OdivO@ péver,

1 él Srpévav, Pluygers’ certain emendation for émorpé-
Wavtes of the MSS.
2 Madvig deletes, followed by Hude.

1090

BOOK I. ix. 2-Lxu. 3

that the former thousand had just taken Therme
and were besieging Pydna; so they also took part
in the siege of Pydna. But afterwards they con-
cluded an agreement and an alliance with Per-
diccas, being forced thereto by the situation of
Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus, which compelled
them to. hasten, and then they withdrew from Mace-
donia. On their way they came to Beroea and
thence to Strepsa,! and after an unsuccessful at-
tempt upon this place proceeded overland to Poti-
daea with three thousand hoplites of their own and
with many of their allies besides, and with six
hundred Macedonian cavalry, who were under the
command of Philip and Pausanias; and at the same
time their ships, seventy in number, sailed along the
coast. And marching leisurely they arrived on the
third day at Gigonus, and went into camp.

LXII. The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians
under Aristeus were awaiting the Athenians, en-
camped on the Olynthian side of the isthmus; and
they had established a market outside of the city.
The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the
infantry, and Perdiccas of the cavalry ; for Perdiccas
had immediately deserted the Athenians again? and
was now in alliance with the Potidaeans, having
appointed lolaus as his administrator at home. The
plan of Aristeus was as follows: he was to hold his
own army on the isthmus and watch for the approach
of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians and the
other allies from outside of the isthmus® and the
two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas were to

1 In Mygdonia, north of Therme.

2 For his first desertion of the Athenians, see ch. lvii.

3 i.e. the Bottiaeans, who, like the Chalcidians, lived out-
side the isthmus.

Iol

THUCYDIDES

> ’ a ae A A A ,
kal 6tav A@nvaior eri spas YwpOot, KaTA vwTOU
Lal lal Cal \
BonOodvtas év péow Trorety AVTA@V TOUS TrONEMLOUS.
€ cal > / Z
KadXias 8 at 6 tTav ‘APnvaiwy otpatnyds Kal oi
\ y , € ~
Evvapyovtes tovs wev Maxedovas imméas Kal Tav
, >] / > Ni , > /
Evppayewv ortyous éri ‘OdvvOou aroréutrovaw,
ev yv \ > tal > ral > \ ‘
OTWS Elpywat Tovs EexetOev EmiBonOety, adTo dé
/ ,
avacTnaavTes TO oTpaTOTrEdoy Eywpouy él THI
’ \ \ lal lal
Ilotetdarav. Kal émecdn pos TO icOue éyévovTo
/
Kai eldov Tovs évayTiovs TapacKxevalomévous ws
, \ ,
és wayny, avtixabiatavto Kal avToi, Kal ov TOAD
¢i \ \ \ a
tatepov Evvéutoyov. Kal avTo pev TO TOD “Apt-
\ Lal
aTéws KEpaS Kal Ooo. Tepl Exetvov Haav KopivOiwy
Te kal TOV addwy RAoydbes ETpeWav TO Kal
€ \ \ > a“ , > \ , \
€autTous Kal éreEnNOov Stm@Kovtes ert TorU: TO
5€ adddXo otpatoredov Lotedeatav xai IleXo-
a \ lal > / \
movvnciwv nocato uTO TaV A@nvaiwy Kal és TO
a ,
TELyos KaTEpuyeV.
a = a fol
LXIII. ‘Ezavaywpav $€ 0 “Apioteds aro ths
, e an \ ww /
duwEews, @S Opa TO AAO GTPaTEVLA oOoHMEVO?,
€ / /
nmopnoe pev oTroTépwae Siaxivduvevon Ywpyaas,
h emt tis ‘OdvvOou 4 és thy Ilotetdarav: éoke
, \ n
8 otv Euvayayovtt tovs pel’ éavtovd ws és
> , , , , > \
é\ayistov ywplov dpoum BracacBar és tip
\ a \ \
Iloteiéarav, kai waphdOe Ttrapa thy ynrnv ba
a / , \ 7
THs Oardoons Bardopevos TE Kal yYaXeTas, OXI-
, \ , ,
yous wév Tivas aToBadwv, Tous O€ TAELOUS Twaas.
of © amo Tis (OdXvvOou trois Lotededrars BonOoi

1902

BOOK I. uxn. 3-Lxu. 2

remain at Olynthus; then when the Athenians
should move against the forces of Aristeus, the
others were to come up and attack them in the rear,
and thus place the enemy between their two divi-
sions. But Callias, the commander of the Athenians,
and his colleagues sent the Macedonian cavalry and
a few of the allies toward Olynthus, to shut off aid
from that quarter, while they themselves broke
camp and advanced against Potidaea. And when
they arrived at the isthmus and saw the enemy pre-
paring for battle, they took up their position facing
them ; and soon the two sides joined battle. And
the wing led by Aristeus himself, which included
the picked Corinthian and other troops, routed the
forces opposed to them and pressed on a long dis-
tance in pursuit; but the rest of the army of the
Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians was worsted by
the Athenians and took refuge within the walls of
Potidaea.

LXIII. When Aristeus returned from the pursuit
and saw that the rest of the army was defeated, he
was at a loss whether he should try to fight his way
through towards Olynthus or into Potidaea. He
determined, however, to bring his own troops to-
gether into as compact a body as possible and to force
his way into Potidaea on arun. And he succeeded
in getting in by way of the breakwater through the
sea, with difficulty, indeed, and harassed by missiles ;
but though he lost a few men, he saved the greater
number of them. Now when the battle began and
the standards had been raised,! the auxiliaries of

1 These signals were not for battle, but for the Olynthian
auxiliaries to come, and as soon as it became clear, through

the speedy success of the Athenians, that their object could
not be accomplished, they were lowered.

103

THUCYDIDES

(améyer dé eEnKovTa padre oTadtous Kal éoTe
KaTapaves), WS u) payn eylyvero Kal Ta onpela
7pOn, Bpaxv pév Te _T por) Oov @S Bon? ycovtes,
kat of Maxedoves imms avtitapetatavto ws
KwAvaovTEs* émreldn b&€ dia Tayous H viKn TOV
"A@Onvaiwy éyiyveto Kal Ta onpelta KaTeoTradOn,
Tadw éravex@pour és TO Tetyos Kal of Maxedoves
mapa tovs "A@nvaious: immys & ovdeTépors Trape-
yévovTo. peTa O€ THY wdyNnVY TpoTatoy ~cTHnTaV
of “AOnvaiot Kal Tous vexpovs voamovdous aTreé-
Socav tots lotedeatais: améGavov 5é Wotedea-
T@v pev Kal Tov Evupaywv orjLy@ éAdoaoOUS
tpiaxootwyv, A@nvaiwy d€ avTav TevTHKOVTA Kal
éxatov Kal KadXias 0 otpaTnyos.

LXIV. To 6€ é« Tob LaO ov Tetxos! evOus ol
"A @nvaior arrotevxia ares ep povpour TO &° és Thy
Tadrxvny areiXoTov Av ov yap ixavol évopefov
elvar év TE TO LoOUO poupeiv Kal és THY Tanr-
AnvHY SuaBdvres revyitew, S€OLOTES ea odiotv ot
Ilotesdeatac Kal ot Evppaxor yevouevors dixa
émiOwvtat. Kal TuvPavoperoe ol ev TH TOEL
"A@nvator thy TladAnvnv ateiyiotov ovcav, Kpovm
istepov méutovow é€axoolovs Kal xXLALous
omAiTas éauT@v Kal Popptwva TOV ‘Acwmiov
oTparyyov" os APLKOMEVOS és THY Tadrnvny Kal eg
"Advtios opp@pevos Tpoonyaye TH Llorerdaia tov

1 Classen deletes, followed by Hude.

1 On the Athenian side were 600 Macedonian cavalry
(ch. lxi. 4), on the Potidaean side 200 Macedonian cavalry
under Perdiccas (ch. lxii. 3).

2 Thucydides omits the loss of the allies of the Athenians.

2 The wall on the isthmus side of the Potidaeans is the

104

BOOK I. vx. 2—LxIv. 3

the Potidaeans in Olynthus—which is only about
sixty stadia distant and can be seen from Potidaea—
advanced a short distance to give aid, and the Mace-
donian cavalry drew up in line against them to
prevent it. But since the Athenians were soon
proving the victors and the standards were pulled
down, the auxiliaries retired again within the walls
of Olynthus and the Macedonians rejoined the
Athenians. And so no cavalry got into action
on either side.! After the battle the Athenians set
up a trophy and gave up their dead under a truce to
the Potidaeans. There were slain, of the Potidaeans
and their allies a little less than three hundred, and
of the Athenians alone? about a hundred and fifty, -
and also their general Callias.

LXIV. The city wall on the isthmus side? the
Athenians immediately cut off by a transverse wall
and set a guard there, but the wall toward Pallene
was not shut off. For they thought their numbers
were insufficient to maintain a garrison on the isthmus
and also to cross over to Pallene and build a wall
there too, fearing that, if they divided their forces,
the Potidaeans and their allies would attack them.
Afterwards, when the Athenians at home learned
that Pallene was not blockaded, they sent sixteen
hundred of their own hoplites under the command
of Phormio son of Asopius; and he, when he arrived
at Pallene, making Aphytis his base, brought his
army to Potidaea, marching leisurely and ravaging
reixos of ch. lxii. 6; the wall to Pallene is that mentioned
in ch. lvi. 2 as rd és MadAhyny tetxos.

4 The investment of Potidaea was effected by walling off
first the northern and then also the southern city wall by a

‘blockading wall; on the west and east, where the city ex-

tended to the sea, the blockade was made with ships.

Io
VOL. I. E 5

THUCYDIDES

oTpatov, kata Bpaxyd mpoiwy Kal Keipwv apa THI
3 yi: ws b€ ovdels éemeEne és paynv, atreteiyic
ves a / lal \ ef ww
to ex THS LladdAnvns tetxos* Kal ottws HO Kate
/ € , > / > A
xpatos » Iloteidara audotépwhev érrodopKett
Kal €x Gaddoons vavoly dua éboppoveats.

> P > / 54 , a / >
éATrida ovdeuiavy Exwv cwTnplas, hv wn TL an
a ¥
IleXomtrovyxjcou adXo Tapa Aoyov yiyvnTta
\
EvveBovreve ev ANY TevTaKOTiwY AvEe“ov T
/ lal Mv > lal 7 > \ /
pyoacte tTols adrAols ExTTAEVTAL, OTWS ETL TE
e a , \ » n
0 altos avTicxn, Kal avTos H0eXe TAY pevovTe
* e > > » , ae ae ,
elvat' ws © ovK érreiOe, BourNomevos Ta emi TOUTE
, 5 A oy ¢ e ”
TapacKkevatey Kal OTrws TA CEwOer E£er ws Apiar
a \ a b]
éxTAouv Trovettat AaV@y tHv dvraxny tov A€
/ \ , > a , »”
2 valwv’ Kal Tapapuévwv ev Xadkidevot Ta TE AA
, \ a \
Evvetrodkéuer Kal LepuvrAl@v Aoynoas mpos

0

ToAEL TOANOVS SiePOerpev, és Te THY IleNorovt | ,

3 cov érpaccev brn wberla Tis yevijoeTar. pp #

dé THs Llotedaias tHv arrotetyicw Popyiwv | m

4 \ € \ P \ pe lo mi
éxwv tors éEaxoctous Kal yihious THY Xadkioup

| po

\ /
kat Botticny édyjov Kai éotw & Kal Toriop
elev. es
LXVI. Tots & ’A@nvaiows cai [leXotrovynofis | 5,
ae. \ * , ix ? , ,
aitiat pev avtat mpooyeyévnvtTo! és adAANA
lal \ 61 2 ¢ ‘ IL a) e l
trois pev KopivOios” bt tTHv Lloteidarav éavps
* ? / \ ” 5 e ‘ fin
ovoav atrolKiav Kat avopas Kopivéiwy te fa

1 Hude reads mpovyeyernvro, with BCE.
2 Hude inserts, after Kopiv@los, the words és rods A@nvpus } Uy!

following Reiske

HI
4

106

==

1

BOOK I. wtxiv. 2—txvi. 1

the country at the same time. And as no one came
out against him to give battle he built a wall to
blockade the Pallene wall. And so Potidaea was at
length in a state of siege, which was prosecuted
vigorously on both sides of it as well as by sea,
where a fleet blockaded it.

LXV. As for Aristeus, now that Potidaea was cut
off by the blockade and he had no hope of saving it
unless help should come from the Peloponnesus or
something else should happen beyond his expecta-
tion, he advised all the garrison except five hundred
men to wait for a wind and sail out of the harbour,
that the food might hold out longer, and he himself
was ready to be one of those who should remain. But
since he could not gain their consent, wishing to do
the next best thing and to provide that their affairs
outside should be put into the best possible con-
dition, he sailed out, unobserved by the Athenian
guard, He then remained among the Chalcidians,
whom he assisted generally in carrying on the war,
and especially by destroying a large force of Ser-
mylians, whom he ambushed near their city; and
meanwhile he kept up negotiations with the Pelo-
ponnesians to see if some aid could not be obtained.
Phormio, however, after the investment of Potidaea
was complete, took his sixteen hundred troops and
ravaged Chalcidice and Bottice ; and he also cap-
tured some towns.

LXVI. As between the Athenians and the Pelo-
ponnesians, then, these additional grounds of com-
plaint had arisen on either side, the Corinthians
being aggrieved because the Athenians were besieg-
ing Potidaea, a colony of theirs with men in it from

107

THUCYDIDES

TleAorovynaiwy é€v auth ovTas émolopKow, Tots
6é "AOnvaioss € és TOUS Ilehorovynatous OTL éauTa@v
TE TONAL Evupaxioa Kab popov UmoTenh atré-
oTnoay Kal ehOovtes adic ato TOU '™ popavous
€uaXOvTO peta LlotedeaTov. ov HEVTOL 6 ve
TONE LOS To Evvepparyet, GXN ett avoxwxn Vv
ista yap TavTa ol Kopiv@.o1 én pakay.

LXVII. [lodopkoupévns 8€ rijs Tloresdaias
oux jovxatov, avdpav te ohicw évovTwy Kal
dua mepl Te yopio deduoTes. TapeKad\ouy Te
evOus és THY ANaxedaimova TOUS Evppaxous Kal
KaTeBowy ehOovres Tov "AOnvatov OTL oTroveds
Te NEAVKOTES Elev KAL aduxoiev THY IleXotrovvnaov.
Atywihtat Te davep@s pev ov ™ peo Bevopevor,
debz0 Tes TOUS ‘AOnvaious, Kpupa 5é, ovx Heir
per’ avTav evyyov TOV TONELOD, AéyouTes OvUK
elvat AUTOVOMOL KATA TAS omovods. ot 6€ Aaxe-
Satpoveot MpooTapakanéa aves TOV Evpuaxyov
kat! et tis'te aAXOS én) nHoiKHa Oat UTrO ‘AOnvator,
EvARoyov ohav auTay TOLNTAVTES TOV eL@OoTa)
Néyerv™ ex€eevOY. Kal aot TE TaplovTes éyKXn-
pata €TOLODVTO @S xa ToL Kal Meyapijs, 5n-
AOdVTES EV KAL ETEPA OVK oriya dudgopa, padara
dé Lepevov TE elpryer Cat TOV ev TH "A Onvaiwv
apyn kat THs AtTiKis ayopas Tapa Tas oroveds.
mapedovres dé terevtaios Kopiv@sor Kal TOUS
adXovus édoayTes mpa@tov tapokdvar Tovs Aaxe-
Salpovious €7retTrov Towdoe.

LXVELE *'To Toa TOY vpas, @ Aaxedatpovrot,
Tis Kal’ buds avtods todTeias Kal opmidias

1 Hude reads te xa} with C and some inferior MSS.

108

i a

BOOK I. vcxvi. 1-Lxvit. 1

Corinth and the Peloponnesus, the Athenians, because
the Peloponnesians had brought about the revolt of
a city that was an ally and tributary of theirs, and
then had come and openly fought with the Potidaeans
against themselves. As yet, however, the war had
not openly broken out, but there was still a truce
for in these things the Corinthians had acted only on
their own authority.

LXVII. But when siege was laid to Potidaea they
did not take it quietly, not only because Corinthians
were in the town, but also because they were in fear
about the place; and they immediately summoned
the allies to Lacedaemon and, once there, they pro-
ceeded to inveigh against the Athenians on the
ground that they had broken the treaty and were
wronging the Peloponnesus. The Aeginetans also
sent delegates—not openly, to be sure, for they
feared the Athenians, but secretly—and, acting with
the Corinthians, took a leading part in fomenting
the war, saying that they were not autonomous as
stipulated in the treaty. Then the Lacedaemonians
sent out a summons to all the other allies who.
claimed to have suffered any wrong at the hands ot
the Athenians, and calling their own customary
assembly bade them~speak. Others came forward
and stated their several complaints, and particularly
the Megarians, who presented a great many other
grievances, and chiefly this, that they were ex-
cluded from the harbours throughout the Athenian
dominions and from the Athenian market, contrary
to the treaty. Lastly the Corinthians, after they
had first allowed the others to exasperate the Lace-
daemonians, spoke as follows :—

LXVIII. “That spirit of trust which marks your
domestic policy, O Lacedaemonians, and your relations

109

f r > a
a . ey 6 e
, Tir. “

Tee 5 §

<<

“THUCY DIDES ©

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n 4
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éxete, auabla dé TAEoVL TPOS Ta EEW TPayyaTA
a / rn
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/
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Gra THY AeyovTwY Madov UTEVoEITE ws EVEKa
Tav avtois idia duapcpwv Aeyouowy Kal oe avto:
ou | arply Tao XEL, ANN’ érrerdn Ev TR Epyo oa
tous Euppdyous tovase mapexarécate, év ols
a > val \
TPOTHKEL MAS OVY HKLOTA ELTELY OOM Kal péyLoTA
’ / ” e \ \ ? £ € ,
eyxAnuata exomwev, vo pev “A@nvatwv vBp.fo-
\ fal 4
pevol, UTO O€ UUa@Y apedovpevol. Kal ef pepv
a , A ¢€
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, a fe 5 se , an \ , oa
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paxpnyopety, ay Tovs pev Sedovd@pévous oparTe,
cal >] b] / > 9 \ > 4
tots 8 émiBovAevovtas avTovs, Kal ovxX HKLoTa
n \ Lal
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Taper Kevad MEVOUS, El TOTE TOAEMNTOVTAL; OV yap
av Ké ty Te UTTOAaBorTES Bia Huav Eixov Kal
adv Képxupay te vr s Bia ne Yov Kal
, ? \ a /
TloteiSatav érrodopKouv: @v TO meév ETT LKAaLpOTATOD
/ \ \ > ae , > a e \
Ywplov Tpos Ta él Opakns aroyphaba, 7 Sé
/ na
vauTikov av péytotov Tapécye Tots IleXozrovn-
olous.
al lal , a
LXIX. “ Kal tavde byets aitior, TO Te MP@TOv
27 ? \ \ / \ \
€dcavtTes avtov’s THY Tok peTa TA Mydixa

IIo

BOOK I. vxvin. 1- “xix, 1

with one another, renders you more mistrustful
if we bring any charge against others, and thus
while this quality gives you sobriety, yet because
of it you betray a want of understanding in dealing
with affairs abroad. For example, although we
warned you time and again of the injury the
Athenians were intending to do us, you refused to
accept the information we kept giving you, but pre-
ferred to direct your suspicions against the speakers,
feeling that they were actuated by their own private
interests. And this is the reason why you did not act
before we got into trouble, but it is only when we
are in the midst of it that you have summoned these
allies, among whom it is especially fitting that we
should speak, inasmuch as we have the gravest accu-
sations to bring, insulted as we have long been by the
Athenians and neglected by you. And if they were
wronging Hellas in some underhand way, you might
have needed additional information on the ground
of your ignorance ; but as the case stands, what need
is there of a long harangue, when you see that they
have enslaved some of us! and are plotting against
others, notably against your—own allies, and that
they have long been making their preparations with
a view to the contingency of war? For otherwise
they would not have purloined Corcyra, which they
still hold in despite of us, and would not be besieg-
ing Potidaea—one of these being a most strategic
point for operations on the Thracian coast, while the
other would have furnished a very large fleet to the
Peloponnesians.

LXIX. “And the blame for all this belongs to
you, for you permitted them in the first instance to

+ ape especially to the Aeginetans, in the other

cases to the Megarians and Potidaeans.
Il!

THUCYDIDES

a \ a ,
Kpatovat Kal boTepov TA paKpa oTHoal TELyN, ES
a / >
T0de TE alel ATooTEpOvVTES OV povoY TOUS UIT
\
éxeivov SedovAwpévous eAevOGepias, GANA Kal TOUS
e / + / > \ e /
Upmetépous On Evpdyxous:; ov yap o dovdwad-
oe 78 a na
LEevos, GAN’ oO Suvdpevos wey TAavVcaL, TEeplopa@v Oé
ir bé as 2% 5 a ” x \ vEL a
arnbéctepov avTo Spa, elmep Kat THY akiwouy THs
= A € Sf)
apeThs ws éhevOepav tiv “EdAddda pépetar. pworss
\ a / \ ’ \ ca > \ rad
dé viv ye EvyyjAPopev Kati ovdé vov él dhavepois.
an %& > rad > / 7 ra > \
Yphv yap ovK el adtxovpeOa ETL oKoTreEiv, adda
Kal’ 6 Te auvvovpeba: ot yap! Spavres BeBounrev-
/ \ > , 4 \ > /
pévol Tpos ov dLreyvwKoTas On Kai ov pédXoVTES
b] / \ > / / e a £')>
émépyovtalt. Kal émiotduea ola cd@ ot ‘AOn-
a > ’ / fa)
vaio. Kal 6TL KaT OXLyOV, YwpovatW emt TOUS
/ \ / \ DLA \ x
méXas. Kal AavOdvery pev olouevor Sia TO
avaicOnrov vuav hacov Capacovet, yvovtes Oé
elOdTas Teplopayv iaxupas eyKElcOVTaL. novyd-
\ , ¢€ / 9 / > aA
fete yap povor “EXdAnvav, @ Aaxedatpoviol, ov TH
, , 9 \ A , ’ , \
Suvdpet TLVa, ANNA TH meAAHoTEL Awuvopevot, Kal
4 » a lal
ovo. ovK apxouévny Thy av&now TeV éxOpar,
/ \ / , > /
diumAacoupévynv 6€ KaTadVoVTES. Kaito. éréyerOe
’ val * 2 ” e Ud a b ,
acpanrels elvat, wy apa oO NOYOS TOU Epryou ExpaTel.
\ a fol
tov te yap Mijoov avtot iopev ex mepatav yijs

quar

ani ec , \ :
mpotepoy émt tiv IleXordvyncov érXOdvta h Ta
4

1 of yap, so MSS.: Hude reads of ye after Classen.

1 See ch. xc. ff. 2 See ch. evii. 1.
8 Referring to the recent increase of the Athenian navy by
the accession of the Corcyraean fleet.

II2

BOOK I. vxix. 1-5

strengthen their city after the Persian war,’ and _/
afterwards to build their Long Walls,? while up to

this very hour you are perpetually defrauding of their
freedom not only those who have been enslaved by
them, but now even your own allies also. For the
state which has reduced others to slavery does not
in a more real fashion enslave them than the state
which has power to prevent it, and yet looks care-
lessly on, although claiming as its preéminent dis-
tinction that it is the liberator of Hellas. And now
at last we have with difficulty managed to come
together, though even now without a clearly defined
purpose. For we ought no longer to be considering
whether we are wronged, but how we are to avenge
our wrongs. For where men are men of action, it is
with resolved plans against those who have come to no
decision, it is at once and without waiting, that they
advance. We know too by what method the Athen-
ians move against their neighbours—that it is here
a little and there alittle. And aslong as they think
that, owing to your want of perception, they are
undetected, they are less bold; but once let them
learn that you are aware but complaisant, and they
will press on with vigour. For indeed, O Lacedae-
monians, you alone of the Hellenes pursue a passive
policy, defending yourselves against aggression, not
by the use of your power, but by your intention to
use it; and you alone propose to destroy your
enemies’ power, not at its inception,’but when it is
doubling itself. And yet you had the reputation of
running no risks; but with you, it would seem, repute
goes beyond reality. For example, the Persian, as
we ourselves know, came from the ends of the earth
as far as the Peloponnesus before your forces went

113

THUCYDIDES

> lal / lel ~
Tap wpav afiws wpoatavticat, Kal viv Tovs
"AG, / > e / 4 ] Lad An” > \
valous ovy ExdS, WaTTEP ExEiVOV, GAN eyyvs
” rn \ ? \ n > a > \
6vTas Teplopate, Kal avtl Tov émedOeiy avTol
/ 4 val
auvverPat Bovrecbe padrrov éridvtas Kal és
/ ~ \ XAG 6 / > fo
TVXAS) TPOS TOAAG OuvaTwtéepous aywrilouevoe
KATAOTHVAl, eTLaTapevor Kal TOV BapRapov avTov
\ e al \ / / \ \ > \
MEPL AUT@ Ta TAELW TGharEeVTA Kal TPOS AUTOS
\ > / 7 rn
tous ‘A@nvaiovs mroddka Huas 6n Tols ayapTn-
5) lal al Xa a 5] | e r /
paciw avTav padrov 4 TH ad vuav Timwpia
/ ir 4
Tepryeyevnuevous* eel al ye vpéTepar edrridES
, \ \ fel
On Twas Tov Kal aTapacKevous 61a TO TLOTED-
cat épOepay. Kal pnoels tudv én éxOpa To
pav. PACES +e gs oar mile
TrEov 4 aiTia vouion Tdbe AéyeoOat aitia pe
7) : LG 7) Y t@ MEV
D3 } > cal > id /
yap ditwv avdp@v éotw apaptavovtwy, Katn-
/ a7 a b ,
yopia bé éyOpav adixnoavtov.
LXX. “Kat dua, elwep tivés kal adrot, vout-
~ a a LU / > a
Couev aksor eivar tots méXas Woyov émeveyxely,
dAXws TE Kal weydrov Tov diahepovtayv KabecTo-
Vie > , 4 e n tal ȢO?
TwV, TEpl MY OvK aicOdvecbar Huiyv ye SoKette OVS
b / , \ A eo See. 78 ,
éxroyicacGat TwToTE pos olous bpuiv ’AOnvaious
” » aad e a \ e la} / e
évTas Kal dcov vuov Kal ws wav Siadpépovtas oO
ayov éctal. ob pév ye vewTEpoTrolol Kal ém-
a > al \ b , 4 a x n
vonoat ofets Kal éemutedécar Epyw & av yvaowr,
e lal \ \ e / / / \ > ”
bpets 6€ Ta UTdpKovTd Te OMLEW Kal emLyVavaL
\ ‘) ” , \ > - >’ /
pnodev kal Epym ovde tavayxaia é€ixécOas.

114

BOOK I. txrx. 5-Lxx. 2

forth to withstand him in a manner worthy of your
power; and now you regard with indifference tiie
Athenians who are not afar off, as the Persian was, but
near at hand, and instead of attacking them your-
selves, you prefer to ward them off when they
attack, and incur hazard by joining in a struggle
with opponents who have become far more powerful.
Yet you know that the Barbarian failed mostly by
his own fault, and that in our struggles with the
Athenians themselves we have so far often owed
our successes rather to their own errors than to any
aid received from you ; indeed, it is the hopes they
have placed in you that have already ruined more
than one state! that was unprepared just because
of trust in you. And let no one of you think that
these things are said more out of hostile feeling
than by way of complaint ; for complaint is against
friends that err, but accusation against enemies that
have inflicted an injury.

LXX. “ And besides, we have the right, we think,
if any men have, to find fault with our neighbours,
especially since the interests at stake for us are im-
portant. To these interests it seems to us at least
that you are insensible, and that you have never even
fully considered what sort of men the Athenians are
with whom you will have to fight, and how very, how
utterly, different they are from you. For they are
given to innovation and quick to form plans and to
put their decisions into execution, whereas you are
disposed merely to keep what you have, to devise
nothing new, and, when you do take action, not to
carry to completion even what is indispensable.

1 Alluding perhaps to the Thasiana (ch. ci.) and the
Euboeans (ch. cxiv.).

115

THUCYDIDES

Ss \ e A ‘ \ / A \

adOis S€ of wev Kat Tapa Sivaplv TorApnTal Kal
~~ a A

Tapa yvaunv Kivduvevtat Kal év tots Sewwvois

» We \ ~ id / fal Ye ? rn

evédmides* TO O€ UpeTepov THS TE Suvdpuews (Evded

mpata\ ths Te yyOuns unde Tois BeBators mo Ted-
ca a / y 2 2

cat Tav te Sewav pndémote olecPat atrodvOn-
\ \ Vee \ e \ \

cecbat. Kal pny Kal aoKvot Tpos Uuas wEAANTAS

Kal amoonuntal mpos évdnwotatous: olovta yap

ot pev TH atrovoia av Te KTacVal, pels OE TO

éfedOeiy nal Ta étoipa dv Prdwar. Kpatodvtés

a lal a ,

Te Tov éxOpav él mrElotov eépyovTar Kal

vik@mevol er eXaXLOTOY avaTiTTOVOLY. ETL OE

Tols pev cwpacw adAdoTpLwTaTOLS UTEP TIS

n A , > \

TOAEWS YP@vTal, TH Sé yvoOun olKELoTaTH €s TO

a \

Tpaccew Te UTEép adTHS’ Kal & pev ay érLvon-
age UA > , / € a

cavTes pi eweEéXO wor, oixeiwy orépecbar jyovv-
ry 3 XA b] / / >’ / \

rat, & & av émedOovtes KTHTwVTAL, OLya Tpos

\ / a 4 a 5 vy \

Ta pédrovta TuXEly TpakavTes, HV O apa TOU Kal

Telpa oparaaw, avterTioavtes adda eTANpwoav

77s e

Thy xpelav' jLovol yap EXovol TE oMolwWS Kal
> / aa > / \ \ r \

erxrivovalw & av éemivonowot Oia TO TayYElay THY

émiyelpnow troteicbar Oy av yvaouw. Kal TavTa

> lal

peta Tovey mavTa Kal Kxiwdvvwv d1 ddov Tov

ai@vos poxGovat, kal aToNavovew éhayioTa TOV

irapxovtav bia 7 alel KTaCOaL Kal pHTE EopTHY

ra \ cal

ddro Te HyeicOa 7 TO Ta Séovta mpaktar Evp-

, > a

gopdy Te ovX Nagov yovxiay aTpaypova 7

116

BOOK I. txx. 3-8

Again, they are bold beyond their strength, venture-
some beyond their better judgment, and sanguine in
the face of dangers; while your way is to do less
than your strength warrants, to distrust even what
your judgment is sure of, and when dangers come
to despair of deliverance. Nay more, they are
prompt in decision, while you are dilatory; they
stir abroad, while you are perfect stay-at-homes ;
for they expect by absence from home to gain
something, while you are afraid that, if you go out
after something, you may imperil even what you have.
If victorious over their enemies, they pursue their
advantage to the utmost; if beaten, they fall back
as little as possible. Moreover, they use their bodie
in the service of their country as though they were
the bodies of quite other men, but their minds as
though they were wholly their own, so as to accom-
plish anything on her behalf. And whenever they
have conceived a plan but fail to carry it to fulfil-
ment, they think themselves robbed of a possession
of their own; and whenever they go after a thing
and obtain it, they consider that they have accom-
plished but little in comparison with what the future
has in store for them ; but if it so happens that they
try a thing and fail, they form new hopes instead and
thus make up the loss. For with them alone is it
the same thing to hope for and to attain when once
they conceive a plan, for the reason that they swiftly
undertake whatever they determine upon. In this
way they toil, with hardships and dangers, all their
life long; and least of all men they enjoy what they
have because they are always seeking more, because
they think their only holiday is to do their duty,
and because they regard untroubled peace as a far

117

THUCYDIDES

> / bJ / 4 ” > \ ‘\
9 acxorlay éritovoyy aaTe él TIS avTOUS EvYEedwv
hain weduxévas él TH uNTEe avTOVs ExeELy Novyiav
/ \ ” b , ba! ’ ~ a
fnTe Tovs aAdovs avOpwrovs Eeav, opOas av
€l7T0L.
/
LXXI. “Tavrns pévtor toravtns avtixabectn-
/ / = ‘ / \
KULAS TTOAEWS, W Aaxedatpoviot, OvapéAXrETE Kal
olecOe tiv Hovxiav ov TOUTOLs THY avOpaTrwV eri
~ cal A nw ,
TAELTTOV apKeEiV, of av TH wey TapacKevy Sixata
a a Lal a
Tpdcocwol, TH S€ yroun, hv adixavtat, dHrou
* ee / > 2 een a \ a
MOL pn ETLTpEefrovTes, GAN ETL TW uN AvTrELY TE
\ ” \ > > Wer , \ /
TOUS GAXOUS Kal avTOL auvVoOpEvor “7 BrYaTTETOaL
we , , ee , € ,
2 ro ico vepere. pores & av Toe Opoig Ta,pot-
KovvTes eTUyYaveTe TOUTOU: Viv 8, OTrEp Kal ApTL
/ lal A
ednAWTAMEV, GDKALOTPOTTA UuaV TA émiTNOEvLATA
? / \ id /
3 mpos avTovs éotiv. avdykn S€ waoTEp TéxVNS
/ r
aiel Ta émuytyvoueva Kpatelv’ Kal novyalovon
/ v7
pev TOAEL TA GKivNTA Vola apLoTa, TpOS
/ , fol
moAra 6€ avayKxalopévors iévat ToAARS Kal
A A > cA A
Ths émitexyvnocews Set. Oe Grep Kal Ta TOD
> , > \ fol / pea, , e a
A@nvaiwy aro THs TOAVTELpLas ETL TAEOY UU@Y
KEKALVWTAL.
“ / A
4 ‘ Méyps peév oty Todde w@picOw tuav 7 Bpadv-
, lal \ n lA \ / C4
THs: vov O€ Tois Te GAXOLS Kal IloTedeaTats, BoTrEp
\
umedéEacbe, BonOnoate kata Tayos éoBadovtes
; \ > / / \ A ‘4 A
és thv “Artixyy, va pn avdpas te dirovs Kai
nw a , Ul fn .
Euyyevets tots éx@iators mponaGe Kal nuas Tos
IAN wOuuia mpos étépay tia EF 4
GAXovs abvyia Tp p Uupaxiav

1 7.e. you attempt to be fair on the principle that it is wise
not to offend others and so run the risk of injury which may

118

BOOK I. ixx. 8-Lxxi. 4

greater calamity than laborious activity. Therefore
if a man should sum up and say that they were born
neither to have peace themselves nor to let other
men have it, he would simply speak the truth.

LXXI. “And yet, although you have such a state
ranged against you, O Lacedaemonians, you go on
delaying and forget that a peaceful policy suffices
long only for those who, while they employ their
military strength only for just ends, yet by their
spirit show plainly that they will not put up with
it if they are treated with injustice; whereas you
practise fair dealing on the principle of neither giving
offence to others nor exposing yourselves to injury
in self-defence.! But it would be difficult to carry —
out such a policy successfully if you had as neighbour
a state just like yourselves; whereas now, as we have —
just shown, your practices are old-fashioned as com-
pared with theirs. But in politics, as in the arts, the
new must always prevail over the old. It is true
that when a state is at peace the established practices
are best left unmodified, but when men are compelled
to enter into many undertakings there is need of
much improvement in method. It is for this reason
that the government of the Athenians, because they
have undertaken many things, has undergone greater
change than yours.

“Here, then, let your dilatoriness end; at this
moment succour both the Potidaeans and the rest
of your allies, as you promised to do,\ by invading |
Attica without delay, that-you may not betray your
friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and
drive the rest of usin despair to seek some other

arise in defending yourselves against the attacks you have
provoked,

119

THUCYDIDES

A > A
5 Tpéynte. Sp@puev & av adsxov ovdév ovTE pos
an ral e \ lal
Gedy TOY OpKiwy oUTE TpOS avOpwTrwY THY aidBa-
\
vouevayv: AvovaL yap aTrovdds ovy ot Su’ épnutay
] fal
adXols TpoatovTEs, GAN ot wn BonBodvtes ols av
, / \ e nw /

6 Evvopocwaw. Bovropévwv dé vuav Tpobvpov
elval pevOUMEV* OUTE yap Gola AV ToLOtMeY meTa-
Barropevat ovte Evvnfeatépous dv adXovs evpor-

7 pev. mpos tdde BovreverGe ed kai tHv Iledo-

, val \ /, ] lal A e
movynaov Teipacbe py éAdoow efnyetaPar 7) o1
Tatépes upiv Tapédocav.

LXXII. Totatdra peév of KopivOio: eirrov. §=tav
ard , YA \ ‘A / >
Sé "A@nvaiwy Etvye yap mpecReta mpotepov ev
A , \ ” lal e
th Aaxedaipow tept aA\Xwv Tapovoa, Kal ws
” a LU 7 > a fy >
nzOovto TaV AOywr, EdoEEv avTols TapiTNTEéa €s
tous Aakedatpovious eivar, TOV pev éyKAN“aToV
Tépt pndev aTroAoyncomevous, WY ai TOAELS évE-
KdXovr, Onr@aat O€ TrEpt TOD TaVTOS) ws ov TAYEwS
> a ls oy] > ss / /
avutois BouvXeutéov ein, AAN ev TWAEOVL TKETTTEOV.
atl - 4 \ / / > 4 a
Kal dua THY odetépav TodW €BovrAoYTO onuHnVvaL
don ein SUvaply, Kal UTOpYynoWw ToLncacBat Tots
Te mpecButépors av yoecav Kal Tois vewTépols
> / z BU 93 / A A
éEnynow wv aTretpor Hoav, vouifovTes paddov av
autous €k TOV AOywv pds TO Haovyalew TpaTreé-

\ al lal
2 c0at 7) Tpos TO TroNepeiv. TpocedOovTes odv Tos
Aaxedaipoviows épbacav Bovr\ecPat Kal avToi és
nr r al a e
TO TANOoS AUTAY ElTrEty, EL TL M1) ATOKWAVOL. OL
‘
Sé éxéXevovy Te Taptévat, Kal tapedOovTes ob
"AOnvaios éXeyov Todde.
120

BOOK I. ixx1. A-LXXI1. 2

alliance. If we took such a course we should be
committing no wrong either in the sight of the gods
we have sworn by or of men of understanding ; for
treaties are broken not by those who when left un-
supported join others, but by those who fail to
succour allies they have sworn to aid. But if you
mean to be zealous allies we will stay; for in that
case we should be guilty of impiety if we changed
our friends, nor should we find others more congenial.
In view of these things, be well advised, and make
it your endeavour that the Peloponnesian league shall
be no weaker under your leadership than oes you __
inherited it from your fathers.”

LXXII. Thus spoke the Corinthians. But there
happened to be present at Lacedaemon an embassy
of the Athenians that had come on other business,
and when they heard the various speeches they
deemed it advisable to appear before the Lacedae-
monians, not indeed to make any defence on the
charges brought by the cities, but to make clear with
regard to the whole question at issue that the Lace-
daemonians should not decide it hastily but should
take more time to consider it. At the same time
they wished to show how great was the power of
their own city, reminding the older men of what
they already knew, and recounting to the younger
things of which they were ignorant, in the belief
that under the influence of their arguments the
Lacedaemonians would be inclined to peace rather
than war. Accordingly they approached the Lace-
daemonians and said that they also wished, if there
was nothing to hinder, to address their assembly. The
Lacedaemonians invited them to present themselves,
and the Athenians came forward and spoke as follows:

I2!I

THUCYDIDES

c / fal
LXXIIT. ““H pev mpécBevois nuav ov és
a /
avtTiNoyiav Tots wvpetépors Evppayo éyéveto,
GAXa TEepi MY 7 TOdS Ereurrev: aicPavopevas 5é
\ > ’ Ld = e a /
KaTtaBonv ovK oALynY ovcav Huav TapyndOopeED,
ov TOs éyKAnp“acL TOV TOEWY avTEpOdVTES (ov
yap tapa dixactais viv ovTE nu@Y OUTE TOUTMD
ec , Aa / pI oad? s € , \
of Noyot av yiryvowvTo), AAX’ STrws pn padiws TreEpt
, / ra /
eyddov Tpaypatov tots Evypayors mevOopuevor
yeipov PBovrevonobe, kat Gua Bovdopevor Trepi
Tov TavTos AOyou Tov és Huas KafectaTos dynrAO-
TAL WS OUTE ATELKOTWS EYOMEV A KEKTHUEOA, fh TE
, 2 lal > / , > /
TOALS Hu@Y a&la Noyou eaTLy.

“Kal ta pev wavy taraia ti Set Néyetv, Ov
aKOal “adXov AOywv wadpTupeEs 7) Oris TOV AxKov-
/ \ \ \ \ Cd > \ ,
couévwv; Ta O€ Mnodixa nai Goa avtoi Evuorte,
et kat st’ dyXov padrov Eotat aiel mpoBadXo-
/ > 4 / \ \ ee > an ’ ’
Mévols, aVayKN Aéyetv. Kal yap OTe édpapev, er

> xd > 5 / ca a \ ” /
@pedia eExlvduvEevEeTo, 7S TOD pev Epyou pmépos
/ a be / \ / ¥ > ae |

HETETYVETE, TOU O€ AOYOU LN TAVTOS, El TL WHENEL,
atepioxwpeba. pnOncetrar dé (od trapaitnoews

rn ov a» = / “a , \
PaAXov Eveka, 7) paptuplov Kai dnrAocews T pos
‘/ e lal é, \ s , e ’ \
otav vuivy mod pn ev BovrEvopévolts 0 ayov
KATACTIOCETAL.

\ lal /

“Dayev yap Mapa@avi te povot mpoxiwédv-

vedoat T@® BapBapw nai ote TO botepov FrGer,

1 opera: E.
I22

BOOK I. cxxm. 1-4

LXXIII. “Our embassy did not come here to
‘enter into a dispute with your allies, but on the
business for which our city sent us. Perceiving,
however, that no small outcry is being made against
us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges
of the cities (for it can hardly be that either they or
we are addressing you as judges), but in order that
you may not, yielding to the persuasion of your
allies, lightly make a wrong decision about matters
of great importance. And at the same time we wish,
as regards the whole outcry that has been raised
against us, to show that we are rightfully in posses-
sion of what we have acquired, and that our city is
not to be despised.

“ Now, what need is there to speak about matters
quite remote,’ whose only witnesses are the stories
men hear rather than the eyes of those who
will hear them told? But concerning the Persian
War and all the other events of which you have
personal knowledge, we needs must speak, even
though it will be rather irksome to mention them,
since they are always being paraded. For when we
were performing those deeds the risk was taken for
a common benefit, and since you got a share of the
actual results of that benefit, we should not be wholly
deprived of the credit, if there is any benefit in that.
And our aim in the recital of the facts will be, not
so much to deprecate censure, as to show by evidence
with what sort of city you will be involved in war
if you are not well advised.

“For we affirm that at Marathon we alone bore
the first brunt of the Barbarian’s attack, and that

1 The Schol. remarks 7a xara "AuaCévas wal @paxas xa
‘HpaxaAcidas, favourite themes in eulogies, panegyric speeches,

etc
123

THUCYDIDES

ovx ixavol OVTES KATA yy apvvecOar, éoRavtes
és Tas vas mavdnpel ev Larapive Evvvavpaxi-
ca, OTrEp Eoxe i) KATA TrONELS AUTOV emimeovTa
TH [ledorovyncov mop Oeiv, aduvatov av ovT@Y

5 pos vavs ToAhas aNANAOLS emt Bonbeiv. TEK MN
prov dé péyrorov autos emoinoev™ vixnbels yap
Tals vavolv as OUKETL AUTO omotas ovens THS
éuvdwews KaTa TaXOS TO wréovt Too otTpatov
aVEY@PNTED.

LXXIV. “ Towovtov pevTOL TOUTOU EvpSartos
Kal Tapas Snrobertos ore €v Tais vavol TOV
‘EXAnvey, Ta Tpaypara éyéveTo, Tpla Ta opent-
pwTaTa €$ avo Taperxopeba, a.pt8 pov TE VEY
TNELo TOV Kat avopa oT parnyov VETWTATOV Kal
7 poOupiap aoxvoTaTny- vas pev ye és Tas
TeTpaKolas ory edoaous TOV dvo porpav,
OepiotoKhéa dé apXovra, Os aitL@tatos év TO
oT EVO vaU WAX To aL eyéveTo, Srep cabéctata
evwoe Ta Tm pay para, Kal avtov da TOUTO vets
ETLUNTATE padiora, 67) dvopa Eévov TOV WS vuas

2 éXMovtar: mpobupiay 6€ kal ToD TON pOTaT NY
édeiEapev, ot es émrelon npiv Kara yy oveeis
éBonGer, THaV adrAwV 76 HEX pL TO douhevov-
TOV, nEwwoawev eKALTFOVTES THY TOALY Kal TA Ol-
Kela SvapGetpavres und &$ TO TOV TEepiroiTT@V
Evppaxov KOLVOV 7 ponuTrety poe oxebac Vertes
ax petou auTOLS yever Oat, arr’ eo Barres es Tas
vads Kwdvuvedoat Kal pn OpyoOjvar OTL Nuiv ov

1 Probably a round number for 378 given by Hdt. va.
xiviii., of which the Athenian contingent (200, t.e. 180 + 20
lent to the Chalcidians, Hdt. viu. i.) could be spoken of as

124

BOOK I. cxxim. 4-Lxxiv. 2

when he came again, not being able to defend our-
selves by land, we embarked in a body on our ships
and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis. This prevented
his sailing against you city by city and ravaging the
Peloponnesus, for you would have been unable to
aid one another against a fleet so numerous. And
the weightiest testimony to the truth of what we
say was afforded by the enemy himself; for when
his fleet was defeated, as if aware that his power
was no longer a match for that of the Hellenes, he
hastily withdrew with the greater part of his army.
LXXIV. “Such, then, was the issue of that battle,
and clear proof was given thereby that the salvation
of the Hellenes depended upon their ships. To that
issue we contributed the three most serviceable ele-
ments, namely, the largest number of ships, the
shrewdest general, and the most_unfaltering zeal.
Of the four hundred! ships our quota was_a_little
less.than two-thirds. The commander was Themis-
tocles, who more than any other was responsible for
our fighting the battle in the strait, which most
surely was our salvation; and on this account you
yourselves honoured him above any stranger who
ever visited you.2 And the zeal we displayed was
that of utmost daring, for'when there was no one to
help us on land, since all the rest up to our very
borders were already slaves, we resolved to abandon
our city and sacrifice all our possessions; yet not even
in that extremity to desert the common cause of the
allies who remained, or by dispersing to render our-
selves useless to them, but to embark on our ships

and fight, and_not to be angry because you failed to

mAclous Tav jnutcéwy or with slight exaggeration as dAly@
éAdocous Tay Svo0 potpay.
2 See Hdt. vi. exxiv.; Plut. Them. xvii. 3.
125

THUCYDIDES

/ 4 \ > ? > \
3 mpovTiuwpnoate. wate Papevy ovyY NaTov avToL
adericar twas } Tuxely ToUTOV. pels pev yap
amo Te oikovpévwy TOV TOAE@OY Kal éTL TO TO
\ sf b \ > , e \ e a \
Nowtrov véwer Oar, emery edeicaTe UTEP UPMV Kal
? eon \ , ’ / ” a le
ovxY Huav TO TéoV, EBonOjcate (OTE your mpev
4 la) / e a a / fol
ere o@, ov mrapeyeverOe), mpets O€ amo Te THS OVK
bd ” e / \ € \ n > /
ovens. €Tt OpHa@pevor KaL UTEP TIS eV Bpaxera
éxmide ovons Kivduvevovtes Evverwoapev vps TE
4 TO pépos Kal Huds adtous. ef 5é Tpoceywpyaapev
, A / / LA \
mpotepov TO Mnd@ detoavtes, @oTEp Kal adAoL,
\ fol / a \ > / ef 3 a
TEpl TH YOPA, 7) un ETOApNoapev VoTEpov eo Phvat
> \ rn e / 2>O\ x »~ ”
és Tas vads ws SiePOappévor, ovdev av Eder Ett
ipas! un &yovtas vais ixavas vavpaxeiv, adda
kal’ jouvyxiav av a’Te Tpovywpnoe TA TPaAYyHaTA
7 €BovnrerTo.
LXXV. “Ap dot éopev, & Aaxedatpovror,
/ , a U ,
«al mrpobuptas €vexa THs TOTE Kal yyopns Evve-
aie a ka Y4 a \ ee
cews\apyns-ye Hs Exouev Tois"EAAnot my OUTAS
A 7 b / a“ \ \ > \ /
2 dyav éribOovas SvaxeicOat; Kal yap avtihy Tiv6E
érdBouev ob Bracdpevor, add’ buav pev ovK
re \ \ a
CedncdvtTav Tapapetvat Tpos Ta UTOAOLTA TOD
/ id al A / a ,
BapBapov, nuiv 5€ mpoceMovtav Tay Evppayov
al / fal
3 Kal aitav Senbévtwy tryepovas KatacThvat. €€
aitod 58 Tod épyou KatnvayxacOnpev TO TPa@ToOV

1 §uas: Hude inserts mpbds before suas.

1 ef. the taunt of Adimantus (Hdt. vii. lvii. 7), wep) ovde-
puns tr warpidos vavuaxnoes, “ You will fight for a country
that is no more,” and the famous answer of Themistocles

126

BOOK I. cxxiv. 2-Lxxv. 3

help us earlier. We therefore maintain that we on
our part conferred upon you a_benefit at least as
great as we received; for whereas the population of |
the cities from which you brought aid was still un-
disturbed and you could hope to possess them in the
future, and your motive was fear for yourselves rather
than for us—at any rate you did not come near so
long as we were still unharmed—we on our part,
setting forth from a city that was no more,! and

isking our lives in behalf _of one whose future hung

r
upon but_a slender hope, bore our part in saving
both you and ourselves. But if we had acted as

others did, and through fear of losing our territory
had gone over to the Persians earlier in the war, or
afterwards had_lacked_ the courage to embark on
our ships, in the conviction that we were already
ruined, it would from that moment have been use-
less for you, with your inadequate fleet, to fight at
sea, but the Persian’s plans would have moved on
quietly just as he wished.
LXXV. “Considering, then, Lacedaemonians, the
_ zeal and sagacity of judgment which we displayed
at that time, do we deserve to be regarded with this
excessive jealousy by the Hellenes just on account
of the empire we possess? And indeed we did not
acquire this empire by force, but only after you had
refused_to_continue to oppose what was left of the
barbarian forces, and the allies came to us and of
their own accord asked us to assume the leadership.

It was under the compulsion of circumstances that

(Hdt. vit. lxi. 8), &s ef cad modus Kal yij méCwv Frep Kelvorwr
Zor’ by Sinxdoiat vées ogi Swot TeMANpwueva, ‘* We have a city
and a country greater than yours as long as we have two
hundred ships fully manned.”

127

THUCYDIDES

a > \ b] , 4 \ e XN
Tpoayayely autTny és Toe, paddioTa pev VITO
déous, Eerta Kal Tins, DoTepov Kal wdeXias,

\ > , \ v b] / s r A
kal ovk acdhanrés ete eddKer elvat, Tois moAXois
aTnxOnuévous Kal TiWwY Kat On atrooTayTwV

ca) e rad ,
KATECTPALLEVOV, UL@V Te Nuiy oOvKETL OpMolws

/ > € 4 \ v 2 SP
dirwv, aX UroTtav Kal dvaddpwv dvtwv, avév-
tas Kivduveverv (Kal yap ay ai atootdces Tpos
e nn ] / lal \ > / \
buds éyiyvovto)* mace de avetibOovov ta Evp-
pépovTa TaV peyioTwy rept KiwWdtvwY ev Ti-
Gea bat.

¢ A A

LXXVI. “‘Tueis yotv, @ AaxeSaipoviol, Tas
’ A / / ae | Se. a > f
ev 7H IleXotrovynow@ mrodets Ertl TO Upiv @hedALMOV
KaTaoTnodmevo. e&nyeicbe: Kal ef TOTE Uro-

\ a
pelwavtes 1a Tavtos amnyOecbe ev TH HyEmovia,

A \ nr
WoTrEp Huets, EV lopev un av Rocov bas AVTN-
pous yevopévous Tols Evppadyos Kai avayxacba-
Tas ‘av 7) apyew éyxpaTa@s avtovs xivduvever.

a \
ovTws ovd ueis Oavyactoyv ovdev TeToLnKapev
ovd ato Tov dvOporeiou TpoTrov, eb apxny Te
diSopevny edeEapeBa Kal TavTnY py aveipey
v7o! tev peyiorov vixnbévtes, ToS Kal d€éous
Kal @pertas, od ad mp@tot Tov ToLovTOV UTap-
Eavtes, GAN alel Kabect@tos TOV ocw wo TOD
” ,

Suvatwtépov KatelpyecOat, akvot Te Gua vopi-
Covtes elvar kal vtyiv Soxovyvtes, méxpt ov Ta

/ , al / f a
Evudépovta Roylouevot TO Sixaiw rAOyo viv

1 Hude inserts rpiév before rév peylorwy, with van
Herwerden and Weil.

128

BOOK I. txxv. 3-Lxxvi. 2

we were driven at first to advance our empire to its

present state, influenced chiefly by_fear, then by.

honour also, and lastly by self-interest_as well; and

after we had once incurred the hatred of most of
our allies, and several of them had already revolted
and been reduced to subjection, and when you were
no longer friendly as before but suspicious and at
variance with us, it no longer seemed safe to risk
relaxing our hold. For all seceders would have gone
over to you. And no man is to be blamed for making
the most of his advantages when it is a question of
the gravest dangers
LXXVI. “ At any rate you, Lacedaemonians, in
the exercise of your leadership over the Pelopon-
nesian states regulate their polities! according to
your own advantage; and if in the Persian war
you had held out to the end in the hegemony
and had become unpopular in its exercise, as we
did, you would certainly have become not less ob-
noxious to the allies than we are, and would have
been compelled either to rule them with a strong
hand or yourselves to risk losing the hegemony.
human nature in what we also have done, just because
pted-an~empire when it was offered us, and
then, yieldingto.the strongest motives—honour,
fear, and sélf-interest— declined to give it up. Nor,
again, are we-the-first who have entered upon such a
course, but it has ever been an established rule that
the weaker is kept down by the stronger. And at
the same time we thought we were worthy to rule,
and used to be so regarded by you also, until you fell
to calculating what your interests were and resorted,

1 i.e. by setting up oligarchies in them, cf. ch. xix.

129

V

Thus there is nothing remarkable or inconsistent with _

THUCYDIDES

rn a > , X 3 A /
ypiabe, dv ovdeis TH TapatUXOY LoXUL TL KTI-
fa \ f
cacOat poles Tod jut) TAEOY EXELY ATrETPATFETO.
al / ‘/ A
émratvelcGai te aol, oltives Ypnodpevor TH
> / / ¢ € / BA ,
avOpwteia pices Bate ETépwv apyew OdiKaLO-
s 4
Tepol ) KATA THY UTapyYovaay SuVamLY yévwvTAL.
<4
ddXous y av ovv oloueba Ta nuétEepa ANaPBovTas
” vn / v / Aes \ \
SetEar dv pdduota el TL peTpialoper, Hut dé Kal
> a fal 5] , \ / a »” >
€x Tov émetxovs abokia TO TEOV 7 ETAaLVOS OVK
ELKOTWS TEPLETTN.
LXXVII. ‘Kai édaccotvpevor yap év tats
/ \ \ / /, \
EvuBoraiats mpos tovs Evupdxous Sixais Kal
a val a e
Tap nuiv avtois ev Tots Omolols VomoLs TOLNTAVTES
\ , rf an \ > A
tas «pices didodixetvy Soxodpev. Kat ovdeis
me rely a : eee / ” 2 «7!
TKOTEL AUTOY, TOs Kal GXXOOL Tov EYovaLY apynV
a \ , /
Kal hocov nua@Y Tpos TOUS UTNKOOVS METPLOLS
a /
ovat St 6 TL TOdTO ovK oveldivetar: BrafecPa
yap ols av é&F, SindlecOar ovdev mpocdéovtar.
€ AAS , \ etn Sad a» c a
of 6¢ €(0tc wévot TPOS Mas Aro TOU icov optreiy,
» \ fol a
nv Te Tapa TO pn olecOar xpjvar } yvoun 7
a e lal
Suvaper TH Oia THY apxnv Kal oTwoodY éhaccw-
al A /
Oaow, ov TOU TA€OVOS fH TTEPLTKOmEVvOL YapLY
» > \ 2s ‘a , /
éxouo, adda Tod evdeods yareTwTEpov hépovary
, / \ na
4 ef avo mpatns atobéuevor TOV vouov davepas

1 These seem to have been disputes in matters of trade
tried before federal courts elsewhere than in Athens ; whereas
Tas Kpioeis refers to compulsory jurisdiction which Athens
enforced upon her allies in her own courts.

130

BOOK I. txxvi. 2-Lxxvil. 3

as you do now, to the plea of justice—which no one,

oppor ing by
main strength, ever yet put before force and ab-
stained from taking advantage. And they are to be
commended who, yielding to the instinct of human
nature to rule over others, have been more observant
of justice than they might have been, considering
their power. At least, if others should seize our
power, they would, we think, exhibit the best proof
that we show some moderation; but in our case the
result of our very reasonableness is, perversely enough,
obloquy rather than commendation.

LXXVII. “Tor although we are at a disadvantage
in suits! with our allies arising out of commercial
agreements, and although in our own courts in
Athens, where we have established Spat the
same laws apply to us as to them, we are thought
to insist too much upon our legal rights. And
none of our allies observes why it is that those
who hold dominion elsewhere, and are less mode-
rate than we are toward their subjects, are not
reproached on this account. It is because those
who may use might have no need to appeal to right.
But if ever our allies, accustomed as they are to
associate with us on the basis of equality, come off
second best in any matter, however trivial, contrary
to their own notion that it ought to be otherwise,
whether their discomfiture is due to a legal decision
or to the exercise of our imperial power, instead of
being grateful that they have not been deprived of
what is of greater moment,” they are more deeply
offended because of their trifling inequality than if
we had from the first put aside all legal restraints

® Namely, their equality before the law.
131

THUCYDIDES

3 a 229 1 9.039 5a PAT en ee
érreovextovpev. exelvas O€ OV av avTol avTeE-
¢ > \ \ ce A a
Aeyov @S OU YpEwWY TOV YOTW TM KpaTovyTL
a ¥ / U
imoxwpetv. adiKovpeEvot TE, WS EoLKeED, ol avOpa-
a ? / x / \ \ \
mot wadXov opyiGovtar 7 Bialopuevor’ TO pev yap
>] \ n 7 “a a \ >] > \ .
ajo Tov loov SoKxel tAEOVEeKTEtcOal, TO OS AaTO
Tov Kpelocovos KaTtavayKxdlecGat. vio your TOD
/ /
Mndou Sewotepa TovTwV) TacTXoVTES HVELYOVTO,
e \ e / > \ \ a 3 > ,
Se juetépa apxyn YareT? SoKxel Eivat, eLKOTwS
TO Tapov yap aiel Bapd Tols UrnKools. pels y
Ry =: Ra , rdecok ae 2 yaa VS N
dp obv\el KadeXovtes Huas apfaite, Taya av THY
> a yh es Oo ae zs / oF
evvotay Hy Sia TO HwéTEpov Séos EtAnpaTe peTa-
, \ \ a
Bddoute, eltrep ola Kat TOTe mpos Tov Mydov bv
? / e , e / e n \ ral
OdLyou Hynoduevor wrredelEaTe, omoia Kal vov
>! 3 a
yvocerbe. auerxta yap Ta TE KAP pas avToUS
a \
voulpa Tois ddXrows EXETE Kal TPOGETL els ExaTTOS
a Yi c \
é£.w@v ovTEe TOUTOLS YpHTaL OVE ois 7 AAAN ENAas
/
voutlet.
LXXVIII. “ Bovretverbe otv Bpadéws ws ov
\ , \ pe , , \
mept Bpaxéwv, Kal py AdXoTpials yvomats Kai
> a
éyxAnpact TercOévTes OlKetov Tovoy mpocOnabe.
rn \ / \ 4 id > , \
tov 6€ ToAéu“ov TOY TapdNoyoy aos é€oTi, mpl
9 . A , , : , \
év avT@ yevécOar TpodidyvaTe pnkuvomevos yap
"al ed / \ \ 4 e yy
direi és TUXaS TA TOANA TepLictacOaL, wv ico
e y
Te aTéyouev Kal oTroTépws EoTaL ev adyrw KW-
,
Suvevetat. lovtes Te of avOpwrot és TOUS TOdE-
fw v , 4 \ A Qn
mous Ta Epywv mpoTepov Eyov Tal, & Yphv VaTepov

132

BOOK I. vxxvit. 3-Lxxvil, 3

and had openly sought our own advantage. In that
case even they would not be setting up the claim
that the weaker should not have to yield to the
stronger. Men, it seems, are more resentful of in-
justice than of violence ; for the former, they feel, is
overreaching by an equal, whereas the latter is
coercion by a superior. At any rate, they submitted
to more grievous wrongs than these at the hands of
the Persians, while our rule is hard to bear, as they
think ; and no wonder, for the present yoke is always
heavy to subjects. Certainly you, should you, over-
throw us and obtain supremacy, would soon lese the
good will which you have gained through fear of us—
if indeed you mean again ‘to show such | temper as you
gave a glimpse of at that time when for a little while
you had the hegemony against the Persian.! For the
institutions that prevail among you at home are in-
compatible with those of other peoples, and, besides,
each one of you when he goes abroad uses neither
these nor those which the rest of Greece is accustomed
to.

LXXVIII. “Be slow, then, in your deliberations,
for no slight matters are at stake; and do not,
influenced by the opinions and accusations of others,
burden yourselves needlessly with trouble of your
own. Realise before you get into it how great are
the chances of miscalculation in war. For when it
is long drawn out, it is wont generally to resolve it-
self into a mere matter of chance; and over chance_
both sides equally have no control, and what the
outcome will be is unknown and precarious. Most
men rush into war and proceed to blows first,
although that ought to be the last resort, and then,

1 ¢.g. the conduct of Pausanias described in ch. cxxx.

F353)

THUCYDIDES

A la ha” / a / LA
Spav, kaxoTrabovrtes S€ 76n TOV NOywv arTovTat.
n an /
jets O€ ev ovdemid TH TOLAUTN adpaptia ovTEs
> ’ e an e ca a
ovtT avtol ov vuas opa@vTes Aéyomev Upiy, Ews
” b] / > fd e > / \
étt avOaipetos audotépors 7) evBovrAia, otrovdas
\ / \ / \ cd x \
un Ave pndé tapaBaivery Tovs SpKous, Ta OE
/ 7
Siadopa Sixn AVecIar Kata thy EvvOynKnv, 7
\ \ e / Pa /
Geovs TOUS OpKLoUS fapTUpPas TroLOvmEVOL TELPATO-
/ ¥ /
ucla apvvecOar Todéuov apyovtas TavTn 7 av
a bb]
vdnynade.
lal ee A s
LXXIX. Toradta dé of “AOnvator eitrov. ére-
\ \ a , 4 e 4
87 6€ Tov Te Evppaxwrv Heoveav ot Aaxedaipovior
\ > / \ b \ ’ / \ ”
Ta éykAnuata Ta és Ttovs "AOnvaious Kal Tav
? / a - / ‘
A@nvaiwv & édreEav, petactnodpmevor TavTas
cal \ an
€BourevovTo Kata odas avTous Tept TOV Tapov-
lal / la
Tov. Kal TOV ev TAEOVWY ETL TO AUTO al yYo@paL
Edepov, adixeiv Te TOUS "APnvaious 76n Kal Tode-
/ > > / Oa be , / e
pntéa elvar év Taye: TrapedOawv de Apyidapos o
a ‘\ \ nS a
Bactrevs atvtav, avnp Kal Evvetos Soxav eivat
Kal copper, éreke Tordde.

LXXX. “Kal avros rodd\ov 75n Todtéuov
éurrerpos eiut, @ Aaxedatpmoriol, Kal Uw@V Tovs eV
fel > Pine’ / € a ef i. > / b fol
TH AUTH HALK(a OPO, WoTE NTE aTrelpia éTTLOUELH-

lal e /
cat Twa TOD épyou, OTEp Av of TodXOL TUOozeE?D,
/ > \ \ > \ , ev >
unre ayaboyv Kai acparés vouicavta. evpote 6
av tovde trept ov viv BovrevecGe ovK av éda-
YLTTOV YyEVvOMEVOV, EL THPpPOVaS TLS AUTOV EKAOYI-
foto. pos pev yap IleXomovynciovs Kal tous

134

BOOK I. txxvin. 3-Lxxx, 3

when they are in distress, at length have recourse to
words. But since we ourselves are not as yet involved
in any such error and see that you are not, we urge
you, while wise counsels are still a matter of free
choice to both of us, not to violate the treaty or

hs ag aera ee differences be
settled_by arbitration according to thé agréément.
But if you refuse, we shall invoke as witnesses the ~~
gods by whom our oaths were sworn, and shall en-
deavour to make reprisals on those who begin the war,
following that path in which you have led the way.”
LXXIX. Thus the Athenians spoke. And when
the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges brought
by the allies against the Athenians, and what the
latter said in reply, they caused all others to with-
draw and deliberated by themselves on the situation
before them. And the opinions of the majority
tended to the same conclusion, namely, that the ~»
Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that |
they must go to war without delay. Ko oeeeane
their king, a man reputed to be both sagatiousand =
prudent, came forward and spoke as follows: |
LXXX. “ I have both myself, Lacedaemonians, had
experience in my day of many wars, and I seemen ™
among you who are as old as I am; no one of them,
therefore, is eager for war through lack of experience,
as would be the case with most men, nor because
he thinks it a good or a safe thing. And you
would find that this war about which you are now
deliberating is likely to prove no trifling matter, if
one should reflect upon it soberly.—¥orin a contest
with the Peloponnesians or the neighbouring states !
1 By the Peloponnesians Thucydides means the Spartan

alliance ; the neighbouring states would then be the Pelo-
ponnesian states not in the alliance, e.g. Argos.

“

135

THUCYDIDES

> , , con C39 bx \ \
GOTVYELTOVAS TAPOMLOLOS UHV N aXKH, KAaL dia
y, ar 9,9 of > lal \ A
Tayéwv otov Te Eh Exacta éeiv: pos dé avdpas
i. a v y
of yy te éxas éxovot Kal wpocéts Oaddoons
/ ral
EUTELPOTATOL Elo Kal TOlS GdAOLS ATracLY apLoTa
2Enptuvtal, wArovUT@m Te ldiw Kal § ( I
éEnpTuvTalt, TOUTS Loto Kat Snuwociw Kal
A >
vavol Kat immo Kat OmXoLs Kal BY Boos OvK
/ ¢e al

év addw Evi ye xopio EddAnvike éortw, ete dé Kal

U lal lal
Evppayous trodXovs Popov UToTEXEls EyouaL, TAS

/
Xpn Tpos TOVTOUS padlws TroAEuov apacBat Kal
tive TioTEvoaVvTaS aTapacKevous eTELyOnvaL;
, la , > ? ed > / > \
4 TOTEpOV Talis vavolv; aX Hocovs éeopév: ef be
/
MeNETHCOMEV Kal avTLTAapacKEevacouela, Ypovos
évéoTalt. Gada TOS XpHuacW; GAA TOANO
/ ” 4 _ “4 \ ” > a
TAEOV ETL TOUT@ EAAELTIOMEV KAL OUTE EV KOW@
"4 lal
EYOMEV OUTE ETOLUWS EK THY LOLwY Pépomer.
mal by y ¢i al
LXXXI. “Tay av tis Oapooin ote Tots br-
5) lal \ a / c f °¢

Nols av’T@V Kail TO TAHOE UTEepPhépopev, WoTe
2 Thy yhv Snovv emipoit@vtes. Tots dé aAAH YA

bd \ a8 v \ > , >
éoTt TOAAN 1S apyouvcl, Kat ex Padaaons ov

, 5) , > > > \ ,
3 déovtar érdfovtar. ae 8 av Tovs Evupayous
; / , are ,
adictavat Teipacopeda, dence. Kai ToUTOLS Vavat
n \ “ 2 , / oS
4 BonOeivy TO TA€OY OvaL VnTLwWTAaLs. Tis OdY EcTaL
a e / > \ \ x \
LOV O TOAEMOS; EL LN Yap 7) Vavol KpaTHCOMeEV
> /
}) TAS Tpocodous adarprycopev adh’ WV TO VaUTLKOV
, \ /
5 tpéhovalt, BrawroucOa Ta TrElw. Kav TOUT@
,

ovde KatadvecOar Ett Kadov, GAXwS TE Kal Et
1 «.¢, it is military rather than naval ; similar, too, in the

matter of wealth, equipment, absence of foreign resources,
tributary allies, etc,

136

BOOK I. xxx. 3-Lxxxi. 5

our power is of the same type with theirs! and we can
be upon them quickly at every point ; but when op-
posed to men whose territory is far away, who besides
are beyond all others experienced in seamanship and
are best equipped in all other respects, with wealth
both private and public, ships, horses, arms and a
larger population than is to be found in any other single
district in Hellas, who have, moreover, numerous
allies subject to tribute—against such men why should
we lightly take up arms? In what do we place our
trust that we should attack them unprepared? In
our ships? But there we are inferior; and if we
train and make ourselves ready to encounter them,
that will take time. In our wealth then? But in
that respect we are still more deficient, neither having
money in the treasury of the state nor finding it easy
to raise money from our private resources by
taxation.”

LXXXI. “ Perhaps some of us are emboldened by
our superiority in arms and numbers, which enables
us freely to invade and lay waste their territory.
But there is other territory in plenty over which
they hold sway, and they will import by sea what-
ever they need. And if, on the other hand, we try
to induce their allies to revolt, we shall have in
addition to protect them with a fleet, since they are
chiefly islanders. What then will be the character

*

of the war we shall be waging? | Unless we ¢an—

‘either win the mastery on the sea or cut off the
revenues by which they support their navy, we shall
get the worst of it. And; if it~comes-to-that, we
‘can no longer even conclude an honourable peace,

2 The poverty of the Peloponnesians is referred to by
Pericles in ch. cxli. 3, The statement is true especially of
the Spartans, but also of all the rest except the Corinthians.

I
VOL. I. F 37

THUCYDIDES

6 d0fopev dp~ar wadrov THs diahopas. pn yap dy
éxelvn YE TH EATLOL ETTAaLpwW EIA WS TAY TavGON-
e / \ an lal
GETAL O TOAELOS, HY THY Yhv av’Tav Téuwperv.
/ \ a \ \ a \ My ec
déd0.xa 6€ wadXov 7 Kal TOlS TAaLalY aUTOV UToO-
, ef Md \ ’ / / A
Aitrw@pev OUTS eiKos ’AOnvaiovs dpovnpate pHTeE
Th yn SovAEedcaL pte WoTrEp aTELpoUS KaTa-
TrAAYHVAL TO TOEMO.
LXXXII. “Od pny ot6€ dvatcOjtws adtovs
i / / e€ lal IA 4
KeXevw Tovs TE Evupayous nuay éav BraTTELVY
Kal émuBovrevovtas pn KaTapwpav, ad\r\}a bra
pev nto Kiveiv, TéwTre O€ Kal aitiacOar pHTeE
/ A a ‘fp e b] ,
ToNE“ov ayav OnrodvTas uO ws éeriTpéWouer,
, ? cal
Kav TOUT@ Kal Ta HuEeTEp avTav e€aptierBaL
A €
Evupayov te Tpocaywyn, Kal “EXAnvev Kal
BapBdapovel Toév Tiva 7} vavTiKoD } YpnudTwv
/
Svvamww mpoornYopnela (aveTipovoyv Sێ, dcot
ev Mier (Sep ie ul oe Om1 , 2 r
@oTrep Kal tuets UT "AOnvaiwy ém1Bovdevopeba,
2
un” EAAnvas povev, AAA kal BapBapovs rpocda-
rf a oy
Bovtas S:acwOfvat), Kal Ta avT@Y aya extropt-
2 Cwpeba. Kal hv pwev Ecaxovwot TL mpec Bevomevev
e fad ra y 5 xX be , é 06 b] rn
HuaV, TADTA apiota* Hv Sé pr, SeAOovT@Y éeTaY
Sv0 Kal TpL@y dpevov H5n, hv SoxH, Teppaypévor
€ “~ “
3 iuev rr avtovs. Kal lows opa@vtes Huay Hdn THY
, a e al
Te TapacKeuny Kal TOS AOYOUS avTH Opmola UtTo-
onpaivovTas madrXov ay eixovev, Kal yh ete ATEN -
/ fal >
Tov éyovTes Kal Tepl TapovTway ayabay Kai ovTw

138

BOOK I. txxx. 5-LXXXIl. 3

especially if it is believed that we rather than they
began the quarrel. For we assuredly must not be
buoyed up by any such hope as that the war will
soon be over if we but ravage their territory. I fear
rather that we shall even bequeath it to our children,
so improbable it is that the Athenians, high spirited
as they are, will either make themselves vassals to
their land, or, like novices, become panic-stricken at
the war.

LXXXII. “Yet assuredly I do not advise you
that you should blindly suffer them to injure our
allies and allow their plotting to go undetected, but
rather that you should adopt the following course:
Do not take up arms yet, but/send envoys to them
and make complaints, without indicating too clearly <
whether we shall go to war or put up _with-their
conduct ; also in the meantime, let us proceed with
‘our own preparations, in the first place by winning”
allies to our side, Barbarians as well as Hellenes, in
the hope of obtaining from some quarter or other
_ additional resources in ships or money (for those who,
like ourselves, are plotted against by the Athenians
are not to be blamed if they procure their salvation
by gaining the aid, not of Hellenes only, but even of
Barbarians) ; and let us at the same time be developing
our resources) at home. And if they give any heed
to our envoys, there could be nothing better; but if
not, then, after the lapse of two or three years, we
shall at length be better equipped to go against
them, if we decide todo so. Or perhaps when they
see our preparations, and that our words correspond
thereto, they will be more inclined to yield, for they
will both have their land still unravaged and their
deliberations will concern goods that are still theirs

139

THUCYDIDES

4 épOappevav Bovrevopevor. pt) yap arAXo TE
vouicnte THY yHv avTav H Ounpov Eyew Kal ovy
Hocov bo@ apevov éefeipyactar js dheldecOar
Vpn @s éml TrEloTOY, Kai py) €S ATOVOLAY KaTa-

5 oTHcavTas avToUs aAnTTOTépous Eye. Eb yap
aTapacKevor Tots Tov Evppayov éyKAnpacw
emery OevTes TE“ovMEV aUTHV, opate OTws p71
alcyov Kal atropwtepov TH LleXoTovyijcw mpako-

6 wev. eyKAnwaTa pevY yap Kal TodEwy Kal
LOlwT@v olov Te KaTaXDGaL’ TOrNEnov Sé EvpuTrav-
Tas apapévous évexa TOV idiwy, dv ovy UTapyxer
eidévat Kal’ 6 Te Xwpyoel, ov padioy evrpeTas
Gécba.

LXXXIII. “Kai avavdépia pndevi rordovs pa

2 moder py TAXY ETENOeEty SoKEiTw eivar. eiol yap
Kal éxelvols ovK éAdocOUS ypHuwaTta dé€povTes
Evupaxor, Kal got Oo TOAEMOS OVX STAwY TO
wréov, adra Satravyns, Ov hv Ta bTAA where,

3 ddrXws TE Kal Hre_pwTats Tpos Padaaciouvs. To-
picw@peba ody TPOTOv avTHY, Kal pun TOIS TOV
Evpayov Aoyos MpoTEpov eTrarpwpmeOa, otTrep é
Kal tTav amoBaivovtwy TO TAéov em’ aupoTtepa
Ths aitias €€ouev, odToL Kat Kal’ yovyiav te
avTa@v Tpoldwper.

LXXXIV. “Kat ro Bpadv cai pérrev, 6 pép-
hovtar padrioTa nuav, pn alayuverGe. oTev-
Sovtés Te yap ayodaltepoy av Tavaoaabe dia TO
amapacKkevoe éyxerpely, Kal Gua édevOépav Kal

140

BOOK I. ixxxi. 3-Lxxxiv. 1

and as yet not ruined. For do not regard their land
as anything but a hostage for us to hold, and a better
hostage the better it is cultivated. You should there-
fore spare it as long as possible, instead of making them
desperate and thus having a more intractable foe to
deal with. For if, without adequate preparation,
egged on by the complaints of our allies, we shall
ravage their territory, beware lest we adopt a course
which might rather! result in disgrace and diff-
culties for the Peloponnesus. For complaints, in-
deed, whether brought by states, or by individuals,
may possibly be adjusted ; but when a whole con-
federacy, for the sake of individual interests, under-
takes a war of which no man can foresee the issue,
it is not easy to end it with honour.

LXXXIII. “And let no man think it pusillanimous
that many states should hesitate to attack a single
city. For they also have allies not less numerous
than ours who pay tribute; and war is a matter not
so much of arms as of money, for it is money alone
that makes arms serviceable, especially when an-inland |
opposes a maritime power. Let us therefore provide
ourselves with money first, instead of being carried
away prematurely by the eloquence of our allies;
and, just as it is we who shall bear the greater part
of the responsibility for the consequences, whether
for good or evil, so let it be our task also calmly to
get some forecast of them.

LXXXIV. “And so be not ashamed of the slow-
ness and dilatoriness for which they censure us most ;
for speed in beginning may mean delay in ending,
because you went into the war without preparation,
and, moreover, in consequence of our policy we have

1 4.¢, than the opposite course.

141

THUCYDIDES

\
evdofoTaTny moduw dia TavTos vewopeBa., Kak

4 / / ” sone as.
dvvatat padiota cwdpocvyy Eudpwv TovT eivar:
povot yap Ov avTo evTpaytats Te ovK eEUBpifomev

yap pay piloper

\ a a (oe A ” rn \
kat Evydopais Hocoy eTépwv etxouev, TOV TE Evy
5) , ’ id thpab a) > al \ \ \ \
érraive éEoTpuvovT@y amas emi Ta Selva Tapa TO

lal a / A
doxovv nutv ovK éetratpopeOa ndovn, Kal Hv TIS
bya \ / / > \ \ lal
apa Evy katnyopia trapoEvvn, ovdev On padXov
b] / 3 / , \
axylecOévtes aveTretcOnuev. TrOdEMLKOL TE Kal

v \ \ ” / \ \ a
eUBovro 1a TO EVKOTMOY ylyVouEla, TO peEV OTL

, \ - a / ’ / \
aldws cwppogvvns TrEloToV peTéexvet, alaxvvys O€
evpuxia, evBovror Oé apaléctepoy TOV vopwv

a e / / \ \ ,
THS UTEepowias TaLdevopevor Kai Evy yadreTroTHTL

a a \
Twppovértepov 7) WATE AUT@V aVNKOVOTELV, KAL
, \ > a re ” \ an
py Ta aypeta Evvetol ayay ovtes, Tas T@Y TrOdE-
, la) “i
piov TapacKkevas OYO KAN@S pEeupomevot avo-
, ” b / / be / } /
potms Epy@ émekvévat, vomiferv O€ Tas Te dtavotas

a be

TOV Tédkas TapaTANCLoUS ElvaL Kal TAS TpoTTT-
dé / > / / b Dae, VY 18 \
TToVaas TUXAS OV OY SiatpeTas. atei dé WS TrPOS
> / \ b / v
ev BovdXevopevous TOUS EVAVTLOUS Epy@ TapacKeva-
/ e 7
CoueOa: Kal ove €& Exelvwy ws amapTnToMEevwV
a / ’ lal a
exew Sel Tas EATrLOaS, GAN’ WS juoY aiTaV acda-

nm ‘ / cal
ABs Mpovoovpevwyv, Tov te ciadépew ov Set

—_—

1 The speaker uses e¥coouov, rather than Bpadd employed
by the critics of Sparta, to suggest the contrast with im-
pulsiveness or undue haste.

142

BOOK I. uxxxiv. 1—4

ever inhabited a city at once free and of fairest
fame. And, after all, this trait in us may well be in
the truest sense intelligent self-control, for by_
reason of it we alone do not become insolent in
prosperity or succumb to adversity as much as others
do; and when men try to goad us by praise into
dangerous enterprises against our better judgment,
we are not carried away by their flattery, or, if any-
one goes so far as to attempt to provoke us to action
by invective, we are none the more moved to com-
pliance through vexation. Indeed, it is because of
our orderly temper! that we are brave in war and
wise in counsel—brave in war, because self-control is
the chief element in self-respect, and respect of self,
in turn, is the chief element in courage; and wise in
counsel, because we are educated too rudely to
despise the laws and with too much severity of
discipline to disobey them, and not to be so ultra-
clever in useless accomplishments? as to disparage
our enemy’s military preparations in brave words
and then fail to go through with the business with
corresponding deeds, but rather to consider that the
designs of our neighbours are very much like our own
and that what may befall from fortune? cannot be
determined by speeches. , But it is our way always
to make our preparations by deeds, on the presump-
tion that we go against opponents who are wise in
counsel ; and we ought never to build our hopes on
the chance that they are going to make mistakes,
but on the belief that we ourselves are taking safe
precautions. And we must not believe that man

? With a glance at the Athenians’ attention to culture,
especially the art of elegant speech.

> cf. the Corinthians’ charge, ch. lxix: 5, that the Spartans
trusted to chance, —

143

THUCYDIDES

\ 2
vouitey avOpwrov avOpwtov, Kpatictov Sé elvat
GaTLS év TOIS AVAYKALOTATOLS TALOEVETAL.

LXXXV. “Tavras otv Gs of watépes Te Hpiv
f , \ > v \ Nes ,
Tapédocay medETAas Kal avToL dia TaVTOs whEdov-
r /
pevoe ExXouev pn Tap@pmev, pnde éreryOevTes €v
Bpaxet popiw nuépas Tepl TOAN@Y TwOLATwY Kal
, \ / \ / J
XpnuaTwv Kal Todkewy Kal Oofns Bovrevowper,
’ >) a lal ‘
ara Kal iovyiav. eé€eatt O Hytv panddop érte-
tee , \ \ \ 334 , ,
2 pwv ota toxuv. Kal mpos Ttovs “AOnvatous TéEu-
an /
mete pev wept THS Ilotedaias, wéutete S€ Trepl
/ a
av ot Evppayot dacw adieicOar, dXXrXws TE Kal
lal , fal
éToimov dvT@v auTav dixas Sovvar: éml dé Tov
> lal
Sid0vta ov TpoTepov vopupmov ws eT adiKodVTA
+/ / \ \ / oe
iévat. twapackevdfecbe dé Tov TOAEuOY dua.
fal \ / a
TavTa yap Kal Kpaticta BovdevoecOe Kai Tos
, , p]
évavtios hoBepwtata.’
e > / fal =
3 Kalo pev “Apyidapor toratta eitev’ traped-
/ tal n
Gav S& LOevedadas TerevTaios, els THY éhopov
Tote wy, édekev Tots Aaxedaipoviots! dbe.
LXXXVI. “Tovs pév Aoyous Tovs TOAXNOUS TOV
> , > , bd] /, \ \
AOnvaiav ov yiyvocKkm: éTatvécavtes yap TOANG
EaUTOUS OVOALOU aVTELTOV WS OUK adLKOUaL TOUS
\
nuetépous Evspayous Kat tHv Ledorovyvncov:
\ ,
Kaltot et mpos Tous Mndous éyévovto ayaol Tote,
\ > c al \ lal , , ” ,
mpos & nuas Kaxol viv, diumdactas Enutas aELoi
2 eiow, OTL avtT ayalav Kaxol yeyévnvTat. pets
5é Omotos Kal TOTE Kal viv ecpev, Kal Tovs Evppa-
1 Hude deletes with Kriiger.
144

BOOK I. cxxxiv. 4—Lxxxvi. 2

differs much from man,! but that he is best who is
trained in the severest discipline.

LXXXV. “These are the practices which our
fathers bequeathed to us and we ourselves have
maintained from the beginning to our profit; let us
not abandon them, nor allow ourselves in a small
portion of one day to be hurried into a decision which
involves many lives, much money, many cities and a
good name ; but let us deliberate at our leisure. And
this course is permitted to us more than to the sup-
porters of the other view because of our strength. And

_ send envoys tothe Athenians to take up the question

_ of Potidaea, and also to take up the matters wherein

\ our allies claim that they are wronged. The chief
‘reason for this is that they are-ready 2 to submit to
arbitration, and it is not lawful to proceed forthwith
against one who offers arbitration as though against a
wrong-doer. But all the while prepare yourselves
for the war. This decision will be best for yourselves
“and will inspire most fear *., your foes.”

Thus spoke Archidamuse and finally Sthenelaidas, — es

one of the ephors at that time, came forward and
addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows :
LXXXVI. “The long speeches of the Athenians
I cannot understand; for though they indulged in
much praise of themselves, they nowhere denied that
they are wronging our allies and the Peloponnesus.
And yet, if they conducted themselves well against
the Persians in former times but are now conducting
tiiemselves ill toward us, they deserve two-fold
punishment, because they used to be good and have
become bad. But we are the same now as we were

1 ¢f. the Corinthians’ praise of Athenian superiority, ch. lxx.
® of. ch. lxxviii. 4.

145

3

THUCYDIDES

a lal > / >
yous, iv cwppovapuev, ov meptoiroueBa adixov-
/ ’ \ / lal e 3 > /
pévous ovde pedAAHoOpMEV TiwwpeEty: of & OvKETL
sf la , ” \ \ /
éANOVGL KAKWS TagyYElV. AAXOLS peV Yap KPN-
pata éote Kal vies Kal immos, tiv dé Evppaxot
> , A > , ae , ’ ,
aya0ol, ods ov Tapabotéa Tols “APnvatos éotiy,
ovdé dixais Kal Aoyows StaxpiTéa p1) AOYO Kal

E ¥ fey Nays
> \ , > \ / > /
avtous BXaTTOMEVOUS, AANA TLULWPNTEA EV TAYXEL
Kal Tavtl cOéver. Kal ws nuas peter Bovrev-
ec0at adlKovpévous pnoels dL6acKéeT@, AAA TOUS
wéAXOVTAS aoLKEly MANOV TpéTTEL TOAUY YXpoVvOV
BovrevecOar. wWndifecde orv, ® Aaxedatpoviot,
a \
akiws Ths Lmaptns Tov TwoAEMoY Kal pTE TOUS
"A@ / baal / / a) / \
nvatous é€ate pelfous yiyver0ar, mnte Tous
/ a > \ \ lal val
Evpuaxous KataTpodloapev, adda Evv tots Geois
émiwpev el TOUS abLKovVTAS.”
LXXXVII. Tovadta réEas ereWydifev avtos
” BY hat | A 3 , A A 5 ,
Epopos av és! THv exxdrAnaotav Tov Aaxedatpoviwr.
\ rn
6 8€ (xpivovas yap Bon cai ov Whdw) ovK &py
, \ x / / > \
SiaylyvwcKer THv Bony ToTépa peilwv, adda
Bovropevos avtovs havepas aTroderxvupevous THY
, > \ a a e a /-
yv@pnv és TO ToNEuEtY waddov opyncaL EdeEev"
“Orem pev tuav, ® Aaxedaiporiot, Soxodat e-
AVcOat ai otrovdal Kal ot “AOnvaior ad.xeir,
avacTyTw és éxeivo TO ywpiov, SetEas TL Ywpiov
iP ghbe sels A ? . 2s) ba »
autos, “Tw 5é un Sokovaw, €s Ta emi OadTepa.
> / \ / \ an /
avactdvtes b€ SiuéoTnoav, Kal TOAXB TreElous
’ / s > / e \ /
éyévovto ols eboKovv ai otrovdai Nedvabat. Tpoc-
1 Hude deletes, after Fr. Miiller.
146

BOOK I. txxxvi. 2-Lxxxvil. 4

then, and if we are in our right minds, we shall not
permit our allies to be wronged or even put off
avenging their wrongs, since they cannot longer put
off suffering them. Others, indeed, may have money
in abundance and ships and horses,! but we have
brave allies, and they must not be delivered over to
the Athenians; nor must we seek redress by means
of legal processes and words when it is not in word
only that we ourselves are being injured, but we
must avenge them speedily and with all our might.
And let no man tell us that it befits us to deliberate
when a wrong is being done us; nay, it befits rather
those who intend to do us a wrong to deliberate a
long time. Vote, therefore, Lacedaemonians, for the
war as beseems the dignity of Sparta, and do not
permit the Athenians to become too great; and let
us not prove false to our allies, but let us with the
favour of the gods go against the wrong-doer.”
LXXXVII. When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken,
he himself, since he was an ephor, put the vote to
the assembly of the Lacedaemonians. Now in their
voting they usually decide by shout and not by
ballot, but Sthenelaidas said that he could not distin-
guish which shout was the louder, and wishing to
make the assembly more eager for war by a clear
demonstration of their sentiment, he said: “ Who-
ever of you, Lacedaemonians, thinks that the treaty
has been broken and the Athenians are doing wrong,
let him rise and go to yonder spot (pointing to a
certain spot), and whoever thinks otherwise, to the
other side.” Then they rose and divided, and those
who thought the treaty had been broken were found
to be in a large majority. Then they called in the

+ of. ehzlzxx, 3;
147

THUCYDIDES

/ A \ 4 s id ,
Kadéoavtés Te Tos Evppaxous eimov OTL odhiat
lal lal “ \
pev Soxolev adixeiv ot “A@nvaior, Bovrecbar Sé
Kal ToUs TavTas _Evppaxous TapaKanéo ares
Vapov emayaryet, CT WS KOT Bovrevo apevor TOV
Toe MOV TOL@VTAL, hv 60K}. Kab ov pev amexo-
pnoav é€m otKov Svar pakapevoe TavTa, Kal ob
"AOnvalwv mrpéa Bers taotepov ep arrep HAO ov xXpN-
| patioavTes.

id \ , oA fel >? / a \

H &€ d:ayvepn avtn THs exKANTLasS TOU Tas

da / @ 1 PD] / > / \ Py
aomrovoas AeXvaCaL* EYEVETO EV TETAPTW KAL OE-
KaTM ETEL TOV TPlAKOVTOUTLOMY oTOVOaY TpO-
KeYopnKkuov, al éyévovto peta Ta EvPoixa.
LXXXVIII. éWndicavto 6é of Aaxedatpovior

\ 8 , \ / - >
Tas omrovoas AEAVTOaL Kal TONEUNTEA ElVaL, OU
TocovTov Tav Evppaywov recPertes Tos Noyots
vf / \ , / \ > \ lal
dcov hoSovpevor Tovs “AOnvatous pn emt petfov

a e lal 5] a \ \ a ¢ ,
Suvnbaciy, op@vtes avTOIs TA TOANA THS EAXa-
Sos UToyelpla 757 ovTa.

LXXXIX. Oi yap ’A@nvaio tpoTr@ toi@de
Ss Bees \ / > = > / > \
ArOov ert Ta Tpaypata ev ols HVENOncay. érrELd7
Miédoau aveywpnoav éx ths Edpwrns wendévtes

\ \ \ en ec 1.7 / \ e
Kal vavol Kal Teg vTO EXAnva@v Kal ol KaTa-

, > A Qn \ > / 4
dhuyovtes avTav tats vavolv és Muxaddny d:epOa-
/ \ e \ r
pnoav, Aewtvxidns pev 0 Bactrevs Tov Aaxedat-
, ec e cad A > / ¢ "4
pLoviwr, daTrep nryetto Tov ev Muxadryn EXAnvar,
amteywpnoev em oixov &ywv Tovs ato Iledorrov-

/ s e se 9 an \ e by \
vycov Evypayous: ot b€ ‘A@nvaio: Kal ot atro

1 ted Tas onovdas AeAUoOa:, omitted by Hude, following
van Herwerden.

148

BOOK I, txxxvi. 4-Lxxx1x. 2

allies and told them that, in their opinion, the Athe-
nians were doing wrong, but that they wished to
summon the whole body of the allies! and put the
vote to them, in order that they might all deliberate
together and together undertake the war, if it should
be so decided. And so the allies who were there
went back home, having brought these matters to a
settlement, and so did the Athenian envoys later,
after they had finished the business on which they
had come.

This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had

been broken, was made in the fourteenth year? from
the beginning of the thirty years’ truce, which was
made after the Euboean war. LXXXVIII. And

the vote of the Lacedaemonians that the treaty had=

been broken and that they must go to war was
determined, not so much by the influence of the
speeches of their allies, as by fear of the Athenians,
lest they become too powerful, seeing that the greater
part of Hellas was already subject to them.

LXXXIX. For it was in the following manner that =

the Athenians found themselves face to face with
those circumstances in dealing with which they rose
to greatness. When the Persians had retreated from
Europe, defeated on both sea and land by the Hel-
lenes,* and those of them who with their ships had
taken refuge at Mycale had perished there, Leoty-
chides, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was com-
mander of the Hellenes at Mycale, went home with
the allies from the Peloponnesus. But the Athe-
nians, together with the allies from Ionia and the

1 A general convocation of the allies; at this time only
part of them had been invited, according to ch. Ixvii. See

ch. cxix., where the plan is carried out. 2 445 B.c.
de ch. exiy. * At Salamis, Plataea, Mycale.

149

THUCYDIDES

/ /
‘Twvias cat ‘EXXnorovtov Evupayor, dn adeotn-
/ / \
KoTeEs ATO Buctréws, Utropetvaytes Xnotov éro-
/
ALopKovv Mrydav éxovtwv, Kal éTiyerwaoavTes
= > \ ? / lal s \ \
elXov avTiy éxdiTovT@y TaY BapBapev, Kal peTa
a > / bd € / e a4
TovTo aTémAevcav €& EXANoTOVTOU ws EXaTTOL
x , > , \ \ , ) \
Kata roves. “AOnvaiwy 6€ TO KoLvov, érreLdy
> lal rc. f. > lo yy: > 4
avtots ot BapBapor €x THs ywpas awHdOon, Siexo-
/ b] \ e/ e of lal % A
pilovto evOvds G0ev UTeEEevTO Tratéas Kal yuvat-
rn \ \
Kas Kal THY Teplovcay KaTaCKEUHY, KAL THY TOALY
lal \ / cal
avolKosomely TapecKevalovTo Kal TA TELYN* TOU
/ / e A
Te yap TeptBorou Bpayéa eiotHKer Kal oikiat ai
\ \ 2 , Ie \ an b]
pev TONAL erreTTM@KETAY, ONiyat SE TEPinaaD, év
€ lal lal
als avtol éoxyjvacav ot dvvatot Tav Hepaav.
/ \
XC. Aaxedarpoveor 6€ alc Popevor TO wéAXOV HA-
/ \ \ e nr
Gov mpecBetav, Ta ev Kal avTOl HoLov av opavTes
Wu - m 2 | / / ” SYA / a ”
pnt éxelvous punt adrov pNdéva TEtXos ExovTA,
an /
TO 6€ TACOV TaY EVvumaywy eEoTpUYVOYT@Y Kal
lal fal an x la) a
hoBoupévwy Tov TE VaUTLKOV aUT@Y TO TAHOOs, O
\ > e a \ \ > \ / 5 \ /
Tpiv ovy UTHpXE, Kal THY €s TOV MyndiKov Trode-
/ /
pov TOApaVv yevouevnv. n&lovy TE avToOvs py
Teryiferv, ara Kal TOV €Ew LleXoTrovyrjcou par-
Nov Oaos elatyKer Evyxalenely peta shav Tovs
, \ 7 \ ef lel
meptBorous, TO uev PovroOmevoyv Kal VTOoTTOY THs
, > A bd \ ’ , c \
yvouns ov dnrovvtes €s Tovs ‘AOnvatous, ws 6é
a / ? ef b] / > x »”
Tov BapBapov, et avis érédOot, ovK av ExXoVTOS

1 The contingents from the islands and the coast of Asia
Minor, who, in consequence of the battle at Mycale and the

150

BOOK I. txxxtx. 2—xc. 2

Hellespont,! who were already in revolt from the
King, remained at their task and besieged Sestos,
which was held by the Persians; and passing the
winter there they took it, as it had been deserted by
the Barbarians; and after that the contingents of
the several cities sailed away from the Hellespont.
But the Athenian people, when the Barbarians had
departed from their territory, straightway began to
fetch back their wives and their children and the
remnant of their household goods from where they
had placed them for safety,” and to rebuild the city
and the walls; for of the encircling wall only small
portions were left standing, and most of the houses
were in ruins, only a few remaining in which the
chief men of the Persians had themselves taken
quarters.

XC. But the Lacedaemonians, perceiving what
was in prospect, came on an embassy, partly because
they themselves would have preferred to see neither
the Athenians nor anyone else have a wall, but more
because their allies urged them on through appre-
hension, not only of the size of the Athenian navy,
which had hitherto not been large, but also of the
daring they had shown in the Persian war. So they
requested them not to rebuild their walls, but rather
to join with them in razing the walls of whatsoever
towns outside the Peloponnesus had them standing,
giving no indication of their real purpose or of their
suspicion with regard to the Athenians, but repre-
senting that the Barbarian, if he should attack them
again, would not have any stronghold to make his

advance of the victors to Abydos, had been received into the
Hellenic alliance.
2 Salamis, Aegina, and Troezen; cf. Hdt. vir. xli.

I51

THUCYDIDES

amo éxupov mobev, OoTEp vov éx« tav OnBoar,
oppacbat, THY TE Tletorovyncov Taow epacay
avaxepnoty TE Kal adopyny teavny elvau. oa 8
*AOnvaios OcurrroKéovs youn TOUS pev Aaxe-
Satmovious TavT elTOVTas, aTroxpwapevol OTL TEL-

ovclY @S avToUS Tpéa Bets Tept Ov Aéyouow,
ev0us anipragav- éavTov © exehevev aToaTéX-
Nev @S TAaXYLTTA O Oem ToKAAs és tnv Aaxedai-
pova, addous dé mpos éavT@ EdopEvous T peo Beus
p42) evOvs € ERTEMTEEY; aX emia xe pexpe Tooov-
Tov €ws av TO Teixos (KaVOV Apwol WOTE aTrO"a-
xerGar € éx TOU avarykaLoTaTov Dypous: Tevx (Few bé
mavTas Tavonpel Tous €v TH TonEL,) Kal avTous
Kal yuvaixas Kal Tatas, devdouévous pire idtou
Lyre Onpoctov oik0b0f.7/4aT os 60ev Tis apedia
eo Tal és TO épyov, adda cabarpodvras Tara.
Kal c pev TavTa OddEas Kal UrevTov, TaAXA OTL
aUTOS TAKEL mpakor, @XETO. Kal €s THY Aaxedai-
pova ed Oav ov Tpoo ret pos Tas apxas, Gra
Oufiye Kat mpouvpacivero. “Kal “OT OTE “TUS avrov
Epoto (TOV év TENEL OVT@V\S TL ovK em epXeTar €Trl
TO KoLVOV, EbN TOUS Evpm peo Bers avamevelv, AZKO-
Alas b€ TLVOS OVENS avToOvs UToAELPOHVAL, TpOG-
déyerOat pévtor ev Taye iEew Kal Oavyalew ws
¥ ;
OUT TUApELoLV.

XCI. Of &€ adxovovtes TH pev OepiotoKkre?
éreiGovto dia diriav, Tov? b€ ad\rXwY adixvov-
uévov Kal cabas KaTnyopovvTwy OTL Taxi erat

1 ros ev rH wédet, Kriiger brackets, followed by Hude.
Kal abtovs... maidas also bracketed by Hude, as not read by
Schol.

2 Hude adopts Shilleto’s conjecture aitomtay,

152

BOOK | I. xe. 2=xcr. 1

base of operations, as lately he had made Thebes;
the Peloponnesus, they added, was large enough for
all, both as a retreat and as a base of operations. To
these proposals of the Lacedaemonians, the Athe-
nians, by the advice of Themistocles, replied that
they would send ambassadors to Sparta to discuss
these matters, and so got rid of them without delay.
Themistocles then proposed that they should send
himself as speedily as possible to Lacedaemon; that
they should then choose other ambassadors in addi-
tion, but, instead of sending them immediately,
should wait until they should have raised the wall to
such a height as was absolutely necessary for defence ;
and that the whole population of the city, men,
women, and children, should take part in the wall-
building, sparing neither private nor public edifice
that would in any way help to further the work, but
demolishing them all. After he had given these
instructions, and an intimation that, for the rest, he
would himself look after matters at Sparta, he
departed. And when he came to Lacedaemon he
did not present himself to the magistrates, but kept
putting it off and making excuses; and whenever
any one of those in authority asked why he did not
come before the people, he said that he was waiting
for his colleagues, who had stayed behind on account
of some urgent business; he expected them however
to come soon, and wondered that they were not
already there.

XCI. And the Lacedaemonian magistrates were
disposed to be content with this reply by reason
of their friendship for Themistocles ; but when every-
body who came from Athens declared quite positively

153

to

THUCYDIDES

\ v ef / 3 s 4 \
Te Kal On Dros AapPBaver, ovK elyov OTaS XPT)
amicthoat. yvors S€ exelvos KehevEL aUTOVS LN
, lal lol
Aoyous paAXov trapayerOar 7 Téurpar chav av-
~ ” cal
T@v avdpas oltwes YpNeTOL Kail TiaTHs avayye-
Novat oKxerldpevot. aToaTéANovew odY, KAaL TEpL
a e ~ al > /
aitav 6 QeuctoxrAAs Tots “AOnvaiow xpvda
Téuret KEAEVOV! wS HKLTTA ETLpAaVaS KATATE
Kal py adeivar mpl av adtol madw Koptc@oow
v7 \ \ @ > A e / ¢ ,
(H8n yap Kali jKeov avt@ ot EvyrpecBes, ABpa-
, e /
viyos te 6 Avowxdéovs Kal ’Apiortetdns o Avot
/ fal cal
pdyou, ayyédNovtes Exe ikava@s TO TELXOS):
>] “ \ \ € / an e ,
époBeito yap py oi Aaxedatpovior ofas, omoTe
cabas axovceav, ovKéTL apo. of TE odv
’ lal \ / ef ’ / rf
AOnvaiot Tous Tpéa BEls .WOTEP emeoTahn Kar el-
Xo, kal 6 OewatoxrHs éredOwv tots Aaxedat-
poviors evtadéa 87 pavepas eimrev OTL ” bev TONS
chav teteiyiotar On Wate ixavyn eivar owlery
\ > a ? / /

Tous évoixobvtas, et 5€ Te Bovrovtar Aaxedat-
, ry t , / \ na
poviot 4) of Evppaxor mpecBevecOar Tapa opas

, \ \ /
@S POs SiayeyvarKovr as TO AoLTTOV Léval Ta TE
cdhiow avtois Evudpopa Kal Ta Kowa. THY TE yap
TOA OTE eOOKEL EXALTELY HELVOV ElvaL Kal €s TAS
vads eo Bivat, avev éxelvav Epacav? yvovtTes ToX-
a > , ,
pnoa, Kal boa av peT exelvor Bovreveo Pat,
ovoevos t borepot motty Pavan ae, Soxelv ovv odiat
Kal viv dpewov elvar Thy éavT@v TOdW TeEtXoS

1 Hude omits with Lex. Vindob.
2 Deleted by Kriiger, followed by Hude.

154

BOOK I. xc1. 1-6

that the wall was going up and was already attaining
height, they did not know how to discredit it.
Themistocles, however, when he perceived this bade
them not to be misled by reports, but rather to send
some trustworthy men of their own number who
would see for themselves and bring back a faithful
report. They did so, and Themistocles sent word
secretly to the Athenians to detain the envoys as
covertly as possible and not to let them go until they
themselves returned—for by this time his colleagues,
Habronichus son of Lysicles and Aristides son of
Lysimachus, had joined him, with the news that the
wall was high enough—the reason for his precaution
being that he was afraid the Lacedaemonians, when
they heard the truth, would then refuse to let them
go. Accordingly the Athenians detained the envoys
as they were directed, and Themistocles, appearing
before the Lacedaemonians, at length told them
frankly that the city was now walled and therefore
in a position to protect its inhabitants, and that if
the Lacedaemonians or their allies cared to negotiate
any matter with them they must hereafter come to
them with the understanding that they were dealing
with men who were fully aware of what was for
their own and the general interest. For when they
thought it best to abandon their city and embark on
their ships, they had resolved, said the ambassadors,
upon this bold step without the advice of the Lace-
daemonians, and again in all matters in which the
Athenans took counsel with the Lacedaemonians
they had shown themselves inferior to none in
judgment. Accordingly in the present instance also
it seemed to them best that their city should have
a wall, and that this course would be of great

199

THUCYDIDES

oa \ 307 lal x ‘ bd \ /
éxyewv, Kal dia Tots TodiTaLs Kal €s TO’S TaVTas
‘ ’ , yy > \ / ,
Evpudxous apedtpw@tepov EcecOat- ov yap olov +
elvat pu) aro avTLTadoV TapacKeEUAS omotov TL 4)
” ’ \ \ s Q A , >
icov és TO Kolwwov BovrevecOar. 7 Tavtas ov
ateryiatous é€bn yphvar Evupayeivy Kai rade
vouilew opbas évew.
/
XCII. Of S€ Aaxedatpoviot axovcavtes dpynv
\ \ > > a a eI , »O\
bev davepav ov« érroovvtTo Tots ’AOnvaiors (ovdé
\ > a, 4 ’ \ , / A
yap é7l KwAUUN, AAA yvouns Tapaivécer S7HOev
an a 5] / A \ \ cal
T® KOLV@ ETrpecBevoavTo, awa O€ Kal tpocdireis
» A U \ \ ag
évTes €v T@ TOTE 1a THY es TOY MAdov tpoOupiav
‘ om / i
Ta waddicTa avTos ETUYXaVOV), THS pévToL Bov-
, e , > / v iA
AnTEwWsS ApapTavovTes adyrws 1)xOovTO. of TE
/ 4 / > a >) 3 v > ff.
mpéa Bets Exatépwv amndOov em’ oikov aveTiKAn-
TOS.
al €+3 a
XCIII. Totte 7 tpoTe ot “AOnvaio: thy o-
x >] / b] XL / \ 8 Xr e ’ 8
w éteiyicay ev Odiyw ypove@, Kal dnd 1) OiKOb0-
pla éte Kal viv éotiy OTL KaTAa oTrOVONnY éeyéveTO.
« \ , , , e. BS \
of yap Oeuérto. Tavtoiwy ALGwy voKeWTaL Kal
> / ” e > ] id (cA / 1
ov Evvepyacuevmy eat 4, GNX ws ExaTTOL
/ , n > \ ,
TOTE TpocEehEepov, TWOAAAL TE OTHAAL aTO Onpma-
twv Kal ALGor eipyacpévor eyKaTeréynoav. pel-
\ ¢ Aa > / ‘ol
Cwv yap o mwepiBoros wavtayn €&nyOn THs To-

1 Hude reads €xaorov with C.

1 The remains of the walls now seen around the Peiraeus
are not those of the Themistoclean walls, which were de-
stroyed at the end of the Peloponnesian War, but of the
walls built by Conon in 393. A small part of these remains,

156

ot fp A en >
.

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a

yet ts say =% ont
PrmEVE UR, f: .
Lint, that iver e. "tt
A eniuny ec ie wis

ee,

tse

ise Bey
re *

his ie a3

os .) TOSS 2 e
} :

nied ag By

\ i A Bote ahi
eee
Hn Sy's<, > dome

vopUoT “PIT PLofunjigs panmpg Seine eat Ee

SIJeM JO SuIeuURY =S=—= ant
Oa Ss)
118M P1]OG Je Sulewayy """\ AAS

I, ;
Y JID
Z3SSa4 161 :
Gs ce PLL f (Ws NS
ey NN ARAN

SALTS
rly Wy

4

Sy
ey \ Hc

a

SNaVadId

BOOK I. xcr. 6—xcur. 2

advantage both to themselves in particular, and to
the whole body of the allies; for it was impossible
for them, he added, to have equal or similar weight
in the general councils of the alliance except on the
basis of a military strength that was a match for
theirs. Therefore, he concluded, the members of
the alliance should either dispense with their walls
one and all, or regard this act of the Athenians as
justified.

XCII. On hearing this, the Lacedaemonians did not
openly show any resentment against the Athenians ;
for they had sent their embassy to Athens, not to
stop the work, but to offer, as they professed, a sugges- _
tion in the common interest, and besides, they enter-
tained at that time the most friendly feelings for the
Athenians on account of their zeal in opposing the
Persians; since, however, they had failed in their
purpose, they were secretly vexed. So the envoys
on either side returned home without making any
formal complaint.

XCIII. It was in this manner that the Athenians
got their wall built in so short a time, and even
to-day the structure shows that it was put together
in haste.1 For the lower courses consist of all sorts
of stones, in some cases not even hewn to fit but just
as they were when the several workers brought
them, and many columns from grave monuments
and stones wrought for other purposes were built in.
For the circuit-wall of the city was extended in

on the flat ground north of the Peiraeus toward the main-
land, answers exactly to Thucydides’ description—being of
solid stone and over 25 feet thick—but most of the remains
are of two outer faces of stone, the intermediate spaces filled
in with rubble and earth. On Munychia there is no trace
anywhere of a solid wall of the age of Themistocles.

157

THUCYDIDES

A ral e , cal
hews, Kal Sta TOUTO TaVTa Opoiws KLVOUVTES
nmelyovTo. émerce O€ Kal TOD Llerpar@s Ta AOLTTA

fal nw ral , lal
0 @cepyiotoKANs otKodopety (UTHpKTO O avUTOU
MpoTEpov él THS ExElvoU apYAs hs KaT éviauToV
b | / ss / / 7, \
AOnvaio p&e), voutfov to Te Ywpiovy Kaov
elvar ALuéevas EXOV TpEls aUTOpvEls, Kal avTOUS

/ ,
vauTlKous yeyevnuévous péya tmpopépe és TO
4 fal \ - Lal
ctncacbar Svvamw (ths yap 6) Cardcons Tpa-
Tos €TOAMNnoev eitrety WS avOexTéa éaTi), Kal THY
\ 4 \ ?
apynv evdus Evyxatecxevalev. Kal oxodounoav
Qn 4 / ral
Th éxelvou yV@puN TO TAXOS TOV TElLYoUs OEP VUV
v 4 / °’ x \ lal 4 \ cA
ére SHAOv Eote Tepl Tov Lleparas dvo0 yap apakar
A / r
évavtiat ddAnAaLS TOUS ALOoUS errfryov, évTOs Sé
ote YarE ovTE TAOS Hv, ara Evy@Kodopnpe-
vou peyaror ALOoL Kal evTopH eyywviol, aLdynpw
TT pos GAANHAOUS Ta &wbev Kai pworvPdo Sedepévor.
\ \ ee ¢ / ’ / e nr
70 6€ Uvvos Huicu pdriota éTehéOn ov duevoetto.
b} / \ lal / \ a 4 > /
€BovreTo yap TO peyeOa Kal TO Taye AdioTavat
TAS TOV ToAELLoY éeTLBovAdS, avOpwTraYV TE €VO-
puter ONyoV Kal TOY AXpPELOTAaTMY apKécELY THY
/ \ > »” Pb] \ Qn 5 /
duraxkyy, Tos © aAXous és TAS vads ec PryjcecOat.
tails yap vavol pddtoTa TpocéKeELTO, LOWY, ws
€wel doKel, THS Bacikéws oTpaTlids THY KaTa
Ouraccav épodov evtopwtépay Ths Kata yhv
ovcav: Tov Te Iletpara mpeAtpwrtepov evoule THs
dvw Toews, Kal TOANAKLS TOs "AOnvaiols Tapy-

1 The Peiraeus, here in widest sense, is the peninsula, the
heart of which is the steep height of Munychia, from which

158

BOOK I. xc. 2-7

every direction, and on this account they laid hands
upon everything alike in their haste. Themistocles,
moreover, persuaded them also to finish the walls of
the Peiraeus, a beginning of which had been made
during the year in which he was archon of the Athe-
nians ; for he considered that the Peiraeus with its
three natural harbours! was a fine site to develop and
that to have become a nation of seamen would be a
great advantage to the Athenians themselves, with a
view to their acquisition of power—uindeed it was he
who first dared declare that they must apply them-
selves to the sea—and so he immediately took the
first steps in this undertaking.* And following his
advice they built the wall round the Peiraeus of the
thickness that may still be observed ; for two wagons
carrying the stones could meet and pass each other.
Inside, moreover, there was neither rubble nor
mortar, but stones of large size hewn square were
closely laid together, bound to one another on the
outside with iron clamps and lead. But the wall
was completed to only about half of the height he
originally intended, for what he wished was to be
able to repel the assaults of the enemy by the very
height and thickness of the wall, and he thought
that a few men, and these the least effective, would
suffice to guard it, while all the rest might man the
ships. For Themistocles devoted himself particularly
to the navy, because, as it seems to me, he had
observed that the approach of the King’s forces was
easier by sea than by land; and he thought that the
Peiraeus would prove more serviceable than the upper
city, and often advised the Athenians, if ever they
it stretches into the sea like an indented leaf, forming three
natural basins—the Peiraeus, Zea, Munychia.

* Others render: immediately began to help them to lay
the foundation of their empire.

159

THUCYDIDES

DI vw 5 \ a a /
vel, Vv apa ToTe Kata ynv BracOadat, kataBavtTas
\ a
és avTov Tais vavol Tpos atavtas avbictacbat.
] a \ 93 e b] 4 \ ~~
A@nraios pév odv oUTws éTELytaOnoav Kai TANNA
Katecxevabovto evdvs peta THY Mrydwp avaxo-
pnou.
XCIV. Havaavas 6€ 0 KieouBpotov éx Aake-
, lal 3 ,
Saiuovos otpatnyos Tov “EdXXAnvev é£eTEéEwhOn
. na \
peta eixoot vea@v aro IleXorovvncov: Evvétdeov
\ » tk Lal / \ ‘ fa) A
dé kal "AOnvaios tpidxovta vavoi Kal TOY adrwY
Evpudyov TARGs. Kal éotparevoav és Kuzrpov
Kal AUTHS TA TOAXA KaTECTPEWaVTO, Kal VoTEpoV
/
és Bufavtiov Mrydav éyovtwmy Kai é£etrodtop-
fol a /
Knoav év THSE TH NYyEemovia.t
\ > nf / ?.
XCV. "Hén dé Biaiov dvtos avtod ot Te GAXOL
EdAnves 7xGovTo Kai ovy Axicta ot “lwves
\ ef > \ / \ ,’ /
Kal 6c0t ato PBaciiéws vewoTti ndevOépwvTo:
a \ \ ? / tof
dhoitavrés Te Tpos Tovs “A@nvatovs nftovy av-
\ r “ /
Tovs yenovas odhav yiyverPar Kata To Evy-
/
yeves cal Ilavoavia ph émitpérev, qv tov
a / /
Budknrar. of dé “AOnvaior édéEavta te Tovs
. a \ ,
oyous Kal TpocEtyov THY yYvouNnY ws Ov TeEpt-
U 2 , , ? ,
owouwevol TAAAA TE KATATTHTOMEVOL N PatLvoLTo
» Lad \ e
dpista avtois. év tovtTm b€ ot Aaxedatporior
/ a
peteTréuTrovto Llavoaviay avaxpivodrtes @v Tépt
‘ \ / \ °
éruvOidvovto: Kal yap abiKia TOA KaTNYOpEtTO
’ la ¢ \ lal € / r > ,
avtov uTo Tav EXAnvav tov adixvovpEevor,
\ , lal > / / x
kal tupavvidos padrpov édpaiveTo piunos 7

1 Hude transfers, with Kriiger, év rHde tH Hyeuorlg to
ch. xcv., deleting 5¢ after #57.

160

BOOK I. xem. 7—xev. 3

were hard pressed on land, to go down to the*Pei-
raeus, and resist all their opponents with their fleet.
It was in this way, then, that the Athenians got
their walls built, and came to be engaged upon their
other fortifications, immediately after the withdrawal
of the Persians.

XCIV. Meanwhile Pausanias son of Cleombrotus
was sent out from Lacedaemon in command of the
Hellenes with twenty ships from Peloponnesus,
accompanied by thirty Athenian ships and a multi-
tude of other allies. They made also an expedition
against Cyprus, subduing most of it, and afterwards,
at the time of Pausanias’ leadership, besieged By-
zantium, which the Persians then held, and took it.

XCV. But, since he had already become head-
strong,! the rest of the Hellenes became disaffected,
especially the Ionians and all who had been recently
emancipated from the King. So they waited upon
the Athenians and begged them in the name of
their kinship? to become their leaders, and to resist
Pausanias if he should attempt to coerce them.? The
Athenians accepted their proposals and gave full
attention to the matter with the determination to
endure Pausanias’ conduct no longer and to settle
all other matters as should seem best to them-
selves. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians recalled
Pausanias in order to interrogate him about re-
ports they were hearing, for much wrongdoing was
charged against him by the Hellenes who came to
Sparta, and his behaviour seemed an aping of des-
potic power rather than the conduct of a general.

1 of. ch. cxxx. 2.
2 As the mother city; ¢f. ch. ii. (end),
3 478 B.C.

161

i

oO

~]

THUCYDIDES

s / > a a , ef
aotpatnyia. EvvéBn Te avT@ KadeloGat Te aua
\ \ r Aoagt , ” \ 29
Kal tous Evppdyous TO éxeivou EyPerrap ’AOn-
, / ‘ al ’ \
vatous petatatacOat. mANVY Tov aro IleXoTor-
/ “ > 34 \ > /
vycov atpatiotav. édAOav bé és Aaxedaipova
TOV meV LOLA GpO \ ad itTwov nuove 2
be 2 Tpos Tia) adicnuatov nvovvOn, Ta
Sé péyiota aroNveTas py adsxety' KaTNYOpEtTO
\ > la] > isd \ \ bi , /
Sé avTod ovy HKioTa pndiopos Kal edoxer cade-
OTATOV Eival. Kal éxelvoy pev ovKEeTL ExTréUTTOU-
” ’ \ x 9 \ >
aw apxovta, Aopkw d€ Kat addovs TiWas per
avTov otpatiay éyovTas ov ToAAHVY* ols OvKETE
’ , e FA \ € 7 e \ >
édlecav ot Evupayoe THY ryEwoviavy ot O€ al-
4 > a \ A > / ef
cOopevoe amrndOov, Kal addous ovKETL UoTEpOV
éférreurav of Aaxedatpoviot, poBovpevor pi
/ , /,
adic ot é&ovtes Yelpous yiyvwvTal, OTEp Kal
év 7@ Ilavcavia éveidov, ataddakelovtes b€ Kar
tod Mnoixod trodéuou Kal tovs ’A@nvaious vopt-
Covtes ixavovs éEnyeicOar Kal cdhiow év TO TOTE
TApPOVTL ETLTNOELOUS.
’ a
XCVI. IlaparaBovtes S€ ot “AOnvator thy
an / ca
Hyemoviavy TOUT® T@ TpoT@ ExovT@V TaV Evypd-
\ \ / n yy ee ”
yov dia TO Ilavoaviou picos, éra€av as Te edet
Tapéexelv TOV TOoEWY XpPnuwaTA Tpos TOV Bap-
fal “
Bapov Kai as vais Tpocxnua yap Hv auvverOat
? ” a \ i“ , \
ap érabov Snodvtas tiv Baciiéws yopav. Kal
Cy , , lal >] /, ,
EXAnvotapuiar Tote Tp@Tov “AOnvatows KaTécTH
b] / + ee / \ / e/ \ ’ /
apyn, ot édéyovto Tov Popov: ovTw yap wvonacOn

162

BOOK I. xcv. 3-xcvi. 2

And it so happened that he was cited before the
court at the very time that the allies in vexation at
him had gone over to the side of the Athenians, all
except the soldiers from the Peloponnesus. And
although, on his return to Lacedaemon, Pausanias
was held to account for any personal wrongs he had
committed against individuals, yet on the principal
charges he was acquitted of misconduct; for he was
accused most of all of treasonable relations with the
Persians, and it seemed to be a very clear case. And
they did not again send him out as commander, but
Dorcis, together with some others, with an incon-
siderable force; but the allies did not entrust these
with the chief command. And they, being now
aware of the situation, went back home; and the
Lacedaemonians sent out no other commanders
thereafter, fearing that any who went out might be
corrupted, as they saw had happened in the case of
Pausanias ; they also wanted to be rid of the Persian
war, and thought that the Athenians were com-
petent to take the leadership and were friendly to
themselves at the time.

XCVI. After the Athenians had succeeded in this
way to the leadership over the allies, who freely
chose them on account of their hatred of Pausanias,
they assessed the amount of their contributions, both
for the states which were to furnish money for the
war against the Barbarians and for those which were
to furnish ships, the avowed object being to avenge
themselves for what they had suffered by ravaging
the King’s territory. And it was then! that the
Athenians first established the office of Hellenic
treasurers, who received the tribute; for so the

1 476 B.O.
163

to

THUCYDIDES

nm / e / S 8 e A ,
Tay XpnuaToY 1 dopa. nv 6 o mpaTos Popos
TaxOels térpacoows TadavTa Kal eEjovta, Ta-
puciov te Afitos Fv adtois kal ai Evvodou és TO
lepov éyiyvovTo.

XCVII. “Hyovpevor dé avTovopoy TO TP@TOV
trav Evppayov Kal(ato Kowev Evvobav) \Bovrev-
ovT@Y TOTAbE er idOov ToNéu@ TE Kal Siaxerpioet
mpaypatwov petaEY Tove TOU ToAEuOU Kal TOD
Mnérxod, & éyéveto mpos Te TOY BapBapov avtois
Kal mpos Tors odetépous Evppayous vewrepi-
Covras Kai Hedorovynciay tovs alel mpootuyya-

> iq / 7 \ > \ A \
yovtas €v ExaoT@. eéypawa b€ avTa Kat THY
> \ Tal / b] / A / 4 a
exBodny Tov Aoyou érorncapny Sia TOE, OTL TOIS
po énod imac €xrduTrés TOUTO HY TO Ywplov Kal
Ta po TOV Mnoicav “EXAqviKd Euverifeoay 7 7)
aita ka Myéuxed: tovtwy &€ boTep Kal HyyaTo
év th Atrixh Evyypadh “EAXavixos, Bpayews Te
Kal Tots Ypovols ovK aKplB@s éTEeuvijcOyn: apa de

\ aA ’ a ) , ” Prat a ? ,
Kal Ths apyns amobeEw exer THs TOV 'AOnvatov
év olm TpOT@ KaTéoTY.

XCVIII. [Ipaérov pév Hiova thv éxl Xtpupove
Mijdav éyovtwv todopkia eldov Kal nvdpamo-
Sicav Kipwvos tod MiAtiddou otpatnyodrtos,
recta SKdpov tHy év TO Aiyaiw vijcov, tv @Kxouv
Aodxrorres, nvdparrodicav | Kat @Kicay avTol. mpos
S¢ Kapvotious avtois dvev Tov addov EvBoéwv

/ ’ / \ , / >
modewos eyéveto, Kal xpove EvvéBnoav Kal

1 Deleted by Hude, after Cobet.
164

BOOK I. xevi. 2—xcvut. 3

contribution of money was termed. The amount
of the tribute first assessed was four hundred and
sixty talents, and the treasury of the allies was
Delos, where the meetings were held in the temple.
XCVII. Exercising then what was at first a leader-
ship over allies who were autonomous and took part
in the deliberations of common assemblies, the
Athenians, in the interval between this war and the
Persian, undertook, both in war and in the adminis-
tration of public affairs, the enterprises now to be
related, which were directed against the Barbarian,
against their own allies when they attempted revolu-
tion, and against such of the Peloponnesians as from
time to time came into conflict with them in the
course of each attempt. And I have made a
digression to write of these matters for the reason
that this period has been omitted by all my pre-
decessors, who have confined their narratives either
to Hellenic affairs before the Persian War or to the
Persian War itself; and Hellanicus, the only one of
these who has ever touched upon this period, has in
his Attic History treated of it briefly, and with
inaccuracy as regards his chronology. And at the
same time the narrative of these events serves to
explain how the empire of Athens was established.
XCVIII. First, then, under the leadership of
Cimon son of Miltiades, they took by siege Eion
on the Strymon, which the Persians held, and en-
slaved its inhabitants!; then they enslaved Scyros,
the island in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopians,
and colonised it themselves. And a war arose
between them and the Carystians, the other Eu-
boeans taking no part in it, and after a time terms

1 476 B.O.
165

THUCYDIDES

4 dporoyiav. Nakiow 8& atoctaot peta tavta
/ / ,
eTONEULNT AY KAL TONLOPKLAa TAPETTNTAVTO. TPWTH
\
Te avtn mods Evupayls wapa TO KaleoTHKOS
? , v \ \ ~ v e 4 /
edovAwbn, erretta S€ Kal TOV ANAwWY WS EXAOTH
/
EvveBy.*
XCIX. Aitias 6€ &\XaL Te Hoav TOV aTooTa-
e a / an
TEWY Kal wéyloTat al TOY Popwv Kal vedv Exerat
l AutroaTpatiov el Tw eyéveTo* of yap AOnvat
Kal ALTOTTpPaTLOV El TW EY ol yap nvator
> a ” \ x US > > ,
axpiBas érpaccov Kal AvTNpOl Hoav ovK ElwOo-
aw ovde Bovropévors TAXALT@pElY TpocayovTeEs
/
2 Tas avaycas. Hoav 6€ Tas Kal adres ot “AOn-
rad je / a\
vaio ovKéete (Opmoiws év nOovn)apyovTes, Kal oUTE
lal / 7
Evveotpatevov amo Tov icov padiov Te Tpocd-
vad \ / ‘
yerOar Hv avtois Tov’s apiatapévous: MY av7ot
/ e / \ \
3 alton éyévovto of Evppayor Sia yap THY azro-
KVNTW TAUTHY TOV TTPATEL@V Ol TAELOUS AUTAaY,
> > 5 /
iva pn am olxov wot, ypnuata étaEayto ayTl
a a Wa ¢ 4 > / cal
TOV VEMY TO LKVOUPLEVOY aGVadwpa PépeLy, Kal Tots
\ >] / A \ \ > \ lal ,
pev "AOnvaiors niEeto 70 vavtiKov amo THs Sama-
lal / / e
vns iw éxeivor Evpdépovev, avtol dé, o7oTe atro-
rn v
otaiev, aTapdoKevot Kal a7retpor €s TOV TOAELOV
Ka0toTavTo.
> \ lol
C. ’Eyéveto 8& peta tadta cat 9 én’ Kvpupé-
Sovts Totapue@ év Llaydhvadia® wefomayia Kal vav-
Be ppurig pax
, ’ , \ n ‘4 ‘ ‘
paxtia APnvaiwy cal rav Evxppaxev pos Mnéovs,
, a > ral / > / Suj n
Kal évikwv TH avTH Huépa audhotepa “APnvaio
1 Deleted by Hude as probably not read by Schol.
2 éy MaupvAig, omitted by Hude and Stahl, with Codex M.
166

BOOK I. xcevu. 3-c. 1

of capitulation were agreed upon. After this they
waged war upon the Naxians,! who had revolted,
and reduced them by siege. And this was the first
allied city to be enslaved in violation of the estab-
lished rule; but afterwards the others also were
enslaved as it happened in each case. ‘

XCIX. Now while there were other causes of
revolts, the principal ones were the failures in bring-
ing in the tribute or their quota of ships and, in
some cases, refusal of military service; for the
Athenians exacted the tribute strictly and gave
offence by applying coercive measures to any who
were unaccustomed or unwilling to bear the hard-
ships of service. And in some other respects, too,
the Athenians were no longer equally agreeable as
leaders ; they would not take part in expeditions on
terms of equality, and they found it easy to reduce
those who revolted. - For all this the allies them-
selves were responsible ; for most of them, on account
of their aversion to military service, in order to
avoid being away.from home got themselves rated
in sums of money instead of ships, which they should
pay in as their proportionate contribution, and con-
sequently the fleet of the Athenians was increased
by the funds which they contributed, while they
themselves, whenever they revolted, entered on the
war without preparation and without experience.

C. After this occurred at the river Eurymedon in
Pamphylia the land-battle and sea-fight of the
Athenians? and their allies against the Persians;
and the Athenians were victorious in both on the

1 406-B.c.
* For this glorious victory of Cimon’s, whose date (466 B.c. ?)
is not certain, cf. Diod. xi. 60; Plut. Cim. xii.

167

THUCYDIDES

Kipewvos tod Midtiaddou otpatnyodrtos, Kai eldov
/ , \ / \ 4 >
tpinpers Powikwv cai dvépOerpay tas Tacas €s
é , , be e/ E 28 e /
lakoglas. Yypovm oe vatepov Evvé8yn Oacious
auT@y atrooThvar OieveyOévtas Tepl TOV ev TH
/ \ lal
avtiTépas Opakn €uropiwy Kat Tov peTaddXouv,
& 3. f \ \ \ > \ / /
& évémovto. Kat vavol pev ert Oacov mrev-
> al '*
aavtes of ‘A@nvaio: vavpayia expdtncay Kal és
\ na > , > \ \ ta /
Thy ynv anéBnaoav: emi dé Xtpupova wéwravtes
fLuplous olxnTopas auTa@y Kai Tov Evpydywv vTO
, a \
TOUS AUTOS XpovoUS, WS oOlKLODYTES TAS TOTE
/ en 4 lal \ / vad
Kadoupévas Evvéa odovs, viv d€ Auditory, Tav
\ > , e lal > \ > 4 a > ?
pev *Evvéa od@v adtot éxpatynaay, as eiyov "Héw-
, a / $ ,
vol, mpoedOovtes O€ THS Opanns és pecoyerav
a a?) a lal
diehOapnoav év ApaBynorkd 7H’ Hdauxry tro tTav
a / ? rd s \ / 2
Opacav EvyTravT@v ols Toheutovy HY TO YwpPLoV
KTLCOMEVOD.
CI. Odcvor 5€ wixndévtes udyn Kal TodopKoOU-
/ r
pevo. Aaxedatmovious érexandovvto Kal érapvverv
/
éxéXevov éeoBarovtas és tHv “Attixjy. ot O€
e / \ tA lal > / \oy»
trécyovto péev epuda TOV AOnvatwy Kal EwerdXor,
X fa) fal
duexwrAvOnoay S€ UTO TOD yEevopevou TEL MOD, EV @
¢/- a nm “
kal ot Kitwtes avtois Kal TOV TepLoixay Ooupra-
, \ > fal > ’ , > / a
tai te kal Aidaris és “lO@unv aréctncav. mTei-

1 gi ’Evréa 660i, in the MSS. after xwplov, rejected by
Cobet.

1 465 B.C.

2 The Thasians had a gold mine at Skapte Hyle on the
Thracian coast, from which they drew rich revenues ; ¢/f.
Hdt. vi. xlvi. f.

168

BOOK I. ec. 1-c1. 2

same day under the command of Cimon son of
Miltiades, and they took and destroyed triremes of
the Phoenicians to the number of two hundred all
told. And some time afterwards it came to pass
that the Thasians revolted from them,! a quarrel
having arisen about the trading posts and the
mine? on the opposite coast of Thrace, of which
the Thasians enjoyed the profits. Thereupon the
Athenians sailed with their fleet against Thasos,
and, after winning a battle at sea, disembarked on_
the island. About the same time they sent to the
river Strymon ten thousand colonists, consisting of
Athenians and their allies, with a view to colonising
the place, then called Nine Ways, but now Am-
phipolis; and though these colonists gained posses-
sion of Nine Ways, which was inhabited by Edoni,
yet when they advanced into the interior of Thrace
they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the
united forces of the Thracians, to whom the settle-
ment of the place was a menace.

CI. As for the Thasians, who had been defeated
in battle and were now besieged, they appealed to
the Lacedaemonians and urged them to come to
their aid by invading Attica. This, unknown to the
Athenians, they promised to do, and intended to
keep their promise, but were prevented by the
earthquake ® which occurred at the time * when both
their Helots and the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea
revolted and went to Ithome.® Most of the Helots

8 Called ‘‘the great earthquake” in ch. exxviii. 1.

* 464:3.c. 24/6 S-

5 The Perioeci were the old inhabitants of the country,
chiefly of Achaean stock, reduced to a condition of depen-

dence, t.e. were not citizens, though not state-slaves as the
Helots were.

VOL, I. g 3 69

>

THUCYDIDES

oto. d¢€ Tav Eikwtar éyévovto of TaY Tadal@v
/
Meconviwy tote SovAwPevT@v amoyovers 7H Kal

3 Meaconvor éxrAnOncay oi TavTes. Tpos péev ovv

tous év “l@@un rodepos Kabevotnker Aaxedar-
/ / \ , by4 /
poviowss Odcroe dé tTpitw ETEer TrodLopKovpevor
e / >] , a U / \
@pmoroynoav "AOnvators Tetyos Te KaleXovTeEs Kai
vads wapacovtes, ypywatd Te boca dee aTo-
a , \
Sodvar avtixa taEduevot Kat TO Aovrov hépewy,
, a \ \ f bf /
THY TE NITELPOV KAL TO weTAaAXOV adevTes.
/ A
CII. Aaxedatpovior dé, a avTots mpos Tovs év

~ "TOwun éunxtveto 0 TdAE“OS, aAXoUS TE ETTEKANE-

cavto Evupayous Kat *“AOnvaiouvs: of & *AAOov
ppd ,

2 Kiwwvos otpatnyodvtos TANCE: ovK GAiyw. pd-

= / wn“
Micta 8 avtovs emEeKadécavto, OTL TELyouaxetv
> J lol / a
édoxouv duvatol elvat, THs 6€ ToALopKias paKpas
, / ’ na b] / / x
xabeotnkvias TovTov évded épaiveto: Bia yap

/ n
3 dy elNov TO Ywpiov. Kal Siadhopa é€x TavTns THs

r fal / ». a ,
otpatetas mp@tov Aaxedatpoviows Kal 'A@nvators
dhavepa éyéveto. of yap Aaxedarpoviot, érerdn TO

fal >
yopiov Bial ovy AtoKeTo, Seicavtes Tov “AOn-
\ \ /
valwy TO TOAMNPOVY Kal THY VvEwTEpoOTrOLlaY, Kal
> / ee ¢ , / a
adropuAovs ALA NYNTapEVOL, MN TL, HY Tapa-
pelvoow, UT Tav év “lOapun TrevaOévtes vewTept-
A \
cwol, movous Tov Evpudyov atréTveurav, THY meV
Cs , > a > , \ ef »O\
Umowiav ov Sndodvtes, elmovtes O€ STL ovdev

4 mpocdéovtar avTav ett. ot 8 "AOnvaior éyvwoav

1 Kriiger deletes, followed by Hude.
170 ?

BOOK I. ct. 2-c1. 4

were the descendants of the early Messenians who
had been enslaved of old,! and hence were all called
Messenians. The Lacedaemonians, then, were in-
volved in war with the rebels on Ithome; and so the
Thasians, who were in the third year of the siege,
came to terms with the Athenians, pulling down
their walls and delivering over their ships, agreeing
to pay forthwith whatever sum of money should be
required of them and to render tribute in future, and,
finally, giving up both the mainland and the mine.
CII. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand,
when their war with the rebels on Ithome proved a
long affair, appealed to their allies in general and
especially to the Athenians, who came with a con-
siderable force under the command of Cimon. The
principal reason why an appeal was made to them
was that they were reputed to be skilful in siege
operations, whereas the long continuance of the siege
showed their own deficiency in this respect; for other-
wise they would have taken the place by assault. And
it was in consequence of this expedition that a lack of
harmony in the relations of the Lacedaemonians and
the Athenians first became manifest. For the Lace-
daemonians, when they failed to take the place by
storm, fearing the audacity and the fickleness of
the Athenians, whom they regarded, besides, as men
of another race, thought that, if they remained, they
might be persuaded by the rebels on Ithome to
change sides; they therefore dismissed them, alone
of the allies, without giving any indication of their
suspicion, but merely saying that they had no further
need of them. The Athenians, however, recognized

1 Referring to the mythical time of the first Messenian
war.

171

‘p

THUCYDIDES

> > A , / b / > /
oun éml T@ BedTiove NOY aTroTE“TTOMEVOL, adda
TiVOS UTOTTOU yEevouévou, Kal Sevov Tromnodpevot

\ > 3 , ead , aA
Kal ovx aktooavtes Ud Aakedatpovimy TtovTo

al > \ > \ > / > l4 \
mabeiv, evOvs émrerdy) aveyopnoav, adévtes THV
/ srr a / / \ > \
yevouevny emt TO Mydm Evypaxtav mpos avtous
’ / n > / / / > /
Apyelous Tois éxeivwv trodeutors Evupayor eye-
\ \ \ ¢ ? , e
vovto, Kal tpos Beccarovs awa apgorépors ot
avtol OpKot Kal Evppayia KatéoTn.

CIII. Of & ev “lOeéun Sexato eter, > ovKéte
307 > , P: \ \
édvvavto avtéxew, EvveBnoav mpos tovs Aaxe-

, > m2 ze 2g/ > / e ,
Satpovious eh & é€tacww é€x IleNoTrovyncov vTo-
\ / >? / > An a /
oTrovool Kal pndétroTte ETLUBHTOVTaAL aUTHAS* Hv Oé
a 4 a

2 tis adlokntal, TOD AaBovTos eivar SovrAov. Hy Sé
\ / a / \
TL Kal xpnatnpiov tots AaKedarpovious TvOiKxov

\ rf A e ‘ ral \ we. / > /

mpo Tov, Tov ikeTHV TOU Atos Tov ‘lGwpunra adie-
fol \ Lal r
3 vat. €EANOov S€ avTol Kai Traides Kal yuvaixes, Kal
avtous of "A@nvaior deFapuevor kata €xOos Hdn TO
Aaxebatpovioy és Navmaxtov Kkatwxicav, iv
€ \ a x a
Eruyov ypnKotes vewott Aoxpav tav ‘Oforav
4, éxovTwy. mpocexwpnoav dé kal Meyapijs ’AOn-
Ks , /
vaio (és Evppaytay Aaxedaipovioy atoctartes,
eo > \ , \ a ef ,
Ste autovs KopivOcot tmept yiis opav toréu@
r > Lal
Kateiyov. Kal éryov A@nvaios Méyapa xa IIn-
\ / > / al
yds, kal TA paxpa Telyn @Kodounoay Meyapedor
«

1 455 B.O.

172

BOOK I. cu. 4-cr11. 4

that they were not being sent away on the more
creditable ground, but because some suspicion had
arisen; so because they felt indignant and con-
sidered that they had not deserved such treatment
at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, the instant
they returned home they gave up the alliance which
they had made with the Lacedaemonians against the
Persians and became allies of their enemies, the
Argives. And an alliance at the same time, on the
same terms and confirmed by the same oaths, was
concluded by both the Athenians and the Argives
with the Thessalians.

CIII. In the tenth year! the rebels on Ithome
found that they could hold out no longer and surren-
dered to the Lacedaemonians on condition that they
should leave the Peloponnesus under a truce and
should never set foot in it again; and if any of them
should be caught there, he was to be a slave of his
captor. Moreover, before this time the Lacedae-
monians also received a Pythian oracle, which bade
them let go the suppliant of Ithomean Zeus. So
the Messenians left the Peloponnesus, themselves
and their children and wives; and the Athenians
received them, in consequence of the enmity to the
Lacedaemonians already existing, and settled them
at Naupactus, which they happened to have lately
taken from its possessors, the Ozolian Locrians. And
the Megarians also entered into alliance with the
Athenians, revolting from the Lacedaemonians be-
cause the Corinthians were pressing them hard in
a war about boundaries; and thus the Athenians
secured Megara and Pegae,? and they built for the
Megarians the long walls which run from the city to

* Pegae was the Megarian harbour on the Corinthian gulf:
Nisaea, a nearer one, on the Saronic gulf.

173

THUCYDIDES

Ta aro THS Toews és Nicarav Kxal éppovpouy
auto. Kxai KopivOiows pev ovy iKicta amd TODSE
\ \ r pA fa b] : ,
TO ahodpov picos npEato mpwtov és ’AOnvaious
yevéo Oat.
€
CIV. “Ivdpws 5€ 0 Vapypntixyov, AiBus, Bact-
\ 4 lal in! > / € s >
Aevs AuBvav trav mpos AtyuTT@, opum@pevos éx
n € /
Mapeias tis vUmrép Pdpov todews aréotncev
Aiyumtov Ta Trelw amo Bacihéws "AptaképEov,
/ .
Kal autos apxwv yevouevos “AOnvaious érnyd-
yeto. of 5€ (€tvxov yap és Kumpov otpatevo-
pevol vavol Staxocials avT@v te Kal Tov Evp-
, s b] / \ 4 \
paxyov) iAOov amodTovtes THY Kumrpov, Kal
> & ’ \ / >] \ nr nr
avaTAevoarvtes ato Carxacans és tov NeiXov tov
T€ ToTauov KpatoovTes Kat THS Méudidos tay
an \ / , a
dvo mEep@v Tpos TO TplTOY pépos 0 KanreiTaL
Aevxov tetyos érodguour: éevjcav 5€ avToOs Tep-
a / ,
cav cai Mndov ot catadvyovtes kai AiyuTrtiov
ot un EvvatrooTavtes.
OV. ’AOnvaiow b6é€ vavoly aroBaow és ‘AXas
\ x / \cs / 4 Siid
mpos Kopwiovs xal ‘Emidaupious udyn éyéveto,
\ > Ee , \ cA > fal
kal évixkwv KopivOcot. Kai vaotepov "AOnvaios
A
évaupaynoav émt Kexpudareta erorovvncioy
vavol, kat évixwv AOnvaio. moréuov &€ Kata-
>] 7 al
otavtos mpos Aiyintas "A@nvaiors peta tadta
/ / 9*9 : aed / > ,
vauvpayla yiyvetat em Alryivn peyadn ‘AOnvaior
a , / 7
kal Aiyivntav (Kal ot Evupayo. éExatépos traph-
> ee ae > a“ \ nn € /
cav), cal évicwy A@nvaiol, kai vads éE8dounKorvta
AaBovtes avTav és THY yhv awéBnoayv Kai érro-
Avopxouv Aewxpatous Tov XtpoiSov ctpatnyoovr-

174

BOOK I. ci. 4-cv. 2

Nisaea and held it with a garrison of their own
troops. And it was chiefly because of this act that
the vehement hatred of the Corinthians for the
Athenians first arose.

CIV. Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a
Libyan and king of the Libyans who are adjacent to
Egypt, setting out from Mareia, the city just north
of Pharos, caused the greater part of Egypt to revolt
from King Artaxerxes,! and then, when he had
made himself ruler, he called in the Athenians.
And they left Cyprus,? where they happened to be
on an expedition with two hundred ships of their
own and of their allies, and went to Egypt, and
when they had sailed up the Nile from the sea,
finding themselves masters of the river and of two-
thirds of Memphis, they proceeded to attack the
third part, which is called the White Fortress. And
in this fortress were some Persians and Medes who
had taken refuge there, and such Egyptians as had
not joined in the revolt.

CV. The Athenians also made a descent with a
fleet upon Halieis, where they had a battle with
some Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the
Corinthians won. And afterwards the Athenians
fought a sea-fight at Cecryphaleia with a Pelopon-
nesian fleet, in which the Athenians won. After
this war broke out between the Athenians and the
Aeginetans, and a great sea-fight occurred between
the Athenians and the Aeginetans off Aegina, in
which the allies of both sides were present. This the
Athenians won and having taken seventy Aeginetan
ships they descended upon their territory and
laid siege to the city, Leocrates son of Stroebus,

1 460° B.O. ® of. ch. xciv. 2,
4571 175

THUCYDIDES

3 Tos. émerta IleXorrovynciot autvery Bovropevor
\
Aiywntats és pev thy Aiyivav tpiaxocious
e , —a , , “i prs /
omAitas, mpotepov Kopiwiwv kal *Emidaupiov
bd 4 / \ Vow fol /
émixoupous, dLeSiBacar, Ta 6€ axpa THs Tepaveias
/ \ > nm , /
katékaBov Kat és thv Meyapida xatéSnoav
lal /
Kopivéco. peta Tov Evppaywv, vouifovtes ddv-
vatous ésec@at “AOnvaiovs Bonbeiy trois Meya-
pevow év te Alyivy atovens otpatias Tos
ae -> / x \ \ n ’ : 13.37
kai ev Aiyitte@: Hv 6 Kal Bonbacu, at’ Aiyivns
b] , ’ e € 2 al \ A
4 avactncecOar avtovs. ot dé “AOnvaios TO pev
/ lal
mpos Aiyivn otpatevpa ovK exivnoay, Tov 8 éx
THS TOAEWS UTONOiTMY Of Te TPETBUTATOL Kal ob
, b) a > \ As 4
vewTatot adixvovyTa és Ta Meéyapa Mupwvidov
A“ \ 4, / >
5 OTpAaTNYOUVTOS. Kal waxns yevouevns icoppoTrauv
, /
mpos KopwO@tovs SuexpiOncav an’ addr nrwv, Kal
évouloav avTol ExdTEpol OUK EXacaoY ExEW ev TO
” \ e \ >? al > / \
6 épye. Kal of pev AOnvaior (exparnoav yap
ev a lal
Suws padrXrov) aveovtav tav Kopiwbiwv tpo-
val /
matov éornaoav: of S¢ KopivOvor caxilopevor td
Tov év TH TOME TpEeTBuTEépwy Kal TapacKevacd-
pevol, Nuépars UaTepov Owdexa pddiota édOovTes
avOictacayv TpoTraiov Kal avTol ws viknoavtes.
\ a a ] / I] lal /
kal of A@nvatos éxBonOnoavtes éx Tov Meydpav
Tous Te TO TpoTraiov iatdvTas StapOeipover Kal
nr ,
Tots aAdows EvpBarovtes Expatnoav. OVI. of
, / cal
Sé viKwpevol UTEXWpOUY, KAL TL AVT@V pépos OvK
ddiyov mpoaBiacbev Kal dtapaptov ths odod
, > ,
écémecev &5 Tov Xwploy idtwTov, @ ETUXEV

176

BOOK I. cv. 2-cv1. 1

being in command. Thereupon the Peloponnesians,
wishing to aid the Aeginetans, sent into Aegina
three hundred hoplites, who had previously been
assisting the Corinthians and Epidaurians. More-
over, the Corinthians occupied the heights of Gera-
neia, and made a descent upon the territory of
Megara in conjunction with their allies, thinking
that the Athenians would be unable to aid the
Megarians, since many of their troops were away in
Aegina and in Egypt, or if they should attempt it
that they would have to withdraw from Aegina.
The Athenians, however; did not disturb the army
besieging Aegina, but with such forces as were left
in the city, consisting of the oldest and the youngest }
men, marched into Megara, the general in command
being Myronides. An indecisive battle was fought
with the Corinthians, whereupon they separated, each
side thinking they had not got the worst of it in the
action. And the Athenians, who had in fact got
rather the better of it, when the Corinthians with-
drew, set up a trophy; but the Corinthians, being
reproached by the older men in their city, made
their preparations and about twelve days later came
back and set up for themselves a rival trophy, as
though they had won. Hereupon the Athenians
made a sally from Megara, slew those who were
setting up the trophy, and joining battle with the
rest defeated them. CVI. The vanquished party
now retreated, and a not inconsiderable portion
of them, being hard pressed, missed their way
and rushed into a piece of land belonging to

1 These performed military service only in extraordinary
cases ; the former were between fifty and sixty, the latter
under twenty years of age.

177

| THUCYDIDES
2 Spuyywa péya Tepretpyov cal ouK 7 eEob0s. ol
dé "AOnvaior yvoures Kara T po WT OV TE elpryov
Tols omAitats Kal TEpLaTn saves KUKA® TOUS
wirovs KaTénevo av TavTas TOUS écedOdvas, Kal
mabos peya ToUTO Kopi ios éyéveTo. TO be
TAO os aveyopnoev avtois Ths otpaTias én
OLKOU.
CVI. pis pEavto | dé Kata TOUS Xpovous TOUTOUS
Kal Ta pax pa TELYN ‘AOnvator és Garaccav
oixodopely, TO TE Darnpovee Kal TO és Tletpasd.
2 kai Pwxéwy ctTpatevodyTwv €s Awpias THY Aaxe-
Satpoviwy LNT POTONLD, Bowvov cat Kurtiviov rai
"Epweov, Kal éXNovT@y Ev TAY TOM LAT @Y TOUT@V
OL Aaxesarpoviot Nexopdous Tov KXeouBpotou
Umep Tero toavaxros Tou Ilavcaviov Bacrréas,
véov ovTOs eT, HrYyOUpLEVOU éBonbnaav tois Aw-
prevow EQUT@V TE TEVTAKOGLOLS Kat XerLoLs omTAL-
Tas Kal TOV Evppaxov puptots, Kal TOUS Poxéas
ouodoyia avayKkKdaoavTes amooobvas THY mohuy
3 amex @pouv Taw. Kal KaTa Oaraccay bev
avtovs, dia TOU Kpioatiov KohTov él BovrowTo
mepawovobat, "AOnvaios vavat TepiTevo aves
EweXAOV Kohvael dua 66 TIS Tepavetas OuUK
aapanres avtots épaiveto ‘AOnvaiwv eXOvT@Y
Méyapa Kal IInyas mopever Oa? ddcodes Te yap
7) Depavera Kal eppoupeito aiel wo "AOnvaiwy,
Kal TOTe naOavovTo auTovs HédOVTAS Kal TAUTH
4 KwAvoew. édoke be avrois év Botwtots eptpet-
vact oxeyrac bar OTw TpoT® aopareorata d1a-
TopevoovTat. TO Sé 71 nal dvdpes érivyov adtods

1 wopevecOa: deleted by Hude as not read by Schol,
178

BOOK I. evi. 1-cvit. 4

some private person, which was enclosed by a great
ditch and had no exit. And when the Athenians
perceived this, they shut them in by barring the
entrance with hoplites, and stationing light-armed
troops all round stoned all who had entered. And
this was a great calamity to the Corinthians; the
main body of their army, however, returned home.
CVII. About this period! the Athenians began to
build their long walls to the sea, one to Phalerum,
the other to the Peiraeus. And the Phocians made
an expedition against the land of the Dorians, the
mother-country of the Lacedaemonians, namely the
towns of Boeum, Citinium, and Erineum, one of
which they captured; whereupon the Lacedae-
monians, under the lead of Nicomedes son of Cleom-
brotus, acting for King Pleistoanax son of Pausanias,
who was still a minor, sent to the aid of the Dorians
a force of fifteen hundred hoplites of their own and
ten thousand of their allies, and after they had forced
the Phocians to make terms and restore the city
they began their return homeward. Now if they
wished to take the sea-route and make their passage
by way of the Crisaean Gulf, the Athenians were
sure to take their fleet round the Peloponnesus and
block their way; and to march over the Geranaean
pass appeared to them hazardous, since the Athenians
held Megara and Pegae. Besides, the Geranaean
pass was not easy to traverse and was at all times
guarded by the Athenians, and at this present time,
as the Lacedaemonians perceived, they intended
to block their way. So they decided to wait in
Boeotia and consider how they might most safely
cross over to the Peloponnesus. To this course they
were partly influenced by some Athenians, who were
1 457 B.O.
179

THUCYDIDES

tav AOnvaiwy xpuda, érricavtes Shudv Te KaTa-
Tavcel Kal Ta paKkpa TElyn olKodomovpeva.
éBonOnaav bé ém’ avdtovs ot "AO@nvaios travdnpel
kal "Apyeiwy yidior Kal TOY ad\rAwv Evppdyov
ws €xacto EvuTravtes O€ éyévovTo TeTpaKiaxt-
LoL Kal puplol. voplcavtes 5é atopety Orn
SEM wou, EmecTpaTEevoay aUTOIS, Kal TL Kal TOD
Sipov Katarvoews vTowia. rAOov Sé Kai Oec-
carov immis tots “A@nvatows cata To Evppayi-
KOV, of petéoTncay év TO éEpyw Tapa Tovs
Aaxedatpovious.

CVIII. Tevopévns 6€ tis wayns ev Tavdypa
THs Bowwtias évicwv Aaxedarwomot cal ot Evp-
payot, Kal hovos éyéveTo audhotépwv Torvs. Kal
AaxeSaipoviot péev és THY Meyapiéa éXOovtes Kal
SevdpotounoavTes Tadiv amndOov ém olxov Sa
Tepaveias kat icOpod: “A@nvaio: de devtépa rab
EEnkooTh Nméepa meTa THY waxXnV éaTpaTEVCAD €s
Botwrovs Mupavidov otpatnyotvtos, Kal payn
év Oivoditos Borwrtovs wxjoavtes THs TE YwOpas
éxpatncay THs Bowwtias Kat Pawxidos cat Tava-
ypaiwy TO Tetyos TepietAov Kat Aoxpav Tav
’Orrouytiwy éxaTov avdpas opnpous tos mrov-
ciuwTatous éhaBov, Ta TE TELYN EAUTOY TA pwaKpa
ametédXecav. wporoynoav 6é kal of Aiyivhras
peta Tadta Tois A@nvaiors, Teryn TE TepLeAoYTES
Kal vais Tapadovtes Popov te TaEdwevor és Tov
éxerta ypovov. Kat IleXotrovynaov TrepiémrEvcay
"AOnvaios Torpidou tod TorAmaiou orpatnyovvtos,

180

BOOK I. cvu. 4-cvit. 5

secretly inviting them into their country,in the hope
of putting an end to the democracy and to the build-
ing of the long walls. But the Athenians went out
against the Lacedaemonians with their whole force
and with one thousand Argives and contingents of
the several allies, the whole body amounting to
fourteen thousand men. And they undertook the
expedition against them because they believed that
they were at a loss how to get through, and partly
too on a suspicion of a plot to overthrow the
democracy. The forces of the Athenians were
strengthened by some Thessalian cavalry, who came
in accordance with the terms of the alliance, but
they deserted to the Lacedaemonians in the course
of the action.

CVIII. The battle took place! at Tanagra in
Boeotia, and in it the Lacedaemonians and _ their
allies were victorious, and there was much slaughter
on both sides. The Lacedaemonians then entered
the Megarian territory, cut down the trees, and went
back home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus.
But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the
Athenians, having made an expedition into Boeotia
under Myronides, defeated the Boeotians at Oeno-
phyta, got control of Boeotia and Phocis, pulled
down the walls of Tanagra, and took one hundred
of the wealthiest men of the Opuntian Locrians as
hostages. Meanwhile they completed their own long
walls. After this the Aeginetans also capitulated to
the Athenians, pulling down their walls, delivering
up their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute in future.?
And the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides
son of Tolmaeus, sailed round the Peloponnesus,

1 456 R.O. 2 455 B.O.
181

THUCYDIDES

kal TO vewptov tav Aaxedaipovioy évérpnoay
kat Xadkida KopiwOiwv etrov Kal Sixv@viovs ev
aToBacet THS ys maxXn expatnoav.
CIX. Of & &v tH Alyirt@ *A@nvaior Kal ol
/ ’ / x > cal A > ,
Evupayo. éméuevov, Kal avtois moddai idéar
2 Tohkéuwv KaTéoTnoaV. TO Lev yap TpwWTOV éKpa-
n : , 4 e >] r \ \
touvv THs Alyurtov ot ’A@nvaiot, kat Baotrevs
méutrer €s Aaxedaipova MeyaBafov avipa Ilép-
onv xXpnuata éyovta, STws és thy “AtTiKny
* ; nr / ral , > >
éoBareiv teccbévtwv tov IleXotovynciwy at
’ / > 4 >] / e 7 > lal >
3 Aiyirrou amayayot A@nvaious. ws 5€ avT@ ov
mTpovywper Kal TA YpnuaTa arAwS avydodTO, 0
pev MeyaBafos nal ta AoLTA TOY XpHn~adToV
marw és thv “Aciapv avexopiabn, MeyaBufov 6€
tov ZLwmvpov téutrer avdpa Iléponv peta otpa-
4 TLaS TOAANS' Os adhixdpevos KATA Yhv TOUS TE
Aiyumtious cal trols Evppdyous payn éxpatnoe
Kal ex THS Méudidos éEjAace Tors “EXAnvas Kal
téros és Ipocwmitida tHv vicov KaTéxdnoeV"
Kal érodlopKes ev aUTH eviavTov Kal €& phvas,
péexpe ov Enpdvas THhv Swpuya Kal Tapatpéwas
arn TO Udwp tds Te vais emt TOD Enpod érroince
\ n / \ \ ’ , \ \
Kal THS vycov Ta ToAAA HTEipov, Kal diaBas
elXe THY LnoOV TECH.
CX. Otto pév ta tov ‘EXAnvoY tpaypata
3 / ral v / \ ’ / > A
épOapn €& ETN ToNeuNTAaYTA: Kal OALYOL ATO
TOAA@Y Topevopevor Sia THS AtBuns és Kupryynv
5] , - \ a“ > , wv
2 écwOnoar, ot d€ TAELoTOL aTwAOVTO. AiyuTToOS
Sé wdaduv U7 Baciréa éyéveto ANY ’Apuvptaiov

182

BOOK 1. cvut. 5-cx. 2

burned the dock-yard! of the Lacedaemonians, took
Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and making a de-
scent upon the territory of the Sicyonians defeated
them in battle.

CIX. Meanwhile the Athenians and: their allies
stayed on in Egypt and the war took on many forms.
At first the Athenians had the mastery in Egypt, and
the King sent to Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian ,
with a supply of money, in order that the Lacedae-
monians might be induced to invade Attica and the
Athenians thus be drawn away from Egypt. But
when he found that matters did not advance and the
money was being spent in vain, Megabazus betook
himself back to Asia with the money that was left, ~
and Megabyzus son of Zopyrus,? a Persian, was des-
patched with a large army.* He marched thither by
land, and defeated the Egyptians and their allies in
battle, drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and fin-
ally shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where
he besieged them for a year and six months, then
finally, by diverting the water into another course,
drained the canal and left the ships high and dry,
converting the greater part of the island into main-
land; then he crossed over dry-shod and took the
island.

CX. Thus this undertaking of the Hellenes came
to naught after a war of six years;* and but few out
of many, making their way through Libya into
Cyrene, escaped with their lives; the most of them
perished. And all Egypt again came under the
King’s dominion, except Amyrtaeus, the king of the

1 Gytheum, on the Laconian gulf.

? Hero of the capture of Babylon, Hdt. 111. clx.

3 Diodorus gives him with Artabazus 300,000 men (xi. 75)
and 300 ships (xi. 77). * 454 B.O.

ws

183

THUCYDIDES

Tov ev Tolis €éXEct Bacthéws: toorov 6 ba
peyeBos te Tov €dovus ovK edvvayTo Edeiv Kal apa

3 paxypararot Elol TOV Alyurtiay oi €Xevor. ‘lva-
pos 5¢ 6 ArBiwv Bacirevs, b5 Ta Tavta Empage
mept tis Aliyimtov, mpodocia Andeis avertav-

4 pwOn. , ex b€ TaV "AOnvav Kal THS adAdns Evp-
paxiBo 0s TEVTHKOVTA Tpunpets diddoxyou AEovoaL
és Alyutrtov Eaxov KATA TO Mevdnovov Képas,
ovK ElOoTES TOY YyeyovoTwY ovdév" Kal avTOtS Ex
Te yhs émimecovtes Tebol Kal éx Oaracons Poi-
vixwv vauTixoy rébOerpav Tas TOAasS TMV vEewr,

5 ai & éddacous Siédvyov Tad. Ta pev Kata
Ti peyarnv otpateiay “A@nvatwy cai tov Evp-
payer és Alyurtov otTws éTehevTyC ED.

CXI. ’Ex 68 Oeccaria¥ Opéatys 0 'Exexpari-
Sou vids ToD Oeccarav Baciréwspevyav Ereta ev
"AOnvatovs éavtov KaTayew: Kat tapadaBovTes
Bowwtovs Kal Pwxéas dvTas Evppaxous ot ’A@n-
yatot eoTpatevaay THS Ococanrias emi Papoarov.
Kal THs pev YS exparouv 6 60a LN Tpoiovtes “arONU
éx TOV OTAwDY) (Ot yap immys tTav Oeccarav
eipyov); Ty 88 méduv ox eiXov, ovd adXO ™ pov-
Koper avtois ovdév @v Evexa éaTpdrevoay, aXX
arexaopnoay mardww Opéatny Exovtes ampaxTot.

2 Mera S€ tadta ov woAX@ BaTepov yirsor
’"AOnvaiwy éml Tas vais tas év IInyais emiBavres
(eiyov S avtot tas IInyas) TapéT\Nevoay €s
Licvova Tlepuedcous TOU RavOimmov oTparn-
youvros, Kal atoBavtes Xuxvwviwy Tovs Mpocpel-

184

BOOK I. ex. 2-cxr. 2

marshes!; for the Persians were unable to capture
him, both on account of the extent of the marsh and
because the marsh people are the best fighters
among the Egyptians. Inaros, however, the king of
the Libyans, who had been the originator of the
whole movement in Egypt, was taken by treachery
and impaled. And when fifty triremes, which sailed
to Egypt from Athens and the rest of the con-
federacy to relieve the fleet there, put in at the
Mendesian mouth of the Nile, quite unaware of what
had happened, the infantry fell upon them from the
shore and a Phoenician fleet from the sea and de-
stroyed most of the ships, a small number only
escaping. So ended the great expedition against
Egypt of the Athenians and their allies.

CXI. And now Orestes son of Echecratidas, king
of the Thessalians, who was exiled from Thessaly,
persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And they,
taking along some Boeotians and Phocians who were
allies, made an expedition against Pharsalus in
Thessaly. And though they made themselves masters
of the land, so far as this was possible without going far
from their camp—for the Thessalian cavalry hemmed
them in—they failed to capture the city and indeed
none of the other objects of their expedition was
attained, so they went back home again unsuccessful,
having Orestes with them.

Not long after this? one thousand Athenians, em-
barking on the ships at Pegae, which was now in
their possession,® sailed along the coast to Sicyon
under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus,
and disembarking defeated in battle the Sicyonians

1 cof. Hdt. 1.-oxl.; m1. xv.
2 454 B.C, 3 cf. ch. ciii. 4.

185

THUCYDIDES

3 Eavtas paxn expatnaav. Kal_ evOus Tapana-
Bovtes “Axavous Kal SuaTrrevoarres mepay, THs
‘Axapvavias és Oivadas eat patevoay Kal €7r0-
AcopKour, ov pévtor eldov ye, GAN aTreywpnoay
ém olKou.

CXII. “Yorepov € Ssaditovtwy éTav TpL@v
oTrovoal Yeyvovrar IeAomovynctors Kal "AOnvaiors

2 WevTeTeEls. Kal ‘EXAnvixod pev TONE LOU éoyov ot
"A@nvaior, és be Kumpov | eo TpaTEvovTo vavat
diakoglals AUT@V TE Kal TOV Evppaxov Kipovos

3 oTpatnyoovTos. kat éEnxovta pev vies es At-
yumTov aT aut ay émevoav "Auuptatou peTa-
TéuTovtos Tov év Tois EXeot Bacidéws, at dé

4 adraL Kirov eTTONLOpKOUY. Kipevos dé aTro-
Gavovtos Kal ALpLod ryevopevou aTexwpnoay amo
Kuitiov: Kal TEVTAVTES umép Larapivos TIS €v
Kurpe Poin kat Kumptows Kai KineEw € €vavU-
paxnoav Kal érrelouaxnoav apa, Kat veKncavres
apporepa aTeXapnaav €’ olKoU Kal at €& Ai-

5 yumtTou vies T adwieeten Boba au per avutav. Aake-
Oatpovior O€ pera TaUTa Tov lepov Kadovpevov |
Tohewov €aTpaTevoar, Kal KPaTHoavTes Tov év
Acr¢ois (epou Tapédocay Aer dois: Kat avdis
baTepov "AOnvatot aTroxwpne dvt oy auT@Y oTpa-
TEVTAaVTES Kal KPaTHO AVTES mapésoaav PDoxevow.

CXIII. Kai Xpovou eyryevopevov peta TavTa
"AOnvaion, Bowwrav TOV pevyovTay exovTov ‘Op-
Nomevov Kal Xatpwverav Kat arr’ arta wpia THS
Bowwtias, éotpatevoay eauTav bev XtALoLs omi-
Tals, TaY O€ Evppaywv ws ExaoTols él TA Ywpia
Tavta Toéuwa ovta, Torpidov tod Todpaiov
atpatnyouvtos. Kai Xarpwverav édovtes Kal

186

BOOK I. cx. 2-cxut. 4

who came out against them. Immediately thereafter,
taking along some Achaeans and sailing across the
gulf, they made an expedition against Oeniadae ir
Acarnania and laid siege to it; but failing to take it
they went back home.

CXII. Three years afterwards! a truce was made
between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, to last
five years. And the Athenians did abstain from war-
fare against Hellenes, but they made an expedition
against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own
and of their allies, under the command of Cimon.
Sixty of these ships sailed to Egypt on the summons
of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, while the
others laid siege to Citium. But Cimon died and a
famine arose, and so they withdrew from Citium ;?
and on their way home, when off Salamis in Cyprus,
they fought the Phoenicians, Cyprians and Cilicians
by sea and on land. Gaining the victory in both
battles they went back home, and with them returned
the ships that had been in Egypt. After this the
Lacedaemonians undertook the so-called sacred war,
and getting possession of the temple at Delphi, de-
livered it to the Delphians; and afterwards, when
they had withdrawn, the Athenians made an expedi-
tion, got possession of it, and delivered it again to
the Phocians.

CXIII. Some time after this? the Athenians under
the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, with one
thousand hoplites of their own and the respective
quotas of their allies, made an expedition against
Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and some other places
in Boeotia, which were in the possession of the Boeo-
tian exiles and therefore hostile. And after taking

1 451 B.o. 2 449 B.o, 8 447 BO.
187

THUCYDIDES

avdpaTrodicavtes aTreX @pouV pudaKny KATaOTN-
oaVTES. TopevopLevors & avtois é€v Kopowreia
emuTiOevtat ot Te ex THS ‘Opxonevod puyases
Botwtrav Kal Aoxpol per QuTay. Kal EvBoewy
puyaces Kal boot THs aurijs YVOLNS hoa: Kal
waxy KPATHTAVTES TOUS [ev d1ePOerpav tav 'A@n-
valwy, Tors dé CavTas éXaBov. Kal THv Bowwtiav
eféhutrov AOnvato: Tacav, atovdas Tomnodpevot
ep @ Tovs avopas KomLovVTaL. Kal ol hevyovTes
Bowwt@yv KateNOovTes Kat of AAAOL TavTES avTO-
VOMOL TAALY €yEVOVTO.

CXIV. Mera dé TavtTa ov TOAD Uo TEepov
EiBora aréctn ato “A@nvaiwv. Kal és avtny
SvaBeSnnoros 76n Tlepucdeous oTpaTea AOnvatav
nyyérOn adt@ Ott Méyapa adéotnxe Kal Ieno-
Tovvnalo, péAXovaww eg arrewy és THY’ ATTLKHY
Kat ot dpovpolt “AOnvaiwr dvePOappévor eicly bro
Meyapéwv, mAHY boot €s Nicaay am epuyov" érra-
yaryopevor bé Kopw8iovs Kal LiKvevious Kab ’Eqe-
Savptous a anéo tno av ol Meyapis. o dé Lepixrjs
Tadw Kata TAXOS exopute THY oTpatiav ék THs
EvBoias. Kati peta TovTO ot [leXotrovynaiot TAS
"Arrikis és "EXevctva kal Opiate é€o BaXovtes
ésnwoav Iderotoavaxtos tov Maveaviov Bact-
Aéws Aaxedatpoviwy ayouuévov, Kal TO mAéov
ovKEeTL TpoEAOovTES aTEXMpHoaY eT olkOV. Kal
‘AOnvator madw és EvPoav d.aBavtes Tepe-
Khéous oT patnyovvTos KaTeoTpeyavto Taoay,
Kal Ty pev adXnV omororyia KATETTHNTAVTO,
‘Eotiaiads 6€ é€orxicavtes avtot Thy yi Eoxov.

44h B.C.
188

BOOK I. cxm. 1-cx1v. 3

Chaeroneia and selling its inhabitants into slavery,
they placed a garrison in it and departed. But
while they were on the march they were attacked at
Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, to-
gether with some Locrians and Euboean exiles and
others who held the same political views, and were de-
feated, some of the Athenians being slain and others
takenalive. Accordingly the Athenians evacuated the
whole of Boeotia, making a treaty upon the stipula-
tion that they should receive back their prisoners.
And so the Boeotian exiles were restored, and they
as well as all the rest of the Boeotians again became
autonomous.

CXIV. Not long after this! Euboea revolted from
Athens; and Pericles had just crossed over to the
island with an Athenian army when word was brought
to him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponne-
sians were about to invade Attica, and that all the
Athenian garrison had been destroyed by the Mega-
rians except such as had escaped to Nisaea. The
Megarians had effected this revolt by bringing Corin-
thians, Sicyonians and Epidaurians to their aid. So
Pericles in haste brought his army back again from
Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians, under the
command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the
Lacedaemonians, advanced into Attica as far as Eleusis
and Thria, ravaging the country; but without going
further they returned home. Thereupon the Athen-
ians again crossed over into Euboea under the com-
mand of Pericles and subdued the whole of it;
the rest of the island they settled? by agreement,
but expelled the Hestiaeans from their homes and
themselves occupied their territory.

? Setting up democracies, ete. ¢f. C.I.A. iv. 27 a.
189

THUCYDIDES

CXV. ‘Avaxopioavtes 6é at’ Evoias ov
TOAN@ Dorepov gmovoas €TOLNTAVTO TpOsS Aake-
Saipovious Kal Tovds Eupuaxo ous TpLaxovTouTels,
atrodovtes Nicaray kal ny s kat Tpoifjva Kai
"Ayatiav: tadta yap eixov “A@nvaior Uedotrop-
vpnoiwv.

"Exto 6é eTEl Laptors Kal Maanators TONELOS
eryéveTo Tepl Tpurjuns- Kal ot Mirae €Xac-
covpevoL T@ ToAguwm tap *“AOnvatous édOovres
kateBowv Te Saplov. EvvetreAaBovto 6é Kal €&
avis THS 2 dpov avopes tOL@Tal, vewrepioat
BovrAopevoe THY moNTelay.” mMrEevoavTes ovV
"AOnvaiot és Lawov vavol teccapaKovta dnpo-
Kpatiay KatéoTnoav Kal ounpous éaBov tav
Laplov TevTjKovTa mev Tratoas, iaous 5é avdpas,
kat katéGevto és Afuvov Kat dpovpay éyxata-
ALTrOVTES avex@pnoay. Tav 6é Lapiov joav yap
TLVES OF OVY UTEMEWaY, ann’ Epuyov és THY Hrrel-
pov, Evv0épevor (Tav év TH Tod) ‘Tots SuvaTo-
TaTOLS Kal Tec oov8vy 70 ‘Totdorov Evxppaytay,
os exe Lapoers TOTE, eT LK OUPOUS TE Evdréeavres
és émtakoaious 6uéByoay t vTo vUKTO és THY 2dyov.
Kal Tp@Tov bev TO nue emavéeg tno ay Kal expa-
THoay TOV mreiaTor, emerta ‘rous _ Opn pous €K-
KheyarTes ex Anpvov Tous aAUTOV aneoTnoay,
kal TOUS ppoupovs Tous "AOnvaiwy Kal Tovs
dpyovTas ot noav twapa odiow) é&édocav Ilic-
covlvy, érit te Midntov evdus mapecxevdlovTo
otpatevev. Evvatéctncav 8 avtois cai Bv-
CavTvot.

1 hy wodcrelay seems not to have been read by the Schol.,
and so is deleted by van Herwerden and Hude.

190 2

vr
af

BOOK I. cxv. 1-5

CXV. Withdrawing their troops from Euboea not
long afterwards they made a truce with the Lacedae-
monians and their allies which was to last for thirty
years, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea;
for these were the places belonging to the Peloponne-
sians which the Athenians then held.

Six years later! a war arose between the Samians
and the Milesians about the possession of Priene,
and the Milesians, who were being worsted in the
war, went to Athens and cried out against the Samians.
They were seconded in their complaint by some
private citizens from Samos itself who wished to
revolutionize the government. So the Athenians
sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a de-
mocracy, taking as hostages of the Samians fifty boys
and as many men, whom they deposited in Lemnos;
then they withdrew from Samos, leaving a garrison
behind. Some of the Samians, however, did not
stay, but fled to the mainland, first making an alliance
with the most influential men who remained in the
city and with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, then
satrap of Sardis; and collecting mercenary troops to
the number of seven hundred they crossed over by
night to Samos. First they attacked the popular
party and got most of them into their power; then
they secretly got their hostages out of Lemnos and
revolted from Athens, handing over to Pissuthnes
the Athenian officers and garrison that were on the
island, and at once set about preparing an expedition
against Miletus. And the Byzantines also joined in

their revolt.
1 440 B.o,
191

THUCYDIDES

CXVI. ’A@nvaio: Sé es AoOovTo, wAEVoavTES
vavolv éEjxovta érl Xdwou tais pev ExKaldexa
TOV veov ovK éexpnoavto (éTUXoV yap at pev
éxt Kapias és mpocxornv tav Dowicoay vedv
oiyopevat, ai dé érl Xiov Kai AéoBou meprayyér-
ANoveat BonOeiv), recoapaKovta Sé vaval Kal Téc-
capat Ilepixréous Sexatov avtod atpatnyouvTos
évavpdynoav mpos Tpayia TH vic@ Laplov
vavolv EBSopnxovta, OY Hoav ai Elkool oTpaTLW-

tides (€ruxov 8 at macat aro Midntov mré-

oveat), Kai évixwv "A@nvatot. tatepov € avtois
éBorOncav éx tov AOnvav vies TEeccapaxovTa
kal Xiwv cal AeoBiwv mévte Kal eixool, Kal
amtoSdvrTes Kal Kpatovvtes TO Tel@ éTOLOpKOUY
Tplol Teiyece THY TOAW Kal éx Oaddoons apa.
Tlepuxrjs 8€ AaBov éEnxovta vais aro Tov
éhopuovaay @yEeTO KaTa Tayos emi Kavvou kat
Kapias, écayyerOévtwv Str Doiviccar vijes err
aitovs TA€oveW: OxXETO yap Kal ex THs Lapov
mévte vavot Ltynoayopas Kal ardour emt Tas
Poiviccas.

CXVIIL. Ev tovto 8€ of Ladpior éEativatws
éxmAovv tromnoduevos AbapKT@ TO oTpaToTéd@
erie OVTES TAS TE TpOPuAaKloas vais d1édOerpav

\ “ \ > Lf
Kal vavpaxouvTes Tas avTavayopevas Eviknoar,
kal ths Oadacons Ths Ka? éavtovs éexpatnoav
Huépas wept Téecoapas Kal déxa Kal éoeKoutcayTo
kal é£exouicavto & éBovrovTo. édOovTos é
IlepuxXéous maddy tais vavol KcatexdnoOnoar.
kal é« tav "AOnvav totepov mpoceBonOnacav

192

BOOK I. cxvi. 1-cxvu. 2

CXVI. But when the Athenians heard of this they
sailed for Samos with sixty ships. Sixteen of these,
however, they did not make use of on this enterprise,
for these had already gone, some toward Caria to keep
watch upon the Phoenician ships, others towards Chios
and Lesbos to summon aid ; but with forty-four ships,
under the command of Pericles and nine others,!
they fought a sea-fight at the island of Tragia against
seventy ships of the Samians, of which twenty were
transport-ships, the whole fleet being on the way
back from Miletus; and the Athenians were vic-
torious. Later, having received a_ reinforcement
_ from Athens of forty ships and from the Chians and
Lesbians of twenty-five, they disembarked, and being
superior to the Samians with their infantry proceeded
to invest the city with three walls, at the same
time blockading it by sea as well. But Pericles took
sixty ships away from the blockading fleet and de-
parted in haste towards Caunus in Caria, a report
having come that a Phoenician fleet was sailing
against his forces; for Stesagoras and others had
gone from Samos with five vessels to fetch the
Phoenician ships.

CXVII. Meanwhile the Samians suddenly made a
sally and fell upon the Athenian naval station, which
was unprotected bya stockade, destroying the guard-
ships and defeating in a sea-fight the ships that
put out against them. And for about fourteen days
they were masters of the sea off their coast, bringing
in and carrying out whatever they wished ; but when
Pericles came they were again blockaded by sea.
And afterwards a reinforcement came from Athens

1 Sophocles was on the fleet, as one of the ten generals of
the year.

193

THUCYDIDES

TeccapaKovTa pev at pera Bovevdi dou Kal “Ay-
vovos Kal Poppiwvos VIIES, elkooe dé at pera
TAnroréguov cat "Avtixdéous, é« b€ Xiov kat
AécBov tpidxovta. Kal vavuaxiay pev Tova
Bpaxetav €ToljcavTo of LYdpto., advvaror be
évTes ay Tio XeLV eferroduopxn Ona av evare@ pnvi
Kal Tpooexwpnaav oporoyia, Tetyos Te Kale-
avres Kal opr) pous dovtes Kal vas mapadovres
kal Xpypata Ta avadwlévta TAFapEvoe KaTa
xpovous arrodobvat. EvveBnoav dé cal BuSavtioe
\

woTTEp Kat 7 pOoTepov Um KOOL eival.

CXVIII. Meta tavta 6€ 67 yeyvetae ov
mToXXois ETECLY _borepov Ta T poeipnueva, Ta Té
Kepxupaixa. kat Ta Toredeatixa Kal 60a Tp0-
dacs Tobde TOU TToNémoU KaTeoT. Tatra oé
Evpravta dca émpatav ot “EdAqves Tpos TE
aXdjhous kat tov SapBapov eyeveTo év éreae
TEVTHKOVTA padora peTakv THS TE Eépfou ava-
Xopnrens Kal Tis apxiis Tove Tob TONE MOU" €y
ois ot ’“A@nvator Tay TE apxny eyKpatertepay
KATETTHTAVTO Kal avtol éml péeya ex@pne ay
Suvdpews. ol 6é Aaxedarpmovior aicOopevor ouTE
EX@AVOV EL p7) ETL Bpaxy, novxatov TE 70 THEO
Tob xpovov, OVTES meV Kal 7 po Tov pny Taxeis
iévat és TOUS TONELOUS, ay py dvayKdafovrat, TO
dé Te Kal qroAéuots olKetors EF erpyopuevot, piv 67
4 Sivas Tov “AOnvaiwy capes npeto Kai THs

17> 5é rt, so MSS.: rove ® &r: is read by Hude, after
Reiske (Dion. H. rére dé r:).

1 Possibly the historian, as some have thought; others
explain as the son of Melesias and opponent of Pericles ;
still others as the poet from the deme of Acherdus,

194

BOOK I. cxvu. 2-cxvi. 2

of forty ships under the command of Thucydides,}
Hagnon and Phormio, twenty under Tlepolemus and
Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. Now
the Samians did indeed put up a sea-fight for a
short time, but they were unable to hold out, and in
the ninth month ? were reduced by siege and agreed
to a capitulation, pulling down their walls, giving
hostages, delivering over their ships, and consenting
to pay back by instalments the money spent upon
the siege. The Byzantines too came to terms,
agreeing to be subjects as before.

CXVIIT. It was not many years? after this that

the events already narrated occurred, namely the
Coreyraean affair,t the Potidaean,® and all the other
incidents ® that furnished an occasion for this war.
And all these operations of the Hellenes, against one
another and against the Barbarian, took place in the
interval of about fifty years between the retreat of
Xerxes and the beginning of this war.’ It was in
this period that the Athenians established their rule
more firmly and themselves advanced to great power.
And. the Lacedaemonians, though aware of their
growing power, made no attempt to check it, except
to a trifling extent, remaining indifferent the greater
part of the time, since they had never been quick to
go to war except under compulsion, and in this case
were in some degree precluded from interference by
wars of their own.® But at last the power of the
Athenians began clearly to exalt itself and they were
2 439 B.c.

* Hardly four years, since the naval battle between the
Corcyraeans and Corinthians seems to have occurred 435 B.o.

* Chs, xxiv-—lv. ® Chs. liv—lxvi.
§ The transactions in the Spartan assembly, chs. lxvii-
Ixxxviii. 7 479-432 B.c.

8 The Helot rebellion, ch. ci. et seq. 195

THUCYDIDES

A . ,

Evupaxias avtav hrTovtTo. Tote S€ ovKEeTL ava-
\ b a > + > / IQ 7 J
OXETOV ETTOLODVTO, GAN ELverpyTéa edOKeEL elvat
, 6 , \ é , e ? s = rte
Tdaon TpoOvpla Kai Kalatpetéa H ioxus, Av bv-

/ \ / \
VovTal, apamwevors On TOVSE TOY TOAEpOV.
Avtois pév odv tots Aaxedatmovios S1éyvwoto
AeAVa Cat Te TAS oTOoVvdas Kal Tov’s "AOnvatous
a /
adiceiv, wéeuravtes Sé és Aedhovs ernp@twv tov
Geov ef ToXcuodow dpyetvov Ectat. o b€ avetrev
al f ral
avTots, @S AéYETAL, KATA KPATOS TOAELOVGL ViKnY
écec Oat, kal avtos &py EvAAWecWar Kat Tapa-
KaNovpevos Kal akAnTOS. CXIX. Adis bé rods
Evupayous Tapaxadécavtes Widov éBovdovto
a > \ a lal
érayayely ef yp) ToNepety. Kal éXOovtwv Tav
\ a ,
mpeaRewv aro THs Evppaytias cal Evvddou yevo-
Va vA y >? a b] /
pévns of Te AddoL eitov & éBovAOVYTO, KaTNYO-
A id , ial > / \ \ /
pouvtes ol TAELOUS TOV AOnvaiwy Kal TOV TOAEMOV
ak.obvtes yiyvecOat, Kai ot KopivOror dSenbévtes
/
yey Kal KaTad TONES MpoTepov Exdotav idia
ote Wndicac0at Tov Trodremov, SedioTEs Tepl TH
, \ a / 5 \ ,
Tlotesdata wn mpodiaplapi, TmapovTes 5€ Kal TOTE
a > » /
Kal TeNeuTaion EmreNOovTES EXeyov ToLdbe.
CXX. “Tovds péev Aaxedaipoviovs, & davdpes
rd
Evupayolt, ovK av Ett aitiacaipeOa ws ov Kal
> \a2 , \ Ld L > A ice et ?
avtol éyrndicpévor TOV TOAEMOV EloL Kal Huds és
A a / \ \ \ ¢ ,
TovTo vov Evynyayov. xpn yap TOUS 7YyE“ovas
\ a
Ta ida €& icov vésovtas Ta KoWa TpocKoTel)D,
/ a
@omep Kal év adXaLs €x TadvTwY TpoOTLMaVTAL.

196

BOOK I. cxvin. 2-cxx. 1

laying hands upon their allies. Then the Lacedae-
monians could bear it no longer, but determined
that they must attack the Athenian power with all
zeal and overthrow it, if they could, by undertaking
this war.

The Lacedaemonians themselves, then,! had de-
cided that the treaty had been broken and that the
Athenians were in the wrong, and sending to Delphi
they asked the god if it would be advisable for
them to go to war. The god answered them, as it is
said, that if they warred with all their might, victory
would be theirs, and said that he himself would help
them, whether invoked or uninvoked. CXIX. But
they wished to summon their allies again and put
to them the question whether they should go to
war. And when the envoys from the allies had
come and an assembly was held, the others said
what they wished, most of them complaining of the
Athenians and demanding that the war should be
entered upon, and especially the Corinthians. They
had already, before the meeting, privately begged
the allies city by city to vote for the war, fearing lest
Potidaea would be destroyed before help came, and
now, being also present at this meeting, they came
forward last of all and spoke as follows:

CXX. “Men of the allies, we can no longer com-
plain of the Lacedaemonians that they have not both
themselves voted for the war and also brought us to-
gether for this object. And that is right; for it is
the duty of leaders, while equitably considering
their particular interests, to have special regard for
the general weal, just as in other matters they are

1 Resuming the narrative interrupted at the end of ch,
Ixxxviii.
197

™

432 B.

THUCYDIDES

lal : >
2 *uav b€ dco. pev “AOnvators 4dn Evynd\raynoav
fel 4
ovyt Sidayfs Séovtar date purdEacOar avtovs:
Tovs S¢ THY pecoyeray padrov Kal pH ev Tope
, \ lal a A
KaT@Knéevous eldévat xpr OTL, Tols KATO HY wy
duivoct, yareTrwtépav EEover THY KaTaKopLdyy
TOV @paiwv Kal Tadw avTikn bw ov 7 Baracoa
a lal fa) / \
Th nTeipw Sidwol, Kai TOV voV eyomEvaV BN
KAKOUS KPLTAS WS pi) TpPOTHKOVT@Y Elva, TpoTdE-
J \ A /
yeo Oar Sé Tote, eb Ta KATW TpPOOLWTO, KAY MeXpt
a \ \ a \ X e lal >
ophav To Sevov mpoedOeiv, Kal TEpl AUTWY OVX
lal wy Sr \ vad
3 hooov viv BovrevecOar. Sv brep Kal pa oKvetY
a b) \ \ LU b ’ > / /
Sel AVTOUS TOV TONEMOV aVT ELPnYNS peTarapuBa-
al \ ‘ > \
very. avdpav yap cwppovwy pév e€oTLv, eb p1)
> a“ e / > a pe / >
adiKoivTo, novyatew, ayalapy O€ adiKovpevous EK
\ > / ~ = \ \ > /
pev elpyvns modepuetv, ed € Tapacyov EK To)eE-
/ A A / lal \ /
pov madw EvpBhvat, Kai prjTe TH KATA ToOhELOV
> / 3 , / An et / lal > /
edTuxla erraiper Oar pte TO NoOVXw THS elpynvys
£56 18 a Q P 7 \ Py \ \ 58 \
4 Hddmevov adiKetcPar' 6 TE yap Sta THY HoovnY
> cal / : ee | b / a € , \
éxvav TaxioT av agpatpefetn THS pacTwrns TO
\ PS > e > n > ¢ / 1 4 b]
TepTvov os Oiep Oxvel, eb NovXaloL,, Oo TE EV
ré > / Dr, / > b] Av
Toheu@ evTvxla mrEovalwy ovK evTeuunTar
/ b , > , \ \ Le
5 Opdoe atiot@ éTratpopevos. TOAAA Yap KaKWS
/ > / ca) / U
yoocbévta aPovroTépwy TOV evavTiwY TUXOVTA
, \ ” / lal rn
katwp0ebn, Kal ett Trew Karas doxodvTa
a > f lal /
BovrevOjvat és Tovvaytiov aloyp@s TeEplecTy®

1 ci jovxd or deleted by Hude, after Lehner.
198

BOOK 1. cxx. 2-5
“honoured above all. Now those of us who have
had dealings with the Athenians in the past do not
need to be taught to be on our guard against them.
But those who dwell more in the interior and away
from any trade-route should be warned that, if they
do not-aid-those who are on the seaboard, they will
find it more difficult to bring the products of the
land down to the sea and to get in return what the
sea gives to the mainland; and that they should not
be careless judges of what is said here, as though it
were no concern of theirs, but should expect that, if
they abandon the seacoast to its fate, the danger
may possibly some day reach them, and that>they
are deliberating upon their own interests no less

- than_upon ours. They ought not, therefore, to

hesitaté a moment to adopt war in place of peace.
For though it is the part of men of discretion to
remain tranquil should they not be wronged, it
behooves brave men, when wronged, to go from
peace to war, but when a favourable opportunity offers
to abandon war and resume peace again, allowing
themselves neither to be elated by success in war nor
to be so enamoured of the quiet of~peace as to sub-
mit to wrong. For he who for the sake of his comfort
shrinks from war is likely, should he remain tranquil,
very speedily to forfeit the delights of ease which
caused him to shrink ; and he who presumes upon his
success in war has failed to reflect how treacherous is
the confidence which elates him. For many enter-

_.prises which were ill-planned have succeeded because

the adversary has proved to be still worse advised,

and yet more, which to all appearances were well

advised, have turned out the opposite way and
brought disgrace. For no one ever carries out a

199

THUCYDIDES

yOumet dp oveels opola TH miote Kal ~,
évOupettat yap ovdeis opola* TH Epyo
/ ’ ,
érreEepyeTal, GANa peT aoharelas wev OoEdfopuer,
\ / 3 a > 4
peta Séous Sé év TO Epyw EAreElTOpED.
CXXI. “‘“Hyeis 5é viv nal adccovpevor tov
4 \
TONELOV eyEelpopeV Kal ixava ExovTES eyKAnpaTA,
\ ev > / P / /
kal dtav apvvepeba ’AOnvaiovs, Katanoopeba
ae 28. > n x \ \ Cae: ER > &
avtov év Kalp@. KaTa Toda Sé Has ElKOS
a lal /
ETLKPATHTAL, TPOTov wev TAIRGEL TpovyovTas Kal
> / fal y e / s 5 \
€umerpla TONELLKH, EeLTa opolms Tavras €s Te
, .7 b] 4
TAPAYYEAXOMEVA LOVTAS, VAUTLKOV TE, ® loxv-
a / e
ovolv, ato THs UTapxYovons TE ExdoToLs OvCLAas
N nw a
éEaptucopeba Kal amo tov év Aeddois xa
’ / / / \ ’
Ordvuptia xXpnudtov: ddvercpa yap Tornoapmevos
a / , b \ A / \ /
itrokaBeiv olot T éopev prcG@ petfove tors Ee-
am a / ? \ \ e. 9 ‘
vous avtT@v vavBdatas. wyvntn yap 7 'A@nvaiwv
, ral xX , / id \ e , a x
Svvapts “adXov 7) oikeia: 1) O€ HueTEepa Nooov av
~ a , \ / >
TovTo TdOoL, TOs THmacL TO TOV LaXVOVCA 7}
a a /, ,
Tols Ypyjpacw. pia Te vixn vavpayias KaTa TO
> \ ¢ , > ’ > / /
eikos adioKovTat' et & avTicyolev, medeTHO OmEV
a / , \
Kal Hweis ev WA€OVL YPOV@ TA VavTLKd, Kal OTaV
/ a
THY éeTLoTHUNV €s TO icov KaTATTHOwWLEV, TH YE
ev uyla dimou Teprecopefas 6 yap npuels Exowev
xta 87) pleco yap pels Exower
/ U > , > A an
duce ayabov, exetvois OUK av YEVOLTO duday7, 6

1 Reiske’s correction for 8uoia of the MSS.

1 cf. u. xiii. 4, where Pericles suggests a similar resource.
The Delphic oracle favoured the Peloponnesians, according
to ch. exviii. 3.

200

BOOK I. cxx. 5-cxx1. 4

plan with the same confidence with which he con-
ceives it; on the contrary we form our fond schemes
‘with a feeling of security, but when it comes to their
“execution, we are possessed by fear and fall short ot
_ suecess.

CXXI. “ And so now in our own case, it is because
we are suffering wrongs and have ample grounds for
complaint that we are stirring up this war, and_as
soon as we have avenged our wrongs upon the
Athenians we will bring the war to an end when
_oceasion offers. And for many reasons we are likely
to prevail : first, because -we_are-superior in_point of
numbers and in military experience ; secondly, because
we all with one accord obey the word of command;
and, thirdly, on the sea, where their stréngth lies, we
shall be able to equip a fleet, not only with ‘the
means which we severally possess, but also with the
funds stored up at Delphi and Olympia! For by
contracting a loan we can use the inducement of
higher pay to entice away from them their mercenary
sailors ; for the forces of the Athenians are made up
of hirelings rather than of their own citizens, where-
as ours, whose strength lies more in-the quality of
the menethan in the pay they get, would be less
subject to such defection. And so, if we win a single
victory at sea, in all probability they are defeated.?
If, however, they should still hold out, we on our

part shall have more time for practice in seaman-.
ship, and as soon as we have brought our skill to a
parity with theirs, in_coura , assuredly, we shall be

superior. For the excellene ‘that nature has given
ustannot become theirs Wccah instruction, whereas

* Through the mercenary sailors flocking to the Pelopon-
nesian side for higher pay.

VOL. I. H 201

THUCYDIDES

f / / al
& éxetvor eT LOT NLT) ™ povxovar, xaBarper ov * pty
/
5 éoTt pedeTy. xpnwara dé wore exe és ava,
olc open’ q Sevvoyv av ein ef ot pev éxelvwr Fim
(A
HaxXor él Sovreld TH AVTOV Pépovtes OUK amre-
povowr, pets 5 (ert TO TLpM@POUMEVOL TOUS €y-
Opovs Kai avrol apa F@lecOar) OUK dpa daTravn-
copev Kai emi TO pn br’ éxelvov ata gig
Oévtes avTots ToUTOLs KAKMS naoxew
CXXII. “‘“Yardpyouvo. 6€ cai GrXat odo TOD
ToNenov Hui, Evpayov Te aTooTacls, uddLoTA
~~ /
Tapaiperis ovca THY TpoTOdwY als iayvoUCL, Kal
- r /, ¢
ETLTELXYLT LOS TH XOPA, AAA TE Goa olK av TIS
lal is4 / an
vov tpoldol. HKicTa yap ToAEmos él pyTois
cal DEAN \ ? > ¢e a \ \ a
YWpel, AUTOS Y apm avtTov Ta Toda TEYVATAL
\ 3 ws \

Tpos TO TapaTvyxdvov' év w oO pev Eevopyntws
+ rn / / e , > \
avT® Tpocopirnoas BeBarotepos, 0 8 dpyioGeis

Tept avTov? ovK éX\doow TTaLEL.
2 ‘?RKv@uvuepeba 6€ cal OT, eb pev Huav oav
\ rn
EXATTOLS TPOS AVTLTAXOUS Trepl ys Gpwy ai dLa-
an \ \ 4,
dhopat, oiatov av nv: viv Sé mpos Evpravtds Te
c a 2 a € \ \ \ , y
nas A@nvaior ixavol Kal Kata TwoAWw ete duva-
, > \ /

TWTEPOL' WOTE, EL gt) KaL ABpoor Kal Kata EOvy
yy & ” A“ , > / > ,
Kal Exacrov dory ped youn apuvovpeba avtous,

, v e a“ > ,
diya ye OvTas Huds atovws Yelipwoovtat. Kal
THY Hoocav, & Kal CeLvoY TW AakOVaGAaL, icTW OK
1 xaSaipetdv, Which Hude adopts from C and G (ez corr.),
against «aBaiperéov of the other MSS., is confirmed by the
echo in Dio C. xliii. 11, 7d wey yap xrnrdv 5:4 Bpaxéos Tors Toy

vovv avTa mpocéxovert Kal Kabaperdy medrETD elvat.
2 Dobree’s correction for aérdy of nearly all MSS.

202

BOOK I. cxxt. 4-cxxu. 2

the advantage they have in skill can be acquired by us
through practice. And as to the money we need to
accomplish all this, weshall provide it by contributions;
or strange were it, if their allies should never fail to
pay tribute to ensure their own slavery, but we, to
secure at once vengeance upon our enemies and safety
for ourselves, shall prove anwilling to spend money,
aye, and that we may not be robbed of that very

wealth and withal have it used to our-destruction....

CXXII. “ But we have other ays also of waging

War nee their allies to. to..revolt, which is the

Tear

best™mean o& them of the revenues in
whichtheir ical Consists, the planting of forts in
their territory, ad all the other measures which one
cannot now foresee. For war least of all conforms
to fixed rules, but itself in most cases _has to form
its plans~to~suit’ the occasion as its own resources
allow ; when, therefore, a man keeps his temper
cool while dealing with war, he is more likely to be
safe, while he who loses his temper over it! makes
more blunders.

“ And let us reflect also that, if we individually
were involved in a dispute about mere boundary-lines
with an enemy who was no more than our equal,
that might be borne; but as the case stands, the
Athenians are quite a_match for us all together, and
still more powerful a against us ‘city by city. “Heiice,
unless all of us together, every nation and town, with
one accord resist “them, “they will easily overpower
us because we shall be divided. And as to deé-
feat—even though this is terrible to hear, let it

1 Or, reading airéy with the MSS., ‘‘makes blunders
through his own fault as much as any thing,” ve. ‘the man
who loses his head has only himself to blame for his disasters.”

203

THUCYDIDES

3 GAXo Te dépovcav avtixpus Sovrciayv 6 Kal
Noy@ évdotacOjvat aticypov TH Lerdotovyncw

.
2

/ , ca) lal
Kal TONELS TOTaT OE UTO plas KaKoTrabeiv. ev @
a 8 / é ” x , x é \ é / Sieve
i) Oixalws Ooxolmev av Tacyew 7 dia Serdiav avé-
year Kal TOY TaTépwyv Yeipovs faivesOat, of
thy “ErXdrdba HrevGépwcav: nueis b€ odd Hyuiv
lal fal / An
avtois BeSatodpev avto, Tupavvov 5é é@pev éey-
/ / \ > b a 4
kabectavat woduw, Tors 5 év pid povdpxous
a \ U e
4 akiodpev KaTaNUELY. Kai OUK iopEV OTTWS TAbE
a lal , al /
Tplav TOY peyiotwy Evudopwav amnddaxTaL,
> / x / x» > / > \ \
afvvecias 7) pmadakias 7) apedetas. ov yap $1)
, > \ > \ \ , \ 4
mehevyoTes aUTA éTL THY TAELTTOUS 67 BAdrracav
a a
Katappovnow KeywpnKate, ) €k TOU ToAXOUS
/ \ > / v > 4 /
opaddetv TO evavTiov ovoxa adpoovvn peTwvo-
paoTat.
/ /, al
OXXIII. “Ta pév otv trpoyeyevnuéva ti Set
A lal / n
paxpotepov % és Gcov Tols viv Evydéper aitia-
a / lal r
Oat; Twepl 6€ Tov EvTELTA peAOVTwY TOls TapOD-
al \ lal / \
ot BonOovvtas yp7 éeTLTAaAalT wpe (TaTpLOY yap
A a / \ by \ ca) ‘ \
fyutv! éx TOY TOovwY Tas apeTas KTaCOaL), Kal pn
/ \ 4 2. / lal \
peTaBarrew TO 00s, Eb Apa TAOUT@ TE VV Kal
é£ovcia odiyov mpopépete (ov yap Sixatoy & TH
‘ ‘
imopla exTHOn TH TWeplovaia amod€cOat), adra
amopia é€xTnOn TH TEp pS Oat), a
a 7/7 \ >
Oapcodvtas iévat KaTa TOANA €S TOV 7TOAELOD,
tov te Geod ypyncavtos Kal avTov UToaKXopévov

1 With C, the other MSS. have dyiv.

1 xatadpdvnots is that proud and haughty spirit which pre-
cedes and invites a fall. It seems impossible to reproduce in

204

BOOK I. cxxm. 2-cxxmt. 1

be well understood that it brings nothing else than
downright slavery. That such an outcome should
even be spoken ofgas a possibility, or that so many
cities might suffer ill-at the hands of one, is a
disgrace to the Peloponnesus. In such a case men
would say of us, either that we deserved our fate, or
that through cowardice we submitted to it, and that
we were clearly dégenerate sons of our fathers, who
liberated Hellas, whereas we, so far from making
this liberty secure, should be allowing a city to be
established as a tyrant in our midst, though we claim
the reputation of deposing the monarchs in single
states. We know not how such a course can be ac-
quitted of one of the three gravest errors, stupidity
or cowardice, or carelessness. For I cannot suppose
that, escaping those errors, you have reached that
most fatal spirit of proud disdain! which has ruined
so many men that it has taken on a new name,
that of despicable folly.

CXXIII. “ With regard, however, to what is past
and done, what need is there to find fault at
length, except in so far as that is profitable for what
is present? But with a view to what shall be
hereafter, we should devote every effort to the task
in hand—for to win virtue? by toils is our heritage
—and make no change of custom because.-you
now have a Slight superiority in wealth and _ power ;
for -it-is*not right that attributes which have
been won through poverty should be lost through
prosperity. Nay, you should go into the war with
confidence, and for many reasons: the god has
spoken through his oracle and promised that he

English the assonance of the words katagdpdéyynats appooivn.
Thucydides was fond of paronomasia ; ¢f. ch. xxxiii. 4.

* Or, ‘‘the rewards of virtue”—honour, renown. 205

THUCYDIDES

EurArXjWecbat, Kal THs adAAns “EAAdbos araons
Evvaywviovpévns, Ta pev PoBo, Ta 5é opedia
yovloupévns, TA p 2, z.
, U ef € \
omovods Te OU AVGETE TPOTEPOL, as ye Kal Oo Geos
KeAEVOV TrOoAE“EY vomifer TapaBeBacPa, HOd:-
Knpevars 6€ wadAXrov BonOynceTe? AVOVGL yap OvY
Of duvvopevol, GAN ot TpdTEpoL ETLOVTES.
CXXIV. ““Oote tavtaydbev caras brapyov
ipiv jTodepety Kal nuav Kown TAde TapawvovYTw?,
” , \ ( a AVG, L \
elrep SeBatotatov To \tavta’ Evydepovta Kat
/ \ >] , ‘ a \ la
moXeot Kal ldr@tats) elvat, un pédreTe Lortes-
Seatais Te ToletcGar Tipwpiay ovat Awpievor
Kat uTo “lovey TodLopKoupévols, OU mpoTEpov
5 > , \ a v a \
nV TOUVAaVTLOY, KaL TMY AdrA@DV perenGeiy THV
ehevdepiar, @S OUKETL evdexerart Te pi pevovTas
TOUS pev On Sranrec at, TOUS 8, el prod Ona o-
pba EvvehOovtes ev, dutveaOar dé atoAporTes}
\ \ ef \ > \ i] 7 2 ‘ /
un To UoTEepov TO avVTO TdoxXeELVY’ GAA vopi-
> > / > ca] > ” /
cavtes és avayxny adpiyPa, ® avdpes Evppayo,
\ ef 4 v / , \
Kal Gua Tdabe dpiota éyecCar, Whdicace Tov
morenov pn hoByOévtes TO adtixna Sewov, Ths 6
> 9 ? a _\ ! > / > (Jere
aw avtov (61a TrElovos Eelpnuvns)émLuunoavTes’
] / \ \ > , a r
€x ToANéu“ouv pev yap elpyvn wadrov BeRaovrat,
> >] id / \ \ fol > e / > /
ad’ jovxias S€ mi) TodEUHOAL OVX Omolws aKLV-
\ ‘ la > A c /
Suvov. Kal tiv Kabeotnxviav év tH “EdXabu
TOAW TUpavvoy Hynoamevor éeTL TAacW opoLws
Kkaleotaval, WoTe TOY pev Hon apyew, Tov Sé
2 So Hude, after Reiske (raita I, ravta yp.ag); Taira
ABCEGM.
206

BOOK I. cxxm. 1-cxxiv. 3

_~

, himself will help you; all the rest of Hellas will join
you in the struggle, partly through fear and partly
through self-interest; and, finally, you will not be
the ones to break the treaty, inasmuch as the god, in
bidding you go to war, considers it to have been
transgressed already, but you will be going to the
defence of a treaty that has been violated. For it
is not those who fight in self-defence that break a

treaty, but those who attack others unprovoked.
CXXIV. “So then, since from every quarter a
favourable opportunity offers itself to you to go to
war, and since we recommend this course in the
common_interest—if it be true that identity of
interest! is the surest policy for states and individuals
‘to follow—make haste to succour the Potidaeans, who
‘are Dorians and besieged by Ionians—the reverse of
what used to be—and to recover the liberty of the
rest ; since it will no longer do for us to wait, when
some are already being injured, and others, if it shall
become known that we have had a meeting and
dare not defend ourselves, will soon suffer the same
fate. On the contrary, men of the allies, recognize
that we are now facing the inevitable, and at the
same time that this proposal is for the best; and
vote for the war, not fearing the immediate danger,
but coveting the more enduring peace which will
result from the war. For peace is more firmly
established when it follows war, but to refuse to
go to war from a desire for tranquillity is by no means
so free from danger. And so, in the conviction that
the state which has set itself up as a tyrant in Hellas
is a menace to all alike,ruling over some already and
1 Or, reading taira, ‘‘if it be most certain that this course
(i.e. declaration of war) is advantageous for states as well as

individuals,”

207

THUCYDIDES

Siavocio Fat, TapacTnowpela emedOovtes, Kal
avTol Te akLvoUVwS TO AOLTTOY OiKauEV Kal TOUS
vov dedovAwpévous “EAAHvVas érevOepaawpev.”
CXXV. Toradtra pév ot Kopiv@ior eitrov. ot
dé Aaxedarpovror émelon) ag’ aT avT@v Heovo av
yvrouny, Wijpov emnryaryov Tols Evupayos a draco
OgoL Tapigav éENs Kal petCove Kal é\doocov TO-
Rew Kal 70 THO OS evn picavto mohepelv. dedoy-
pévov dé avTois evdus fev advvaTa Hv émruxerpety
aTrapac Kevous ovolr, Exrropiver Bar 5é edoKer éExa-
oToLs & mpoagpopa Hv Kal pn) elvan peddyow.
Suws € Kadiotapévors wv eer EVLAUTOS pev ov
SueTpiBn, éNagaov dé, mplv éaBareivy és thy
"ATTLKNY Kal TOV TONE MOV apac bar pavepas.
CXXVI. "Ev tovTe@ 6é ém peo Bevovto TO xXpove
T pos TOUS 'AOnvaiovs eyKAn LATA TOLOUpEvOL,
OT WS opiow OTe peylarn Tpopaces eln TOU TONE-
pew, Hv pn Te ecaxovaow. Kal TpaTov pev
mpéa Bets TEU AVES ol Aaxedarpovtot éxeevov
TOUS "AOnvaious TO ayos ehavverv THs Oeod. TO
dé ayos ip TOLOVOE. Kurov my "A@nvaios avnp
‘Orvprriovixns TOV TadaL evyevns TE Kal SuvaToOs:
eyeryaprjKer dé Guyarépa Ocayévous Meyapews
avdpos, 0s KaT exeivov TOV Xpovov ETUPAVVEL
Meyapov. Xpopmevep dé TO Kvrove €v Aeros
avetnev 0 Geos év tod Ards TH peylotn eopTi}
kataraPelv tiv AOnvaiwy axpotrodw. o 6é Tapa
Te TOD Bcayévous Stvapyiv AaBwv Kai Tovs Pirous
avateiaas, é7revdn ew ipOev ‘Odbpria Ta ev
Hedorovvyjc, katédaBe THY dic poT ody as é€ml
Tupavviol, voulcas éoptnv te TOV Auos peyioTny

208

‘ earn)

BOOK I. exxiv. 3-cxxvi. 5

designing to rule over others, let us attack and reduce
it, and henceforth dwell in security ourselves and set
free those Hellenes who are already enslaved.
CXXV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the
Lacedaemonians when they had heard the opinions
of all, put the vote in succession to all the allied
states which were present,.both great and small;
andere ae majorit voted for war. But though the ,
decision’ Was made it was impossible for them to
take up arms at once, as they were unprepared ; it
was determined, howéver, “that the several states
should make the fitting preparations and that there
should be no delay. Nevertheless, in providing them-
selves with what was needed there was spent, not
indeed a full year, but somewhat less, before they
invaded Attica and took up the war openly.
CXXVI. During this“interval-they~kept sending
embassies to the Athenians*and-making complaints,
that they might havé-as"gbod a pretext as possible
for making war, in case the Athenians should refuse
to consider them. And first the Lacedaemonian
envoys bade the Athenians drive out_the “curse of
the goddess.” [The curse was as follows: There
was an Athenian in days of old namédf Cylon, a
victor at Olympia, of noble birth and powerful ;~ and
he had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian,
who was at that time tyrant of Megara. Now Cylon
consulted the oracle at Delphi, and the god in
answer told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens
“at the greatest festival of Zeus.” So he obtained a
force from Theagenes and, persuading his friends to
help, when the Olympic festival in the Peloponnesus
came on he; seized the createed 2 a view to
making himself tyrant; for he thought that the

209

10

THUCYDIDES

elvar Kal éavTd Te TpoojKew ‘OdvpTLa veviKn-
Kot. ef 56 ev TH ATTLKA GAXOOL Tov % peylaTH
Eoptn elpnto, ovte éxeivos ETL KaTEVONTE TO TE
pavteiov ove édydov (€oTe yap Kal ’AOnvators
Audowa, & Kadeitat, Aros éopti Metdrytov pe-
ylotn, &&w THis Toews, ev Tavdnpel Bvovet,
modrol! ovy iepeia adda Ovpata éemiywpia),
Soxav Sé 6p0as yryy@oKew ETTEXELPNTE TO EPYO.
of 5€ “A@nvatot aicQopevar éBonPnacav te Tav-
Snuel ex TOV aypav ér avTouvs Kal TpocKale-
Comevor ETTOALOPKOUY. XpoVvoU Sé eyyuyvopevov ot
’"AOnvaior tpuxXopevor TH Tpocedpla aTnAPov ot
morXol, emitpépavtes Tols evvéa Apyovat THY
puraxny\re Kal TO TaV avToKpaTopar dialeivat
fh av apicta SiayityveoKkwow: ToTe Sé Ta TOA
TOV TOALTLKOY OL evvéa ApyYovTes ETPagaor.
of 6€ peta TOU KudAwvos trodcopKovmevor PrAVPS
elyov citov Te Kal vaTos amropia. oO kev ovV
Kirov kal 0 aderdas €xdsdpacKovaly> ot & adrot
@s éméCovto Kat Ties Kal atéfynoKov vo TOD
ALpov, KaOiSovow eri Tov Bwpmov iKéTUL TOV EV TH

1 wodAol: Hude adopts C. F. Hermann’s conjecture woAAd,
and, after Madvig, inserts ayva before @vuata.

1 On this first attempt to establish a tyranny in Athens,
see also Hdt. v. Ixxi ; Plut. Solon, xii. It was not a rising
of the people against the nobles, but the attempt of an am-
bitious man who aspired to royal power, supported only bya
few friends and » body of Megarian soldiers. To the mass

210

BOOK I. cxxvi. 5-10

Olympic festival was not only the greatest festival
of Zeus, but also in a manner was connected with
him as having won an Olympic victory.t But
whether the oracle meant the greatest festival in
Attica or somewhere else he did not go on to con-
sider, and the oracle did not make it clear. For, in
fact, the Athenians also have a festival in honour of
Zeus Meilichius, the Diasia, as it is called, a very
great festival celebrated outside the city, whereat
all the people offer sacrifices, many making offer-
ings? peculiar to the country instead of victims.
But Cylon, thinking that he was right in his opinion,
made his attempt. And the Athenians, when they
were aware of it, came in a body from the fields
against them and sitting down before the Acropolis
laid siege to it. But as time passed the Athenians
grew weary of the siege and most of them went
away, committing the task of guarding to the nine
Archons, to whom they also gave full power to settle
the whole matter as they might determine to be
best; for at that time * the nine Archons transacted
most of the public business. But Cylon and those
who were being besieged with him were in hard
straits through lack of food and water. So Cylon
and his brother escaped ; but the rest, when they
were in great distress and some of them were even
dying of hunger, sat down as suppliants at the

of the people it seemed to portend subjection to Megara, so
they flocked in to crush the movement, not, as Cylon hoped,
to support it.

2 A scholiast suggests cakes (réuuata) made in the forms
of animals.

* i.e. before the legislation of Solon ; from that time the
power of the Archons decreased, and was restricted chiefly
to judicial functions.

211

THUCYDIDES

/ / \ > \ e ’

ll axpomoXe. avacticavtes 5é avTovs oi Tav 'AOn-
/ > / \ / e Caf
vaiwy émiTeTpappevoe THY PuAAaKIV, wS EWPwV
> Q / > lal ° Qn > ’ e be \
atoOvncKovtTas €v T@ lep@, Eh w pw jOEV KAKOV

> 3 / /
Tolncoucly, aTayayovTes aTéxtewav: KabeCope-
\ a lal a n
vous 6€ Tivas Kal éml TOV ceuvav Oedy Tois
ral cal / > / \
Bwpois év TH Tapodm ateypncavto. Kal amo
a \ > / r f r ,
ToUTOU évayels Kal aXLTIHpLOL THS Beod érelvol TE
> lal \ \ / \ > ’ > & BA
12 éxaXovvTo Kal TO yévos TO aT éxeivwv. }NacAaV
ue! val \ a /
peev ovv Kat ot ‘AQnvator Tovs évaryets touTous,
/ ¢€ ,
nrace de Kal Kreopévns 0 Aaxedarpovos taTtepov
, / , lal
peta “A@nvaiwv aotacialovtwy, tovs te Cavtas
lal / \ ral
éXavvovTes Kal TOV TEOVEOTWY TA OGTA AVENOVTES
> / n / ef \ \ /
é&éBadov: KaTHdOov pevtot VaTEpov, Kal TO yévos
al a /
QUT@V ETL EaTLV EV TH TOKEL.
lal \ \ v e ,
CXXVII. Totdto 8) 70 ayos of Aaxedaipovior
/ a as lal lal
éxéXevov eXavverv S7Gev Tols Peots mp@Tov Timo-
r / \ , \
povvtes, eldotes Sé Llepuxdéa tov Eavbimrov
U A \ \ / ,
TPOTEXOMEVOY AUT@ KATA THY pyNTEpa Kal vopt-
Ul > a en x /
fovtes éxtecovtTos avTov pdov av! adiot rpo-
a % 3 \ a ? / / a
2 ywpely Ta aTro TMV ~A@nvaiwv. ov pévToLTOG07-
lal \ a
tov HAMLov Tabety av avUTOV TOUTO Gao diaBorrV
lal \ /
oloev avT@ Tpos THY TodW, ws Kal dta THY
9 , \ \ , ” € / a
3 éxeivou Evpdhopav TO mépos EaTal Oo TOAEMOS. wv
1 Added by Stahl. |

1 Of Athena Polias.
2 The sanctuary of the Eumenides, which lay between the
Acropolis and the Areopagus.

212

BOOK I. cxxvi. 10-cxxvu. 3

altar! on the Acropolis. And the Athenians who
had been charged with guarding them, when they
saw them dying in the temple, caused them to arise
on promise of doing them no harm, and leading
them away put them to death; and some who in
passing by took refuge at the altar of the Awful
Goddesses? they dispatched even there. For this
act both they and their descendants? were called
accursed and sinners against the Goddess. Accord-
ingly the accursed persons were driven out not only
by the Athenians but also at a later time by Cleo-
menes the Lacedaemonian, with the help of a
faction of the Athenians, during a civil strife, when
they drove out the living and disinterred and cast
out the bones of the dead. Afterwards, however,
they were restored, and their descendants are still
in the city.

CXXVII. It was this “curse” that the Lacedae-
monians now bade the Athenians drive out, prin-
cipally, as they pretended, to avenge the honour of
the gods, but in fact because they knew that Pericles

son of Xanthippus was implicated in the curse on ~

his mother’s side,* and thinking that, if he were
banished, they would find it easier to get from the
Athenians the concessions they hoped for. They
did not, however, so much expect that he would
suffer banishment, as that they would discredit him ‘
with his fellow-citizens, who would feel that to some
extent his misfortune® would be the cause of the

8 Chiefly the Alcmaeonidae, whose head was Megacles,
Archon at the time of Cylon’s attempt.

4 Pericles was a descendant in the sixth generation from
Megacles, his mother Agariste being niece of the Alemaeonid
Cleisthenes (Hdt vr. cxxxi.).

5 As belonging to the accursed fainily,

213

THUCYDIDES

7 , a or, ce \ wv b
yap Suvat@tatos TOV Kal” éavTov Kal dywv THY
ToXLTELav HvavttovTo TavtTa Tois Aaxeda:povioss,

\ > y e / > wh 3 \ ‘+s ef
KQL OUK €1@ UTELKELY, ANN ES TOY TOAE“LOY wWPLA

\ ’ /
tous ’A@nvaiovus.
> lal

CXXVIII. ’AvtexéXevov Sé cal ot “AOnvator

\ / \ > \ / ” , 4
tous Aaxedaipoviouvs TO ato Tatvdpouv ayos éXav-

\ , /
very. of yap Aaxedaipouo, avactncavTés TroTE
> la) e a lo) 80 > \ Ai /, 1
€x Tov lepov tov Iloceda@vos amo ‘lawvapov
tov Eik@tov ixétas amayayovtes StébOerpav’ Ov
a \ \ , 5) n jaz \ t

0 67 Kat odiow avtots voyifovcr Tov péeyav
\ / BI / bp / \ \ \

ceo pov yevécOar ev Xraptyn. éxédevov 6é Kal TO
fal / v > 4 > # > / \
THs Nadkoixouv ayos €Navvewy avToUs: eyéveTo Oé
, > \ / e , \
Totovee. e7re!dy Ilavoavias 0 Aaxedatpovios TO
Tp@Tov petarveudbels vo LraptiaTt@v amo THs
> a wn > ¢€ / \ ‘ c , > nr
apxns THs év “EXXnoTOVT@ Kal KpLO Els UT avTOY
aTréervOn 1 adieety, Snuocia peéev ovKéte é€eTép-
Ui] #7) 2 Tied ya lad be

, \ \
hOn, idia dé adros tpijpn AaBav ‘Epwovisa
n ¢

avev Aaxedatpoviov adixvettar és “EXXnoTovTor,

a \ XZ S28 \ r Mustv’ aS A ne

TO pev Oy@ El TOV TONEMOV, TO OE
\
éopyw Ta mpos Baciléa Tpayuwata mpdoce,
fal / s fo)
@aoTTEp Kal TO TPWTOV EeTTEVELPNTEV, EhLemeEVOS TIS
n fol / cal
“EdAAnuixis apxns. evepyeciavy b& amo Tovde
mpa@tov és Baciiéa KxatéGeto Kal Tov TavTos
Tpaypatos apynyv émoujcato. Bufavtiov yap

1 Van Herwerden deletes, followed by Hude.

1 of. ch. ci. 2.

214

BOOK I. cxxvut. 3-cxxvill. 5

war. For being the most powerful man of his time
and the leader of the state, he was opposed to the
Lacedaemonians in all things, and would not let
the Athenians make concessions, but kept urging
them on to the war. -

CXXVIIL The Athenians answered with the

demand that the Lacedaemonians should drive out
the curse of Taenarus. For the Lacedaemonians had
on one occasion caused some suppliant Helots to leave
their refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus,
then had led them off and put them to death; and
the Lacedaemonians believe that it was because
of this sacrilege that the great earthquake! befell
them at Sparta. And the Athenians also bade them
drive out the curse of Athena of the Brazen House.?
And this is the way it was incurred. After Pau-
sanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the
Spartans, on the first occasion,? from his command
on the Hellespont, and on trial had been acquitted
of wrong-doing, he was never again sent out in a
public capacity, but privately and on his own account
he took a trireme of Hermione without authority of
the Lacedaemonians and came to the Hellespont,
to take part, as he pretended,in the Persian war, but
in reality to carry on an intrigue with the Great King
—an enterprise to which he had set his hand in the
first instance also, his aim being to become master
of all Hellas. He had namely first laid up for him-
self with the King a store of gratitude in the follow-
ing circumstances, and thus had begun the whole
affair. When he was in that quarter before, after

2 So called from her temple or shrine in the citadel at
Sparta. Pausanias says (111. xvii. 2) both temple and statue
were of bronze. 3477 8.0. ef. ch. xcv. 3.

215

4

2

~~

THUCYDIDES

ey \ a . \ \ b /
Eloy TH TpoTépa Tapovota peta THY é€x Kutrpou
> , 5 \ aA > \ \ ,
avaxyopnow (eiyov 6€ Myjéor avto nai Baoirews
a \ f' >
mpoonkovTés tives Kat Evyyeveis, of Eddwoav ev
> fal / "h A i > /
avuT® TOTE) TOUTOUS ods EXaPev aTroTéuTrEL Bact-
a a f- A \ i
Nel Kpvpa Tav adrdr\,wv Evppadywv, TO O€ AOYH
Yj \ a \
avédpacay avtov. émpacae b€ TavTa peta J'oy-
4 a?) lal = bl / , /
yuXou Tov Epetpids, omep éemetpevre TO Te BuCav-
Tlov Kal Tovs aixpwarwtous. émeurbpe 5é Kal
b] \ Ni 4 / > a >
éemioToAny tov L'oyyvAov Pépovta avT@. €ve-
yéypatrto 5é Tabe év avTH, ws UaTEpov avnupEeOn:
id \ a / /
“ Tlavoavias 0 nyep@v THs Lraptns Tovade Té
/ / > / te, ,
cor xapitecOar Bovropevos atroTréuTret Sopl EXov,
tal > \ \ a
Kal yv@uNy TroLovpmat, e& Kal cot Soxel, Ovyatépa
TE THY ONY yhuat Kal cor YSraptynv te Kal THV
c e f. fal
ddAnv “EXXdéba Urroxeiprov Toincar. Svvatos 6é
lal lal lal \ Lal
S0x@ elvar Tav’Ta Tpatat peTa TOD BovrEvOpLEVOS.
5 /
él OUV TL OE TOVT@Y apécKE, TEuTTE AVOpa TLAOTOP
> ade / ? 2 \ \ \ Ul
éml Oddaccav 6s ov TO AOLTTOV TOUS NOYOUS TrOLN-
/ » a \ ¢e I
couela.” tocaita pev 7 ypadn €d1Xov.
\ a A
CXXIX. BépEns 5€ hoOn te tH éeiaToAR Kal
\
atoaTtéxree “AptaBafov tov Papvakov emi Oa-
» ra > \ /, ra
Aacoav Kal KedXevEeL auvTOv THV TE AacKvXriTLW
catpateiay twapadkaBety MeyaBdtnv amandXa-
/
Eavta, 0s mpoTepov apyxe, Kai wapa Ilavoaviav
> / > \ > / > fal td
és Bufdvtiov émictoAny avtetetiver avT@® ws
/ / \ \ a 5) tal
Taylota OvaTréwrpat Kal THY oppayioa arrodetEat,
b) a , a
kal nv TL avT@ Ilavoavias TapayyéAXy Tepl TOV
a /
€avTOU TpayLaTwV, Tpdocelvy ws aploTa Kal
4 , /
TLTTOTATA. 0 O€ AbLKOMEVOS TA TE AX ErrOinceD
216

BOOK I. exxvii. 5-cxxix. 2

the return of the Hellenic fleet from Cyprus,! he
had taken Byzantium, then in the possession of the
Persians, and certain connections and kinsmen of
the King were captured in the place when the city
fell. These prisoners he sent back to the King
without the knowledge of the allies in general, whom
he gave to understand that they had escaped from
him. And he was carrying on this intrigue in con-
cert with Gongylus the Eretrian, the very man whom
he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the
captives. And he also sent a letter by Gongylus
to the King, in which the following was written,
as was afterwards discovered :

“ Pausanias, the Spartan commander, wishing to
do you a favour, sends you back these men whom
he took with the spear. And I make the proposal,
if it seems good to you also, to marry your daughter
and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to
you. And I am able, I think, to accomplish these
things with the help of your counsel. If any ot
these things pleases you, send a trusty man to the
sea, and through him we shall in future confer.”
So much the letter disclosed.

CXXIX. Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and
sent Artabazus son of Pharnaces to the sea, com-

manding him to take over the satrapy of Dascylium,
superseding Megabates, who was governor before ;
and he charged him with a letter in reply to
Pausanias, bidding him transmit it to him in By-
zantium as quickly as possible and to show him
the seal, and if Pausanias should give him any
direction about the King’s affairs, to execute it with
all care and fidelity. And he on his arrival did

1 of. ch. xciv. 2.

217

3.

THUCYDIDES

Got ep elpnto Kal thy émictoNny drétreprper.
avTeveyeypamtTo dé Tabe"
«* (de ever Bactrevs EépEns Iavoavia: Kai
TOV avo pay c oUs pot Tépav Oaracons € ex Butavriou
/ , J
érwoas) KeiceTal cot evepyeoia év TO TMT Ep@
olk@ és aiel avarypaTTos, Kab Tois Aéyors Tots aro
gov apéoKopalt. Kat ce pare yok pie mpEpa
> / (4
eTLTXETM WATE aVELVAL Tpaocew TL @Y €uol
Umityvel, poe xpucod Kal apyvpou dSaTravn
KEKWAUTO poe oTpatuas Tet, el mou Sei
maparyiyves Gat, adra pet “AptaBafov dvd pos
ayabob, 6 6yv cot emeppa, Tpacce Capo av Kal Ta

éua Kal TA oa 67n Kd\MOTA Kal apiota ee

apdhortépots.”

CXXX. Tatra AaBav o Haveavias ta ypap-
para, @v Kat ™ pote pov ev peyar@ a&iopate b vmo
TOV “EXAgjvev 61a Tip Trataraow HysHoviay,
TOAN® TOTE peaddov ApTo Kal OVKETL eduvato €v
TO KabecTOrt TOT Beorevery, aAXa oKEVaS Te
Mnbucas évduomevos €K TOU Bulavtiov €Ener Kal
dia THS Opakns T Opevo“EvoVy avtov Mijdot Kat
Alyurttot edopupopour, Tpamelay TE Tlepoveny
mapeTideTo Kat KaTeX el THY OLdvolay ovK €dv-
VaTO, aA Epyous Bpaxéoe Tpovonrov & TH yvoun
perloves és Evrerta Emedde Tpagew. Svampocodev
TE QUTOV Taperye Kal 7H opyn ovTm yareTTA
EXpHTO és mavTas omotes OoTE pndéva dwvac bar
T poovevar’ 6: émep Kal 7 pos tovs "A@nvatous ovx
HKLOTA 1 Evppaxia peTéeo Ty.

CXXXI. O: oe Aanedarpovtor aicBopevor 70
Te TpaTov dv a’Ta TavUTAa uvexaddecay avTOY, Kal

218

BOOK I. cxxix. 2-cxxx1. 1

other things as he was told and transmitted the
letter. And this reply of the King ran as follows:

“ Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias: As touch-
ing the men whom thou didst save for me out of
Byzantium beyond the sea, a store of gratitude is
laid up for thee, of record, in our house forever, and
with thy words also I am pleased. And let neither
night nor day stay thee to make thee remiss in
performing aught of what thou dost promise me;
and let nothing hinder thee, either expense of gold
and silver or number of troops, if there be need of
their presence anywhere; but with Artabazus, a
good man, whom I have sent to thee, transact with
confidence my business and thine as shall be most
honourable and best for both of us.”

CXXX. When Pausanias received this letter,
although even before this he had been held in high
consideration by the Hellenes because he had led
them at Plataea, he was then far more elated and
couid no longer bring himself to live in the usual
manner of his people, but clad himself in Persian
apparel whenever he went forth from Byzantium,
and when he travelled through Thrace a body-guard
of Medes and Egyptians attended him; he had his
table served in Persian style, and indeed could not
conceal his real purpose, but by such trifling acts
showed plainly what greater designs he purposed in
his heart to accomplish thereafter. And so he made
himself difficult of access, and indulged in such a
violent temper towards everybody that no one could
come near him; and this was one of the chief
reasons why the allies went over to the Athenians.

CXXXI. Now it was just this conduct that had
caused the Lacedaemonians in the first instance to

219

THUCYDIDES

> \ ae / \ \ 7 > 7
éretd1) TH Eppuovids vn to Sevtepov éextreUvoas
ov KeXEVTAYTWY AUTHY ToLAaUTA epalveTo TrOLaY,
la! / ,
kal éx tov Bufavtiov Bia bm’ ’AOnvatwv éxtroX-
\
opxnbels és pev THY Lardptyy ovK éeTaveywper, és
\ \ /
Sé Kortwvas tas Tpwddas idpv8els rpdocwv Te
DI] / > a 3 \ f \ >
e€onyyérreTO auTois és Tovs BapBapous Kai ovK
a \
er ayad@ THy povny ToLtovpevos, OUTw 57 OvKETL
Madea > \ f , mer x
émécxov, Ara TEurrayTes KNPUKA ol Efopot Kat
lal \ ,
CKUTGANDY ElTOV TOU KHPUKOS M1 AElTrETOaL, Et SE
uy, TOAEMOY avT@ LmaptTiatas mMpoaryopeverv. j
6 6€ BovAomevos ws HKLoTAa UroTTOS elvat Kal
/ 4 ld \ \ >
TioTevov YXpipact dvadkvoew THY diaBornV ave-
,
yoper TO SevTepov és XaapTyy. Kal és pev THY
/ lal \ n /
EipPKTHV €OTLTTEL TO TP@TOV UTO TAY éehopwv
> ra / ‘ / 6 fal
(€£ecte 5€ Tots Efopors TOV Bacidéa Spacat TovTO),
yy / ef Jen \ /
érerta Statrpakapevos tatepov €EAAVe Kal Kali-
\ / Taal
aotnow éavtov és Kpiaw Tots Bovropévors Trept
avToV edeyyelv.
\
CXXXII. Kai davepov pev eiyov ovdév ot
Lraptatat onpetov, ovtEe of ExXOpoi ovTE 1) Taca
/ a
TOMS, Tw av TiaTEvoavTes BEeBaiws ETLULwWpodYTO
avépa yévous te Tod BaciXelov dvTa Kal év TO
\ / \
mapovTe tiny exovtas (IlXetctapyov yap Tov
» /
Aewvidouv dvta Bactréa Kal véov Ett averios Ov
’ ‘ e , \ \ a a
émeTpoTrevev), UToias 5é Todas Tapetye TH TE

1 The oxvrdAn was a staff used for writing dispatches.
The Lacedaemonians had two round staves of one size, the
one kept at Sparta, the other in possession of commanders

220

BOOK I, cxxxi. 1-cxxxtl. 2

recall Pausanias, when they learned of it; and when
this second time, on his sailing away in the ship of
Hermione without their authority, it was evident
that he was acting in the very same manner—when,
after being forcibly dislodged from Byzantium by
the Athenians, instead of returning to Sparta, he
settled at Colonae in the Troad and was reported to
the ephors to be intriguing with the Barbarians and
tarrying there for no good purpose—then at length
they held back no longer, but sent a herald with a
skytale-dispatch,! in which they told him not to lag
behind the herald, or the Spartans would declare
war upon him. And he, wishing to avoid suspicion
as far as possible, and confident that he could~
dispose of the charge by the use of money, returned
the second time to Sparta. And at first he was
thrown into prison by the ephors, who have the
power to do this in the case of the king himself ;
then, having contrived after a time to get out, he
offered himself for trial to any who might wish to
examine into his case.

CXXXII. There was, indeed, no clear proof in
the possession of the Spartans, either his personal
enemies or the state at large, on the strength of
which they could with entire confidence proceed to
punish a man who was of the royal family and held
high office for the time being—for as cousin of
Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, who was king and
still a minor, he was acting as regent for him; but

he, by his disregard of propriety, and particularly by

abroad. A strip of paper was rolled slantwise round the staff
and the dispatch written lengthwise on it; when unrolted
the dispatch was unintelligible, but rolled slantwise round
the commander’s skytale it could be read,

221

THUCYDIDES

2 0 / x o x, , a B Ba S Lae
mapavopia Kal (nrooe Tov BapBapav pn ioos
/ fal s i a la \ 1 / ”
Bovrecbat eivat Tols Tapoval, Kal” Ta TE adda

lal ’ / 2 rn
avtov avecKoTrouy el Ti mov e€ededinTnTO TOV

/ % \
KabecT@ToY vopimeorv Kal OTL éml Tov Tpitroda
\ a a / raed
mote tov év Aeddois, dv avéPecav ot “EXXnveEs
> \ lal Af > / b] , b] /
aro tav Mydwv axpobiviov, n&iwoev émiypa-
> \ 207 \ b] a ,

wacbat avtos idia TO édeyetov TOG

“EXXijvov apynyos érel ctparov deve Myjdav,
Ilavcavias PoiBeo pri avéOnne TObe.

S a e / ‘
TO ev oov édeyelov ot Aaxedammovior eEexodarvav
\ a / n /
evovs TOTE ATO TOD TplTr0b0S TOUTO Kal eTéypapav
\ \ / ee 4 \
ovopaatl tas mores boat Evyxaedovoat Tov
\ / n
BdpBapov éotncav TO ayvdOnpa> tov pévTor
, \ | a / 3
Ilavoartov adiknua Kat ToT edcxet eivat, Kal éTrel
/ fal lal
ye 67 €v TOUT@ KabeLaTIKEL, TOAXK@ pbaddov
a / a ve
Tapoporoy TpaxOnvar épaiveto TH Tapovon ova-
, > , \ \ ’ \ ¢/-
voila. €muvOavovTo 6é kat es tovs EiAwtas
, > A 2 x ef > lA /
meadooew TL avToV, Kal Ry Sé ovTwS* EhevOEpwolv
al Qn \ /
Te yap wUmiryvelTo avTols Kal moX.Telay, iV
r XN a ,
Evveravact@ct Kal To wav EvyKcatepyaowrTal.
ind Lal id 7 tal
GN dS Hs )odvdé TOV EiXo@t@v pynvutais tot
v4 / / / lal
miotevcavtTes 7Eiwoav vewTepov TL Totty Es
"1 Added by Ullrich.

1 A golden tripod set upon a three-headed bronze serpent
(Hdt. 1x. lxxxi.). he gold tripod was carried off hy the
Phocians in the Sacred War (Paus. x. xiii. 5), but the
bronze pillar, eighteen feet high, of three intertwined snakes,
was removed by the Emperor Constantine to Constantinople

222

oa

BOOK I. cxxxi. 2-5

his aping of the Barbarians, gave them much ground
for suspecting that he did not want to remain an
equal in the present order of things at Sparta. And
they went back into his past and scrutinized all his
other acts, to see if perchance he had in his mode
of life departed from established customs, and they
recalled especially that he had once presumed, on
his own authority, to have inscribed on the tripod
at Delphi,! which the Hellenes dedicated as first
fruits of the spoils they had won from the Persians,
the following elegiac couplet:

«When as captain of the Hellenes he had
destroyed the Persian host, Pausanias dedicated
this memorial to Phoebus.” ?

Now the Lacedaemonians had immediately chiselled
off these verses and inscribed on the tripod by
name all the cities which had had a part in over-
throwing the Barbarians and had together set up
this offering. The act of Pausanias, however, was
felt at the time to have been a transgression, and
now that he had got into this further trouble, it
stood out more clearly than ever as having been
but a prelude to his present designs. They were
informed also that he was intriguing with the
Helots; and it was even so, for he was promising
them freedom and citizenship if they would join

-him in a revolt and help him accomplish his whole

plan. But not even then, nor relying on certain
Helots who had turned informers, did they think it
best to take harsh measures against him; they

and placed in the hippodrome, the modern Atmeidan, where
it still is. It contains the names of thirty-one Greek states
which took part in the Persian War.

2 The distich was composed by Simonides.

223

THUCYDIDES

a U .
AUTOV, YPO/LEVOL TO TPoTw wTED el@lacw és
val n 3
adas avtous, mi) Taxels elvar TEpl avdpos Yrap-
/
TlaTov avev avaudicBnTyT@V Texunpiwy PBov-
a / al
Nedoal TL avnKeotov, Tpiv ye 62) avTois, ws
\ a
AéyeTal, O péA\AWY TAS TerAeUTAias Bactrel
émusto\as mpos “AptaBalov Komeiv, avynp ’Ap-
yidlos, TALOLKA TOTE @V AUTOU Kal TLaTOTATOS
\ / , \ /
ExelvO, MNVUTIS ylyveTat, detcas Kata évOvunoly
lal XN lal
Tia 6Tt ovdcis TH TV TPO éavTOD ayyéXov
/ 0)
Tandw adixeto, Kal Tapacnunvapevos, va, Hv
ral an / a \ > FI) /
evan ths OoEns 7} Kal exeivos TL peTaypdryyat
aitnon, £1 ETLyVa, AVEL TAS ETTLTTONGS, ev als
UTovoncas TL TOLOUTOV TpocEeTTETTaAOaL Kal av-
TOV NUpEV eyyEryPa-pevov KTELVELV.
CXXXIII. Tote 8% of &bopot beiEavtos adtod
n \ / ~T
Ta ypappaTa paddov pev eTLTTEVTAV; AUTHKOOL
\ / yy — / > lal VW ,
dé BournOévtes Ett YevérOar avtov Ilaveaviouv tt
AéyovtTos, amo TapacKevns Tov avOpwrov én
/
Taivapov ikérov otyouévov Kal oxnvecapéevou
nm , / a
Sutrny dradpdypate KarvBnv, és hv tav
, U 1. , 4 \ li / e
éhopwv! évtos Twas Expuwe, kal Hlavoaviov ws
avtov éhOovtos Kal €pwT@vTos THY Tpohpacw Tis
ixetelas a000vTo TavTa capas, aitiwpévov Tov
> , , \ > a / \ S ’
avOpwirov Ta TE TEPL AVTOU ypaderTa Kal TAAX
atopaivovtos Kal’ Exactov, ws ovdéy TwTOTE
TE > a \ 4 / ,
avtov év Tais mpos Baciiéa Scaxoviats tapaBa-
x ~ / be ? yy a Rr lal la
ovto, mpoTiunlein S€ év tow Tois ToAXOIs THY
1 ray te épdpwv in the MSS.; Poppo deletes re,
224

BOOK I. cxxxu. 5—cxxxitl.

adhered to their usual method in dealing with men
of their own class—not to be hasty, in the case of a
Spartan, in adopting an irrevocable decision unless
they had indisputable proofs. But at last, as it is
said, the man who was to take to Artabazus
Pausanias’ last letter to the King, a man of Argilus
who had once been a favourite of his and had
hitherto been most loyal to him, turned informer.
For he took fright when he called to mind that no
previous messenger had ever come back again ; and
so, having made a counterfeit seal, in order that his
act might not be discovered, in case he should be
wrong in his suspicion or in case Pausanias should
ask to make some alteration in the letter, he opened
the letter and in fact found written therein, as he
suspected he should find something of the sort to
have been directed, an order for his own death.
CXXXIII. At this point the ephors, when the
man showed them the letter, were at last more
nearly convinced, but they wished besides to hear
with their own ears some word from Pausanias’ own
lips; so in accordance with a prearranged plan the
man went as a suppliant to Taenarus and put up
there a hut divided by a partition. In the inner
room of the hut he concealed some of the ephors,
and when Pausanias visited him and asked the
reason of his taking the position of a suppliant, they
heard clearly everything that was said: they heard
the man accuse Pausanias of having written the
order about himself, reveal the other items of the
plot in detail, and protest that, though he had never
yet compromised Pausanias in his errands to the
King, the special honour awarded him was no better
than that which the common run of his servants

225

THUCYDIDES

cal / F fal
Staxovwv aobavely, KaKEivoU avTad TE TAUTA
a \ nr ,
Evvoworoyobvtos Kal tepl tov TapovTos ovK
2A >? / > \ / b] fal r Al
€avtos opyifecPat, ara TiotLv éx Tod Lepod
S.66vTOs THs avactacews Kal akLodvTOS ws Ta-
: / \ \ U
yiota TopeverOat Kal pn Ta Tpaccopeva OLaKw-
ve.
> \ a ,
CXXXIV. ’Axovcavtes 88 axpiBas ToTe pev
an / > > ’ rn
amArGov ot Ebopot, BeBaiws dé 76n etdotes Ev TH
a / ] \
monet THY EVAAHWL éTroLodVTO. éyeTat 6 avTov
/ a e a \ \
péerrovta EvrArANPOncecOar ev TH 0O@, Evos peEV
a / \ , f 3
Tav épopev TO TpocwTOY TpoTLoVTOS ws ELE,
a 5 Ds 9 , ” be Ys ,’ lal
yvavar eb @ €yopel, AXAov O€ vevwaTe apavei
, ff \ N Xi
ypnoapmevou Kal OnrWcaVTOS EvVOLA, TPOS TO Lepov
GRRE S ; \
Ths Xadkoixov ywphoa: Spoum Kat mpoxatadu-
a ? p] \ \ / \
yeiv: WV O eyyds TO Téwevos. Kal és olka OU
/ A 9 “A e a 3 f ef me /
péya & Hv Tov lepod écedOwr, iva pun Ural pros
, e e \ \
TadaiTwpoin, novyatev. ol O€ TO TapauvTixa pev
A , \ \ rn r
totépnoay TH Ov@éer, peta S€ TOUTO TOD TE OLKN-
\ v by) ~ \ X , y
patos Tov dpopov adethov Kal tas Oupas évdov
\
évTa THpyNCavTes avTOV Kal atroXaBovTes Ecw
U / / U4
ar@kodouncav, tpocKkabefouevot te &€eTrodop-
fal dh a
Knoav ALlu@. Kal péAdOVTOS aUTOU aTro vyeELY
ef a / /
darep elyev ev TO olKnpatl, aicOopevor é€a-
ral ¢ nm» lj v
youow €k Tov lepov éTL EuTrvoUY dvTa, Kal éEax-
nr \ \
Gels adméOave Tapaxyphua. Kal avTov éuédAnoav
ail © \ /
pev és Tov Katdédav, ovmep Tous Kaxoupyous, éc-

1 2 rod fepov deleted by Hude, after Kriiger.

1 The temple would have been polluted if he had been
allowed to die there.

226

BOOK I. cxxxmi.—cxxxiv. 4

received—to be put to death; and they heard
Pausanias acknowledge these same things, urge the
man not to be angry with him this time, offer him
a guarantee that he might leave the temple in
safety, and finally request him to go on his way
with all speed and not frustrate the negotiations.
CXXXIV. When the ephors had heard all the
details they went back home for the present, but
inasmuch as they now had certain knowledge, they
were planning to make the arrest in the city. And
the story goes that when Pausanias was about to be
arrested in the street, he saw the face of one of the
ephors as he was approaching and realised for what
purpose he was coming, and that another ephor out
of friendship warned him by giving a covert nod,
whereupon he set off on a run for the temple of
Athena of the Brazen House, and reached the refuge
first, as the sacred precinct was near by. Entering
then into a building of no great size belonging to
the temple, that he might not suffer from exposure
under the open sky, he kept quiet. For the
moment then the ephors were distanced in their pur-
suit, but afterwards they took the roof off the build-
ing and, watching until he was inside and shutting off
his retreat, walled up the doors; then they invested
the place and starved him to death. And when he
was about to expire, imprisoned as he was in the
building,! they perceived his condition and brought
him out of the temple still breathing; but when he
was brought out he died immediately. It was their
first intention to cast him into the Caeadas,? where
2 A cleft in the mountains not far from the city, probably
near the modern Mistra, into which in early times prisoners,

in later, corpses of criminals, were thrown; cf. Strabo, vim.
v. 7; Paus. Iv. xviii. 3.

227

THUCYDIDES

/ /
Barre: éreta eof wAnciov mov KaTopvEa.
e e a ef
o 6€ Geds o ev Aerois tov te Taphov voTEpov
rn r *
€ypnoe tots Aakedatpoviors peteveyKxety ouTrEp
/ \ fal a a a
antéOave (kal viv xeitar év TO TpoTEpEeviopatt, O
an n ra Xx e ov > a xX \
ypadhn otirat Snrovot), Kai ws ayos avTois Ov TO
/ / , > > tag, oe an /
Tem paypévov v0 cwopata avd’ évos TH Xadk1oiK@
n na 4
atobobval. of dé Tolnaodmevor YadKovs avdptav-
7 id b \ / > /
tas dvo ws avti Lavoaviou avébecav.
> a \ a! al
CXXXV. Of & ’A@nvaiot, os Kal tod Geod
, lal ,
diyos Kplvavtos, avtetétatav Tois Aaxedatpoviors
éNavvely AUTO.
Tod Sé€ pundtcpod tod Iavoaviov oi Aaxedar-
/ / / x \ ’ .
povioe Tpéa Pers Te avtes Tapa ToLs AOnvatous
EvverrnTi@vTo Kal Tov OeutoToKrEéa, ws NUpLaKOV
fal / / al al
éx Tov Llavcaviou éhéyxov, nEtovy Te Tois auUTOIS
/ > & € \ / ” \
KkonatecOar avtov. ot € Terabévtes (ETUYE yap
”
@otpaxicpévos Kat éyov Slartav pev ev “Apyet,
lal \ ,
émiportav bé kal és tHv &ddnv IleXotrovynoor)
\ la 5)
méuTovol peta THY AaKedatpoviwr éToimwV OvT@V
Euvdioxerv avdpas ois eipnto ayev Smov ap
TEPLTVY WOLD.
¢ ‘ fol
CXXXVI. ‘O d€ QemictokrAHs tpoarcPopevos
, > / b] / x > fal
devyet €x LleNorrovvncou és Képxupar, ov avtav
> / , \ / ag ,
evepyéTyns. Sedsévas b€ hackovtTwv Kepxupatov

1 of. ch. cxxviii. 1.

2 evepyerns, benefactor, a title of honour bestowed upon
him, either because he took the part of the Corcyraeans ina
dispute with Corinth (Plut. 7’hem. xxiv), or because he had

228

BOOK I. cxxxiv. 4-cxxxvl. 1

they throw malefactors ; but afterwards they decided
to bury him somewhere near the city. But the god
at Delphi afterwards warned the Lacedaemonians by
oracle to transfer him to the place where he died
(and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct,
as an inscription on some columus testifies), and that
they should recompense Athena of the Brazen House
with two bodies in place of one, since their act
had brought a curse upon them. So they had two
bronze statues made and dedicated them to Athena
to be a substitute for Pausanias.

CXXXV. Thus it was that the Athenians,! in re-
sponse to the demand of the Lacedaemonians,
ordered them to drive out the curse of Taenarus,
seeing that the god also declared it to be a curse.

But when Pausanias was thus convicted of treason-
able dealings with Persia, the Lacedaemonians sent
envoys to the Athenians and accused Themistocles
also of complicity in the plot, in accordance with
discoveries they had made in connection with their
investigation about Pausanias; and they demanded
that he be punished in the same way. The Athenians
agreed, but as he happened to have been ostracised,
and, though living in Argos, frequently visited other
parts of the Peloponnesus also, they sent some men,
accompanied by the Lacedaemonians (who were
quite ready to join in the pursuit), with instructions
to arrest him wherever they chanced to find him.

CXXXVI. But Themistocles, forewarned, fled
from the Peloponnesus to Corcyra, since he was a
benefactor? of the Corcyraeans. As they, however,
alleged that they were afraid to keep him and thus
excused their absence (Schol.) in the Persian war (Hdt. vir.
exv). Themistocles relied upon the right of asylum, which

had doubtless been decreed him as evepyérns.
229

THUCYDIDES

éyew avtov wote Aakedarpoviors Kal "A@nvaiois
atexyGécbat, Siaxouifetar bm attav és Thy
Hymrespov THY KaTAaVTLKpU. Kab St@xopevos vTrO
TOV TPOTTETAY MEVOV KaTa TUOTLY 7 “mMpotn,
avayKabeTal KATA TL dm opov Tapa "Abpntov TOV
Mondooc av Bacvréa ova, avUT® Ov pidrov KaTa-
doar. Kal O per ovK eTUYEV errdmua, 6 0 é THs
yuvarKkos iKéTnS yevouevos OtddoKeTar tT? auras
Tov Taida opp AaBov cabélec bar em THD
éotiav. Kal eXGovTos ov TOND UVoTEpov rod
“Adprjrov Ondot Te OS éore Kal ovx akLot, el Tt
apa autos avTelrev avTo ‘AOnvaiov Soper,
devyovta TiwpetcOa. Kal yap av um exelvou
TOAXN@ aaGevertépov? ev TO Tapovre KAKOS Ta-
oXEW, yevvatov oé elvat Tous onotous aro TOD
icou TYpopeta Oar. Kal apa autos ev éxelva
Vpelas TWOS Kal OvK és TO coma o@cerdar é évav-
Te@O var, exelvov é av, et éxdoin auTov (etre
id’ av «al ep @® OvoKeTat), cwTynpias av Tijs
puxns amooTephaat. bis on
CXXXVIL. O 6é dxovoas dvictnat Te avrov
pLeTa TOU éavTod viéos (@omep Kal éy@v avrov®
exablelero, kal fey lo Tov HY (KEéTEVLA TOUTO) Kal
UaTEepovy ov TOAA@® Tots Te Aakedatpoviors Kal
"A@nvaiots éXGotot Kal wodAAa ElTOovoW ovK
EKOLO@TLY, AAW dmroaT EXEL Boudouevov ws Bact-
hea Topevijvat éml TV eT épay Gddaccay meoH
és Hvdévav tyv ’AdeEdvdpov.j év 7 oAKdbos TUY@V

1 The reading of nearly all the better MSS.; Hude and
many other recent editors adopt the correction of Graevianus
aabevéotepos.

2 Hude deletes, as not read by the Scholiast.

230

BOOK I. cxxxvi. 1—-cxxxvil. 2

incur the enmity of the lLacedaemonians and
Athenians, he was conveyed by them across to the
mainland opposite. And being pursued by those
who had been appointed to the task, according as
they could learn the course he was taking, he was
forced in some strait to take lodging with Admetus,
king of the Molossians, who was not friendly to him.
Admetus happened not to be at home, but Themis-
tocles approached his wife as a suppliant and was
instructed by her to take their child and_ seat
himself on the hearth. And when Admetus re-
turned after a short time, Themistocles declared
who he was and urged that, if he had ever opposed
any request Admetus had made to the Athenians,
he ought not to take vengeance on him when a
fugitive ; for in his present plight he might come to
harm at the hands of a far weaker man _ than
Admetus, whereas the noble thing to do was to
take vengeance on fair terms upon equals. Besides,
he added, he had opposed Admetus merely in the
matter of a petition and not of his personal safety ;
whereas Admetus, if he gave him up to his pursuers
(telling who these were and what the charge against
him), would deprive him of the salvation of his life.
CXXXVII. Admetus, hearing this, raised him up,
together with his own son, even as he still sat
holding him, this being the most potent form of
supplication. And when, not long afterwards, the
Athenians and Lacedaemonians came and made
urgent demands for him, Admetus would not give
him up, but, since he wished to go to the King, gave
him an escort overland to Pydna on the other?
sea, the capital of Alexander.?, There he found a

1 The Aegean, 2 King of Macedonia.

231

THUCYDIDES

> / a ey) / \ b] \ ,
avayonevys é€7 Iwvias Kal émiBas Katadépetar
a b] X42 fa} , / a >
yemwave és TO AOnvatwyv otpatotedov 6 éroXt-
/ / \ 3 X ] \ rn ’ rf ,
opxet Nafov. Kal (qv yap ayvas Tots €v TH vn)
, , A / ov > \ \ xa
Seicas Ppave. TS vauKAnpw OoTis éotl Kal Sv &
/ \ > \ , > / yv > a A
gevyel, KAL EL LN TwWOEL AUTOV, EPH EpEly OTL
/ \ > \ BUA \ WV. v2 /
Xpnwact TevoGeis avTOV ayer’ THY d€ acdareLar

/ a > fol \ lal
eivar pndéva éexBivar ex THS vews péexXpe Tods
/ > a
yévntar weiPonévw & avtT@ Kapiy atopuvncecbau
¢ \ / a “

Kat agiav. o O€ vavKEAnpos Tolel TE TaUTAa Kal
4 , 7 \ rn
ATOTANEVTAS NUEPAY KAL VUKTA UTEP TOU oTpAaTO-
/ ec > a > v \ e
méoouv vaTepov adixvettar és “Edecov, Kal o

a relgug /

OewictoxAs exeivov te eVepdtevce YpNudTov
, 5 \ 3 a e/ 4 b a
doce (HAGE yap avT@® vaTepov Ex te ’AOnvaev

tal / \ wv €
Tapa Tav pirwv cai €€ “Apyous & vmeEdxeTo),
Kal peta Tov KaTw Ilepa@y Tivos Tmropevbels avw
/ \ / >
éorméuTrer ypdupata tmpos Baoihéa “AptaképEnv
tov Zépfou vewoti Bacidevovta. édyrov be 7
Loo «<Q wile \ yw \
ypacdi) OTe EMLOTOKANS KO TAPA GE, OS>KAKA
val € / i .
pev wretota EXXAjvev eipyacmarctov vpéTepov
t \ \ s 2
olkov, Gaov Ypovoyv Tov cov TaTépa eTrlovTa euol
Sd > , \ 8 ” sp ~Ws /
avaykn nuvvouny, ToAV €TL TAElL@ ayaba,
> \ b] tal > al A b] / > , \ >
émevon €v TO acharel pev Eepmol, exeiv@ Sé év
> / , e. 2 XY Def /
CTIKLVOUV@ TANLY 9 ATTOKOULO? eylyvEeTO. Kai [LOL
/ / / cal
evepyecia odetreTat (ypawas tiv Te éx Ladapivos
n / na
TpoayyerAclv THS avaywpnoews Kal THY TOV
= A al / , ’
yehupav, ty v~revd@s mpocetroincato, tote du

232

i A LAI

BOOK I. cxxxvi. 2-4

merchant vessel putting off for Ionia, and going on
board was driven by a storm to the station of the
Athenian fleet which was blockading Naxos. Themis-
tocles became afraid and told the captain who he
was (for he was unknown to those on board) and
why he was in flight, adding that if he did not
save him he would tell the Athenians that he
had been bribed to give him passage; their only
chance for safety, he explained, was that no one
be allowed to leave the ship until the voyage
could be resumed, and he promised that if he com-
plied with his request he would make a fitting
return for the favour. The captain did as he was
bidden, and after riding out>the gale for a day and
a night just outside the Athenian station, duly
arrived at Ephesus. And Themistocles rewarded
him handsomely with a gift of money (for he soon
received from his friends in Athens and from Argos
the funds which he had deposited for safekeeping) ;
then proceeding into the interior with one of the
Persians who dwelt on the coast, he sent on a letter
to King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes, who had lately
come to the throne. And the letter ran as follows:
“1, Themistocles, am come to you, who of all Hel-
lenes did your house most harm so long as your
father assailed me and I was constrained to defend
myself, but still greater good by far when, his
retreat being in progress, I was in security and he
in dire peril. And there is a kindness due to me
(here he related the timely warning to retreat given
at Salamis, and the failure of the Hellenic fleet to
destroy the bridges at that time,! which he falsely

1 For Themistocles’ advice given to Xerxes to retreat before

it was too late and his claim about the non-destruction of
the bridges, ¢f. Hdt. vim. cviii-cx.
233

VOL, I. I

THUCYDIDES

> \ > / \ le) v /
avTov ov diddAvowV), Kai vdv Eywv oe peydra
\ ca / fal ¢
ayada dpacat Taperpt StwKopevos UTO TAY EXX1-
\ \ \ / / >]
vov dia THY anv diriav. PBovropuar & éviavTov
> \ F / \ oe. ef an ”
ETLOY@V AUTOS ToL TEPL OV Kw SnrAOCAL.
CXXXVIII. Baoirevs 5é, ws Aévyetar, eOav-
/ > an \ / \ > / lal
pacé Te avTov THY didvolay Kal éxédeveEe TroLety
A e ie ae lal Ud a > f n
oUTw. 00 év TO Xpov@ bv erécye THs Te Ilep-
/ / is > 7 , \ lal
gidos yAooons Goa édvvato KaTevonoe Kal ToV
’ / ral , > f \ \
eTLTNOEVLATOY THS Kwpas’ adtKopevos b€ peta
/ > rn
Tov évlauTOY ylyveTal Tap aUvT@ péyas Kal bcos
c \
ovdeis Tw EXXAjvav oid TE THY TpoUTTapYoUcaY
n lo) ,
akiwow Kat ToD “EXAnuxod érrida fv vretiber
b] ~ / / \ ’ \ a lal
avT® dovrwcev, padiata S€ amo TOD Teipav
\ € a
did0us Evvetos haivecOatr. tv yap 0 OemotokdAs,
BeBavotata 61 hdvcews icydy dnrwoas, Kal dia-
/ ’ > ‘," lal e / ”
hepovTws TL €s avTO maddov ETepov akios Pav-
4 >? / X / \ BA »' >
pdoat olxeia yap Evvécer Kal ovTEe Tpopalay és
> \ Oe vw? ] 2 , yA r ra
avTny ovdev ovT eripabwv, TOv Te Tapaxphya
’ > / cal / , ‘\ , lal
bu éXLaytoTns BovArs Kpatiatos YVOU@V) Kai TOV
f “A a / ‘
MEANOVTOY (ETL TAELTTOV TOD YEVNTOMEVOV )APLOTOS
> HPAI a \ \ a y \
ELKAOTIS® KAL A@ MEV META “YELPAS EYOL, KAL
b) / yy = % a ” cal
éEnynoacbat olds te, ay 8 atrerpos ein, Kpivat

. aA > > / , cae. KR a >
LEAVWS OUK aTNAAAKTO, nS Labrie = a EtVOV 7) XElLpOv €V

1 Or, as some take it, ‘‘ character.” cf. Plut. Them. xxviii
rd ppdyvnua Kal Thy TéApuay avtod, the boldness of his spirit.

234

BOOK I. cxxxvit. 4-cxxxvill. 3

claimed to have been due to his own efforts), and
now I am here, having it in my power to do you
great good, being pursued by the Hellenes on
account of my friendship to you; and my desire is
to wait a year and then in person explain to you
that for which J am come.”

CXXXVIII. The King, it is said, marvelled at
his purpose! and bade him do as he desired. And
Themistocles, in the interval of his waiting, made
himself acquainted, as far as he could, with the
Persian language and with the customs of the
country; but when the year was ended he came to
the King and became more influential with him
than any of the Hellenes ever had been before, both
because of the reputation he already enjoyed and
of the hope which he kept suggesting to him that
he would make all Hellas subject to him, but
most of all in consequence of the insight he mani-
fested, of which he gave repeated proofs. [or
indeed Themistocles was a man who had most con-
vincingly demonstrated the strength of his natural
sagacity, and was in the very highest degree worthy
of admiration in that respect. For by native in-
sight, not reinforced by earlier or later study,’ he
was ‘beyond other men, with the briefest delibera--
tion, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present
and wise in forecasting what would happen in the
most distant future. Moreover, he had the ability
to expound to others the enterprises he had in
hand, and on those which he had not yet essayed
he could yet without fail pass competent judgment ;
and he could most clearly foresee the issue for better

2 i.e. without knowledge acquired either before or after
the occasion for action had arisen.

235

THUCYDIDES

vo ao , 4 \ \ /
T@ abavel étt Tpoewpa paddiota. Kal TO Edwrrav
> val / \ / , \ ,
eitretv hucews pev Svvapet, wedéTHs O€ BpayuTnte
Kpatiatos 61) ovTos avTocyedidfeww ta SéovTa
eryéveTO.
a \ ,
Noonoas 6€ TedkevTa Tov Piov: Réyouvar Fé
4 cal
Tives Kal éxovctov dapudKkw arobavetvy avTov,
> / / ie > / nr a
aovUvaToV voulcavTa eivat émiTEeXNecar Bacirel a
e / a \ s > n> ,
UmEecXeTo. pyyetov pev OvY avTOU eV a Ear.
> A “~ A nr nr
éott Th Aciavh év TH ayopa: TavTns yap Apye
A , U /, > fal /
THs xX@pas, Sovtos Bacir€ws avT@ Maryvyoiav
f / ~
ev apTov, ) TMpocépepe TWEVTHNKOVTA TadaVTA TOD
fal \
éviavtov, Aduwaxov 6€ oivoy (éddxer yap ToXv-
, a , v3 a \ v
olvoTatov Ta@v ToTe elvat), Mvovvta Sé dor.
a nm A e
ta 6€ dcTa hace KopicOivat avTod ot Tpoon-
, cad
KOVTES OlKabE KEAEVTAVTOS EKElvVoU Kal TEOHVAaL
/ nr fol \ a
xkpvhda “AOnvaiwy év tH “AtTiKh: ov yap é&nv
, 5 | t. ’ \ / / \ \
Ganrrew! ws eri mpodocia devyovtos. Ta pev
\ / \ / \
kata Ilavoaviav tov Aaxkedatpovov Kat Oepi-
otoxréa Tov A@nvaiov AaumpoTatous yevopévous
fal Be Ae \ ¢ / iA bp /
Tav Kad éavtovs EXAnvwrv ovT@s ETENEUTNCED.
CXXXIX. Aaxedarpovior 6é él pév THS Tpo-
, an /

Ts wpecBelas Tovavta emétatday Te Kai avTe-
4 a lal an /
KerevcOnoayv tmepl TOV evayav THS é€AaoEws’

lal \? , ,
vatepov 6€ hortavtes Tapa AOnvatous Ilotedatas
“4

Te atvraviotacbar éxéXevov Kal Ai’'yivay avTovomov
> / \ / / / ‘72 /
adtévat, kal wadLoTa ye TavT@V Kal evdnroTaTa

\ / / a
mpovreyov TO Tept Meyapéwv Wh pio pa KaberXovat

Hude deletes, after Cobet.

236 :

BOOK I. cxxxviit. 3—-cxxx1x. 1

or worse that lay in the still dim future. To sum
up all in a word, by force of native sagacity and
because of the brief preparation he required, he
proved himself the ablest of all men instantly to
hit upon the right expedient.

He died a natural death, an illness taking him off,
though some say that he put an end to his own life
by poison! when he realised it to be impossible to
fulfil his promises to the King. There is a monu-
ment to him at Magnesia in Asia, in the market-
place; for he was governor of this country, the
King having given him, for bread, Magnesia, which
brought in a revenue of fifty talents a year, for wine,
Lampsacus, reputed to be the best wine country of
all places at that time; and Myus for meat. But
his bones, his relations say, were fetched home by
his own command and buried in Attica unknown to
the Athenians; for it was not lawful to bury him
there, as he had been banished for treason. Such
was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and of

Themistocles the Athenian, the most distinguished

of the Hellenes of their time.

CXXXIX. The Lacedaemonians? then had on
the occasion of their first embassy directed the
Athenians, and received a counter demand from them,
to take such measures about the expulsion of the
accursed. Later, however, they frequently repaired
to Athens and bade them withdraw from Potidaea,
and give Aegina its independence, and above all
they declared in the plainest terms that they could
avoid war only by rescinding the decree about the

1 For the various accounts, see Cie. Brut. xi. 43; Plut.
Them. xxxi.; Diod. xi. 58; Ar. Yq. 83.
2 Taking up the narrative from ch, exxvi.

237

THUCYDIDES

pn av yiyver Pan TONE HOV, év o elpnro avTous pay
xphoGar Tots Apert Tots €v mH ‘AOnvaiwv apxin
pade TH “ATTURA ayopg. | of 8 "A@nvaiot ovte
TaAXA UITHKOVOY OTE TO Wihdiopa KaBy pour
émiKaovyTes éemepyactav Meyapebou THS YS THS
lepas Kab THS aopiarou Kal avépar odo bmroboxny
TOV adioTapevor. TENS dé ah Ko Weveov TOV
TeAEUTAL@Y Tpea Bear € ex Aaxkedaipovos, ‘Papdiou
te Kal MeXnoinmovu Kal 'Aynodvdpou, Kal reyov-
T@Y AAO pEV OVdEV WY T poTEpov el@Berar,” aura
be TAOE OTL “Aaxedarpoveor Bovrovrat THY epnuny
elval, evn) & adv, eb Tous “EXAjvas avTOVOLOUS
adeite, Tomjocavtes exxrnaiav ot “A@nvaio: yvo-
pas opiow avtois mpouTifecay, kal edoxes dtraké
Tepl aTavT@v BovArevoapevous aToxpivacbau,
Kal Ta pLovTes QNAOL TE Tool Edeyov; en ap
hotepa yoyvopevor Tas yropats Kal as Xp)
Tone pel Kal @S pn ep 0OLov elvat TO Whdiopa
eipnvns, anrra caver, Kab rapeav Tlepexdijs
) Bavbinrouv, avnp Kat exelvov TOV Ypovoyv Tpa-
TOS "AOnvaior, éyery Te Kal Tpdooew SvvaTo-
TATOS, Tapnvelr TOLAOE.
CXL. “Tis ev yvouns, ® “A@nvaior, alel THs
avTns EXO MAL tz) ele Tedorovynaioss, KaLTrEp
elOws Tous avOpwrrous ov TH auth opyn avaredo-
pévous TE ToNEpely Kal év 7@ Epy@ Tpaocovtas,
mpos € Tas Evypopas Kal Tas yvomas TpETTOME-

1 cidbeoay deleted by Hude.

1 See ch. lxvii. 4, and the references in Ar. Acharn. 520-3
and 533 f. The date of the decree must have been near the
outbreak of the war (432).

238

a ——

BOOK I. cxxxix. 1-cxL. 1

Megarians,! in which they were forbidden to use any
of the ports in the Athenian empire or even the
Athenian market. But the Athenians would pay no
heed to their other demands and declined to rescind
the decree, charging the Megarians with encroach-
ment upon the sacred land and the border-land not
marked by boundaries,? and also with harbouring
runaway slaves. But at last a final embassy came
from Lacedaemon, consisting of Ramphias, Mele-
sippus, and Agesander, who said nothing of the
demands they had hitherto been wont to make,

_but only this: “ ‘The Lacedaemonians desire peace, |

and there will be peace if you give the Hellenes’

\ their independence.’’ Whereupon the Athenians

called an assembly and gave their citizens an oppor-
tunity to express their opinions ; and it was resolved
to consider the whole question and then give their
answer once for all. And many others came forward
and spoke, in support of both sides of the question,
some urging that war was necessary, others that the
decree should not stand in the way—of peace, but
should be rescinded; and finally /Pericl ee of
Xanthippus, the foremost man of the Athenians at
that time, wielding greatest influence both in speech
and in action, came forward and advised them as
follows :

CXL. “I hold, men of Athens, to the same judg-
ment as always, that we must not yield to the Pelo-
ponnesians, although I know that men are not as a
rule moved by the same spirit when they are actually
engaged in war as when they are being persuaded
to undertake it, but change their judgments in

2 The reference is, first, to the tillage of land dedicated to

the Eleusinian goddesses ; ; second, to land still in dispute
between Athens and Megara, and therefore unmarked.
239

THUCYDIDES

c A \ a c ral /
vous. op@ 5€ Kal viv ouoia Kal mapatdyjota
EvuBovrevtéa pot dvta, Kal Tos avatrerOopévous
Uuav Sixaia Tois Kown SoEacw, hv apa TL «al
sharroueba, BonGeiv, 7 wndé katopBovvtas Ths
Evvécews petatroeicOat. evdéxyeTar yap Tas
Evpdopas Tav TpayuaTwov ovy jaocov apabas

an / A
Yophcar » Kal tas diavolas Tod avOpwirou: bu’
ee \ \ uA e x \ , fol
dep Kal THY TUXYNY, Oca av Tapa Aoyov Evy PH,
elwOapev aitracOat.
/ , a

“ Aaxedatpovioe 5€ mpoTtepov te SHroL Hoav
éruBovrevovTes Huiy Kal VOY OvY HKLOTa. e€ipn-
pévov yap Sixas pev Tov dtagpopa@v adrdnXoLs

/ \ / 4 2748 / a vy

diddvar nal déyerOar, Eyew O€ Exatépous & Exouer,
OUTE avTOL Sixas TH NTNHTAV OUTE HuaV didovTMY
déyovtat, Bovrovtas 5é€ TOAEUWM MadXAOV 7 AOYyoLS
Ta eyxAnuata SsarvecOa, Kal éritdooovtes HON
Kal ovKéTL aitt@pmevor Tapecow. Lloterdaias Te

\ > , , \ oy abe,
yap anaviotacGat Kedevoucr Kal Aiyivay adto-

\
vouov adiéevar Kai TO Meyapéwy Widiowa xabai-
peiv' of S€ tTedXevTaior olde HKovTes Kal Tods
“EAAnvas mpoayopedovow adtovduous adzévat.
c lal / / .
tpav Oé pnoeis vouion Tept Bpaxéos av wodeuelp,
, \
ei TO Meyapéwy Wadiopa pn xabérorper, (Omrep
uaddiota Tpovyovtar eb KabapeBein wn av yi-
\ , “7 i he oer 9 ahd wy ee
yvecOar Tov TodrEpoV, unde év buiv avTols aitiay
e , e \ a \ > / \ \
itonrimnaGe ws Sia pKpov ETOAEUHTATE. TO yap
la lal a »” \

Bpaxv tt TovTO Tacav Upav eye THY BeBaiwouw
240

BOOK I, cxt. 1-5

accordance with events. And now also I see that
I must give you the same or nearly the same advice
as in the past, and I demand that those of you who
are persuaded by what I shall say shall support
the common decisions, even if we should in any way
fail, or else, in case of success, claim no share
in the good judgment shown. For it is just as
possible for the course of events to move perversely
as for the plans of men; and it is for that very
reason that we commonly lay upon fortune the blame
for whatever turns out contrary to our calculations.
“As for the Lacedaemonians, it was perfectly
clear before that they were plotting against us, and
it is now clearer than ever. For whereas it was
expressly stipulated that we should submit our
differences to arbitration, each side meanwhile
keeping what it had, they have never yet asked for
arbitration themselves nor do~they~accept—it.now
when we make the-offer|What they want is to
redress their grievances by war rather than by
eee on fandl they are here dictating already and
no longer expostulating. For they order us to raise
the siege of Potidaea, restore the independence of
Aegina, and rescind the Megarian decree ; and these
men that are just come boldly proclaim that we must
give all the Hellenes also their independence. But
“Tetno one of you think that we shall be going to
war for a trifling matter, if we should refuse to
rescind the Megarian decree—the thing they espe-
cially insist upon, saying that there will be no war
if it is rescinded—and do not let there remain
in your minds any self-reproach that it was a
small matter for which you went to war. For
this trifling thing involves nothing less than the

241

THUCYDIDES

a A , e > / \
Kal Telpav THS yvopuns, ois eb Evyywpnoere, Kal
ay a 2X 2 s re /
Gro te petlov evOds eritaxOncecbe ws hoo
a / 7 / A
Kal ToT wraKkovcayTes\, aTicxXupLcauevor Sé
cadeés av KaTacTHcalTe avTois ato TOV iaov
al a / / \
buiv padrov mpocdépecGar. CXLI. airoler 6
/ XA e 4 , a xX >
dtavonOnte 7 UTaKovew Tpivy TL PrAaRHVaL,H e
y val 3
ToNEunoouev, WoTTEP Ewouye Apmewvov SoKeEl Eivat,
Kal él weyddy Kal ért Bpayela opoiws tpodacer
i él peyddy paxela dpoiws mp
\ \ [ ° a /
un el€ovtes unde Edv PoB@ eovtes a KexTijpeVa.
\ \ 7 / ,
THY yap avTny Stvatat SovAwoW 1 TE peyloTn
\ lal ¢€ ,
Kal ) édX\ayloTn Sixaiwots aTO THY Opolwy Tpo
a A /
diens Tols wéXNas ETLTATT OMEN.
«TA Se n rd ne FS Salt Ye ; e
a 6€ TOU TOAE“OU Kal TOV ExaTépols UTTAp-
/ e > > / / ial >
YovT@V ws ovK aaOevéctepa EEopev yvaTe Kal
ry / /
éxaoTov akovovtTes. avToupyol Te yap eiot LleXo-
/ \ ” > / | el, b] n / /
Tovynolo. Kal ote idla ovT ev KoLWme YpHnMaTAa
, / /
€oTlv, Teta Ypoviwy Tokeuwy Kal SLaTrovTiMV
¥ \ \ / > \ b] ’ > / c \
are:pot Ova TO BpaxXéws\avtTol én’ adANAOUS VTTO
/ £ fa) a
mevias émipépelv. Kal ol ToLovTOL OUTE VadS TAN-
val » \
poov ovte melas oTpatias ToAAdKIS éxTréwrreLy
is A /
Sivavtat, ato THV idiwv Te Gua aTOVTES Kal ATO
TOV avT@V SaTavarvTes Kal TpocéTt Kal Oadacons
, /
eipyouevory ai O€ TepLovalat Tovs TrOAEém“ous
a dR e , , qty , ,
padXov 7 ai Biator Eopopai aveyovoty. Twopmact
Te €TOLMOTEpoL of avTovpyol TeV avOpwTer 1)

1 4.¢. by the superior navy of the Athenians,

242

BOOK I. cx1. 5—cxut. 5

vindication and proof of your political conviction.
If you yield this point to them you will imme-
diately be ordered to yield another and greater

one, as having conceded this first point through |

fear; whereas by a downright refusal you will give
them clearly to understand that they must be more
disposed to deal with you on terms of equality.
CXLI. So make up your minds, heré-andnow,
either to take their orders before any damage is
done you, or, if we mean to go to war,—as to me
at least seems best—do so with the determination
not to yield on any pretext, great or small, and not
to hold our possessions in fear. For it means en-
slavement just the same when either the greatest or
the least_claim is imposed by equals upon their
neighbours, not by an appeal to justice but by-
dictation.

“ But as regards the war and the resources of
each side, make up your minds, as you hear the
particulars frem~me, that our position will be fully
as powerful ras het For the Peloponnesians till
A aa eir own hands; they have no
wealth, either private or public; besides, they have
had no experience in protracted or transmarine wars,
because, owing to their peverty, they only wage brief
campaigns separately against one another. Now
people so poor cannot be manning ships or frequently
sending out expeditions by land, since they would
thus have to be away from their properties and at
the same time would be drawing upon their own
resources for their expenses, and, besides, are barred
from the sea as well.! Again, it is accumulated
wealth, and not taxés levied under stress, that
sustains wars. Men, too, who till their own—lands

243

,

THUCYDIDES

/ a \ \ lal
XPNHMaclL Toepety, TO ev TLaTOV EXOVTES EX TOV
Kivduvev Kav TrepiyevécOat, TO dé ov BEBatov pH
ov Tpoavadwcev, a\rNws TE Kav Tapa Sokar,

, € / al
Omep €ikOs, 0 TOAEMOS AUTOIS pNKUYNTaL. payn
\ \ an \ ¢ d \
pev yap wid tmpos aravtas “EXdnvas dvvarot
,
TleXorovynorot Kat ot EVupayor avticyewv, Tode-
peiv 5é wy pos omolay avTiTapacKeviy advvaTot,
¢ / , a ,
Stav pnte BovreuTnpio evil Xpwpevor Tapayphua

b] / b] a 4 > , v
TL o€€ws €miTeh@or Tavtes Te Laowndor ovTes

\ > e / x, 5.43) 8 \ ¢ ‘
Kal ovxX ouodvro To ep éavtov Exactos omevon,
€£ wy direl pndev éreteres yiyverOar. Kai yap

e \ e / és , /

of wev WS UaLoTA TLLwpHoacOat TLva BovdovTat,
\ a a

of 5é ws HKLcTa Ta OiKela POEipat. ypoviol Te
a , lal fal

Evviovtes ev Bpayel wév popiw ckoTIOvGL TL TOY

Kowwa@v, TO S€ TACO TA OiKELA TPaoOVGl, Kal

¢ > \ \ e a > , v

ékacTos ov Tapa THY éavTOD apéderav oleTaL
/ a

BrawWew, pérewv O€ Tie Kal GAXdX@ UTep EavToOd

- a 4 an > a e \ e / >O7
TL Tpoidely, MATE TH AUTO VTO atdvtwv idia
/
Sofdcpatt NavOaverw Td Kotvov aOpoov POetpo-
a4 / a a

pevov. CXLIT. péyiotov 5é, TH THY YpnuaTov

, / ef an > \ ,

oTdvel KWAVTOVTAL, OTaV TYONH avTa TropLComevot
a) /
StapéAXwow: ToD SE TONEWOU OL KaLpol Ov pE-
veTOl.
,
“Kal pny ovo ) émeteiytors obé TO vauTiKoY

244

BOOK I. cx. 5—cxiu. 2

are_more ready. to_ risk their lives in war than gor
their _property ; for they have confident hope of
surviving the perils, but no assurance that they will
not use up their funds before the war ends, espe-
cially if, as may well happen, the war is protracted
beyond expectation. Indeed, although in a single
battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are strong
enough to withstand all the Hellenes, yet they are
not strong enough to maintain a war against a
military organisation which is so different from
theirs,-seéing that they | have no single general
assembly, and therefore cannot “promptly put into
effect any emergency measure; and as they all
have an equal vote and are of different races they
each strive to advance their own interests. In suc
circumstances it usually happens that nothing is
accomplished, And indeed it could scarcely be
otherwise, for what some of them want is the
greatest possible vengeance upon a particular enemy,
others the least possible damage to their own pro-
perty. And when after many delays they do meet,
they give but a scant portion of their time to the
consideration of any matter of common concern, but
the larger portion to their own individual interests.
And each one thinks no harm will come from his
own negligence, but that it is the business of some-
body else to be provident on his behalf; and so,
through all separately cherishing the same fancy,
universal ruin comes unperceived upon the whole
body. CXLII. And what is most important, they
will be hampered by scarcity of money, seeing that
providing it slowly they are subject to delays; but
the opportunities of war wait for no man.

* Moreover, neither the planting of forts in our

245

THUCYDIDES

al ” a A, A \ est \
avTav aktov poBnOjvar. THv pev yap KaNeTrov
\ / ae , ‘ ‘
kal €v elpynvyn ToL avTLTAdOY katackevackabat,
9 \ P /
7) Tov On €v ToAE“ia TE Kal OVX NoToV ExElVvoLs
na / ft ? > /
HOV avTeTiTEeTELYLapMevav: hpovptov & et TroL7-
a an /

CovTal, THS pev yns BNaTTOLEY AV TL Epos KaTA-
al / ,
Spomats Kal avtoporiats, ov mévToL tKavoV ye

/ ba n 7
€oTat emiteryifey TE KwWAVELY NUaS TAEVTAVTAS
a / , Ga > , rn
€v Th exelywY Kal, NTEp LaxVopEV, Tals vavalv
/ , \ a la n
auvverOat. mA€ov yap Suws nueis Evouev TOD
\ a a a / ? a
KaTa yhv €K TOU VaUTLKOD EpTreplas 1) ‘KELVOL
a b] \ 4 n
€k TOD KAT HrrEelpov és TA vauTLKa. TO b€ THS
, b] / / \ Pee / b] al
daracons ériatimovas yevéeo Oat ov padtws avTots
\ \ ad a
TPOTYEVITETAL. OVOE YAP Upsets, MEAET@VTES AUTO
a an / la)
evOvds amo Tov Mndixar, é€etpyacbé Tw Tas 87
7 \ \ > / \ /
avopes yewpyot kal ot Oardaotol, Kal tpocéte
an / \ > fal
ovoe pmereTHoal eacomevoe Sia TO VP Hu@V TrOA-
Aais vavaly aie Epoppetabar, (aEvov av TL Speer;
s pyeta Bar, ( Spader;
\ \ \ a af. 2 WE x
TMpos pev yap odtyas époppovaas Kav Staxw-
/ / \ b] , /
duvevoctav TANOE THv apaliav Opacivvortes,
a \ > / e 7 hd gh a
TodAais dé eipyouevor naovxdcovel, Kal (ev TO
pn pedeT@vTs\ akvveT@tepor Ecovtat Kat dv avTo
> / < \ \ \ /
Kal OKxVNpoTepol. TO O€ vauTLKoY TéyVNs éoTiD,
ef \ Ae \ > BJ / (24 /
a@omTEep Kal AdXO TL, Kal OVK EVOEYETAL, STAY TUYn,
/ a \ a
éx Tapépyou pedeTacbar, ara padAXov pnNdev
éxelv@ Tapepyov Adro yiyvec Oat.

* Cf. Ci, CRMs Be

246

BOOK I. cx. 2-9

territory! need cause us to be afraid, nor yet their
navy. For as regards the first, it is a difficult matter
even in time of peace to construct here a city that
will be a match for ours, to say nothing of doing
this in a hostile country and at a time when we
have fortifications quite as strong to oppose them.
But suppose they do establish a fort ; although they
might injure a part of our territory by making raids
and receiving our deserters, yet that will not be
sufficient to prevent us from sailing to their land and
building forts there, or making reprisals with our.
fleet, wherein our strength lies. For we have gained
more experience of operations on land from our
career on the sea than they of naval operations
from their career on land. As for their acquiring
the art of seamanship, that is an advantage they
will not easily secure;-. for even you, who began
practising it immediately after the Persian war,
have not yet brought it to perfection. How
then could men do anything worth mention who
are tillers of the soil and not seamen, especially
since they will not even be permitted to practise,
because we shall always be lying in wait for them
with a large fleet? For if they had to cope with
only a small fleet lying in wait, they might perhaps
risk an engagement, in ‘their ignoranté” getting
courage from their mere numbers; but if their way
is blocked by a large fleet, they will remain inactive,
their skill will deteriorate through lack of practice,
and that in itself‘ will make them more timid.
Seamanship, like any other skill, is a matter of art,
and practice in it may not be left to odd times, as
a by-work; on the contrary, no other pursuit may
be carried on as a by-work to it.

247

THUCYDIDES

CXLIII. “EY te nal xkwyoavtes tov ‘Odvp-
miacw % Aedhois ypnuatev picO@ pelfove tret-
pevto Huav uToAaBelv Tors Eévous TOV vauTOD,
un OVT@V meV HuOV avTiTadwD, ésBavT@V avTOV
Te Kal TOV peToikwv Sewov av hv: viv Sé TOE TE
imdpyer Kal, Oep Kpatictov, KUBEepyyntas EXoMeEV
moXitas Kal Ti adAnv UTnpeciav Tretiovs Kal
Gpeivous 4 &taca » Addn “EXAds. Kal él TO
KivOvv@ ovoels av déEarto Tov Eévav THv TE avTOU
devyew Kal peta THS Hocovos awa éerTridos OALywv
Huepav Evexa peyddov pucbod Socews €xelvots
EvvayovifecOat.

“Kal ta pev LleXotovyncioy Eéuorye ToravTa
kal wapatAnowa Soxet eivar, Ta Sé HuéTEpa
TOUT@Y TE MUTE éxetvoLs eueurpauny amnrArAdXOat
Kal a\XNa OK aro TOD loov peyadra Eye. NV TE
emi tiv yopav huav meh iwow, Huets emt THY
éxelvov TrEevcovpEOa, Kal OvKETL ex TOU OpotoU
€xtat IleXotovvijcouv te pwépos Te TUNOAVaL Kat
tnv “Attikny atacav' of pev yap ovy é€ovcw
adrAnv avtiraBelv apayel, hpiv & éots yh TOY
Kal €v vncols Kal KaT irreLpov" pméeya yap TO THS
Oaracons Kpatos. oKxéyacbe Oé& ef yap mer
VnoL@TaL, TivEes AV GANTTOTEPOL Hoav; Kab VvoV
ypn (OTe éyyvtata TovTov SiavonGévtas THY peV
yi Kal olkias adeivat, Ths b€ Pardoons Kai

1 The mercenaries drawn from the states of the Athenian
confederacy ; no one of those who had taken part with the
Peloponnesians would be allowed to return to his native city.

248

BOOK I. cxum. 1-5

CXLIII. “ Then again, if they should lay hands
upon the money at Olympia or Delphi and try to
entice away the mercenaries among our sailors by the
inducement of higher pay, that indeed might be a
dangerous matter if we were not a match for them,
assuming that both citizens and our resident aliens
have manned our ships. But as a matter of fact we
are a match for them, and, what is of the highest
importance, we have citizens for pilots, and our
crews in general are more numerous and better than
those of all the rest of Hellas. And no one of our
mercenaries,! when it came to facing the risk, would
elect to be exiled from his own land and, with a
lesser hope of victory at the same time, fight on
their side because of the offer of a few days’ high
pay.
“Such, as it seems to me at least, or approxi-
mately such, is the situation as far as the Pelopon-
nesians are concerned ; as regards our own, I believe
we are free from the defects I have remarked upon
in them, and that we have in other respects advan-
tages which more than counterbalance theirs. If
they march against our territory, we shall sail
against theirs; and the devastation of a part of the
Peloponnesus will be quite a different thing from
that of the whole of Attica. For they will be
unable to get other territory in its place without
fighting, while we have an abundance of territory
both in the islands and on the mainland. A great
thing, in truth, is the control of the sea. Just
consider: if we were islanders, who would be more
unassailable? So, even now, we must, as near as may
be, imagine ourselves such and relinquish our land and
houses, but keep watch over the sea and the city;

249

THUCYDIDES

in
, \ r BS \
morews hurakip éyew, kal IeAotovvynciow vrép
a lal wy \ e
avtav opytcbévtas TOAAG TAEOGL pun Orapiayed Oat
/ , \ & > > 4 \Ye% 3 7
(kpatnoavtés Te yap avOis(ovK éddeooch payov-
A gk a x. a / ef
pcOa Kal iv charopuev, TA TOV Evppaxar, dOev
\
loxvouev, TpocaToAAUTAL Ov Yap oVvXadooVGL
n al ? \
pn ikavav nu@v dvT@V er avTovs oTpaTeveLy),
2 \ ? A A VW) oan
THv Te dNOdhupoLY py OLKLaV Kal YHS TroLEetcOaL,
> as n / > \ / \ ”
aNAa TOV TwuaToV: ov yap Tadde TOvS avdpas,
3 4 Ay a A \ 5) ”
GXX ot avodpes TavTAa KT@VTaL. Kal EL @pND
, Cun > \ Xx ? LU aise / eee
TELTELVY ULAS, AUTOS av eEeNMovTAs ExENEVOV ALTA
ra \ vad /, ee 43
dn@oat Kal detEar LleXoTovynciors OTL TOVTMY YE
éveka ovx UTaKovcedbe.

CXLIV. “TIloAra 6é Kali ddXra yw és éAtrida
fal / A > / ’ / \ ’
Tov TepiececOat, Hv EOEANTE ApyNV TE wy ETTI-
KTacbat Gua ToremotvTes Kal Kivduvous avOat-

/ a \
pérous pi) TpocTiGecOat- uwadrrov yap TepoRynuar
, an , x an
TAS OLKELAS NU@V Apaptias 7 TAS THY évavTiov
» | la ,

Siavolas. GAN éxeiva pév Kal ev AXXAW AOYO Gua
ral 4 / a \ ‘A ?
Tois épyous SnAwOrjcetat: viv dé TovUTOLS arro-

b , / \ “4
Kpivdpevot atroTréewywpev, Meyapéas pev OTe €aco-
a 4 fal 3
pev ayopa Kal ALpéot xpHaOar, iv Kai Aaxedatpo-
, \ rn , a an
viow Eevnracias fi) TOLWTL MHTE LOY pyTE TOV
> \ a
Hpetépov Evppdywv (ovTE yap éxeivo Kw)ver ev}
a al ” / \ \ / ee >
Tais oTovoais ovTE TOE), TAS SE TOAELS OTL AUTO-
> / »
vouous adyoomev, €6 Kal auvTovosouvs ExoVTES
é€oTercupmeba Kal OTav KaKeElvotL Tals éavT@V
1 éy deleted by Hude, after Dion. H.
y ’
250

BOOK I. ext. 5-cxuiv. 2

and we must not give way to resentment against the
Peloponnesians on account of our losses and risk a
decisive battle with them, far superior in numbers
as they are. If we win we shall have to fight them
again in undiminished number, and if we fail, our
allies, the source of our strength, are lost to us as
well; for they will not keep quiet when we are no
longer able to proceed in arms against them. And
we must not make lament for the loss of houses and

land, but for men; for these thingsedo t procure Pe

us men, but men these. Indeed} I thouant
that I gfould persuade you, I sould hawe urge
you to go forth and lay them waste yourselves, and
thus show the Peloponnesians that you will not, for
the sake of such things, yield them obedience.
CXLIV. “ Many other considerations also lead me
to hope that we shall prove superior, if you will
consent not to attempt to extend your empire while
you_are at war and not to burden yourselves need-
lessly with dangers of your own choosing; for I am
more afraid of our own.mistakes.than of the enemy’s
plans. But these matters will be explained to you
on some later occasion! when we are actually at
war;-at_the present timetlet us send the envoys
_.back with this answer: As to the Megarians, that
we will ‘permit thém to use our markets and
harbours, if the Lacedaemonians on théir part will
cease*passing laws for the expulsion of aliens so far
as concerns us or our allies (for nothing in the treaty
forbids either our action or theirs); as to the states
in our. confederacy, that we will’ give them their
independence if they were independent when we
made the treaty, and as soon as they on their part
2 2/. is sik

———x
251

THUCYDIDES

5 a / \ / ria ip
anodact TOE 7) ofa Tots NaKedatpoviors *
/ tal nF > lal
eTLTNOELMS AUTOVOMELGAaL, AAX avTOLs ExaoTOLS
/ / 4 / nr
ws Bovrovta Sixas Te 6Te COéNOpeY SodvVal KATA
\ / / \ > v >
tas EuvOnKas, jToréuov Sé ovK apEopev, apyo-
a \ /
pévous b€ apvvovpeOa. Ttavta yap Sixata Kat
an a /
mTpémovTa dua THE TH ToAE aTroxpivacOat.
2O7 \ \ ce > / lal x NEce /
eldévar S€ yp STL avayKn TodEpeEtv (Hv € Exov-
GLoL MGAXOV Seyopcla, Paco éyKEettopévous TOVS
/ e la /
évavtious &£ouev), ék Te TOV peyioTaV KdV
3
Ott Kal moder Kal (OLloTN pméeylaTaL Tia TrEpt-
r / la
ylyvovTat. ol yovv maTépes u@Vv UTOOTAaYTES
\ r e ,
Myjdous Kal ovK aro TocM@VvSe Opp@pevol, ANrAG
\ / , f
Kal Ta UTAapYOVTA EXALTTOVTES, YYwW"N TE TEOVL
A / I / / Xx / , /
A tUyn Kal TOAuH petCove 7) Ovvdper Tov Te Bap-
/
Bapov arewoavto Kal és Tdbe Tponyayov avTa:
/ + \
@v ov xpn RAeltrecPat, GANA TOUS TE exXOpovs
/ A \ a
Tavtl TpoT@ auvvecOar Kal Tots eTeyryvopevols
r \ Qn
metpacbat avTa pi) EXMacow Tapadodvat.”
\ la rc 3
CXLV. ‘O pev Ilepixris toradta eirev. ot 6€
n , ” / a
"AOnvaiot vopicavtes adpiata odior Tapavety
a a
avtov éndicarto & éxédeve, Kai Tots Aaxedarpo-
/ lel , ,
viols atrexpivavTo TH éxeivou yvopun, Kal Exacta
e ” \ \ / > \ ,

Te ws éppace kal TO Evutrav, ovdév KEdevdpeEvot
/ / \ \ \ / e a 3
Tounoety, dikn dé Kata Tas EvvOnKasS ETOtMOL EivaL

, \ fal > / a. iN ie \
SuarvecOar wept TaVv éyxAnuatov emt ion cal

1 Deleted by Hude, following Schol.
252

BOOK I. cxtrv. 2-cxtv.

grant the states in their alliance the right to exercise
independence in a manner that conforms, not to the
interest of the Lacedaemonians, but to the wishes of
the individual states; and as to arbitration, that we
are willing to submit to it in accordance with the
treaty, and will not begin war, but will defend our-
selves against those who do. This answer is just
and at the Same time consistent with the dignity of
the city. But we must réalisé that war is inevitable,
and that~the-more--willing’we™ show “ourselves to
- accept it, the less eager “will our enemies be to
attack us, and also that it is from the greatest
dangers that the greatest honours accrue to a state
\ as well as to an individual. Our fathers, at any rate,
withstood the Persians, although they had no such
resources as ours, and abandoned even those which
they possessed, and by their resolution more than by
good fortune and with a courage greater than their
strength beat back the Barbarian and advanced our
fortunes to their present state. And we must not
fall short of their example, but must defend our-
selves against our enemies in every way, and must
endeavour to hand down our empire undiminished
to posterity.” —
CXLV. Such were the words of Pericles: and the
Athenians, thinking that he was advising“them for
the best, voted as “he directed, and answered the
Lacedaemonians according to his bidding, both as
regards the particulars as he set them forth and on
the whole question, to the effect that they would do
nothing upon dictation, but were ready in accord-
ance with the treaty to have all complaints adjusted
by arbitration on a fair and equal basis. So the

253

THUCYDIDES

éuota. Kal of wey amexepnoay én’ oixov Kal
ovKéTL UaTEpov emped RevovTo.
\

CXLVI. Alrias 8¢ attar cal di:ahopat éyévovto
> , \ aA , ? s 2A.
dpdborépois mpd TOU TohEép“ov, apEapevar evOus
iro Tov év Emiddpve cal Kepxvpa. émrept
amo Tov év Enidapre epKupa. €TrEpiryvuvTo

ei a ?

Sé dues ev avtais kal map’ addidous édpoitov
> 4 f 3 f be o 8a \
aKnpUKTaS [éV, AVUTOTTWS O€ OU" TTOVOMY Yap

\ / 9 \ / a
Ebyyvois Ta yuyvoueva tv Kal Tpopacis TOU

TTONEMELW

254

BOOK I. cxtv.—cx tv.

Lacedaemonian envoys went back home and there-
after came on no further missions.

CXLVI. These were the grounds of complaint
and the causes of disagreement on both sides before
the war, and they began to appear immediately
after the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Never-
theless the two parties continued to have intercourse
with one another during these recriminations and
visited each other without heralds, though not
without suspicion ; for the events which were taking
place constituted an actual annulment of the treaty
and furnished an occasion for war.

1 ¢.e. without the formalities which are indispensable after
war is declared.

355

#e8 aries PSII,
sad teks asiahiaeenhciaie HA *
civcaieatred 2 cae coo oa im
pane Deena) om B doishir bobtilasien} a0 Seas

BOOK II

B

4 / ’
I. "Apyertar 5€ 0 TéXEnos EvOevde HOn ’AOPnvaiwy
A na /
kal LleXotrorvnciov Kal Tov ExaTtépois Evppayonr,
> a ” ’ , ” b] \ ’ > /
SG (OUT E Ee IOUT ae ie ate ea arrn-
/ Lal > \
Novus KaTacTavtTes Te EvvEey@s ETONEpWOUY, Kal
/ nr /
yéypattat éENs ws Exacta éylyveto Kata Oépos
Kal YElLOva.
/ 4 /
Il. Téccapa cal déea pev ETN evéwervav ai
e / Pi
TplaxovTovTels omrovoal al éyévovto pet EvPoias
e an \
ddkwow TO O€ TéuTT@ Kal Sexdt@ ere, éml
y , pea ay , 7 a ,
Xpuaidos év "Apyer TOTE TevTHKOVTA Svoty SéovTa
” e / \ > / b] / > ,
érn lepwuevns kal Aivnoiov édopou év Yrrapty
Yj / a /
kal Ilv@o0dépou ett Téccapas pHvas apyovTos
"AOnvat x tTHv év Lotedat l l
nvatols, peta THY év LloTeala paynv pnvi
e \ Py / e/ if = > /, e a
Ext Kal Sexadt@, dual npr apyouéve OnBaiwr
, ~ / fal
avipes oArly@ mTElous TpLakociwv (aAyovvTo Sé
4 lal /
avtav BowwtapyovrTes IlvOayyenos Te 0 Dureidov
\ / © 3 i >? a \ cal
kat Aréutropos 0 "Ovntopidov) éofAOov trepl Tpa-
e/ \ e > / a ,
tov uTrvov Evy OTAoaLs €s LlNataiav THs Botwrtias

1 Hude’s correction for éxtw nal Gua of the MSS. Lipsius
suggested €xtm <xal Sexdt@> kal.

1 The mode of reckoning customary in the time of Thucy-
dides, and continued long afterwards. In such a scheme
the summer included the spring and the winter the autumn:

258

BOOK Il

I. Ar this point in my narrative begins the
account of the actual warfare between the Athenians
and the Peloponnesians and their respective allies.
While it continued they ceased having communi- *
cation with one another except through heralds, and
when once they were at war they waged it without
intermission. The events of the war have been
recorded in the order of their occurrence, summer
by summer and winter by winter.1

Ili For fourteen years the thirty years” truce—

_-—“which had been concluded after the capture of /
\. Euboea remained ‘omaaakaiena, “but inthe fifteenth~
“year, whéiChirysis™ was~in’ the forty-eighth year
of her priesthood ? at Argos, and Aenesias was ephor
at Sparta, and Pythodorus .had still four months to
,serye_as archon at Athens, in the sixteenth month™
' after the battle of Potidaea, at the opening of 4312.
spring, some Thebansy~a~little more than-three_
“hundred in numbér; “under the command of the
Boeotarchs Pythangelus son of Phyleidas and Diem-
porus son of Onetoridas, about the first watch
of the night/,entered under arms into Plataea,| a

the summer period was equal to about eight months, the
winter to about four.

2 The commencement of the war is fixed according to the
forms of reckoning customary in the three most important
Hellenic states.

259

THUCYDIDES

, ,

2 obcav “A@nvaiov Evypayida. émnydyovtu &é
kal avéwtay tas Tiras I dataidv avdpes, Nav-
/ \ e ’ > lal “ O77
KrELoNs TE Kal of peT avTov, BovrAdpmevor tdtas
&vexa Suvdpews avdpas Te TOV TOALT@Y TOUS
/ e , a \ \ /
odicw vmevavtiovs SuapCetpar Kat THY Todw
3 OnBulots tpoctoajoa. éempakay O€ tavta bv

fal \
Etvpuyayou tod Aecovtiddov, avdpos OnBatwv
Suvatwtdtov. tpoiddvtes yap ot OnBaior ote
at / \
écoito 6 ToOAELOS, ERovrAovTO THY IIAaTaLav aiel
, / be 2 ” > bd 4 \ a
adic. Suahopov ovaav ETL EV ELpNVN TE KAL TOU
jTor€uov pnt ghavepod KalecTa@T0s TpoKata-
lal a »- / rn
NaBeiv. % cal pdov EXafov écedOovtes, Puraxis
b] / / x > \ > \
4 ov mpoxabectyKvias. Oémevor € és THY ayopav
val /
Ta 6rda Tols pev eTayayouéevols OvK é7re\OovTO
4 279. v 4 v OF ae, \ LPT
aate evOvs épyou Exec Oar Kai lévat ETL TAS OLKLAS
nr cal 3 ral ,

Tov éxOpav, yoounv 8 éro.odvTo Knpvypact Te
/ >’ / \ > / lal
xpnoacbar emiTndelors Kal és EvwRacw padrov

\ / \ , b) a \ ’ a €
kal diriav Thy Tow ayayeiy (Kai aveimev oO
n ” 4 \ \ / a ,
Khpv€, el tis BovdeTaAl KATA Ta TATpLA THY Tav-

lal 4 / >
tov Bowwtav Evppayeiv, tiWecPar Tap avtovs
~ OTAQ) iCovtes ahiat padiws Tov A
Ta OTAa), vopiovTes pagdiws TOVT@ TO
\ ,
TpOT@ TpoTKopycel THY TON.
III. Of 88 IlAararijs Gs YoOovto Evdov Te dvTas
\ £ \ > / /
tous OnBaiovs nat éEamiwaiws Katetknupevny
, \ / an
THY TOW, KATALELTAVTES KAL VOPLTAVTES TOAXD
\ , a
mrelous écednrvOévas (ov yap Ewpav év TH VUKTL)
, \ Ud
mpos EvpBacw exwpyncav Kal Tovs oyous deFd-
260

BOOK, II. nm. 1=1m. 1

town of Boeotia which was in alliance with Athens,
They had been invited over by some Plataeans,
Naucleides and his partisans, who opened the gates
for them, intending, with a view to getting power
into their hands/ to destroy the citizens who were
“OF the Opposite party and make over the city to the
_ _Thebans.)~And“they~had*conducted»their-intrigte
“~throwgh“Eurymachus son of Leontiades, a man of
great influence at Thebes. For, as Plataea was
_always at variance with them,; the Thebans, fore- of
' seeing that the war! was coming, wished to get
possession of it while there was still peace and
_before the war had yet been openly declared. “And
so they found it easier to maké theirvéfitry unob-
served, because no watch had been set to guard the
city. And when they had grounded their arms in
the market-place, instead of following the advice of
those who had invited them over, namely to set to
work at once and enter the houses of their enemies,
they determined rather to try conciliatory proclama-
tions and to bring the city to an amicable agreement.
The proclamation made by herald was that, if anyone
wished to be an ally according to the hereditary
usages of the whole body of the Boeotians, he
should take his weapons and join them. For they
thought that in this way the city would easily be
induced to come-over.to their side.

Ill. And.the Plataeans,) when they became aware
that the Thebans were inside, and that the city
had been taken by surprise, took fright, and,
as it was night and they could not see, thinking
that a far greater number had come in, they con-
cluded to make terms, and, accepting the proposals

1 i.e. the war between Athens and Sparta.

261

THUCYDIDES

e / C, ” \ DI] &7 DJ bd /
pevor navyalov, aXAws TE Kal ErreLdy és ovdEéVAa
‘ / a7 fa
ovdev evewTépifov.. TpacaovTes O€ TS Ta’TA
/ > \ \ “4 v \
KaTEvONTaY ov TOANOUS TOUS OnBatous ovTas Kal
5) , , / e , ‘fs fal *
évopucav ériGkpevot paciws Kpatncew: TO yap
mrnoer tav Udatardv ot Bovdopévm fy TeV
’ , 247 207 5 > ,
A@nvaiwv adictacbat. boxer odv emiyerpntéa
4)
eivat kal Evvedéyovto SLopvacovtes Tovs KOLVOUS
/ ory : 3 / c/ \ XV Qn ce ral
Tolyous Tap GAXjAoUS, 6TwS pw La TOV Oda
, VA f lal
davepol Bow LovTes, amagas Te avev THY UTO-
\ c ,
tuyiov és Tas odovs Kabiotacayr, iva avti Teiyous
> \ Ss > / e a > / \
n, Kal TANNA eEnpTUov n ExacTOV efatveTo TpOS
\ f , 4 DI \ \ ° .
Ta Tapovta Evudopov écecOar. ere d€ wS EK
tov SuvaTav éToipa Av, PudrddEavtes Ete viKTA
\ \ / f “A A
Kal avTo TO TEptopOpov exwpovy EK TOV OiKiaY
/ ef \ \ ral
ér avtous, 67ws a KaTa Pas Oapcarewtépals
\ / r
ovat Tpochépowto Kal ohiow €x Tov ioov y¥I-
> » ee | \ , v fod
yv@vTal, GAN ev vuKTl Pohepwrepar ovTEs ogous
rn / , 4 »,” \ /
@o. THs obeTépas euTrerplas THS KATA TI TONY.
, b \ pr ohe, tal > \
mpocéBarov te evOus Kat &s yYelpas noav KaTa
/
TAXOS.
, ,
IV. O01 & os éyvacay éEnratrnpuevot, Evvertpe-
a \
dhovto te ev ohicw avtols Kal Tas mpooBodas
i TpooTintoey arewbodvTo. Kai dis pe 7 TPIS
& / ” fal @ t ] a
aTEKpovcavTo, ETELTA TOAX@ GopvB@ avtTav Te
rc lal \ A“ lal
TpogBaXovTwy Kal TOV YUPALKOV Kal TOV OLKETOY
rn > al a \ bl] a
dpa ato TOV OlKLOY Kpavyh Te Kal odOAVYT
/ , \ , , \
vowweveav ALGous TE Kal KEepa@ BaddovTwv, Kai
e fal \ lal /
veTod dpa Oia vuKTOS TOANOD Emuyevopevou, Epo-

262

BOOK II. ur. 1-1v. 2

made to them, raised no disturbance, especially as
the Thebans did no violence to anyone. But, as it
happened, while they were negotiating the terms
‘they pérceived that theFhebans~were™ few in”
_ number, and thought that by an attack _they might

sily overpower them/ or if was not the wish of
“the majority of the Platacans to withdraw from the
' Athenian alliance! “So it’ was detérmined=to~make~/
~the-attempt, and! they began to collect together,
reaching each other's houses by digging through the
party-walls that they might not be seen going
through the streets, and they placed wagons
without the draught-animals in the streets to serve
as a barricade, and took other measures as each
appeared likely to be advantageous in the present
emergency. And when all was ready as far as they ae
could make it so, waiting for the time of night just
before dawn, they sallied from their houses against
the Thebans, not wishing to attack them by day
when they might be more courageous and would be
on equal terms with them, but at night when they
would be more timid and at a disadvantage, in com-
parison with their own familiarity with the town.
And so they fell upon them at once, and speedily
came to close quarters.

IV. The Thebans, when they found they had
been deceived, drew themselves up in close ranks
and sought to repel the assaults of the enemy
wherever they fell upon them. And twice or three
times they repulsed them; then when the Plataeans
charged upon them with a great uproar, and at the
same time the women and slaves on the house-tops,
uttering screams and yells, kept pelting them with
stones and tiles—a heavy rain too had come on

263

~I

THUCYDIDES

/ \ F v \ lol 4
BrnOnoav Kal tpaTropevor Epevyov da THS TOAEWS,
/ / n
amre:por mev OVTES Ol TAELOUS Ev TKOT@ Kal TNO
a , a \ a \ \ la}
tov d10dav 7 Xp7 TwWOFvaL (Kal yap TehEUT@VTOS
nr s /
TOU MNVOS TA yLyVOpmEVva FV), EuTrelpous S€ EXOVTES
\ 8 , la) \ > 7 1 & 5 @ /
Tous SL@KOVTAaS TOD py Exhevyety, Bote SredOei-
lal \ Lal
povto ToAAol.; Tov Oe Idkatai@v tis Tas mvAAaS
rn vA > ,
7 €ondGov Kal aimep oav povar avewypevat,
” / > / > \ / ,
éxAnoe TTUPAKI@ akovTiov avtTt Baddvou ypnoa-
’ \ , Ca 5 Y ” y
pevos és TOV pmoyAoV, BaTE pNnde TavTH EEOOoY ETL
, \ f
eivat. OtwKkdpevor O€ KATA THV TOALY OL pév TLYES
by rn > ES \ a ? Leh, yy > pe
GaUT@V ETL TO Telyos avaPavTes Eppiapv és TO éEw

‘ohas avtovs cai duehOapynoay ot mrelovs, ot Sé

\ 4 +] / \ 8 4 /
KaTa TvAas épyuous yuvatkos Sovans méXexuY
/ \ lal
Aabovtes® duaxoWwavtes Tov poyrov é&AAOov
> / »” \ an > /
ov moro (aicOnois yap tayeia éreyéveTo),
a /
Gdroe O€ GAXN THS TOAEWS TTOPabes ATMOAAUYTO.
\ \ a \¢ / 5 =
TO O€ TAELoTOV Kal OGOV padtota Av Evvertpap-
/ = , lal
pévov €omimTovew és oiknma péeya, 0 Hv TOD
t« ‘4 > / r
telyous Kal al® Cupar avemypéevar EtuYov avTod,
\ / a
olomevoe TUAAS TAS BUpas TOD olKymaTOS Elvat
\ ” / > \ SYA e a \ >
Kal avtixpus dtodov és To Ew. opavtes S€ ad-
a >
tous of IlXatatjs atretAnpmévovs éBovrevovTo
iA
elTe KATAKAVTWOWW WOTEP EYOUTLY, EuTTPHaarTeEs
\ oT] ” , »” / f \
TO OlKnpa, €elTE TL AXAO YXPHOwVTAL. TérXos SE

1 rod uh expevyery Hude deletes, after van Herwerden.

2 xa) of MSS. after Aaédvres deleted by van Herwerden.

3 So Hude with CG; af rAnoiov @dpa:s ABEFm,. Didot and
Haase would transpose thus: tod telxovs mAnalov Kal ai Odpas.

264

BOOK II. 1v. 2-7

during the night—they became panic-stricken and
turned and fled through the city; and since most
of them were unfamiliar with the thoroughfares by
which they must save themselves amid the darkness
and mud—for these things happened at the end of
the month!—, whereas their pursuers knew full well
how to prevent their escape, many of them conse-
quently perished. One of the Plataeans, moreover,
had closed the gates by which they had entered—
the only gates which had been opened—using the
spike of a javelin instead of a pin to fasten the bar,
so that there was no longer a way out in that direc-
tion either. And being pursued up and down the
city, some of them mounted the wall and threw
themselves over, most of these perishing; others
succeeded in getting out by an unguarded gate
without being observed, cutting through the bar
with an axe which a woman gave them—but not
many, for they were soon discovered; and others
got isolated in various parts of the city and were put
to death. But the greater number, those who had
kept more together than the others, rushed into a
large building abutting upon? the wall whose doors
happened to be open, thinking that the doors of the
building were city-gates and that there was a pas-
save right through to the outside. And the
Plataeans, seeing that they were cut off, began to
deliberate whether they should set fire to the
building and burn them up without more ado or
what other disposition they should make of them.

1 When there would be no moon.

? Or, as most MSS. read, ‘‘a large building . . . whose
doors near by happened to be open”; with Didot and Haase,
‘a large building near the wall whose doors . . .”

26
VOL. I. K 5

THUCYDIDES

ovTor Te Kat cot Addo TOV OnBaiwv TEpLhoav
KaTa THY TOALY TAAV@pEVOL, Evve8noar Tots
T\ataedor mapacodva opis Te avtous Kal Ta
oTAa xpycacbar 6 6 TL av Bovhovrar.

WV Oi pev 67 év 7H Natata oUT ws émem parye-
cav. of © ddrot OnBaior ods eu 2 ere TAS VUKTOS
TapayeverFar TAVOTPATiA, El TL apa a) 1 po-
X.@poin TOLS éevednrvboct, THS ayyendtas awa Ka
oO0v auTots pyQetons mept TOV yeryernuévov €Tré-
BonBovv. améxes 5€ 4» UdNataa tov OnBav
oTadlous EPdounKovta, Kal TO Vdwp TO yevopevov
TIS YUKTOS étoinge Bpadurepov avTous éNO ety:
0 yap “Acwtros ToTapos eppun peyas Kal ov
padies dvaBaros nv. Topevopevot TE €V VETO Kal
Tov TOTaLOV (BONS OvaBavres | UaTEepov Tape-
yévovTo, 1/0n TOV avdpav Tav pev diehbGappévor,
Tov o€ Cwvtwv éyopévav. ws 8 ja8ovto ot On-
Batot TO yeyernpmévor, érreBovXevov Tois Ew THs
morews TaV IIdatatav (Hoav yap Kal avOpwrrot
KaTa TOUS aypov’s Kal KaTacKEUy, ola ampocsbo-
KNTOU Tob * KAKOD €D elem n ryevouevou)* €Bov-
AovTo yap opiow, el Twa a Borer, UT apxelv
avrl TOY Evoor, 7] hv dpa TUXwOL TIVES eCoorypnuevot.
Kal of ev TavTta duevoodvtor ot 6é Wdatacis ere
dtaBovAevopevoy AVT@VY UTOTOTIGaYTES TOLOUTOV
TL éceaOar Kal SetoavTes jTept Tots eEco KnpuKa
efémenrpav Tapa TOUS OnRaiovs, AéyouTes OTe
oUTe Ta eT OLN Leva. bola Opacevav év omovoats
ofav Telpacavtes KataaBeiv THY TONY, Ta TE
éEw EXeyov avTots pn adixety: ef S€ uy, Kal avTol
epacav avTay Tos avdpas aToKTEVELV ods EXOUGL

1 Added by Bredow and Baumeister.

266

BOOK IL. 1. 7-v. 5

But finally these and the other Thebans who sur-
vived and were wandering up and down the city
came to an agreement with the Plataeans to
surrender themselves and their arms, to be dealt
with in any way the Plataeans wished.

V. The Thebans in Plataea had fared thus; but
the main body of the Thebans, who were to have
come in full force while it was still night, on the
chance that things might not go well with those
who had entered the city, received while on the way
news of what had happened and were now hastening
to the rescue. Now Plataea is about seventy stadia
distant from Thebes, and the rain that had come
on during the night delayed their coming; for
the river Asopus was running high and was not easy
to cross. And so, marching in the rain and crossing
the river with difficulty, they arrived too late, some

of their men having already been slain and others ~

taken captive alive. And when the Thebans learned
what had happened, they began to plot against the
Plataeans who were outside the city—there were, of
course, men in the fields and household property, as
the trouble had come unexpectedly in time of
peace—for they desired to have such men as they
could lay hands on as hostages for those within, in
case any of them had chanced to be taken captive.
Such then were their plans; but the Plataeans,
while the Thebans were still deliberating, suspected
that something of the sort would be done, and
fearing for those outside sent out a herald to the
Thebans, saying that they had done an impious
thing in trying to seize their city in time of peace,
and they bade them do no injury outside the walls;
if they did, they on their part would put to death

267

eee

THUCYDIDES

a \ ol lol
tavtass avaywpnodavtav b€ mad éx TAS yAs
’ , a »” lal
aToéwcev avtois Tovs avopas. OnBaior pev
fal \ /
TaUTa A€yovoL Kal ETOMOTAaL daciv avTovs:
a >] e a
IIXatarjs & ovxX opmoroyodat Tovs avdpas evOvs
e , > , > \ , A
tTocyécOat atodwcev, GAAA Oyo TpawTov
,
yevouevav nv te EvpPatvwot, Kal eTouocar ov
’ Ss an na > / a
dacw. éx & ody Tis ys avexopynoav ot OnBato
e r
ovoev adixynoavtess ot S€ IXataufs érevdy Ta ex
rn , \ 7,
THS YOpPas KATA TaYOS ETEKOMLOAYTO, aTEKTELVAD
\ , > 5
Tous avdpas ev0us. Aoav dé oydonKxovTa Kai
¢ X e / \ 7 2 On >
Exatov ol AndOévTes, Kal Evpvpayos avtav jy,
/
mpos ov érpakav ot mpod.dovTes.
VI. Todrto 6€ momncavtes és te Tas *AOnvas
, \
diyyeXov éTEwTOV KAaL TOUS VvEKPoUS UTOGTOVOOUS
> / tal / / > A /
am3ésocav tois OnBaiows, ta Te ev TH TOdEL
\ X , e , n
xkabloTavTo Tpos Ta TapovTa 7 €doKEL avTots.
cal / \ \ lal
trois & 7AOnvaiows HyyéXOn evOvs Ta Tepit TaD
cal / \ lal
Il\ataav yeyevnuéva, cat Botwtav te mapa-
rie , ” 5 B) a? 7 x
yphpa EvvédhaBov ooo noav ev TH ATTLKH Kal
> \ , ” , ,
és tHv IlXatatav erepryav KknpuKa, KédevovTes
ELTELY LNOEV VEWTEPOV ToLEtY TEpl TOV avdpav ods
” / \ BA \ > \ ,
éyovot OnBaiwv, mplvy av Te Kal avtot Bovdev-
lal \ > / cr
cwol Tepl avTa@v: ov yap HyyédOn avTois ote
s c \ a U
TeOvnKdTes elev. Apa yap TH €oddm yryvopevy
a 2 lal / , e
tov OnBaiwy o mpaTos ayyeros €Enet, o dé dev-
” /
TEPOS ApTL veviKNmevav TE Kal Evverdnupevwv, Kal
tav taotepov ovdev Hdecav. oOUTw bn OUK ELdOTES
ot "A@nvaior éméstedXov: Oo O€ KHpVE adiKopevos
268

BOOK II. v. 5-v1. 3

the men whom they held captive, but if the Thebans
withdrew from their territory they would restore
the men to them. Now this is the account which
the Thebans give, and they allege that the Plataeans
confirmed their promise with an oath; the Plataeans
do not admit that they promised to restore the oe
at once, but only that they would do so in case
they should come to an agreement after preliminary
Negotiations, and they deny that they swore to-it-—~_ |
At any rate, the Thebans withdrew from their terri-
tory without doing any injury; but the Plataeans,
as soon as they had hastily fetched in their property
from the country, straightway slew the men.) And
~ those who had been taken captive were one hundred
and eighty in number, one of them being Eury-
machus, with whom the traitors had negotiated.

VI. When they had done this, they sent a mes-
senger to Athens, gave back the dead under a
truce to the Thebans, and settled the affairs of the
city as seemed best to them in the emergency.
The report of what had been done in Plataea was
made to the Athenians promptly ; and they instantly
apprehended all the Thebans who were in Attica
‘and sent a herald to Plataea, bidding him tell
them to take no extreme measures regarding the
Thebans whom they held captive until they them-
selves should have taken counsel about them; for
the news had not arrived that the men had been
put to death. For the first messenger had set out at
the time the Thebans were entering the city, the
second immediately after their defeat and capture,
and the Athenians knew nothing of later events.
Consequently the Athenians sent their orders
without knowing the facts; and the herald on his

—-—

269

THUCYDIDES

2 \ v / \ \ A
4 nvpe Tovs avepas diehPappévous. Kal peta TadTAa
lal lal ,
ot “A@nvaiow otparevoavtes és UAdtaiav citov
Te éonyayov Kal dpovpovs éyxaTédiTTOV, TMV TE
, \ \
avOpwrev tovs aypetotdtous Evy yuvarEt Kai
b /
Tatolv e€exouicar.
VIL. Teyevnuévouv dé tod év Wdararais Epyov
rn cal a >
kal Nedupévov AaAUTPas TOV aTrovday at “AOn-
vaio. TapeckevdlovtTo ws ToNELINTOVTES, TApeE-
4 \ \ f \ e ,
aoKxevalovto 6€ cal Aaxedatpovior Kai ot Evppayot,
/ / / \ /
mpecPelas Te péeAXOVTES TreuTTELY Tapa PacthEa
\ ” x \ / yy /
kal adXoce pos Tovs PapPadpous, ei wobEv Tiva
aperiav nrATIov ExaTepot TpogAnWeaOat, TOdELS
te Evppayidas wolovpevor Goat joav éxTOS THS
2 é€avt@y duvapews. Kal Aaxedaipoviors péev pos
rf > nee 7 > > / \ SS /
Tals avTov UTapyovaars €& “ITadXtias Kal LiKedas
TOs TaKelvwY EXomEevoLs Vads EvTEeTaYOncav! Trot-
elc0at Kata péyeOos TOY TodEwV, ws és TOV
\ fal
TavTa aptO mov TevTakociwy vedy écopévor, Kal
apyvptov pytov éToimatew, Ta TE AXA Hovyd-
> / / cal
Covras Kat “A@nvatovs dSexopévous mia vyl Ews
A A A 5) a \ ,
3 dv tavta wapacKkevachy. ‘AOnvaior dé THY TE
uTdapyovcav Evupayiav éEntafov Kai és Ta Tepl
/ a
IleXotovvncov waddov ywpia érped Bevovto, Kép-
\ r / \ > n \
Kupav kat KedaddrAnviav cat Axapvavas kai
ZaxvvOov, opavtes, e&& ohiaot ditta tabr ein

1 énxetaxOn diaxoclas Hude, with Herbst (érerdy6n o’).

1 cf. ch. Ixxviii. 3.
2 Referring, in the one case, to the unsuccessful embassy
of the Lacedaemonians to the King mentioned in ch. lxvii.;

270

BOOK II. vi. 3-vu. 3

arrival found the men slain. After this the Athe-
nians, marching to Plataea, brought in food and left
a garrison,! taking away the least efficient of the
men along with the women_and children.

VIL. . Now that.the affair at Plataea] had. occurred
“and the treaty had been glaringly violated, the
Athenians began preparing for war, and the Lace-

\ daemonians and their allies also begany both sides

were making téady to send embassies"to the King
and to the barbarians of any other land,? where
either of them hoped to secure aid, and they were
negotiating alliances with such cities as were outside
of their own sphere of influence. The Lacedae-
monians, on their part, gave orders to those in Italy
and Sicily who had chosen their side* to build, in
proportion to the size of their cities, other ships, in
addition to those which were already in Pelopon-
nesian ports, their hope being that their fleet would
reach a grand total of five hundred ships, and to
provide a stated sum of money; but as to other
matters, they were instructed to remain inactive and
to refuse their ports to Athenians if they came with
more than a single ship, until these preparations
had been completed. The Athenians, on the other
hand, began to examine their existing list of allies
and also sent embassies more particularly to the
countries lying about the Peloponnesus—Corcyra,
Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus—perceiving
that if they were sure of the friendship of these

in the other, to the connection of the Athenians with the
Odry sian court mentioned in chs. xxix. and Ixvii.

3 Referring to the Dorian colonies in Italy and Sicily (cf.
mt. Ixxxvi. 3), which, however, contributed no ships till
412 B.c. (cf. VIII. xxvi. 1).

271

THUCYDIDES

, / \ ,
BeBaiws, réprE tHv IleXorovyncov Katatrodeun-
COVTES.
,
VIII. "OXiyov te éerevoouv ovdév apdorepor,
> ’ ¥ > \ , > > ,
QXXN €EppwvtTo es TOY TOAEMOVY OUVK ATrELKOTMS"
\
apyomevot yap Tavtes O€UTEpov avTiMauPavorTat,
, \ \ Ld \ \ = b a
ToTe b€ Kal veoTNS TONKA? pev ovaa ev TH LeXo-
/ \ 7/3 la >] / > > ,
Tovynaw, TOAN? 8 év Tats “APnvats ovK axovotws
e \ b] / ef fal / e SYA
UTO aTrelplas TTETO TOV TOhEMOV. 1 TE AAAN
¢ . ¢ / > rn nr s
EAXas adtraca petéwpos Hv Evviovoay TaY TP@-
\ \ ,
2 Twy morkewy. Kal TOANA prev AOYyLAa EXEYETO,
\ , ? y lal
modAa 6€ YPNTMoNOYyoL WOoV Ev TE Tots péANOUVGL
r / ,
3 ToAEeunoely Kal ev Tais adrNaLs TrOAECLY. ETL OE
a ?
Aros éxwvOn odtyov Tpo TovTwY, TpoTEpoV
BA eS ? ? = 7 ,
ovmwm acecGeica ad ov “EXAnves péuvnytar.
» / \ \ 297 > \ a , ,
édéyero S€ Kal edoxer emi Tots péAdoUGL yeEv7)-
r x / / ,
cecbat onunvar el Té Te AAO TOLOVTOTPOTFOY
EvvéBn yevécOar, Tavta avelntetto.
¢ \ ” \ \ b] / rn > ,
4 H 6€ evvora Tapa ToND éerTrole TOV avOparav
na /
uadrov és todvs Aaxedatpoviovs, addrAwsS TE Kal
¢ , r
mpoetovtwy OTe THY “EddXasa €devOepodow.
cad / 7
Eppwro Te TAS Kal LOLkwTNS KAL TONS El TL SUYALTO
\ /, \ 7 , > a ,
Kal Noyw Kal Epyw EvveTriNapBave avtots: év
na , ,
ToUT@® TE KeKw@ADTOaL edoKEL ExdoTw TA Tpay-
os ica A
5 pata @ fn TIS avTOS TapéoTat. ovTwSs ev} opyA
* € , \ ; , c \ a
elyov of mAéelovs tovs “A@nvatous, of pev Tis
rn a“ ‘ © al
apyns aTorvOjvar Bovropevot, of S€ pr) apxOaor
poBovpevot.
1 Added by Stephanus.
272

BOOK II. vu. 3-vu1. 5

places they would be able to encircle the Pelo-
ponnesus and subdue it.

VIII. There was nothing paltry in the designs of
either side; but both put their whole strength into
the war, and not without reason, for men always
lay hold with more spirit at the beginning, and at
this time, in addition, the young men, who were
numerous beth in the Peloponnesus and in Athens,
were unfamiliar enough with war to welcome it.
All the rest of Hellas was in anxious suspense as its
foremost cities came into conflict with each other. —
And many were the prophecies recited and many
those which oracle-mongers chanted, both among
the peoples who were about to go to war and in the
Hellenic cities at large. Moreover, only a short
time before this, Delos had been shaken, although it
had not before been visited by an earthquake within
the memory of the Hellenes.1 This was said and
believed to be ominous of coming events, and indeed
every other incident of the sort which chanced to
occur was carefully looked into.

The general good-will, however, inclined decidedly
to the side of the Lacedaemonians, especially since
they proclaimed that they were liberating Hellas,
Every person and every state was strongly purposed
to assist them in every possible way, whether by
word or by deed, and each man thought that
wherever he could not himself be present, there the
cause had suffered a check. To such an extent were
the majority of the Hellenes enraged against the
Athenians, some wishing to be delivered from their
sway, others fearful of falling under it.

1 Probably an intentional contradiction of Hdt. v1. xeviii.,

where it is stated that an earthquake occurred shortly before
the battle of Marathon, but none later,
273

THUCYDIDES

IX. Ilapaccevf pév odv cal yvopn tovavty
@punvto. odes O€ Exdtepor Taode EXovTES Evp-
payous €s Tov TONEpOV KaBicotavTo. Aaxecatpo-

, \ Oa , 5 , \ e
viwy pev ode Evppayor’ Lledorrovy7jctor pev ot
b) \ > a , \ ? , Sa a
évtos tc Ouov mavtes TANHY Apyelayv Kal “Axaiov
(rovTous S€ és audhotépous diria Hv: IledAnvijs de
lal ‘ lal
"Ayaav povor EvverroNépovy TO TpaTov, Emerta
be ef a e/ \ ” be Il /
é votepov Kal arravtes), Ew de LleNomovyyncov
n / an nn
Meyapijs, Borwrot, Aoxpot, Paxis, Aumpaxiotat,
Aevedé.iot, “Avaxtoplot. TovT@y vauTiKov Tapel-
/ a , fol
yovto KootvO.0r, Meyapijs, Luxverior, lerArnvijs,
"Hreior, “Aprpaxiotat, Aeveadzor, imméas 66
Botwtoi, Pwxis, Aoxpoi, ai & adda Todeus
metov mapetyov.' aitn pev Aaxedatpoviwr
Evpuaxta’ “AOnvaiwy S€ Xtor, AéoBior, Una-
a / e235 T , ? ,
rains, Meconvior ot ev Navraxtw, Axapvavev
oi maAelous, Kepxupaicr, ZaxvvOior, cal adrar

/ € ¢ vad Ss ? »” a
moXELS al UTroTENEis ovcat év EOvEct ToToIase,
Kapia % éri Gardoon, Awpiijs Kapol rpocoxot,
7 , c , Ny bathe aah / a x4
Iwvia, ‘EXAnorrovtos, Ta Ert Opakns, vicot doar
b] \ / \ f \ 4
évtos LleXotovyncov Kxat Kpntns mpos Atop
avicxovta® wAnv Mydov cal Onpas. Tovtwy
vauTikov Tapelyovto Xior, AéoBror, Kepevpaior,
oi & a&ddoe Tefov Kal juata. &v ia mev

e / \ XP \ \ BPAX P

e/ x =
aitn éxaTépwv Kal TapacKevn €s TOV TOAEMOV HV.

yr \ val

X. Of € Aaxedarpovior peta Ta é€v Idatatais

b] \ / \ \ , \
evOds TepinyyedXov kata Tv IleXoTrovyncov Kai

1 Herbst deletes, followed by Hude.
2 Before rahy C gives maoca: af KuxAdbdes, the other MSS.
wacat af &AAa Kuxdrddes. Deleted by Dobree.

274

.

BOOK: + 11s -ex/ tx. 2

IX. Such were the preparations and such the
feelings with which the Hellenes went into the
conflict. And the states which each side had as its

_allies when it entered wen war were as follows,

resé were the-allies-of acedaemonians: all
the Peloponnesterre=sewth™Of-cite-Fethnmnti!-Wieh the
exception of the Argives and Achaeans (these latter
had friendly relations with both sides, and the
Pellenians were the only Achaeans who at first took

_ part in the war with the Lacedaemonians, though

eventually all of them did), and outside of the Pelo-
ponnesus the Megarians, Boeotians, Locrians, Pho-
cians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians.
Of these, the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians,
Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians
furnished ships, while cavalry was contributed by
the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, and infantry
by the other states. —These-were” the allies“of*the

—acedaeiontanrs—Phose of the Athenians were:

the Chians, Lesbiaris}Plataeans, the Messénians of
Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Cor-
eyraeans, the Zacynthians, and in addition the cities
which were tributary in the following countries:
the seaboard of Caria, the Dorians adjacent to the
Carians, Ionia, the Hellespont, the districts on the
coast of Thrace, and the islands which lie between
the Peloponnesus and Crete toward the east, with
the exception of Melos and Thera. Of these, the
Chians, Lesbians, and Coreyraeans furnished ships,

~~.the rest infantry and money. Such were the allies

of eath~side~and-the—preparations~they-made for
the war.

X. Immediately after the affair at Plataea the
Lacedaemonians sent word around to the various

275

>

THUCYDIDES

\ yy / \ z
hv &€m Evppayida otpatiav TrapacKkevater Oar
Tals ToAEGL Ta TE ETTLTHOELA Ola ElKOS Err EEOOOP
” Mv e Pd ~ > \ ? /
Exdnpov Exelv, ws eoRadovvtes es THY ATTLKHD.
e lal fe
évreton O€ EXAOTOLS ETOLWA YlyVvoLTO, KaTa TOV
Uy \ / A /
Ypovov Tov eipnuévov Evvncav Ta dvo mépn a7ro
\ > \ r
TOAEWS EXaaTHS €s TOV icOuov. Kal é7ELdn TAY
\ / ? s > / €
TO otpatevpa Evvereypévov Hv, “Apyidamos o
ral V4 o Lal QY
Bacirevs tav Aaxedatmoviov, baoTep ayettTo TAS
/ , \ \ n
éEodou TavTns, Evykadéoas Tous TTpAaTHYOUS THV
al /
TONEWY TAT@V Kal TOUS paALoTA év TEE Kal
aftoNoywTatous Tapynver ToLade.*
XI. “”Avdpes IleXomovyyjciot cai Evppayot,
a \
Kal of Tatépes Hu@v ToANAaS oTpaTElas Kal év
avtn TH Uedorovynow Kal Ew éeroujoarto, Kal
an lal / ”
NULOV AUTOV OL TpETBUTEpOL OVK ATELPOL TOELOV
o \ a /
eloiv: duws S€ THOSE OUT pelfCova TAapacKEnY
\ ,
éxovtes €EnOopev, adda Kai eT TOAW SvVATO-
TaTnvy vov épxyopeba, Kai avtot mreEloToL Kal
/ lal ,
dpioToL oTpaTevovTEs. OlKaLov ovv 7Mas pjTE
lal / , an a
TOV TATEpwV KElpous haiverOar pjTe NUoV AUT@Y
a / b] / e \ ¢ \ lal
THs So—ns évdeectépous. 7 yap EdXas traca
nr na c ral nan x , \ P
THOE TH OPN ETHpTal Kal Tpocéyer THY yvopn?,
yA ” \ Nw 4D oY a
evvoray éxovoa Sua TO ’AOnvaiwy ExPos mpakar
Huas & emivoovmEev., OUKOVY XpN, El TM Kal
Soxovdmev mwAHGEL émiévas Kal aopaddeta TOAAT
3 a \ : n \
eivat pr) av €AOetv Tovs Evavtiovs Huiv dia payns,
U ,

TOUT@Y EVEKA AMLENETTEPOY TL TAPETKEVATMEVOUS
an / ,
ywpelv, GAAA Kal TOAEWS ExaTTNS HYyE“oVva Kal

>
otpatiwTnv TO KaP avTov alei mpoadéyer Oat és
1 Sintenis’ correction for rapeitva: road? €detev of the MSS.

276

BOOK II. x. 1-x1 3

states in the Peloponnesus and their confederacy
outside the Peloponnesus to make ready such troops
and supplies as it was appropriate they should have
for a foreign expedition, their intention being to
invade Attica.» When everything was ready in the
‘several ‘states; two-thirds of the contingent of each
state assembled at the appointed time at the
dsthmus...And when the whole army was assembled,
Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, ‘w hie
“was"to be the leader of “this expedition, called
together the generals of all the states as well as the
chief officials and the most notable men, and
exhorted them as follows:

XI. “ Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made
many campaigns both in the Peloponnesus and
beyond it, and the elder men also amongst us do
not lack experience in warfare, yet never before
have we taken the field with a greater armament
than this; but though we were never more numerous
and puissant, it is also a very powerful state we
now_go against. It is but right, therefore, that we
neither should show ourselves worse men than our
fathers nor ‘wanting to_ our own fame. For all
Fellas is stirred by this e enterprise e of ours, and
fixes her gaze upon it, and being friendly to us on
account of their hatred of the Athenians hopes
that we shall succeed in carrying out our designs.
Therefore, even if some of us may think that we
are going against them with superior numbers and
that in all likelihood the enemy will not risk a
pitched battle with us, we must not on that account
be a whit less carefully prepared when we advance,
but rather must officer and soldier of every state for

his own part be_always expecting. to encounter

277

THUCYDIDES

/ f cA A \ j \ A /
kivduvoy twa HEew. adnra yapta TOV ToAgLOD,
artes t \ \ \ Be > A ei.3
Kat €£ oALyoU TA TOAAA Kal OL OPYNS at ETrt-

4 / \
YelpHnoels yiryvovTaty TodAaKis TE TO EXaTCOV
fal x ” b] , \ / \
mAnGos SedLos GpEeLvov NuvVAaTO TOUS TAEOVaS OLA
\ fa /
TO KatappovovvTas amapacKevous yevéc@ar. xpn
dé alel ev Tm) Troneuia TH ev youn Papaaréous
oTparevew, T@ © epy@ Sed267as Tmaperxevdaar.
oUTw yap mpos TE TO émévat Tos évayTiols
B) > / \ a
ev uyoTaToL av elev, TpOS TE TO emLyerpetcOaL
aco paréotatot.
““Hyels 6€ od él advvatov apuvecbat odTH
/ 3 / > \ lal cal ”
TOA EepxyouEela, AANA TOls TaCW aploTa TAape-
id \ /
oKEvaTHEVNV, WOTE YPH KaL Tavu edXTiCEY dia
/ > \ lot
paxns lévat avTovs, € fut) Kai VvoOV Bpunvtar &v
Ka bd 4 > 2 > a fal e a
© oUT@ TdpecpeEv, GAN Stay év TH YH opaow
an lal /, x > / / r
Huds OnovvtTds TE Kal TaKelvwyv POEtpovtTas. Tact
cal > \ n / a
yap év Tois Oupact Kal év TO Tapavtixa opav
Yd > \ / t
madaxyovtas Te anes opyn mpoomimte, Kal oi
a > / , a cal >
Noylouwo éAayitTa yYpwpuevor Ove@ TreEicTta és
4 / >? / \ \ /
épyov xabiotavtat. *‘AOnvaious O€ Kal mréov TL
TOV AAXwD ELKOS TOUTO Opacat, of apyew TE TOV
” > n + ety / \ A / r
adXov aktovar Kal éTovtTes THY TMV TEXAS SyodY
fadXov 7) THY AUT@V Opav. ws odv él TOTa’THY
TOA oTpaTevovTes Kal weyloTny doEav oicopevos
lad / \ ¢ lal 4
Tols TE Tpoyovolts Kal Luly auTols er’ auhotepa
n / e fal
éx TOV aToBavovTav, EreaVe STN av TLS HYHTAL,
\ \
KOomov Kal duAaKHY EPL TAVTOS ToLovmEVoL Kal
A , ’ / , /
Ta Tapayyedropeva of€ws Sexouevor’ KadddNLOTOD
1 ofrw deleted by Hude, after Madvig.

1

278

BOOK II. x1. 3-9

some danger. _For the events of war cannot be

foreseen, and attacks are generally sudden and
furious; and oftentimes a smaller force, made
cautious by fear, overmatches a larger number that
is caught unprepared because it despises the foe.
One should, however, when campaigning in—an
enemys-tountry always be bold in spirit, but in
action cautious and therefore prepared. For thus
‘men will be most valorous in attacking their oppo-
nents and most secure against assault.

«And we are going against a city which is not
sO powerless to defend itself as some may think,

but is perfectly prepared in all respects; we a
therefore every reason to expect eae to risk a
battle, if they have not already set out before we
are yet there, at any rate when they see us in
their territory laying it waste and destroying their
property. For with all men, when they suffer an
unwonted calamity, it is the sight set then and
there before their eyes which makes them angry,
and when they are angry they do not pause to think
but rush into action. And the Athenians are even
more likely than most men to act in this way, since
they are more disposed to claim the right to rule
over others and to attack and ravage their neigh-
bours’ Jand than to see their own ravaged, Real-
ising, then, how powerful is the city against which
you are taking the field, and how great is the fame,
for better or for worse, ‘which you are about to win
for your ancestors and for yourselves from the out-
come, follow wherever your officers lead you,
regarding good order and vigilance as all-important,
and sharply giving heed to the word of command ;
for this is the fairest as well as the safest thing—for

279

THUCYDIDES

\ ,
yap Tobe Kal aoghadéotatoyv ToAdovs ovTas évi
/ / / >
KoTpLw Xpwpmevous paiverBar.
a \ / \
XII. Tocadta eitwv cat d:arvoas tov EvNXO-
yov 0 Apxtéapos Mernoitrov Tpa@tov arog TENNEL
/ if
és tas “AOnvas tov Araxpitov, avdpa Xraptia-
va) al C719 a ¢e n
THY, EL TL dpa padXov éevdotev ot “AOnvator opev-
2 tes ahas HON ev 06@ dvTas. oi Sé ov Tpocede-
3 N 5) \ , SY SoseeN \ , >
Eavto avtov és THY TOY Od éTL TO KoOLVOV* TV
\ veh / / ral
yap Ilepixréous yv@un mpoTepov vevixnxvia K1)-
\ , x / ,
puxa Kal mpecBelav pa SéyerGar Aaxedatpoviwr
/ \
éfeotpatevpévav. amoméutouaw obv avtov Tpu
lal \ / \ 4 3
axovoat Kal éxéXevov Ex70s Spav eivat avOnpepor,
TO TE AOLTOY avaywpncavTas eTl Ta ohHéTEpa
lal 7
auToav, nv te Bovr\wvTa, mpecBevecOar. Evp-
, a °
méuTovol te TO Medrnointa@ aywyous, OTws
\ / e >] > \ >? \ la Cie
3 pndevl Evyyévntat. o 0 érrerdy mi Tots optots
éyéveTo Kal éuerre dradvcecGar, Tocovee elT@v
« / a
é€rropeveto OTe “Hoe 7 nwépa tots “EXAnor peya-
lal v 39 a \ ’ / > \ ,
4 \wv Kaxov apEe.” as dé adixeTo €s TO oTPATO-
\ li e > 4 cA > lal
medov Kal éyvm o ‘Apytdapos OTe ot “A@nvaior
ovdév TH EvOwMcovaLy, OUTH 617) apas TO oTpPAT@
, \ ral nan
& mpovywpe: és THY yhv avTov. Bowtot d€ pépos
yey TO odéTepov Kal TOvs imméas TrapeiyovTo
/ , a
IleXorovynaios Evatpatevew, Tots S€ NecTropévors
, / lal
és LXdtarav éXOovtes tH yy ednour.
XII. "Ere 6€ trav LedXorovynciwv EvrAreyopé-

280

BOOK II. x1. g—xm1. 1
a great host to show itself subject to_a single dis-

cipline.”’ -

XII. With these words Archidamus dismissed the-—
assembly. He then first sent Melesippus son of
Diocritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in the hope that
the Athenians, when they saw that the Lace-
daemonians were already on the march, might be
somewhat more inclined to yield. But they did not
allow him to enter the city, much less to appear
before the assembly; for a motion of Pericles had
already been carried not to admit herald or embassy
after the Lacedaemonians had once taken the field.
They accordingly dismissed him without hearing
him, and ordered him to be beyond their borders a
that same day; and in future, they added, the Lace-
daemonians must first withdraw to their own terri-
tory before sending an embassy, if they had any
communication to make. They also sent an escort
along with Melesippus, in order to prevent his
having communication with anyone. And when he
arrived at the frontier and was about to leave his
escort, he uttered these words before he went his
way, “This day will be the beginning of great evils
for the Hellenes.”. When he came to the army,
and Archidamus had learned that the Athenians
would not as yet make any concession, then at
length they broke camp and advanced into Athenian
territory. And the Boeotians not only supplied
their contingent! and the cavalry to serve with the
Peloponnesians, but also went to Plataea with their
remaining troops and proceeded to ravage the
country.

XIII. While the Peloponnesian forces were still

1 1.e. two-thirds of their full appointment ; cf ch. x. 2.

281

THUCYDIDES

pI \ > \ \ ’ 4 A v \
vov te és Tov tcOpmov Kal év 06@ dvtTwv, mplv
ral > ral e ,
éoBareiv és thy “Attixnv, epixr4s 0 Bavéir-
\ xX °’ / / > , e
mov, otpatnyos av “A@nvaiwy déKatos avtcs, ws
bi \ > \ > , € / ef
éyva thy éaBorrnyv écopévynyv, UToTOTNGAS, OTL
> / > lal 7 xX ’ 4 \ 4
Apyidapmos avTe@ Eévos av éTUyXaveE, uw) TOAAG-
Kis autos idia BovArouevos yapitecOar Tov
si) pEevos Xap bs
> A > ra , x \ , a \
aypous avTov Tapaditn Kal un dnwon, } Kal
Aaxedatpoviwy Kedevodvtwy éml dvaBoryn TH
Qn r ad \
EauTovU yévNnTat TOUTO, WaTTEP Kal TA Ayn éXavVELY
a 4 , fal
Tpoelrov eveka Exeivou, mponyopeve Tots ’AOnvat-
> A > x , ef as "A a) O é ec Eé
ows €v TH EXKANTLA OTe Apyidapos pv ot E€vos
an a ,
ein, ov pévTor etl KAKO ye THS TOAEWS YyévoLTO,
ral >
TOUS O€ GypOvs TOUS EAUTOD KUL OlKias Hv apa p1)
, € / (4 \ \ a v
SnOTWOW OL TOAEMLOL WOTEP KAL TA TOV ANWV
> , > \ / > \ , ¢
adinaw avTta Snmooia eivat, Kal pndepiay oi
c at , U
UToWiav KaTa TaDTA yiyverPat. Taprver dé Kal
nr ,
Tépl TOY TapovTwY aTEP KaL TPOTEPOV, Tapa-
\ / x. na
oxevalecOai te é> TOY TONEMOY Kal Ta ex TOV
fal \ ,
aypav écxopiverOar, és Te payny pn éeme€cévar,
/
GXXa THY TOALW égeXOovTas durAacoe, Kal TO
e / n
VAUTLKOV, NTEP LaXVovaW, eEapTVEeTOal, Ta TE TOV
\

Evpuayov dia yerpos Exew, NEywov THY LoxydY
avTois amo TovUTwY EivaL TOV XpNuaTwV THs
\ fal
mpocodou,! Ta O€ TOAAXA TOV TOELOV yop" Kal
YPN MAT @Vv Teplovata kpatetcbar. Capceiv te
1 rav xpnuatwv tis mpocddov deleted by Hude, after van

Herwerden.

282

BOOK II. xi. 1-3

collecting at the Isthmus and while they were_on the
march but had not yet invaded Attiéa, Pericles gon
of Xanthippus, who was one of the ten Athenian
generals, when he realised that the invasion would be
made, conceived a suspicion that perhaps Archi-
damus, who happened to be a guest-friend of his,
might pass by his fields and not lay them waste, doing
this either on his own initiative, in the desire to do
him a personal favour, or at the bidding of the Lace-
daemonians with a view to creating a prejudice
against him, just as it was on his account that they
had called upon the Athenians to drive out the

pollution.! So he ee Athenians in.
their assembly that whiléArchidamus was indeed a

guest-friend of his, this Setattonshtp“had certainly

ot been entered upon for the detriment of the

/state; and that in case the enemy might not lay

;
;
/

\een

waste his fields and houses like the rest, he now gave
them up to be public property} and asked that no
suspieron should-ariseagainst himself on that account.
And he gave them the same advice as before? about
the present situation: that they should prepare for
the war, should bring in their property from the
fields, and should not go out to meet the enemy in
battle, but should come into the city and there act
on the defensive ; that they should equip their fleet,
in which their strength lay, and keep a firm hand
upon their allies, explaining that the Athenian power
depended on revenue of money received from the
allies, and that, as a general rule, victories in war
were won by abundance of money as well as by wise
policy. And he bade them be of good courage, as on

1 ef. 1. exxvii. 1,
8 fs 1. .exiiii.

283

a
Z

THUCYDIDES

’ / , a J U / 4
éxédeve Tpoclovt@y pev EEakoclwy TANAVTWY WS
? \ \ \ U Daw \ > \ lal /
él TO TOAU Popov KaT eviavTov amo Tov Evupa-
fal 7 fol li /
YoOv TH Tore avev THS aAANS TpoTodov, UTap-
fol U ” / >
xovtwv b& év TH axpomroder ETL TOTE apyuptov
,’ / e / / \ \ lad
émionmou éEakicytNiwy TadadvT@v (Ta yap THeéi-
= , / , /
Ta Tplakociwy aTrodéovTa pupia eyéveto, ad
® / A ) so
@v & TE TA TpOTUAALA THs AKpoTTOAEWS Kal TAN-
/ > ,
Xa oikodopnuata Kal és Hotedarav atravnrwbn),
/ / \ 3 /
yopis 6€ Ypuciov adonpov KIL apyuplou év Te
\ , \ iA e
avaOrypaoww idtow Kal Snmociows Kal doa lepa
/ \ \ \ Qr
oKEev!) TEPL TE TAS TOMTAS Kal TOUS ay@vas Kal
r if
axtDAa Myodixa xat el Te ToLovTOTpoTroV, ovK
> , 1s , , ” \
édtuacovos! mevtaKociwy TadavT@v. ETL Ee
lal Vi lal
Kal Ta €k TOV GAXwY lepav TpoceTiOEr YpnuaTa
, , 3 ,
ovx Oddtya, ols ypyoecOat autos, Kal HY TavU
‘d Xx fol fal r ral
éfelpywytat TavTwv, Kal avtis THs Oeod ois
, , 2
TEPLKELMEVOLS Xpuvalos’ amépawe 6 EXOV TO
dyaXpa tTeccapaKovta TadavTa otabmov ypv-
/ XV >
ciov arébOov Kal TeptaipeTov eivat aTav. xpN-
\ / na \
capevous Te €7l cwTNpia Edy YpHvar wn EMacow

1 Fv of the MSS., after éddocovos, deleted by Abresch.

1 About £120,000, or $583,200. The original amount at
the institution of the Confederacy of Delos was 460 talents
(1. xcvi. 2). The figure here given is an average amount,
because the assessment was revised every four years at the
Panathenaea.

These figures, and all other equivalents of Greek financial
statements, are purely conventional, inasmuch as the purchas-
ing power of money was then very much greater than now.

2 The ordinary revenue, apart from the tribute, consisted
of customs duties, tax on sales, poll tax on resident aliens,

284

BOOK II. xm. 3-5

an average six hundred talents! of tribute were
coming in yearly from the allies to the city, not
counting the other sources? of revenue, and there
were at this time still on hand in the Acropolis six
thousand talents? of coined silver (the maximum
amount had been nine thousand seven hundred
talents, from which expenditures had been made for
the construction of the Propylaea* of the Acropolis
and other buildings,® as well as for the operations at
Potidaea). Besides, there was uncoined gold and
silver in public and private dedications, and all the
sacred vessels used in the processions and games, and
the Persian spoils and other treasures of like nature,
worth not less than five hundred talents.6 And he
estimated, besides, the large amount of treasure to
be found in the other temples. All this would
be available for their use, and, if they should be
absolutely cut off from all other resources, they
might use even the gold plates with which the
statue of the goddess herself was overlaid.? The
statue, as he pointed out to them, contained forty
talents’ weight of pure gold, and it was all re-
movable.? ‘his treasure they might use for self-
preservation, but they must replace as much as they

rents of state property, especially the silver mines, court
fees and fines.

3 About £1,940,000, or $9,428,400.

4 Completed about 432 B.c.

> Such as the Parthenon, the Odeum, and the Telesterion
at Eleusis (see Plut. Per. xiii.).

§ About £100,000, or $486,000.

7 The-chryselepliantine statue of Athena by Phidias in the
Parthenon.

8 According to Plut. Per. xxxi., Phidias, by the advice of
Pericles, laid on the gold in such a way that it could all be
removed and weighed.

285

THUCYDIDES

na / \ S

6 avTiKaTacThoaL TAAL. YXpHuace pev odV OUTH
b] 7 > 7 e / \ / \
éOdpauvev avtovs’ omAiTas d€ TpLaXLALOUS Kal

/ 3 / lal lal / al
pupious evar avev TV ev TOs Ppovptots Kal TOY
ty e / \ , a
7 wap érarkiv é€axicxiNwv Kal puplov. Tocod-
x \ cal e , (4
Tou yap ébvAacoov TO TPHTOV OTFOTE Ol TOAEMLOL
éoBddovev, ad Te TOV TpecRuTdTwY Kal TOV
, ccd e cad lal
VEWTATOV KAL [LETOLK@Y SOL OTALTAL HoaV. TOU
\ n /
te yap Padnpixod telyovs otadion Hoav TeEvTeE
\ \ 4 a
Kal TplLdKoVvTAa Tpos TOV KUKAOY TOD aadTEwS Kal
rn fal \ , ral
avtoD TOU KUKAOUV TO duAaccopEvoY TpEis Kal
/ ad \ > lal aA \ > /
Teccapaxovta (€ots S€ avTov 0 Kal apvdaKTov
Av, 70 peTaev TOU Te waKpov Kal ToD Padypixod),
x \ al
Ta 5 paxpa telyn mpos Tov Lletpava teccapa-
\ o r
KovTa oTadiwv, av to &wbev ernpeito, Kal TOU
rn \ ; , ter ‘ , ‘
Ilecparas Evv Movvixig e€nKkovTa yey oTadiop 0
, > r
amas twepiBoros, TO o ev hudakh ov tyucu Tov-
e / \ > / /, \ ,
8 Tov. inméas 6€ atrédhatve Stakociovs Kal XUALOUS
\ te / e / \ \ tA
Eby immotofotats, éEaxociovs 6€ Kai yedtous
\
rofdTas, Kal Tpinpsis Tas TAWLWoUS TpLAKOCias.
a e a . , \

9 Tadta yap UTApyev “AOnvatows Kal ovK éXAdoow
= / ” € 2 \ \ a ”
éxacta TOUTwWY, OTE 7) eo BOA TO TPwTOV Ewedre

\ /
Ilerotrovvnciwy écecOar Kal és Tov TOEMOV KAabL-
otavto. édeye 6¢ Kal adda oldTep eiwher Iepi-
n ’ > / an / lo ,
Kris és aTodeEw TOD TepiécedBat TO TOAELY.
XIV. Of &8 "A@nvaiot dxovcavtes aveTreiBovto
te Kal éoexouilovto ex TaY aypa@v Taidas Kai
al e >
yuvaixas Kal THY GAXQV KaTACKEVIY 1) KAT OLKOY

286

BOOK II. x11. 5—x1v. 1

took. As to their resources in money, then, he thus
sought to encourage them; and as to heavy-armed
‘infantry, he told them that there were thirteen
thousand, not counting the sixteen thousand men
who garrisoned the forts and manned the city walls.
For this was the number engaged in garrison duty at
first, when the enemy were invading Attica, and they
were composed of the oldest and the youngest!
citizens and of such metics as were heavily armed.
For the length of the Phalerian wall was thirty-five
stadia to the circuit-wall of the city, and the portion
of the circuit-wall itself which was guarded was forty-
three stadia (a portion being left unguarded, that be-
tween the Long Wall and the Phalerian); and the
Long Walls to the Peiraeus were forty stadia in extent,
of which only the outside one was guarded; and the
whole circuit of the Peiraeus including Munichia
~was-sixty stadia, half of it being under guard. The
cavalry, Pericles pointed out, numbered twelve

hundred, including mounted-archers, the..bow-men ~

sixteen hundred, and the_triremes’ that were sea-
worthy three hundred. For these were the forces,
and not less than these in each branch, which the
Athenians had on hand when the first invasion of the
Peloponnesians was impending and they found them-
selves involved in the war. And Pericles used still
other arguments, as was his wont, to prove that they
would be victorious in the war.

XIV. After the Athenians had heard his words
they were won to his view, and they began to bring
in from the fields their children and wives, and also

' The age limits were eighteen to sixty, those from
eighteen to twenty (ep{roAm) being called on only for gar-

rison duty within the bounds of Attica. The age of full
citizenship was twenty.

287

‘de

THUCYDIDES

7 nw lal ’ cal cal
éypavTo, Kal avTav TV olKL@Y KaBatpodyTEs THY
s \
EUkwow: mpd8ata 6€ Kal UTotiya és THY Ko-
/ \ \ / \
Boav Sterréuryavto Kal Tas vycovs Tas ETLKEL-
pévas. xareTa@s be avtois dua TO atel evmlevar
Tovs mToNAovUs ev TOs aypots SiatTaoOat 2) ava-
/ / \ a
otacis éyiyveto. XV. EvveBeByxer bé€ a0 Tod
/ / e / cal ] , a
mdvu apyaiov étépwv paddov ‘A@nvaiots TovTO.
>] \ \ re. \ ae Se , / €
éml yap Kéxporros kal Tov tTpeTtav Bacihewv 1
’ \ > / plies, | \ / ’ a
Artiky és Oncéa aiet Kata TONES WKELTO TPU-
4 / \ Ul e
Taveid TE éxovcas Kal apXovTas, Kal OTOTE LUN
an ,
wi Selcerav, ov Evvnocav BovrEvoopevot ws TOP
4 > ’ > \ 4 > / ‘
Baocirtéa, AX avTol ExagToL eTONLTEVOY Kat
> , , <7e5 / , ?
€BovNEVOVTO* Kal TLVES KAL ETTOAELNOAY TOTE Av-
fal av Saae , ’ > / x
Tav, w@oTEp Kal EXevotvior meT Evyor7rov 7 pos
/
"EpeyOéa. émredy 5& Onoeds éBactirevee, ryevo-
\ fa fa A
wevos peta Tod Evvetov Kat duvatos Ta Te adda
, , \ f lal v
Suexdopnoe THY Yopav Kal KaTaXVTAS THY ah-
/ / / \ \ > \ >?
Aw TOAEwWY Ta TE BOVAEVTNELA KAL TAS apYasS ES
\ a U 5 a 4 > /
Thy vov ToAW ovcarv, &v BovrevTrpLov amrodetEas
cal Li
Kal Tputavelov, EvveKice TAvTas, Kal vEWomevous
rat / , \ \ Qn
Ta avTo@Y Exdotous amep Kal TPO TOV nVvayKacE
al Ul / fo) aA / »
wid TOE TA’TH XphoOat, t awavtTwv Hon Evv-
/ \ / /
redovvT@V és avTHVY peyaddn yevomévn TrapedoOn
/ r
ind Oncéws tois éretta: Kal Evvoixia €& Eexeivou
>] lal ” \ rn fal Q fal id \ a
A@nvaio. ért Kal viv TH Oe@ Eoptiv dnuoterh
TOLOvUCLY.
rm \ \ cal > Ul e lal = ,
To S€ mpo tod 7) axpoTroNts 7) VOY OvTa TOMS

1 Others render: ‘since all were now counted as belonging
to it.”

288

BOOK II. xiv. 1-xv. 3

their household furniture, pulling down even the
woodwork of the houses themselves; but sheep
and draught-animals they sent over to Euboea and
the adjacent islands. And the removal was a hard
thing for them to accept, because most of them
had always been used to live in the country.
XV. And this kind of life had been the character-
istic of the Athenians, more than of any other Hel-
lenes, from the very earliest times. For in the time
of Cecrops and the earliest kings down to Theseus,
Attica had been divided into separate towns, each
with its town hall and magistrates, and so long as
they had nothing to fear they did not come together
to consult with the king, but separately administered
their own affairs and took counsel for themselves.
Sometimes they even made war upon the king, as,
for example, the Eleusinians with Eumolpus did upon
Erechtheus. But when Theseus became king and
proved himself a powerful as well as a prudent ruler,
he not only re-organized the country in other respects,

but abolished the councils and magistracies of the.

a,

minor towns and brought all their inhabitants into dé

union with what is now the city, establishing a single
council and town hall, and compelled them, while con-
tinuing to occupy each his own lands as before, to use
Athens as the sole capital. This became a great city,
since all were now paying their taxes to it,land was
such when Theseus handed it down to his successors.
And from his time even to this day the Athenians
have celebrated at the public expense a festival
called the Synoecia,? in honour of the goddess.

Before this? what is now the Acropolis was the

2 “Feast of the Union,” celebrated on the sixteenth of the
month Hecatombaeon.

8 i.e. before the Synoecismus, or union of Attica under
Theseus.

289

THUCYDIDES )

5 Ri NS ee ss IN \ , ,
Av, Kal TO UT aUTHY POS VOTOY WadLoTAa TETPAp-
/ \ \ \ a a
pévov. texunpiov b& Ta yap lepa ev avTh TH
Ld a
axpoToder Kal adrdwv Gedy eat, Kat Ta ew
\ lal \ , a LU lal (cA
Tpos TOUTO TO Epos THS TOhEWS MANAOV LOpuTaL,
’ a \ an? , /
76 te ToD Atos Tod "OXvpriov Kal To TlvOiov Kat
a a \ a / 2
ro THs Tis kal 7o Tod ev Aipvats Acovicov, ©
7 a a
Ta apyaotepa Atovicta TH Swdexdtyn” Toretrar
> na eo pee
év pnvi "AvOcotnprav, @oTep Kal ot am “AOn-
/ v y \ r / 7 \
valwov "lwves éte Kal viv vomifovow. tdputar de
\ bd e \ 7 > n \ a / fol
kal ddra (epa TavTN apyata. Kal TH KpHVH TH
vov pev Tov TUpdyVwY oUTwS cKevacavToV ‘Ey-
/ f \ \ 7 a a
veakpovv@ Kadoupévyn, TO O€ Tahal Pavepov TOV
a rc / / vad /
mnyav ovcav Kaddppon @vopacpevy exetvot TE
\ U lal lal
éyyds oon Ta TAeiaTOU dia éxXp@vTO, Kal VOY
la) / , a
ru amd Tov apyalov Tpo TE yaplKav Kal és ara
r a / lal > a an
Tov lepav vomiterar Te VdaTe xpicOa. Kareirar
\ / ,
Sé Sua THY Tadatay TavTN KATOiKNCW Kal 7) aKpo-
r lj ae y /
Tos wexpe TOdSE ETL UT “AOnvaiwy TOXLs.
“4 on >
XVI. T7 8 obv emi word cata THY ywpav
> / 3 Pe! 3 4 -A@ lal \ bd \
aUTOVOML® oiKHTEL® ot nvaiolt, Kal é7reLon
/ yy \ lal cal o
EvvexicOnoar, 61a Td eos ev Tos aypois Ouws
¢ , a >? , lal
oi mAelous TOV TE apyalwy Kal Tov vaoTEpoV

1 Added by Cobet.

2 +7 Swoexaty deleted by Hude, after Torstrick.

’ ueretxov, in the MSS. before of ’A@nvaio, deleted by
Dreissen.

1 It is taken for granted that these temples were ancient
foundations.

290

BOOK II. xv. 3-xvi. 1

city, together with the region at the foot of the
Acropolis toward the south. And the proof of
this is as follows: On the Acropolis itself are the
sanctuaries? of the other gods as well as of Athena,?
and the sanctuaries which are outside the Acro-
polis are situated more in that quarter of the city,
namely those of Olympian Zeus, of Pythian Apollo,
of Earth, and of Dionysus in Limnae, in whose
honour are celebrated the more ancient Dionysia
the twelfth of the month Anthesterion, just as the
Ionian descendants of the Athenians also are wont
even now to celebrate it. In that quarter are also
situated still other ancient sanctuaries. And the
fountain now called Enneacrunus,‘ from the fashion
given it by the tyrants, but which anciently, when
the springs were uncovered, was named Callirrhoe, was
used by people of those days, because it was close by,
for the most important ceremonials; and even now,
in accordance with the ancient practice, it is still
customary to use its waters in the rites preliminary
to marriages and other sacred ceremonies. And,
finally, the Acropolis, because the Athenians had
there in early times a place of habitation, is still to
this day called by them Polis or city.

XVI. Because, then, of their long-continued life of
independence in the country districts, most of the
Athenians of early times and of their descendants
down to the time of this war, from force of habit,
even after their political union with the city, continued

? A lacuna in the text is generally assumed; Classen would
supply kal ra rijs "A@nvas after beav ear, and I translate this.

* The Anthesteria, contrasted with the Lenaea, which was
also an ancient festival, but of less antiquity. The city

Dionysia was of comparatively recent origin.
* Enneacrunus, Nine Conduits; Callirrhoe, Fair Stream.

2Q1

a

THUCYDIDES

/ lal a / , , /
wx pl Tovdse TOU ToAgu“ov Tavorxnoia’ yevoperdt
Te Kal olxjcavtes, ov padciws Tas avacTacels
> wn ” \ v ’ / A
€motouvTo, AN\AWS TE Kal apTL avetdyPoTes TAS

\ \ \ / > a \ \
KatacKkevas peta Ta Mydixa: éBapvvorto dé Kal

a / ,
yareras épepov oixias Te KaTadelrovtes Kal
e \ x \ al a
iepa & S:a wavtos Hw avtois ex THs Kata TO
’ an / / , / /
apXaiov TorTElas TaTpLa, OlatTav TE EdoVTES
peTaBdrrew Kal ovdev adro 7) TOW THY avTOD
aTroNelT@Vv EKATTOS.
\ ,

XVII. ’Exresdy) 8 ddixovto és TO datu, ddtyors

, fa ’ /
pév TLow UTX oiKnoes Kal Tapa diwv TiVas
Hi > , , e \ \ , ee
1) OLKELMY KaATAPVYN, OL dé woNXot Ta TE EPHUA

rn / ” \ \ n
Tis TOEwWS WKnoav Kal TA lepa Kal Ta Hpoa

/ \ iol > / \ a? /
TavTa TAY THS akpoTrOAEws Kal TOV EXevorviou

UA , \
xa ef te ado BeBalws KAnoTOV Hv TO TE
7 \ \
Tlevapyixov? kadovpevov TO bo THY axpoTrONu,,
A Yes , , = \ > A , \
6 kal érdpatov Te Hv wy olKely Kat Te Kal Hude-

be 6 , > , Ul ‘
Kod pavtelov aKpoTedevTioy ToLovde Srexwdue,

Néyou as “To TleAapyxdv apyov apyewov, ones
ind THs Tapayphya avayens eEpxyOn. Kat pot
Soxel TO pavtetoy Tovvavtiov EvpLhvar } mpoce-
SéxovTo, ob yap Sia THY Tapdvomov évoiKnaty ai
Evpdhopal yevécOar TH TOrEt, GAM Sua TOV TOe-

1 ravoixnole placed by Hude, following Lipsius, after
padiws.

‘2 With C and a popular decree found in 1880 (C.I.A, iv.
27b); the other MSS. MeAaoyixdv.

292

BOOK II. xvi. r1—xvur. 2

to reside, with their households, in the country where
they had been born; and so they did not find it casy
to move away, especially since they had only recently
finished restoring their establishments after the
Persian war. They were dejected and aggrieved at
having to leave their homes and the temples which
had always been theirs,—relics, inherited from their
fathers, of their original form of government—and at
the prospect of changing their mode of life, and
facing what was nothing less for each of them than
forsaking his own town.

XVII. And when they came to the capital, only a
few of them were provided with dwellings or places
of refuge with friends or relatives, and most of them
took up their abode in the vacant places of the city
and the sanctuaries and the shrines of heroes, all
except the Acropolis and the Eleusinium and any
other precinct that could be securely closed. And
the Pelargicum,! as it was called, at the foot of the
Acropolis, although it was under a curse that forbade ,
its use for residence, and this was also prohibited by -
a verse-end of a Pythian oracle to the following
effect :

“The Pelargicum unoccupied is better,”

nevertheless under s'ress of the emergency was com-
pletely filled with buildings. And the oraclé;asvit
© seems to-meycanre™ true; \but in a‘ sense quite the
op of-what-was~expected ;_ forf it was no
Account of the unlawful occupation of the place that
\the city was visited by the calamities, but it was on
1 A fortification built by the ‘Pélasvians”~on~the-west
side of the Acropolis, the only side accessible to an enemy.

It was to the space below and above this fortification that
the curse attached.

293

or

THUCYDIDES

id ’ 4 lol >, / A > > / \
pov 9) avaykn THS oiKHnTEwS, dv OVK OVvomafov TO
A ’ “ \
pavrelov mponde: un eT ayab@ TOTE AUTO KaTOL-

, GC
KkicOnoouevov. KatecKevacavtTo 5é Kal év Tots
lal lal ,
TUpYOLs TOV TELY@Y TOAAOL Kal WS ExXaTTOS TOU
> / > \ ’ , / > > \ e
édvvato* ov yap éywpnoe EvvedOovtas avtTous 1)
, > ? ef \ / \ ,
mods, GAN Uotepov 67) Tad TE paxpa TELYN
Oknoav Katavedwevot kai tod Ileparas ta
/ e \ \ lal \ \ /
Tord. dpa O€ Kab TOY Tpos TOY TOdEpoV
ee / > / \ a
Amtovto, Evppadyous Te wyelpovtes Kal TH LeXo-
\ n , /
Tovync@ ExaTov vewy éeTiTAOvY EEapTVOVTES Kal
€ \ > / lal i
OL peev Ev TOUTM TApacKEUTs ioav.
bs ca
XVIIL. ‘O 6€ otpatos taév HeXotrovynciov
w\ > / nr ray, a >? 8, lal
Tpoiwv apixeto THS "AtTiKhs és Oivony rpator,
mn ral
niep e€“edrov eoBadrelv. Kat ws éexalélorTo,
mTpoa Boras twapeckeudlovTo TO TELYEL TOLNTO-
a Ny jo / ig Xx a oe
pevot pnyavais Te Kal ANXW TpOT@: 7H yap Oivon
93 / lal roe a
ovca ev peOopios THs “Attixns Kat Borwrtias
> , \ 3 an / e€ > ~
éreTetyloTo Kal avT@® gpovpio ot “A@nvaiar
al e U / >
éyp@vTo oTOTE TOAEWOS KaTAaNaBoL. Tas TE OdV
\
mpoaBoras nutpeTifovto Kal adrws evoreTpiav
\ > 7 \ ,
Ypovov mept avTyv. aitiay S€ ovK €dNayloTHY
b , 4 - ’ > > an 6 4 > A
Apyidapos éhaSev am’ avtovd, doxOv Kai év TH
a “ / r
Evvaywy Tov ToA€“ou pmadakos Eivat Kat Tols
/ / a
"AOnvalows émityndel0s, ov Tapawav mpobvpws
val , / , : , iA
ToNeuety* €mreton Te EvvedeyeTO O OTPATOS, 4 TE

a > A \ /
év TO loOud erripovn yevonévn Kal Kata THY

2 of. 1. Ixxx.-Iexxy,

294

\

;
|
\

BOOK II. xvu. 2-xvint. 3

account of the war that there was the necessity of its
occupation, and the oracle, although it did not men-
tion the war, yet foresaw that the place would never
be occupied for any good. ) Many also established

\themselvesi in the towers-of the city walls, and where-

ever each one could find a place; for the city did
not have room for them when they were all there
together. But afterwards they distributed into lots
and occupied the space between the Long Walls and

the greater part of the Peiraeus. (And while all

to the war, bringing together allies and fitting out
an expedition of one hundred ships against the
Peloponnesus. The Athenians then, were in this
stage of their preparations, )“~""

| this was gone on, the Atheniansapplied themselves

camp there, they prepared to assault the wall with
engines wind otherwise ; for Oenoe, which was on the
border between Attica and Boeotia, was a walled
town, and was used as a fortress by the Athenians
whenever war broke out. So the Lacedaemonians
went on with their preparations to assault the place,
and in this and other ways wasted time. And it was for
his conduct here that Archidamus was most severely
censured, though it was thought that in the levying
of the war, too, he had been slack and had played
into the hands of the Athenians when he did not
advise the Peloponnesians to make war with vigour.}
Again, when the army was being collected, he was
criticized for the delay which occurred at the
Isthmus, and afterwards for the leisurely way in

295

"XX VIE Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians .
was neing and the first point it reached in Attica
wa Oenoe, here they intended to begin the \

invasion. Amd while they were establishing their

THUCYDIDES

/ é /
aAXnv Topelav % ayoraroTns SiéBarev avTov,
¢ n ee
partata 6€ 1) é€v TH Olvon ériaxeois. ot yap
? a , al /
A@nvaiot écexoptfovto €v TO Xpov@ TOUT@, Kal
, ’ \ ,
édoxouv of IleXotrovynotos émerXOovtes av Sta Ta-
/ 4 ” a > x \ \
yous Tavta étt Ew KatadaPetv, & wn dia THY
, / ' g x ’ ar ic
éxeivou pédAnow. év TOLAUTN MEV Opn O OTPATOS
\ "A 1 b] a 6é8 t e &é
tov Apxidapov év TH Kabédpa eiyev. 0 Cé, Tpoa-
/ \ , a an
Seyouevos, ws EyEeTaL, TOUS "A@nvatous THs ys
, ” , a zi
ETL AKEpalov Ovans évdw@ceELY TL KAL KATOKVHC EL
al \ lal an
Tepudety avTnY TunOetoav, avelyev.
XIX. ’Esrecdn) pévtoe twpocParovtes 7H Oivon
lal / a
Kal Tacav déay TetpdcavTes oUK EdvVAaVTO EXEl>P,
— b] al 2O\ bd , / ‘\
of te “AOnvaios ovdév emrexnpuKEevovto, oUTw@ On
jpunoavtes at avtHs peta ta év Idataia!
Oppncavtes am avTis peta Thataig’
yevomweva nuépa oySonxooTH pdartoTa, Oépous Kat
a / \
Tov citov akpatovtos, écéBarov és THY AtTiKHY:
e an J / id
nyetto S€ “Apyidapmos o Zev&tddpov, Aaxedar-
if, / / a
poviov Bacirevs. Kat kabeCopwevor ETE“vov Tpa-
\ 31) a \ \ / ‘4 \
tov pev "EXevotva Kal TO Opidowov Tediov kai
val , ¢ /
tpoTy tiva Tav “A@nvaiwv imméwy rept Tous
/

‘Peitovs KaXovpévous érroljocavto: éTEelTa Tpov-
/ ] n ” ‘\ A? / v \
x@povv ev dekid Eyovtes To Alyadewv dpos dia
al >? ,
Kpwmtds &ws adixovto és “Ayapvds, ywptov pé-
nr er a 7 ,
yiotov THS AtTiKAs TOV Ojpwwv KaXovMEVwY, Kat
’ / / /
xabefopevor és adTov oTpaToTeEdoy TE eTOLNTAVTO

, , f
\Ypovoy TE TONVY EppEelvavTES ETELVOD.
na / \ > /
XX. Tveépun 5€ tordse Néyetat Tov “Apyidapov

l rav écedOdvtwv OnSalwy, in the MSS. after MAaralg,
deleted by Classen.

296

BOOK Il. xvut. 3-xx. 1

whiel+ the march was made, but most of all for the

¢ halt at Oenoe> For in the interval the Athenians

“continued to bring their property into the city and
the Peloponnesians believed that but for his pro-
crastination they could have advanced quickly and
found everything still outside. Such was the re-
sentment felt by the army toward Archidamus while
they were sitting still. But the reason, it is said,
why he kept holding back was that he expected the
Athenians would make some concession while their
territory was still unravaged and would be loath to
see it laid waste.

XIX. When, however, after assaulting Oenoe _
and trying in every way to take it they were not able ~
to do so, the Athenians meanwhile making no over-
tures, then at length they set off from there, about
eighty days after the events at Plataea, when it was .
midsummer! and the corn was ripe, and invadéd *\\
Attica, under the command of Archidamus son of |
Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. Making

“avhalt-they~proceededto~™ravage,.first..of“all, the
territory of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, and
they routed the Athenian cavalry néar thé Streams
called Rheiti; then they advanced, keeping” Mount
Aegaleos on their right through Cropia,? until they
came to Acharnae, the largest of the demes of Attica,
as they are called! Halting in the town they made
a camp, where they remained for a long time ravaging

~

the country.
ee. AG it is said that the motive of Archidamus

1 The reference is to the Attic summer, which included
spring. The date was about the end of May, the average
time for cutting grain in Attica.

2 A deme between Aegaleos and Parnes,

297

VOL. I. L

THUCYDIDES

, \ ’ A e > / f
Tept te Tas Ayapvas ws és paynv tafdpevov
petvat Kai és TO TedLov exelvyn TH ea BOAH OU KaTa-
a \ 4 > / »” > / /
Bivat tovs yap “A@nvaious HAmivev, axwalovrdas |
, an / ,
TE VEOTNTL TOAAH Kal TaperKevacpéevous és TOE-
/ a
{ov WS oUTw TpoTEpoV, laws av émreFeAOciy Kal
THY yhv ovK adv wepudety tunOfRvar. érrerdy ovv
bd a 2 >] a \ \ / / >
avT®@ és “EXevciva cal TO Opidovov rediov ovK
tal an x
aTHVTNTAV, Teipay éTroletTo Tept Tas “Ayapvas
Ka@nuevos eb émeElacw Gua pev yap avT@ o
Yapos émiTHOELOS EhaiveTo évaTpaToTEdedaal, dpa
a / 5) fol ,
dé kal of “Ayapviis péya pépos dvtes THS TONES
A \ e tal > / > | ,
(Tptayidtol yap omrAiTat €yévovTo) ov Treptovrec Oat
990 / \ / / > p oe. /
édoxouv Ta odétepa dtadVapévta, aAX opuncev
Kal Tovs TdavTas és paynv. el Te Kal pn ére€-
A fal e ’ al
éEXOorev exeivn TH é€cBorAH ot “AOnvaio, abe-
/ 7 a
éotepov 70n és TO YaoTEpov TO TE TEdiov TEpeEty
\ \ / / \ \
Kal €> avTnY THY TOAW KXwpHcEcOaL> TOUS yap
a / e 4
"Ayapvéas éotepnpévous TOY odeTépwv OvY opmoiws
a nr /
mpoOvmous éEcec0ar UTrép THS TOV ANAwWY KLVdU-
, a
vevew, atdow © eévécecOat TH yvopn. ToLravTyn
\ , a / \ \ > \ >
ev OLavola o Apxicapos mept Tas Axapvas VY.
XXI. A Onvaior dé EXPL bev ov epi "EXevotva
Kal TO Opraciov Tedlov oO oTparos ip Kab TiVva
érTrida elyou és TO éyyutépw avTovs mr) Tpoiévat,
peuvnuéevor Kal IlXevotodvaxta tov Lavoaviou
/ / . na
Aaxedatpoviov Bactiéa, 6Te EoBarwov tis 7Atti-
Kns és “EXevatva cal Opi@fe otpat@ WeXozrov-
\ a lal /
vnoiwy Tpo TovdSe Tod TrOAgwouv Técoapar Kal déxa
, , \
ETeoly aveywpnoe Tadiv és TO TA€OV OUKETL

298

BOOK UH. (xx) y-—xx1.. 1

in waiting about Acharnae with his troops ready for
battle, instead of descending into the plain during
this invasion, was as follows: He cherished the
hope that the Athenians, who were at their very best
as regards the multitude of their youth and prepared
for war as never before, would perhaps come out
against him and not look on and see their land
ravaged. So when they did not come to meet him
at Eleusis and in the Thriasian plain, he settled
down in the neighbourhood of Acharnae, to make a
test whether they would come out; for not only did
that seem to him a suitable place for his camp, but
also the Acharnians were an important part of the
state, their hoplites numbering three thousand, and
he thought that they would not look on and see their
fields ravaged, but would urge the whole people
also to fight. And even if the Athenians should not
come out against him during this invasion, he would
thenceforward proceed with less apprehension to
ravage the plain and even advance to the very walls
of the city; for the Acharnians, once stripped of
their own possessions, would not be as eager to incur
danger as before in behalf of the lands of the rest,
and so a division would arise in the counsels of the
Athenians. It was with this design that Archidamus
stayed at Acharnae.

XXI. Now so long as the Peloponnesian army
remained in the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the
Thriasian plain, the Athenians retained hope that they
would not advance nearer; for they remembered that
Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedae-
monians, when fourteen years before this war he had
invaded Attica with an army of Peloponnesians and
proceeded as far as Eleusis and Thria, had advanced

299

tbo

THUCYDIDES

’ \ \ \ a /
mpoeOav (60 6 67 Kal 7 huyn avT@ éeyéveto éx
a \
Vrdprns SoEavte ypypace wercOjvar THY avayo-
b] dt be \ oe. \ i \ ®
pnaww)* erredy O€ wept Axapvas eldov Tov oTpaTov
, lod , /
éEjxovta oTadlous Tis Toews ATEXOVTA, OVKETL
\ lal > 3 > A e fal
avacXETOV €TOLODVTO, GAN avToOts, WS ELKOS, Ys
n nial Ul
TEeuvouevns ev TO Euavel, 0 oVTM EopaKEecay ot
, 7o) e , \ \
ye vewtepot, ovd ot mpeaRuTepor TAY Ta Mn-
/ \ > , \ ’ , 4 v
Sued, Servov edaiveto kai édoKet Tots Te aAXoLS
ol , , \
Kal wadicTa TH veoTnte émeEvéevar Kal pn TrEpt-
cal \ / fo
opav. KaTa Evotdacers TE yryvomevot Ev TOArXH
> , e
Eptde toay, ol puev KeNEVOVTES erreELévat, ol O€ TLVES
cr / Ss \
OUK E@VTES. XpNTMorOyOL TE HOov YpHnopovs
TavtTolous, @Y axpoacBat ws ExacTos wpunto.
an \ / ral
of te Ayxapvis oldpevor Tapa odio avtois ovK«
tal > / lal e
ehayiotny potpay eivar “A@nvatwr, ws avtov 7
r fal \ /
YF ETEMVETO, evhyyov Thy é€odov padsora. Tavtt
TE TpOT® aumpedigTo.. %) WONLS Kal TOV Hepuecrca
év opyn €ixov, Kal ov Trarpyvere ™poTEpov cue
pvnvto oveEev, AAW éexadxilov OTL oTpaTHYyOS Gv ovK
“i / /
éreEayol, altuov Te odtow évouilov TavtTwv wv
émracxov.
r an \ e a
XXII. Ilepixr7js 8€ copay pev adtovs mpos
, \ x
TO Tapov YareTTAivovTas Kal ov Ta apltoTa po-
lal 4 ‘ ’ r rn
voovtas, Tiatevav S€ OpOGs yryvecKe TeEpi TOD
/ / a
pn eretvévat, ExKANolay TE OVK ETTOLEL AUTA@V OSE
/ > / lal \ ’ a rat x ,
EvAXoyor ovdéva, TOD wn OPyH TL “aAXOV 7H YV@p"N
/ > a / / > /
EvveNOovtas eEapaptety, THvy Te TodkW epvracce
1 With CEG; &pyntro ABM.
300

BOGE“L1! v31.30-xxit.. i

no farther but had gone back again. (And indeed this
was the cause of his banishment from Sparta, since
lie was thought to have been bribed to retreat.) But
when they saw the army in the neighbourhood of
Acharnae, only sixty stadia from the city, they thought
the situation no longer tolerable; on the contrary, it
naturally appeared to them a terrible thing when their
land was being ravaged before their eyes, a sight
which the younger men had never seen, or even the
older men except in the Persian war ; and the general
opinion, especially on the part of the younger men,
was that they ought to go forth and puta stop to it.
They gathered in knots and engaged in hot disputes,
some urging that they should go out, others opposing
this course. Oracle-mongers were chanting oracles
of every import, according as each man was disposed
to hear them. And the Acharnians, thinking that
no insignificant portion of the Athenian people lived
at Acharnae, insisted most of all upon going out, as
it was their land that was being devastated. Thus
in every way the city was in astate of irritation; and
they were indignant against Pericles, and remember-
ing none of his earlier warnings they abused him
because, though their general, he would not lead
them out, and considered him responsible for all
their sufferings.

XXII. Pericles, however, seeing them exasperated
at the present moment and that their intentions
were not for the best, and convinced that his
judgment was right about refusing to go out, would
‘not convoke a meeting of the assembly or any
gathering whatever, for fear that if they got to-
gether there would be an outbreak of passion
without judgment that would end in some serious

301

to

THUCYDIDES

\ r e , / e/ > , s
Kal Oe hovxias padtcTa Ocov édvvaTO ElxXeD.
e / f Pe lal \ ‘
imméas péevtoe e&érreutrev altel TOU ju) TPOdpomous

a cal /
ato Ths oTpaTiads éotimtovtas és Tovs aypous
an / la
ToUs eyyUs THS TOAEwS KaKOUpyely: Kal imTO-
, / a Lg lal
paxyla tis éyéveTo Bpayeta ev Ppvytots THY TE
’ / / CON a e f \ r
A@nvaiwy térer évl TOV imTéwY Kai Deccanrois
an \ \ a /
pet avTav mpos Tovs Bowwtav imméas, ev mp
cal ,
ovx édaccov écxov ot “AOnvaior Kai Oeccarot
7 Lal n la)
péxpt ov tpoc8onOncavrev tots Bowwtots Tav
e lal \ , lal r
OTALT@V TpOT?) EyEVETO AUTOV* Kai aTréGavoy TAV
lal , ,
Qcocarav cat “AOnvaiwy ov trodXol, aveiiovTo
\ XN
pwévtoL avTovs avO@nuepov aomovdovs. Kal ol
IleXcrrovvxjovot TpoTaiov TH votepata éotynoav.
% 66 Bonfera attn Tav Oeccara@v Kata TO
\ \ 3 7 a 9 , \
Tmaralov Evppaxixov éyéveto Tots "A@nvators, Kat
b] , >] > \ A lal / 1
adixovto map avtous Aapicatot, Papoddzo.,
4 / / 6
Kpavveviot, Ilvpacio, Luptevior, Pepaior.
rn \ nA > \ /
fryovvto 6€ avTav ex pev Aapions Tlodvpndns
, \ fel
kal “Aptorovous, 470 THS TTATEWS EKATEPOS, EK
, — a
S& Papoddrov Mévav joav 6é€ Kai Tov addov
/ Ui
KATA TONELS APYOVTES.
XXIII. Of 6é Tledorovvicior, érerdy ovdK
an a“ cs cal
éreEnoay avtots ot ‘A@nvaior és waynv, apavtes
’ rn ’ - 25 / an / A y
éx Tav Axapvav édjouv Tay Ornpwv Tas addovsS
nr \ II / Q \ B a ”
tov petaed Ildpvnfos xai Bpitdknocod spovs.
v \ > lal ’ fol fal ep al > ,
dvtwv b€ avTav év TH yH ot A@nvaioe aréctevnav
\ nm \ /
Tas éxatov vais mept Ledotovvncov aotep
\ / e > rn
mapeckevalovTo Kat xXtdLoUS om iTas ér avTaY

1 Tlapdéoio, in MSS. after Gaprddso, deleted by Heringa.
302

BOOK II. xxn. 1—xxi. 2

mistake; moreover he guarded the city, and as far
as he could kept it free from disturbances. He
did, however, constantly send out detachments of
cavalry to prevent flying parties from the main army
from raiding the fields near the city and ravaging
them; and there was a cavalry skirmish at Phrygia
between a company of Athenian horsemen, assisted
by some Thessalians, and the Boeotian cavalry, in
which the Athenians and Thessalians fully held their
own, until their heavy infantry came to the support
of the Boeotians, when they were routed. <A few of
the Thessalians and the Athenians were killed, but
their bodies were recovered the same day without a
truce; and on the next day the Peloponnesians set up
atrophy. This auxiliary force of the Thessalians was
sent to the Athenians in accordance with an ancient
alliance,! and those who came were Larisaeans,
Pharsalians, Crannonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and
Pheraeans. And their leaders were, from Larissa,
Polymedes and Aristonous, each representing his own
faction, and from Pharsalus Menon; and the others
had their own commander city by city.

XXIII. The Peloponesians, on the other hand,
when the Athenians did not come out to do battle
with them broke up their camp at Acharnae and
ravaged some of the demes which lie between Mt.

Parnes and Mt. Brilessus.?. But while they _ ere).

still in their territory the Athenians sent out on
an e hich round the Peloponnesus the hundred
ships * ‘which™they “had been equipping, and on

: ‘f I. cil. 4.

2 More generally known as Pentelicus, so called from the
deme Pentele on its southern slope,

3 of. ch. xvii. 4.

393

THUCYDIDES

\ ’ / > / \

kal to£otas Tetpaxocious: éatpatyye: dé Kap-
, C(— / \ / © % f

Kivos Te © Bevotivov Kat IIpwréas o Emxdeous

/ / | / e

cal SwKxpdatns 6 Avtuyévous. Kal of pev apavtes
fal A / / e \

Th TapacKkevn TAVTN TEpLeTTAEOV, OL dé Ieno-

/ / A A ei

Tovyyiclot Xpovov eupetvavtes ev TH ATTLKH OooV

elyov Ta émiTySera avexopnoar dia Bowwrav, ovx

4 > / , es \ \ ~

Amep écéBadov: tmapioytes 6€ Opwrrov thy yhv
\ - a! / A / ’ ,

thy Tpaixny Kxadoupévny, iv vémovtat OQpwrvot

’ , e / > / > / \ ?

AOnvaiwv tryjKoo, édjywcav. adixopuevor € €s

/ \

Ilerorévvncov duedvOnoav Kata TONES ExacTOL.
XXIV. ’Avaywpyncavtwy d€ ai’tav ot ’A@n-
rn \ A 4

vaio. durakds KaTETTIHTAYTO KATA Yi Kal KATA

od \ 5) \ a

Oddaccav, @otep 5 Euedrov Sia TavTos TOU

\ , lal
modéuov dura Kal xia TddavTa ato TOV

b] a > / / BA > a b /

év Th axpoToNee XpnuaTov edokev avtois eEaipeta

/ \ / \ \ b] al > )

Tomoapéevols yopls GécOat Kat wn avandodv, arr

b) \ las yA Las x / 5 x »

ano Tav adAXwv Toremetv: nv O€ Tis Ely 7 ETL-

, a \ s lal > wv
wndbicn Kiwelv TA KpHw“aTa TavTa es aXXo TL,
/ a a

Ay ph of Todeuon vyitTy oTpaT@ émiméwot TH
, \ / > md , , 3 ,

more Kat dén aptvacbat, Oavatov Enuav érre-

’ a /
Oevro. Tpinpes Te pet avtTav eEarpétous €7r0L7-
\ \ \

cavTo KaTa& Tov éviauTov ExaTov Tas BedTioTAS

/ b) ce e \ n a

Kal Tpinpapxous avtais, ov wn xXpHoOar wndewd

\ cr , 7 rn

és ddXO TL I) peTa TOV XPHUATwY TEpl TOV avTOD

4 > /

KLVOUVOU, HV O€n.

1 Named after the ancient town of [pata (Hom. B 498).
3°4

BOOK II. xxur. 2—xx1v. 2

them a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers;
and the generals in command were Carcinus son of
Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son
of Antigenes. So they set sail with this force and
began their cruise ; the Peloponnesians, on the other
hand, remained in Attica for as long a time as they
were provisioned and then withdrew through Boeotia,
taking a different route from that by which they had
entered Attica. They passed by Oropus and laid
waste the district called Graice,! which the Oropians
occupy as subjects of the Athenians.?, Then on their
return to the Peloponnesus they were dismissed to
their several cities.

XXIV. After the retreat of the Lacedaemonians,
the Athenians set guards to keep watch both by land
and sea, their purpose being to maintain a like guard
‘throughout the war. They decided also to set apart
one thousand talents? of the money stored on the
Acropolis as a special reserve fund, and not to
spend it, but to use the rest to carry on the war;
and if anyone should make or put to vote a _pro-
posal to touch this money except in the one case
that the enemy should attack the city with a fleet
and they should have to defend it, death was to be
the penalty. And along with this sum of money
they set apart for special service each year one
hundred of the very best triremes, appointing
trierarchs to command them, and no one of these
ships was to be used in any other way than in connec-
tion with this particular fund in dealing with the
same danger should the emergency arise.

2 This was written before 412/11, when Oropus was cap-
tured by the Boeotians.

3 About £200,000, or $972,000. This was part of the
6,100 talents stored on the Acropolis (ch. xiii. 3).

395

THUCYDIDES

XXV. Of & év tais éxatov vavot Twept TeXo-
movunaov “AOnvaior nal Kepxupaio: pet avTov
TEVTHKOVTA vavot m poo BeBonOnxores Kal adXot
TIWes TOV exet Evpuaxov aNXXa TE EXAKOUVY Tet
mAéovTes Kal és MeGavnv tijs Aakovnis aTro-
Bavtes TO TELX EL TpoaeBanror, ¢ OvTt da Bevet Kal
dv poorer ouK €vovTwv. eTUXE 6€ Tept TOUS
Y@pous TOUVTOUS Bpactoas o TérXL60s, aviip
LTaptiaTns, ppoupar ¢ exor, kal aia Gopevos €Bo1-
Oe Tois €v TO _Xeple META OTTALT@V EXATOV,
Sadpapav € TO TOY "AOnvaioy otpatonedor,
éoxedac Levov Kara THY X@pav kal Tpos TO TELXOS
TET Pappevov, EoTLTTEL ES THY Meany Kal oX-
yous Twas év TH éo dpouy amoneoas TOV pe?
avutTov THY Te TOLD TrEpLeTroinae Kal amo TOUTOU
TOD TON [I] WAT OS TPOTOU TOV KATA TOV TONE HOV
émnvédn év Lrdpry. ot Oe “AOnvaior apayres
TapeTeov, Kal oxovTes THIS "Hyelas és Derav
édnouv THY viv él dvo Tmepas Kal ™poa BonO-
cavTas TOV éK THS KOLANS “HAc6os Tplakog ious
Aoyacas Kal Tov avTodev ex THS TEPLOLKLOOS
"Hreiwv paxn expdTna av. avewou &é KATLOVTOS
peyarou Xetpalopevor év adipevep xo pio, OL pev
Tool éwéBnoav emt Tas vaus Kab Te pte N€ov
TOV 1yOov KadoUmEVOY TH axpav és TOV €v TH
Peva Aupeva., ot 6€ Meoonnot €v TOUT® Kal adou
TLVES, OL ov uvdpevor éerreBivar, KaTa Yyhv xepn-
cavtes Tv Peray aipodow. Kai UoTEpov ai TE
VIVES TepiT Evo aTaL avahapBavovew avrovs Kal
eEavayourar exetTovTes Derav, cai Tov ’HreElwv
%) TOA On oTpaTLa TpoceBEeBonOynKke, Tapa-

306

BOOK II. xxv. 1-5

XXV. Meanwhile the Athenians who had been
despatched in the hundred ships around the Pelopon-
nesus, together with the Corcyraeans, who had rein-

gs ema,

Methone in Laconia and assaulted its walls, which /
were weakeand without adequate defenders. But /
Brasidas, son’of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in
that’ neighbourhood with a guarding party, and
seeing the situation he set out with one hundred hop-
lites to relieve the garrison. Dashing through the
army of the Atlenians, which was scattered over the
country and was oecupied solely with the fortress, he
threw his force into Methone, losing a few_of-his.men
in_the rush, and thussaved the city. “This daring.
exploit, the first of the fener ene 4 war, was acknow- *
ledged at Sparta by a vote of thanks, “The Athenians
then weighed-anchorand-eontinued.their cruise along Y
the coast, and putting in‘at-Pheia in Elis ravaged the ~
land for two days, defeating in battle-a-réscue-party

of three hundred picked men gathered from the low-
lands of Elis and from the immediate neighbourhood
of Pheia. But a heavy gale of wind arose, and since
they were exposed to the storm in a harbourless
region, most of them embarked on their ships and
sailed round the promontory called Ichthys into the
harbour at Pheia. Meanwhile the Messenians and
some others, who could not get on board, marched
overland and took Pheia. Afterwards, when the
fleet had rounded the promontory, it took up thesé
men, abandoned Pheia, and put out to sea, for mean-
while the main body of the Eleans had come to the
rescue. The Athenians now resumed their voyage

397

THUCYDIDES

. /, \ e SAY a A
mrevoavtes 5€ of “AOnvaio. él adda yYopia
édSnouv. |
73 ¢ N \ \ lal
XXVI. ‘Tro 6€ tov avtov ypédvov todTov
’ lal 4 fal b] , \ \
A@nvatot tpidxovta vavs éfemenwav tepl tiv
Aoxpioa cat} EvPotas ipa durXakny: éotpatiyyer
\ > a / € ra \ >
d€ avt@v Kvreoroutos o KrXewiov. Kat azo-
Baces Tomodmevos THs TE TaPAPaXacciou EcTLY
a 26 / \ / a e / y
& €dnwoe Kat Opovioy eirev, ounpovs te EXaPev
> lal \ > ’ , ‘\ / nr
avTa@v, Kal é€v “AXown Tovs BonOyncavtas Aoxpav
ayn éxpatnaev.
/ \ \ >? A a
XXVIII. ’Avéotyncav &€ cai Aiywytas TO atta
Oépe. tovT@ €& Alyivns “A@nvator, abtovs Te Kal
Pp , yevn y) S
a a > /

Taidas Kal yuvatcas, émikadéoavTes ovY HKLoTA
a / , BP 3 \ \ A»
TOU ToNé“ov odio aitious eivary Kal THY Aiy-

> , ; > , a /
vav acdharéotepov édaiveto tH LleXotrovyjnce@
/ a / Us
ETLKELMEVNY aUT@VY TéeuyavTas eTrolKoUS ExeELD.
\ > / ef > al > Sa \ \
kal €&érreurpay totepov ov TOA Es avTIY Tovs
cr O\ a >]
oikyntopas. éxTecovat O€ Tots Alywntats ot
/ / a a
Aaxedaipovor Edocav Oupéav oikety Kal THY yh
l / VIB 4 , , \
véwetOat, Kata te TO AOnvaiwrv dtddopov Kal
ral / \ \
é6Tt od@y evepyéTar Hoav UT TOV cEetopov Kal
lal ¢. / \ b] / € \ an
tov Eikotov thy émavactacw. 1 d€ Ovpedtis
a / na > , \ an
yn peOopia tHs Apyetas cat Aakwvixns éotu,
él OdXaccav Ka0ryKovoca. Kal ol pev avTav
evtad0a w@knoav, oi b€ é€oTapnoavy Kata THY
a@ddqv “EdAdSa.
- an ? > “ , , \
XXVIII. Tod & avtovd Gépovs vousnvia cata
id \ / tal > ,
ceArvnv, @oTEp Kal movoyv SoKel elvar yiyvecOat

1 kar’ read by Hude, after Madvig.
308

BOOK II. xxv. 5-xxvin.
along the coast, and visiting other place te
depredations.

XXVI. About this same time the Athenians sent
out thirty ships to operate around Locris and at the
same time to serve as a guard for Euboea, These
were under the command of Cleopompus son of
Clinias, who made descents upon various places along
the seaboard and ravaged them, captured Thronium,
some of whose inhabitants he took as _ hostages,
and at Alope defeated in battle the Locrians who
came to the defence of the town,

Xxvik 1 In the course of this summer the Athen-

—jans_ also expelled the Aeginetans from Aegina} to-
gether with their wives and childr ren, making it their
main charge against them that they were responsible
for the war in which they were involved; besides
Aegina lay close to the Peloponnesus, and it was
clearly a safer policy to send colonists of their own
to occupy it. And indeed-they_soon afterwards sent
_thitherthe settlers.-As for the Aeginetan refugees, ©
the Lacedaemonians gave them Thyrea’ ‘to dwell in
“and its territory~to cultivate, moved™to do this not
only by the hostility of the Aeginetans towards the ®
Athenians but also because the Aeginetans had done *
them a service at the time of the earthquake and
the revolt of the Helots.1 Nowthe district of Thyrea ~
is the border country between Argolis and Laconia,
extending down to the sea. There some of the
Aeginetans settled, while some were scattered over
the rest of Hellas.

XXVIII. During the same summer at the beginning
of a lunar month? (the only time, it seems, when

lof. 1. ci. 2, NI
~ * August 3rd, 431 B.c.

3°9

THUCYDIDES

Suvatov, 0 Atos €€éNuTTE peTa preaonuBpiav Kai
Tar aveTANPwOON, yevomevos pynvoedns Kal ao-
Tépwv Tivav expavevTov.

XXIX. Kal év 76 atte Oéper Nupdodwpov tov
Ilvdew, avdpa “ABSdnpitny, ob ceive tiv aderXdyy
LutadrKns, duvdpevoyv Tap av7@ péya ot ’“AOnvaior
TpoTEpov Tonréemtov vowiCovtes mpokevoy ezroin-

\ / rs 4

gavtTo Kal petevréurpavto, Bovomevor LuTadrKHv

/ \ / lal / 4
adict tov Tipew, Opaxav Baoiréa, Evppayov

/ € \ / f = e “ /
yevesbatr. o 6€ Trpns ovtos 0 Tod XuTAddxKov

\ A Nes \ 7 ,
Tatnp TpaTtos Odpvaais THv peyardnv Racirerav
oo / a ” , b , \
eri mwréov THS adAAns Opaxns Eerroinoev’ TOU
yap mépos Kal avTovomov éott Opaxav. Tnpet dé

an / \ , > ’ ; cal ,
to Ipoxvnv tHv Uavdioves am "A@nvav cyovrtt
yuvaixa tpoanxe. o Trpns ovtos ovdév, ovdé

qn 3 lal ‘ > / > : ih \ > ’
THs avTHns Opakns eyevovto, adr o pev ev Aavda
THs Paxidos viv Karovupévns ys 0 Typevs! oxet,
rOTE vo Opaxayv otkovpévyns, Kal TO Epyov TO

v e lal b fol a

mep. tov “Ituy ai yuvaixes ev TH yn TavTn
»” as \ \ “ nA >? > s
érpakav (moNAols O€ Kal TOY TOLNTa@Y Ev anddovos
pvnun Aavrtas 9 Opvis éETwVOpaTTat), EiKOS TE
Kal TO KHOos Llavdtova EvvdyracOar tis Ouyartpos
Sia tocovTov ém wperta TH TMpos adXAHAOUS
parrov 7 bia TOAXoY Hpepav és “OSptcas odor.
Trpns 6€ odd€ TO adTo dvopa éywv Bacireds?

1 Deleted by Hude, after van Herwerden, as not read by

the Scholiast.
2 re, in the MSS. after Bas:Aebs, deleted by Classen.

1 7.e. their representative to look after Athenian interests
in the country of Sitalees and Tereus. The latter had violated

310

BOOK II. xxvut.—-xx1x. 3 ~~

f/f»

such an occurrence is possible) the was eclipsed ;
after midday ; it assumed the shape of a crescent an
became full again, and during the eclipse some stars
became visible.

XXIX. In this summer, too, Nymphodorus son of
Pythes, a man of Abdera, whose sister Sitalces had
to wife, and possessing great influence with Sitalces,
the Athenians made their proxenus! with that king,
although they had hitherto regarded him as an
enemy ; and they summoned him to Athens, wishing
to gain Sitaleces, son of Teres and king of the
Thracians, as their ally. Now this Teres, the father
of Sitalces, was the first to found the great kingdom
of the Odrysians, which extended over the larger
part of Thrace; for a considerable portion of the
Thracians are independent. This Teres is not in
any way connected with Tereus who took from Athens
to be his wife Procne the daughter of Pandion, nor
indeed did they come from the same Thrace. Tereus
dwelt at Daulia in the land now called Phocis, which
was then occupied by Thracians, and it was in that
land that the women? perpetrated their deed upon
Itys. In fact many of the poets, when they refer to «
the nightingale, call it the bird of Daulia. Besides.
it was natural for Pandion to contract the marriage
alliance for his daughter at so short a distance as
Daulia with a view to mutual protection, rather than
among the Odrysians, who are many days’ journey
distant. ‘Teres, however, whose name was not the
same as the other's, was the first king to attain
Philomela, sister of Procne, and cut out her tongue to prevent
her telling of it; but she revealed it by weaving the story
into a piece of tapestry.

2 The women, 7.e. Procne and Philomela, who murdered
Itys, son of Procne,

311

on

for)

=

THUCYDIDES

a b ‘ "08 cal a! 2 }7 v
TPWTOS ev KPaTEL puc@y éyéveto. ov bn dvTa
\ , e 2? ~ , > ~
tov Lutarknv ot “AOnvaior Evpmaxov érrovovyto,
a pe r Set 2 yy / \
Lovropevoe odhict ta él Opaxns xXwpia Kat
Ilepdicxcav EvveEeXeiv avrov. €dOwv Te és Tas
"AOnvas o Nupdodwpos tHv te Tov YetddKov
Evupaylav évoince Kal Ladoxov Tov viov avtod
, a / 3 \ / , e ,
A@nvaiov, Tov Te él Opaxns TWoEwov vTrEedéxeTo
/
KaTaXVGELW"| TeicELY yap LtTaAKHY TewTELY OTPA-
\ 7 ; , € , \
trav Opaxiav A@nvatots imméewv TE Kal Tred-
al \ , ral
tactav. EvvePiSace 5é€ cai Tov Lepdtexav Tois
3 , \ / >? A 64 > fal
A@nvaios Kal Pépunyv avt@ évrevcev atrodovvar:
/ z > \ / /
Evveotpatevaé te evOds Hepdixcas ert Xadkidéas
\ 3 , \ / cf \ ,
peta “AOnvaiwv cal Poppiwvos. ottTw pév LiTad-
e / lal , ,
kns te 0 Typew, Opaxav Bacirevs, Evupayos
; ,
éyéveto “A@nvaiors cat Ilepdixxas 0 “AXeEdvépou,
Makxedovwv Bacirevs.
XXX. Of & & tais Exatov vavoly ’AOnvaior
Sy ,
ére dvtes mrept IleNXomrévynoov Lordov te Kopuwv-
Giwy moAtcpa aipovot Kal tapadidoact Uandar-
n > \ fo)
pevow “Axapvdvev povors THY yhv Kal mwodw
/ 0 ied , e v > /
véwerOar: kal “Actaxov, is Evapyos érupavver,
AaBovtes KaTa Kpatos Kal éEeXacavtes avTov TO
xwplov és tTHv Evppaxiav mpoceroincavto. ért
te Kedadrdnviay tv vijcov mpoomdevoavtes
/ v / lal \ e
Tpoonyayovto ave paxns’ Keita O€ 7) Kedad-
, a 9 / \ , a
Anvia kata’ Axapvaviav cat Aevxada TeTpaTroNLs
ovaa, Iladis, Kpavior, Lapaior, pavvor. tore-
pov & ov TOAA® advexywpnoav at vies es Tas

"AOnvas.
312

BOOK II. xxix. 3-xxx. 3

great power among the Odrysians. And it was his
son, Sitalees, whom the Athenians wanted to make
their ally, wishing him to help in subduing the
places on the coast of Thrace and Perdiccas. So
Nymphodorus came to Athens, brought about the
alliance with Sitalces,and got Sadocus son of Sitalces
made an Athenian citizen; and he promised also
to bring the war in Thrace to an end, saying that he
would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a
Thracian force of cavalry and targeteers. Moreover,
he brought about a reconciliation between Perdiccas
and the Athenians, whom he persuaded to restore
Therme! to him. Perdiccas immediately joined
forces with the Athenians under, Phormio ? and took
_the field against the Chalcidians. It was in this way
that Sitalces son-of "feres;*king of the Thracians,
became an ally of the Athenians, and also Perdiccas
son.of. Alexander, king of the Macedonians. ©

XXX. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred
ships, who were still opérating on the Peloponnesian
coast, took Sollium, a town belonging to the Corin-
thians, which they then handed over, the territory
as well as the city, to the people of Palaerus in
Acarnania, for their exclusive occupation. They also
stormed Astacus, which Euarchus ruled as tyrant,
drove hinf6Uf""and incorporated the place in their
confederacy. Sailing then to the island of Cephal-
lenia, they brought it over to their side without a
battle. Now Cephallenia lies over against Acar-
nania and Leucas and is a union of four communities,
the Palians, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronnians.
And not long afterwards the ships withdrew to
Athens.

beef Wi Be Pei au leive 2s leve3,

313

THUCYDIDES

XXXI. Ilepi d6€ to POivoTrwpov tod Oépous
toutov "A@nvaiot wavédnuet, avtol Kat ot pét-
orxot, oéBarov és tHv Meyapiéa Iepixréous Tod
Eav0irmov otpatnyovvtos. Kal ot wepi IenXo-
movynoov "A@nvaio. év tais éxaTov vavaiv
(éruyov yap dn év Aiytvn dvtes em olKov ava-
coprlomevor) os 70 QovTo Tous éx THS TONEDS
TavoT pated év Meydpous Gvtas, émXevcav Tap
avtous Kat EvveuetyOnoay. oT paTomebov TE
péytctov 67 TovTO aOpoov *AOnvaiwy éyéveTo,
axwalovons eTL THS TOAEWS Kal OUTH VevoonKviAs:
unter yap oTALT@V OvK eXdacous Hoav avTol

i “A@nvaior (yopis & avtots ot év Toredaig
rpuryiduo Hoav), méeTotKoe O€ EvvecéBarov OUK
€AXaoaous TPLOXLALOY OTALT OV, Yopis dé 0 aXXos
6utros WidOv ovK oArLyos. Snwcavtes S€ TA
TOAAA THS Ys avexwpnoav. éyévovto O€ Kal
G&dXat UaTepov ev TO TOAEUM KATA ETOS ExagToOV
éo Boral ‘AOnvateov és tyv Meyapisa kal imréwv
Kal TavoTpatia, péypt ov Nicata éddw Or’
"AOnvatov.

XXXII. ‘ErerxioOn dé Kal ‘“Atahavtn UO
"AOnvatov @povptov Tov Oépovs TOUTOU TeAEUTOU
TOS, 7 ETL Aoxpots TOUS ‘Or TOUVTiOLS VATOS, EpnuN
TPOTEpoOv oOvGAa, TOD pn AnaTas éexTAEovtas é&
"Orotvtos Kal TIS arys Aoxpisos KaKoupyelv
THY EvBotav. tav7a ev év T@ Oéper TOUT@ peTa
Thy IleXotrovyyciov éx THs ATTIKIS avaxopnow
ery éveTO.

XXXII. Tod & ériyiyvopévov yeuadvos Ki-
apyos 0 "Axapvav, BovXopevos és Thy “Aotaxov

314

BOOK II. xxxi. r-xxxu. 1 — a

I. Toward autumn fof this pean tlie athe!

nians with all their military forces, drawn both from cal

the citizens and the resident aliens, invaded Megaris |
under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus;”

who was general.!. The Athenians of the fleet of
one hundred ships operating around Peloponnesus,
who happened to be at Aegina on their way home,
when they heard that the whole military force of the
city was at Megara, sailed over and joined them.
This was the largest army of Athenians that had
ever béén-assémbled in one body; for the city was
still at the height of its strength and not as yet
stricken by the plague; the Athenians themselves
numbered not less than ten thousand heavy in-
fantry, not including the three thousand at Potidaea,?
and there were three thousand heavy-armed aliens:
who took part in the invasion, and, besides, a con-
siderable body of light-armed troops. After they
had ravaged most of the Megarian country they
retired. Later on in the course of the war still
other invasions were made by the Athenians into
Megaris every year, both with the cavalry and with
the whole army, until Nisaea was captured.3

]

/

XXXII. Towards the end of thig~summerjthe (1 »

Athenians also fortified and _garrisone | Atalante,/the
island which lies off Opuntian Locris and had hitherto
been unoccupied. ‘Their object was to prevent
pirates sailing from Opus and the other ports of
Locris and ravaging Euboea. These were the events
which took place during this summer after the

withdrawal of the.Peloponnesians from Attica. |
XXXIII. But in the ensuing winter} Euarchus the -
Acarnanian, wishing to 1 ' us, persuaded

1 i.e, one of the ten generals elected annually.
2 of. 1. lxi. 4 3 Iv. lxvi.-lxix,
315

A

,

Yy

: THUCYDIDES
tad /
xaterbeiv, reiPe. KopivOiovs teaoapaxovta vaval
/ e / x
Kal TevTaxoclos Kal yirtiows omALTals EauTOV
\
KaTaYEelW TWAEVTAVTAS, KAL AUTOS ETLKOUPOUS TLVAS
TpoceuicOwcato: Apyov b6€ THS otpatias Kv-
, eens”) s \ / t
dauiias te o ’Aptotwvupov cal Tipokevos o
mn / \ A e , \
Tuuoxpatouvs Kxal Etpayos o Xpvoidos. «kal
a ”
TrevoavTes KaTHyayov: Kal THS AadAns ’AKap-
/ an \ / v a / /
vavias Ths Tept Odrdaccav Ectiv & ywpia BovXdo-
pevol TpootroincacGa Kai Tetpadévtes, ws OvK
édvvavto, amémAeov é€m” olxov. ayovtes 0 év TO
/
TapaTrw és KedadrdAnviav cat atoBaocw Trotn-
, a) ,
capevot €s THY Kpaviwv yiv, aratnbévtes tr
: Ey a > € , \ BY ’ /
avTav €& oporoyias Tivos avdpas Te aTToRBAdXOVGL
a a / , la
chav avTov, éemilenévavy ampocdoxntas Tav
,
Kpavioy, cai Biarotepov avayayomevor exopicOn-
cav €T OiKov.
XXXIV. "Ev 6€ 76 atte yempau ’APnvaio
A /
TO TATPLO VO“Lw Xpw@pevor Snuocia Tapas érrotn-
a e an ~L ,
TAVTO TOV EV TOOE TO TOAE“LW TPWTOV ATrobavor-
, n \ ra
TwY TpoT@ ToOL@de. TA pev OoTA TpoTiPevTaL
TOV ATOYEVOMEVWY TPOTPLTA TKNVHVY ToLncarTes,
Kal émipépet TH AUTOV ExacTos HY Tt BovANTAL
> \ \ e b \ 3 , ’
everday O€ 7) Eexhopa 7, Ndpvakas KUTTAapLocivas
” oe 1 n Cx 7 ” ‘
ayovow apakar, dvans éxaotyns piav: éverte bé
\ > aorle ev = a , \ ,
T2 OoTa 1S Exactos Hv dvdAns. pia O€ KrlVy
\ n a n
Kevyn hépetat éctpwpevn TOV adavav, of av pi
e lal I > / / \ ¢ /
evpeOa@aw és avaipecw. Evvexdéper 5€ o Bovro-
Mevos Kai doT@y Kai Eévwv, Kal yuvaixes Tapecow
al tTpocijkovaat éml tov tadpov orodvpopevat.
1 Hude inserts déxa, following Gertz.

316

BOOK II. xxx. 1-xxxiv. 4

the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen
hundred heavy infantry and restore him to power,
and for this purpose he himself hired some mer-
cenaries. The commanders of the expedition were
Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of
Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. They
did in fact sail over and restore him; and wishing
to acquire some other places along the seaboard of
Acarnania they made the attempt but failed, and
thereupon sailed for home. As they skirted the
coast they touched at Cephallenia, where they
made a descent upon the territory of the Cranians ;
here deceived by the inhabitants through some sort
of agreement they lost a few of their men by an un-
expected attack of the Cranians, and finally, after
they had got out to sea with considerable difficulty,

managed to get back home. pps occu.
XXXIV. In the course ofthe same phe
Athenians, following the custom™6f their fathers,
celebrated at the public expense the/ funeral. rites bf
the first who had fallen in this war. The ceremony
is as follows. ‘The bones of the departed lie in state
for the space of three days in a tent erected for that
purpose, and each one brings to his own dead any
offering he desires. On the day of the funeral
coffins of cypress wood are borne on wagons, one
for each tribe, and the bones of each are in the
coffin of his tribe. One empty bier, covered with a
pall, is carried in the procession for the missing
whose bodies could not be found for burial. Any
one who wishes, whether citizen or stranger, may
take part in the funeral procession, and the women
who are related to the deceased are present at the

317

THUCYDIDES

bg 5 . X 5 , A 9 fae ¥
5 TWWéacw ovv és TO Snmoctoy ona, 6 éotiw él
nr / / an ,
Tov KaNXiotTov TpoacTeEiov THs Toews Kal alet
lal \ A
év avT@ OdtTovet TOUS eK THY TOKLwY TARY YE
\ > a > z \ a \
tors év Mapadaw: éxeivav 6€ duatrperh tHv
A , la) \ ,
apeThny KpivavTes avTov Kal TOV Tadov éToLnoaD.
/ a 2 eee ec , a
6 érevday bé Kptiywot Yq, aVYNnP HpNpEEévos VITO THS
3 , a \ /
Toews OS av youn Te SdoKH pn akvveTOS eivat
/ / ; a
Kal afi@oer mponkn, Neyer € avTois Erratvov
\ \ a
7 Tov mpémovta: peta b€ TOTO aTépyovTal. wbe
\ \ 35 \ a
pev Oartovew: Kal dia TavTos Tod TroAémou,
/ a a n /
8 omote EvpSain avtois, ExpovTO TH vouw. emt
ral , a fal (— ,
§ obdv tois mpw@tots Toiade LlepixrHs 0 ZavOimmov
e / / \ > \ \ /
npeOn Réyew. Kal e€rretdn Karpos édapBave,
2 \ > \ n , a3 y nA ¢ \
mpoeAO@v aro Tov onuatos él Piya wYyydov
/ e v4 X a a
TETOLNMEVOV, OWS GKOVOLTO WS ETL TAELTTOV TOD
abt of /
Outrou, édreye TOLACE.
e \ Ss A
XXXV. ‘Of pév ody Todd) Tov évOade %}6n
a \ a /
ELpNKOT@Y érraLvovaL TOY TpocBévTAa T@ VO“@ TOV
, / € \ I] \ cr . Qn ,
Royov Tovde, WS KANOV ETL TOLS EK THY TOKE MOV
4 / fal
Oarrropmévors ayopever Oar avTov. épmol dé apKovy
7 lal J a ”
dv édoxer elvar avdpav ayabav Epyw yevouévav
n 3s! a
Epyo kal SnrotcPar Tas Timds, ola Kat viv sept
/ /
Tov tahov Tovde Snuocia mapacKevacbévta
€ an \ \ > eX > \ ” > \
Opate, Kal pn év Evi avdpl TOAX@Y apeTas KiVdv-
9 \ lal J / A
vevecOar ed TE Kal Yelpov elTOVTL TLTTEVOHVAL.
\ / > r ?
2 yaderov yap TO peTplws eiTety Ev @ pods Kal 7

1 The Outer Cerameicus, just outside the Dipylon gate.
This street was to Athens what the Appian Way was to
Rome.

318

BOOK II. xxxiv. 5-xxxv. 2

burial and make lamentation. The coffins are laid
in the public sepulchre, which is situated in the most
beautiful suburb! of the city; there they always bury
those fallen in war, except indeed those who fell at
Marathon ; for their valour the Athenians judged to
be preéminent and they buried them on the spot
where they fell. But when the remains have been
laid away in the earth, a man chosen by the state,
who is regarded as best endowed with wisdom and is
foremost in public esteem, delivers over them an
appropriate eulogy. After this the people depart. In
this manner they bury; and throughout the war,
whenever occasion arose, they observed this custom.
Now over these, the first victims of the wat, Pericles
son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. And when™
tle proper time came, he advanced from the ile
and took his stand upon a platform which had been
built high in order that his voice might reach as far
as possible in the throng, and spoke as follows: en
XXXV. “Most of those who have spoken here in
the past have commended the law-giver who added
this oration to our ceremony, feeling that it is meet
and right that it should be spoken at their burial
over those who have fallen in war. To me, however,
it would have seemed sufficient, when men have
proved themselves -brave by valiant acts, by act
only to make manifest the honours we render them
—such honours as to-day you have witnessed in
connection with these funeral ceremonics solemnized
by the state—and not that the valour of many men
should be hazarded on one man to be believed or not
according as he spoke well or ill. For it is a hard
matter to speak in just measure on an _ occasion
where it is with difficulty that belief in the speaker’s

319

bo

THUCYDIDES

Soxnois THs adnOcias BeBaovtar. 6 TE yap
Evvetd@s Kal evvous axpoaTns Tax av TL évoe-
extépws pos & BovreTal Te Kal eTiocTaTaL vopt-
gece OndovcOat, 6 Te Ameipos éotw A Kal
mrceovatecbat, da hOovov, ei Te vTép THY avTOD
duc akovor. méxpl yap Tovoe avexTol ot érratvol
cio TrEpl ETEPWV Reyomevot, &s Ooov av Kal AUTOS
ExaTTOS OlNTAaL (KAaVOS Eivat Opacal TL MV HKOVGED"
T@ O€ UTepBadrovTt avT@v POovodvtes On Kal
amtioTovcl. émrEeldn O€ TOs TaAaL OVTwWS €d0-
KiuLadoOn TavTa Kaas EXEL, ¥p7) Kal eye Er OpmEvor
TO vouw Tepacbar Luav THs ExaoTOV BovrAnTEws
te Kal OoEns TUyxEly ws el TrELOTOD.

XXXVI. “"Apfouat b€ ato THY Tpoyoverv
mTpa@tov: Oixatoy yap avtots Kat mpéTov 6& dpa
év TO TOL@E THY TLunY TavTHY THS pyyn_NS
didocBar. THY yap Ywpav ol avTol aiel oixodyTES
Suadoyn ToY eruyryvouévwv péxpt Tovbde édev-
Gépav 60 apetnyv Tapédocayv. Kal éxetvot Te aELoL
ématvou Kal @Tt aAXov of TaTépes Huav: KTHCG-
pevor yap Tpos ols edéEavto Gonv Exouev apynv
OUK aTOVwS, HulY TOS VUY TpocTKaTédLTOV. Ta
Sé mreiw avThs avTol Huets olde of viv Ett dvTES
uddiota ev TH KabeoTynKvLla HriKia érnuEjnoaper,
Kal THY TOAW TOiS TaOL TAapEeTKEVadcapeDY Kal es
ToAewov Kal és ElpnvnY av’TapKEecTaTHY. BV eyw

1 Those enumerated by Pericles in ch. xii .—money, army
and navy.

320

BOOK II. xxxv. 2-xxxvi. 4

accuracy. is established. For the hearer who is
cognizant _of the facts and partial to the dead will
pertiaps think that scant justice has been done
in comparison{ with his own~wishes )jand his own
knowledge, while he who is not so informed, when-
ever he hears of an exploit which goes beyond>
his own capacity, will be led_by envy. tothink
there is some exaggeration. And indeed eulogies
of.other_men are tolerable only in so far as each
héarer thinks that he too has the ability to perforni: |
any of the exploits of which hé héars ; but whatever
goes beyond that~at- once excites envy and unbelief.”
However, since our forefathers approved of this-
practice as right and proper, I also, rendering obedi-
ence to the law, must endeavour to the best of my
ability to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of each of
ou. Ae
XXXVI. “I shall speak first of our ancestors, for
itis right and at the same time fitting, on an occasion
like this, to give them this place of honour, in re-
ealling what they did. For this land of ours, in
which the same people have never ceased to dwell in
an unbroken line of successive generations, they by
their valour’ transmitted to our times a free state.
And not only are they worthy of our praise, but our
fathers still more ; for they, adding to the inheritance
which they received, acquired the empire we now
possess and bequeathed it, not without-toil, to us who
are alive to-day. And we ourselves here assembled,
who are now for the most part still in the prime of
life, have further strengthened the empire in most
respects, and have provided our city with all re-
sources,! so that it is sufficient for itself® both” in
peace and in war. The military exploits whereby

321

THUCYDIDES

Ta wey KaTa Tronewous. Epyas ols éxacTa eer iOn,
4} et TL avTol 4 ob TATEPES nuav BapBapov 7
“EAAnva todepov! ériovta TpoOvpas nuvvapueba,
paxpnyopeiv év eiddcww ov Bovdomevos, édow:
> \ \ / bp] / ” me > \
amo 6€ olas Te émiTNdevoews HAOOMEY Em aUTA
\ . / \ ’ 5 ”
kal peO olas TodTEias Kal TpoTwv éF oiwv
/ Lal lal
peydra éyéveto, Tadta Syrl@cas TPATOV Elws Kal
r , r
él TOV TOVOE Erra.vov, vouifwy él TE TH TApPOVTL
ovK ay ampeTh AeXOhvat av’Ta Kal TOV TavTa
ef \ > fal \ / 4 3
Guirov Kal adotav kat Eévav Evydopov eivar
ETAKOUCAL AUTODV.
Soc , \ , > /
XXXVII. “ Xpw@puela yap wodteLa ov Enrov-
\ a / , / \ ca
on Tovs TY TéhaS VOmouS, Tapdderypa Sé wadrov
avutol OvTes Ticly % pulpovpmevor ETEépouS. — Kal
” X\ \ % \ bd P| / ? > > "
dvoma pwev O14 TO fH ES CALYOUS AAN €s TAELOVAS
rc /
oixeiy Snwoxpatia KéxAnTat, méTEoTL O€ KATA meV
\ \ a
Tovs vom“ous Tpos Ta idva Sidhopa aot TO icor,
Kata dé THY akiwow, @s ExacTos Ev TM EvdOKLMEL,
x z \
OUK aTro HEpous TO TAE€OV €S TA KOWA ) ATT
apeThS TPOTMaTAL, ovd av Kata Teviay, éyav bé
Ti ayad0ov Spacar THhv TOMY, aE vo patos apavera
KeKMAUTAL.) €NEUVDEpws OE Ta TE TPOS TO KOLVOV
/ A > \ \ > / ar ’
moNLTEvomev Kal > THY TPOS GAANAOUS TeV Kab
/ > el
Huepav eTiTNOevLaTaV UTo lay, ov dt Opyis Tov
, ’ SLA / rn » +ON >
méras, ef Kal ndovny te dpa, EyovTes, ovde afn-

1 zédeuov, Hude adopts Haase’s conjecture oA émiov.

1 Alluding to the Spartans, whose institutions were said
to have been borrowed from Crete ; in fact, throughout the
whole speech the contrast is with Spartan conditions.

322

BOOK II. xxxvi. 4-xxxvit.-2

our several possessions were acquired, whether
in any casé it” were we ourselves..or—our. fathers.
that valiantly repelled the onset of war, Bar-
barian or Hellenic, I will not recall, for I have no
desire to speak at length among those who know.
But I shall first set forth by what sort of training;we
have come to our present position, and with’ what..
“political institutions and as the result of what manner
of life our empire became great, and afterwards pro-
ceed to the praise of these men; for I think that on
the present occasion such a recital will be not in-
appropriate and that the whole throng, both of citizens
and of strangers, may with advantage listen to it.
XXXVIT. ** We live under a form of government
which does not emulate thé institutions of our neigh-
bours!; on the contrary, we are ourselves a/ model
which some? follow, rather than the imitators” of
other peoples. “It is true that our_government- is
called a democracy, because its adininistration is in the
hands, not of the few, but of the many; yet while
as regards the law all’men are on an equality for.
the settlement of their private disputes, as regards
the value set on them it is as each man is in any way
distinguished that he is preferred to public honours,

Sree sae

not because he belongs to a particular class, but be-
cause of personal merits ; nor, again, on the ground of
poverty is a man barred from a public career by
obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do the
state a«service. And not only in our public life are
we liberal, but also as regards our freedom from
suspicion of one another in the pursuits of every-day
life ; for we do not feel resentment at our neighbour

2 Possible allusion to the embassy sent from Rome in
454 B.c. to examine the laws of Solon (Livy, iii. 31).

323

THUCYDIDES

lous pév, NUTNpaS O€ TH Orer AYOnSovas TpoaTt-

3 Oéuevor. aveTayOas O€ Ta idla TpOTomiNodYTES

to

\ , \ / / > al
Ta Onuocla dia d€0s paddicTa ov Tapavopovper,
Tov te alel év apyn OvTwY axkpodce Kal TOY
/ \ / > a a >’ > ’ 4
VOM@Y, Kal padicTa avT@Y OooL TE ET wWHEdLA
A / a \ a
TOV GOLKOULEVOV KELVTAL Kal Ooor aypadhot OyTES
€ /
aicyuUVnVY omoroyouperny Pépovarv.
ca ,
XXXVIII. “Kail pnv cai tev rover Treiotas
avaTavras TH yvoun eropicducla, ayaa pév
\ / / / 32¢ 7 \
ye Kat Ovolais dreTnoiors voutfovtes, tdiars dé
ral / e /
KaTacKevals evTpEeTecw, @V Kal Huepay H TEpYris
a \ b] / > / \ \
TO AUTNPOV exTAHTTE. ETETEPYETAL OE Sia
fal n \
péyeOos THs TONEwS eK TaONS YRS TA TavTa, Kal
/ CY a \ > iA a > /
Ev Baiver mute pendey OlKELOTEPa TH drodavoet
\ b) re MBE a A \
Ta aUTOD ayaba yryvopeva Kaptrovabat 7) Kai Ta
lal ” ? ,
TOY AdrAwV avOpaTrwV.
XXXIX. “Avagépopev 5€ Kav tats THY TOXeE-
a “ , lal
[LK@V LEAETALS TOV evavTiwy Tolade. THY TE yap
/ \ 4
TOALY KOLWIY Tapéxouev Kal ovK éoTLY OTE Eevn-
/ x / /
Aacias ateipyouev Twa 7) palrmatos 7) Peapa-
a \ \ v lal / 2O\
Tos, 5 pn Kpudlev av tis TOV TOdEWioV Lowy
w@pernOein,) TictevovTes ov Tals TapacKevats TO

1 Referring especially to the contests at the chief festivals,
like the Panathenaea and Dionysia, which by their artistic
setting and performance were recreations of mind and spirit
quite as much as physical exercises.

2 Thucydides refers to the spiritual no less than to the
physical products which the greatness of Athens attracts to
her, to the poetry, music, and art which find there & con-

324

BOOK II. xxxvir. 2—xxx1x. 1

if he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour
looks which, though harmless, are painful to behold.

But while we thus avoid giving offence in our private
intercourse, in our public. life we are restrained from
lawlessness chiefly through reverent.fear, for wé
render obedience to those in authority and to the
laws, and especially to those laws which are ordained
for the succour of the oppressed and those which,
though unwritten;—bring upon the transgressor a.
disgrace which all men recognize.

XXXVIII. “ Moreover, we have provided for the
spirit many relaxations from toil: we have games}
~and sacrifices regularly throughout the year and

homes fitted out with _ good taste and elegance ; and
the delight we each day find in these things drives
away sadness. And our city is so great that all the
products of all the earth flow in upon us, and ours is
the happy lot to gather in the good fruits of our
own soil with no more home-felt ry of enjoy-
ment than we do those of other lands.?

XXXIX. “We are also superior to our opponents

in our system of training for warfare, and this in-the
following respects. In the first place, we throw our
city open to all the world and we never by exclusion
acts debar any one from learning or seeing anything
which an enemy might profit by observing if it were
not kept from his sight; for we placeeur depend-
ence, not so much upon prearranged devices to

genial home as well as to articles of commerce. On these
latter compare a passage in the»pséido-Xenophontie Con-
stitution of Athens (ii. 7), written somewhat earlier than this
portion of ipiaeevdates’ history : ‘‘ Whatever desirable thing
is found in Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, the Pontus, the
Peloponnesus, or anywhere else, all these things are brought
together at Athens on account of her mastery of the sea. *

325

THUCYDIDES

, X ’ , aA a bp , € lal > ial > \
TNEOV Kal aTATALS 1 TO Ah NuwY aAUTwY Es Ta
/ ‘ lal ’ e
Epya evruy@* Kal €vy Tais TatdElats ol peév éTTL-
Ul / / » lal
Tovm aoKknoe evOvs veo. dvTes TO avdpetov

a ,
peTéepyovTat, nels Sé avetpévws SiarT@pevor ovdEV
\ a 7 rn
Hooov éml TOUS igoTaNEls KLVOVVOUS YwpoupeEr.
/ ” \ A > ¢
texpunptov é& ovTe yap AaKedatpoviot Kal’ éav-
’ \ a n
tovs, weO atdavrwv bé és THY YY Huov oTpaTeEv-
lal / ,
ovol, THY TE TOV TéANAS aUToL émwedOovTES Ov
al a , \ \ na
yaneT@s €v TH GNAOTPLA TOUS TEPL TOV OLKELwY
\ , fal
GUUVVOMEVOUS paXOMEVOL TA TAELW KpPATOUUED
e U a / e a > , /
aOpoa Te TH Suvdper Huey ovdELs TH TOhEmULOS
/ \ \ a a ev ’ ,
evérvye Ola THY TOU vaUTLKOD TE Gyo errtméerav
fal la \ la fal
Kal THY év TH YH éwl TOAAA Huav avToV éTt-
/ \ ,
Temi: vy O€ Tov popim Tiwi mpocpelEwor,
n / > tal
KpaTynocavtTés TE TWAS UBY TavTas auvyovow
n , > e / fal
avnewooOat kal wxnlévtes UP aTavTwv noonabat.
f } babupia padXov 7) ToveV pEré L pr
Kattot et pabvpig adrdov 7 Tovev weheTn Kal pH
/ \ / xX ls > > /
META VOLOV TO TAEOY 7) TPOTTMY aVOpelas EFéomev
an lad /
KLVOUVEVELD, TEPLYlyVETaL Hiv TOis TE eOVE LY
a ‘ \ > \ a
adyewvols pn TpoKduvew, Kat €> avTa €dOovdar
a > / /
pn) ATOAMOTEpOUS TOV alei woxGovvTar PaivecOat,
, i
Kal €y Te TOVTOLS THY TOAW akiay eivat Oavpa-
5 Wd > ”
CecOar Kat ETL ev addats.
a / \
XL. “ Piroxadodpév Te yap pet’ evTeretas Kal
fal / / 4 ”
dirvcododmev avev padakias: TAOVT@ TE Epyou
rn A A / a ,
padrXov Katp@ 7 Aoyou KouT@ xpwpela, Kal TO

1 Pericles here hints at his policy, outlined in ch. xiii. 2,
of always acting on the defensive when the enemy forces are
distinctly superior.

326

BOOK II. xxxix. 1-xL. 1

deceive, as upon the courage which springs from our
own souls when we are called taaction, ~ -And-again,
in-the-matter of education, whereas they from early
childhood by a laborious discipline make pursuit of
manly courage, we with our unrestricted mode of life |
are none the less ready to~meet-any equality of
hazard.t) And here is the proof» When the Lace-
daemonians invade our territory they do not come
alone but bring all their confederates with them,
whereas we, going by ourselves against our neigh-
bours’ territory, generally have no difficulty, though
fighting on foreign soil against men who are defend-
ing their own homes, in “overcoming them in battle.
And in fact our united forces no enemy has ever yet
met, not only because we are constantly attending to
the needs of our navy, but also because on land we
send our troops on many enterprises; but if they by
chance engage with a division of our forces and defeat
a few of us, they boast that they have repulsed us all,
and if the victory is ours, they claim that they have
been beaten by us all. If, then, by taking our ease
rather than by laborious training and depending on a
courage which springs more from manner of life than
com ulsion of laws, we are ready to meet dangers, the
gain is all ours, in that we do not borrow trouble by
anticipating miseries which are not yet at hand, and
when we come £0 the test we show ourselves fully
aS pale as those who are always toiling ; and so our

y is worthy of admiration in these respects, as well
as in others.

XL. “For we are lovers of beauty yet with no
extravagance and lovers of wisdom yet without
weakness. Wealth we employ rather as an oppor-

\ tantty~fer action than as a subject fur boasting;
‘stout ‘uaadl MU 327

THUCYDIDES

, > e lal 5] 4 > A \
méverOat ovy opodoyely TLVL aLoXpoVv, aAXrAa py
Siadhevyerv épyw aloyiov. eve te Tois avTois

’ / ev \ Lad b / xr / i}
OLKEL@Y UA Kal TONLTLK OV ETTLMENELA KAL ETEPOLS

\ \ \ a
mpos épya TeTpappevors Ta TOALTLKA pn EevdEeds

a / \ / \ lal /
yVOval* OVvOL yap TOV TE wndEeV TOVOE peTeXoVTA

> > / ’ > > r , \
oUK amTpaypwova, aAXN aypetov vouiopev, Kal

’ \o »” , / X319 é , Q 3 o8 \
auto.” HToL Kpivomev ye 7) EvOvpovmEOa opOas Ta

/ > \ U al by4 /
mpayyata, ov Tovs AOyous Tots Epyots BraBnv
Fryovpevol, GAAA pn TpPodLdayOHvat wadrov oyw

/ Adi Vie 6 ale b] Q a 8 ,
MpoTepov % emt a det Epyw EAGEivy OLadEepovTws

\ xy \ / v 4 lal 3 > \
yap 67 Kal TObE EXOMEV WOTE TOMY TE OL AUTOL

A \ \ @ > / > /
padiota Kal Tepl ov errxerpnaopen Exroyiler Gar:

lad Yi , \
& Tots adrows auabia pev Opdaos, Aoyropos Sé
v / / > xX \ /
dxvov héper. Kpatiator 8 av rwuynv dixatws
ca ¢ / \ \ e / "4
xpidetev of Tad Te Seva Kat 0éa capéotata
\ a \ ,
yiyv@oKovtes Kal Sta TAaUTA p17) aTOTpPETTOMEVOL
a \
ék Tov KIWdUVOV. Kal Ta és apeTHy evynvTi@pea
: sa<-.

a lal \ lal

Tols TOANOIS: OV yap TacyXoOVTES Ev, GAAS OpwHvTes

e

Kktwuela Tors dirous. PBeBaroTepos dé 0 dpacas
\ / ee > fi ’ > f e /

Ti Yap Bote whetrouerny Ou’ evvotas @ Sédwxe
owlew 0 6é avtopethay auBdUTEpos, Eld@s OK
és yap, GAN ws ohethnua THY apeTiVy atrodw-

1 érépois <€repa> , Hude. 2 Hunde reads of adrol.

1 As contrasted with the Spartans, whose officials made the
most important decisions.

328

BOOK II. xu. 1-4

and with us it is not a shame for a man to ac-
knowledge poverty, but the greater shame is for
him ‘not to do his best to avoid it..- And

will find united in the same persons an interest at
once in_pri affairs, and in others

of us w i ntion chi to business

will find. no lack of insight into_political — ore

For we alone regard the man who takes no part in
public affairs, not as one who minds his own business,
but as good for nothing; and we Athenians decide
~ public questions for ourselves! or at least endeavour
to arrive at a sound understanding of them, in the
belief that itis not debate that is a hindrance to action,
but rather not to be instructed by debate before the
time comes for action. For in truth we have this point
also of superiority over other men, to be most daring
in action and yet at the same timé most given to re-
flection upon the ventures we méan to” undertake ; :
“with other” men; on the~contrary;~-boldness...means
ignorance and reflection brings hesitation. And they
would rightly be adjudged most courageous who,
(realizing most clearly the pains no less than the
pleasures involved, do not on that account turn away
from danger. Again, in nobility of spirit, we stand
in sharp contrast to most men; for it is not by
receiving kindness, but by conferring it, that we
acquire our friends~ Now he who confers the
favour is a firmer friend, in that he is disposed,
by continued goodwill toward the recipient, to
keep the feeling of obligation alive in him?; but
he who owes it is more listless in his friendship,
knowing that when he repays the kindness it will
count, not as a favour bestowed, but as a debt
2 This must be the meaning of the Sate clause, but some-
thing is perhaps wrong with the text.

VOL. L. M 329

THUCYDIDES

A / aA
5 gwv. Kal povor ov tov Evudépovtos pmadXov
A aA fal b] , a a > a
Aoyic ue 7) THS EAXevOepias TO TLIoT@ abdeas Tia
a@pedovuev.
XLI. “ Buvedov te Néy@ THY TE Tacay TOAW
THs ‘EXXabcs taidevow eivat Kal Kal’ éxactov
a \ BA > a
Soxely ay pot Tov avTov avdpa map nuav ért
al ’ x ” \ \ , / > xn
TrElot av elon Kal peTa yapitoyv pdadior ap
2 evTpaTéAws TO THpua avTapKes TapéxecOar. Kal
e > f > a , / / a
@s$ ov AOywv év TO TapovTs Ko“TOS TAabE PaO
x »” > \ > A c ? \ e bu fol
h épywov éotivy arnOca, aitn 4 Svvapis THs
TOAEwS, VY ATO TaVOE TOY TPOTTAV exTHTapLEOa,
3 onpaiver. povn yap T@Y VV aKons Kpelocor
al / A
és Telpav Epxetat, Kal povyn OUTE TH TOAEMIO
3 , > , ” e,;? o& aa
érenOovte ayavaxtnow exer Up olwv Kaxotrabel,
” re eee r , 4 > pit, tense Ds, 6
ovTE TO UTNKO@ KaTadmE“WLY @S OvY LTO akiov
” \ 4 \ / \ > “4
4 dpyeTar. peTa peydrwy O€ onuetwy Kal ov Oy
,
TOL apaptupov ye THY Svvayity Tapacyopevot
Tois Te vov Kal Tois émerta OavpacOnoopeba,}
¢ 7 t
ovdev Tpocdeouevot ovTe Opnpou érratvétou ovTe
\ / a ?
OaoTls Erect pev TO aitixa Téprrer, TOV O Epyav
Tv UTovotay 7» adnOca BrdWet, dAAA Tacav
\ / \ a > \ ied / ,
bev OdrXaccav Kal yhv €o Batov TH nmeTEepa TOMY
KaTavayKacavtes yevécOat, TavtTayxod Sé uyynpeta
5 kakav Te Kaya0av aidta Evyxatoixicaytes. mtept
, a
TOLAUTNS OvV TOAEWS Olde TE YeVVaiws SLKAaLODYTES
1 xal, before ovdéy in the MSS., deleted by Kriiger.

1 The reference is to Athenian colonies and cleruchies,
which, according to the bearing of the natives, had been

33°

BOOK II. xu. 4—xur. 5

repaid. And, finally, we alone confer our benefits
without fear of consequences; not upon a calculation
of the advantage we shall gain, but with confidence
in the spirit of. liberality which.actuates us.

XLI. “In a word, then, I say that our city as a
whole is the school of Hellas, and that, as it seems to
me, each individual amongst us could in his own per-
son, with the utmost grace and -versatility, prove
himself self-sufficient in the-most varied forms of
activity. And that this is no mere boast inspired by
the occasion, but actual truth, is attested by the very
power of our city, a power which we have acquired in
consequence of these qualities. For Athens alone
among her contemporaries, when put to the test, is
superior to the report of her, and she alone neither
affords to the enemy who comes against her cause
for irritation at the character of the foe by whom
he is defeated, nor to her subject cause for com-
plaint that his masters are unworthy. Many are
the proofs which we have given of our power and
assuredly it does not lack witnesses, and there-
fore we shall be the wonder not only of the
men of to-day but of after times; we shall need
no Homer to sing our praise nor any other poet
whose verses may perhaps delight for the moment
but whose presentation of the facts will be dis-
credited by the truth. Nay, we have compelled
every sea and every land to grant access to~our
daring, and have everywhere planted! Saceatas
memorials both of evil to foes and of good to friends
Such, then, is the city for which these men nobTy
fought and ‘died, deeming it their duty not to let her

attended with ill consequences for these (e.g. Oreos, and later
Aegina) or good (e.g. on the Thracian coast).

331

THUCYDIDES

\ 2. nr > \ / > £
Ln adarpeOHvat avTnvy payomuevor éTeMeEVTHCAY,
\ lal / / X ’ \ 3 /
Kal TOV NELTOMEéEVWY TdaVTa TLVa eiKos éOéXeLV
UTEP AUTHS KAMVELY.
XLII. “ Av’ 6 67 Kai éunxvuva ta rept THs To-
/ a
News, SidacKarlav TE TOLOVMEVOS Ly TEPL Laou Ht
s \ > A \ e a \ € /
eivat TOV ayava Kal ols Tavde pndev tTrapyer
e , \ \ by , ee PBS = A /
OMOLWS, KAL THY eVNOYLaVY aya Eh ois VUV EYH
\ / / \ yy b) lel
2 davepav onpeious Kabiotds. Kai elpntar avThs
\ , a \ A ’ ve e =
Ta peyloTa’ a yap THY TON Duvynoa, ai TaVdE
Kal T@V ToL@VoE apeTal exoTpNnoaV, Kal ovK aD
Qn lal / > , ee r
ToAXots TOV “EXAnVwV tcoppoTOs MaTEp TwVOE
, lal / / la fi a
0 Aoyos TaV Epywv davein. Soxet Sé por dnrOd
\ 7
GVOpOS APETV TPOTN TE “NVVOVCA Kal TedEUTALa
3 BeBaotca 7 viv tavde KaTacTpody. Kal yap
al ss J , / \ ’ \ /
TolS TANAA YeELpoOTt Oixalov THY &s TOUS TrONéM“OUS
e€ a a /> > / ,
tmép Ths Tatpioos avépayabiav mpotibec bar:
iya0@ yap Kakov adavicaytes KoWwas padXro
ayavu@ yap $ S$ pa Vv
lal / lal
4 wbérnoav 7 é€k Tov idiwy EBraWav. Tavde dé
> > /
oUTE TAOUTOV TLS THV ETL ATOAAVOLY TpoTLMNaAS
/ ‘
éuarakicOn ote Tevias €ATLOL, ws Kav ETL d1a-
\ fal a
duyav avtnyv+ trovtycELev, avaBodnv Tov Sewvod
a /
€Toinjaato: THY dé TOV évayTioy Tiuwpiayv TOBE-
/ > lal , \ 4 ¢ /,
votépav avTav rAaBovtes Kal xivdvvav aya Tovde
/ ? > a
KaAXNLTTOV VvopicavtTes EBovrAnOncav peT AUTOD
1 gutiv: Hude brackets,

332

BOOK II. xt. 5—xuu. 4

be taken from them; and it is fitting that every man
who is left behind should suffer willingly for her
sake.

XLII. “It is for this reason that I have dwelt
upon the greatness of our city; for I have desired to
show you that we are contending for a higher prize
than those who do not enjoy such privileges irr tike
degree, and at the same time to let the praise of these
men in whose honour [I am now speaking be made
manifest by proofs. Indeed, the greatest part of
their praise has already been spoken ; for when —I
lauded the city, that was but the praise wherewith
the brave deeds of these men and men like them
have already adorned her; and there are not many
Hellenes whose fame would be found, like theirs,
evenly balanced with their deeds. And it seems to
me that such a death as these men died gives proof
enough of manly courage, whether as first revealing
it or as affording its final confirmation. Aye, even in
the case of those who in other ways fell short of
goodness, it is but right that the valour with which
they fought for their country should be set before all
else ; for they have blotted out evil with good and
have bestowed a greater benefht by their service to
the state than they have done harm by their private
lives. And no one of these men either so set his
heart upon the continued enjoyment of wealth as to
become a coward, or put off the dreadful day, yield-
ing to the hope which poverty inspires, that if he
could but escape it he might yet become rich; but,
deeming the punishment of the foe to be more de-
sirable than these things, and at the same time
regarding such a hazard as the most glorious of all,
they chose, accepting the hazard, to be avenged

333

THUCYDIDES

‘ a n ,
Tovs pev Tiwpetcbat, Tav S€ adiecOar, éEXmids
pev TO adaves Tov KaTopOwcew éemitpévartes,
la) 5) e r
Epy@ € Tepl TOD 76n Opwpévov ahicw adtois
akwobvtes TeTroevas Kal év avT@ TO! apu-
veoBar kal” tradety KaddLov? Hynoduevot 7} TO*
b] Qf f @ \ \ > \ A “
évoovtes ow@becOat, To pév aiaxpov Tov Royou
épuyov, To & épyov T@ cwpate UTrépevay, Kal bv
a / a fol
éXayloTov Katpov TUYNS dpa axun THs SoEns
pad Xov 7) TOD déous aTnAAaYyNCaD.
XLII. “ Kai otde pév tpoonkovtws TH ToXeL
/ > / \ \ \ \ >
ToLoloe €yévovTO’ TOUS O€ AoLTOUS Xp? acda-
AecTépay pev evyecPal, aTodmoTtépayv Sé pndéev
akiobv tiv €s Tovs modeutovs dtdvoray yep,
A n , , \ > , & ”
oKOTOUVTAS Ln AOYO LoVe THY @deriav, HY ap
5G \ ¢ ,
TLS TpOs OvdEevY YEtpov avTOUs Umas® eldoTas pN-
/ / iA i a \ / 9 7
KUVOL, A€YV Ga EV TO TOUS TOAELLOUS apvvEd Bat
\ cal a r
ayaba &vertw, adda padrov THY THs ToAEWS
, , /
Sivauw Kal? huépay Epyw Gewpévous Kal épactas
fol e lal s
yeyvouévous auTns, Kal OTav byiv peyarn S0€n
elvat, évOvpoupévous OTL TONWa@VTES Kal yLyVO-
oKOVTES TA O€oVTA Kal eV TOLs Epyols Aico YUYOMEVOL
¢ /
avdpes avTa EKTHTAaYTO, Kal OTOTE Kal TELpa TOU
rad > i \ \ / fal /
odaneiev, ovK ody Kal THY TOAW YE THS opeTépas
apeths aftodvTes oTEpioKew, KaANLoTOY Oé Epavov
El ir

1 So most MSS. Hude reads 7g with CG.

2 «al: Hude brackets.

3 Dobree’s correction for uaAAorv of the MSS. Haude inserts
det and retains uaddAov. * Deleted by Hude.

5 Suas: Hude brackets.

334

BOOK II. xin. 4—xuimt. 1

upon the enemy and to relinquish these other things,
trusting to hope the still obscure possibilities of
success, but in action, as to the issue that was before
their eyes, confidently relying upon themselves. And
then when the moment of combat came, thinking it
better to defend themselves and suffer death rather
than to yield and save their lives, they fled, indeed,
from the shameful word of dishonour, but with life
and limb stood stoutly to their task, and in the brief
instant ordained by fate, at the crowning moment
not of fear but of glory, they passed away.

XLIII. “ And so these men then bore themselves
after a manner that befits our city; but you who
survive, though you may pray that it be with less
hazard, should resolve that you will have a spirit to
meet the foe which is no whit less courageous; and
you must estimate the advantage of of such 2 a_spirit_ not
alone_by a speaker's words, fo for he could make a
long story in telling gs you—what you yourselves know
as well as he—all the advantages that are to be gained
by warding off the foe. Nay rather you must ae
_fix_your_gaze-upon-the-power.of Athens_and becom
lovers of her, and when the vision of her satholb
has inspired y “you, | reflect that all this has been ac-
quired by men of courage who knew their duty and
in the hour of conflict were moved by: a high-sense
of honour, who, if ever they failed in any enter-
prise, were resolved that at least their country
should not find herself deserted by their valour, but
freely sacrificed to her the fairest offering! it was in

1 %pavos, a joint contribution, the regular term for a con-
tribution made for mutual benefit, eg. to a common meal,
to a benevolent society, etc. Demosthenes (cont. Mid. 27)

represents the state as a sort of benefit society to which
every citizen owes a contribution,

335

to

THUCYDIDES

lal o/s lel * \
avuTH Tpoiguevol. KOLWWH yap Ta TouaTa SidoVTES
idta TOV ayipwv érawov éhauBavov Kal Tov
Taghov €TlianmoTatov, OUK ev ® KElVTAL paXo?,
> 2 gel | er < / > a \ a > / om 2%
arr’ év 6 } Sofa aiTav Tapa TO évTvyovTs alEi
\ / \ »” lol a
kal Royou Kai Epyou Kaip@ aleimunaTos KaTa-
/ al 3 an Las a 4
NeitreTAL. avdpav yap éripavav Tada yh Tados,
\ > a > a >? , , >
Kal OV OTNAM@V movoy Ev TH OLKELA OHmaiveL eTTL-
/ ’ \ Vj. 5 a \ / ”
ypapn, adrAa Kal EV TH LN TpoanKovon aypados
> lal , nr la)
LVN Tap ExdoT@ THS yvouns Maddov 7% TOD
Epyou évolaiTatas. ods vov vpeis EnrwoarTes
\ x BA \ > x \ ’ fi \
Kal TO evdatpmov TO é€XEVGEpoy, TO dD EdEVOEpoY TO
» / \ a
evuxov KplvavTes, un TeplopacGe Tovs TONEmt-
KovS KiVOUVOUS. Ov yap ol KaKoTpayodrTes btKAaLO-
> a x a 4 © b \ > ”
Tepov apedoiev av tov Biov, ois édris ovK Ext
a / a fol
ayabod, adr’ ols 4 évavtia petaBorn év TO Shp
\
€TL KivOuVEvETAL Kal ev ols paddioTa peydra Ta
, \
Siadépovta, Hv TL TTaL\owow. adyELvoTépa yap
/ / lj a" lal
avépt ye dpovnua Eyovte 7 meta Tov! pada-
= KR e \ cr a
KicOhvat KaK@OLS 7) O META PONS Kal KoLWAS
/ ¢ / /,
érrridos dua yryvopevos avaicOntos Oavatos.
XLIV. “Av érep Kai tovs Ta@VvdE ViV ToKéas,
cd / > > / nr x
OgOL TUpETTE, OVS OAOPVPOMAaL LAadXAOV 7 Tapa-
, ’ \ na /
pvOncopat. é€v ToAUTpOTras yap Evudopats émi-
/ \ ’ / « a
oTavta, Tpadévtes: TO S& evtuyxés,” of av TIS
icf cal
evTpeTTegTaTNS Adywow, wWoTEp olde pEV VDD,
na lal / \ a ,
TEAEUTHS, pets 6€ AVTINS, Kal ols évevdatmovAcat
te 0 Bios opoiws Kal évtedevthoa EvvepeTpryOn.
1 gy r@, in some MSS. before, in others after, wera rod,

deleted by Bredow.
2 Hude reads réde edtuxés, following Abresch.

336

BOOK II. xu. 1-xtuiv. 1

their power to give. For they gave their lives for
the common weal, and inso doing won for themselves
the praise which grows not old and the most dis-
tinguished of all sepulechres—not that in which they
lie buried, but that in which their glory survives in
everlasting remembranee, celebrated on every occa-
sion which gives rise to word of eulogy or deed of
emulation. For the whole world is the sepulchre of
famous men, and it is not the epitaph upon monuments
set up in their own land that alone commemorates
them, but also in lands not their own there abides in
each breast an unwritten memorial of them, planted
in the heart rather than graven on stone.. Do you
therefore, now make these men your examples, and
“freedom, be not too anxious about the dangers of
war. For it is not those that are in evil plight who
have. the best excuse for being unsparing of their
lives, for they have no hope of better days, but
rather those who run the risk, if they continue to
live, of the opposite reversal of fortune, and those to
whom it makes the greatest difference if they suffer
a disaster. For to a manly spirit more bitter is
humiliation associated with cowardice than death
when it comes unperceived in close company with
stalwart deeds and public hopes.

XLIV. “Wherefore, I do not commiserate the
parents of these men, as many of you as are present
here, but will rather try to comfort them. For they
know that their lives have been passed amid manifold
vicissitudes ; and it is to be accounted good fortune
when men win, even as these now, a most glorious
death—and you a like grief—and when life has been
meted out to them to be happy in no less than to

337

THUCYDIDES

/
2 yanetrov pev ovv oida Tree Gv, OY Kal TOAAAaKIS
vr e , > v > / ?
é£ere vTouvynuwata év addwv evtTvytats, als ToTE
A 3 he] / \ , > a v \
Kal avTol nyadrEcOe* Kal AUT OVY WY AV TLS MN
a -
Telpacduevos ayabav otepicKyntat, adr ov av
b] \ , > A a“ \ \ \
3 éGas yevouevos adatpeOn. Kaptepety dé ypy Kai
a\Xov twaidmyv édmids ols Ett WALKia TéxVwWoLW
A +Q7 \ lal bd ” , e
Toutalar' idia Te yap TOV OVK dvTwY ANON ot
5) a /
eT UyiyVOmevol TLoLY EcoVvTaL, Kal TH TONE StxOOeED,
” las \ > nn \ > / 7
€x TE TOV LN Epnuwovabal Kat acdarela, Evvoic et:
> x er ” aA OF , a
ov yap olov te icov te} dixarov BovreverOar ot
x \ \ “ b] Lal e / ,
adv pu) Kal Tatdas éx TOD Omoiov TapaSarropmevor
° 3
4 xivduvevmolv. dco. 6 av TwapnRynKaTe, Tov TE
/ / aA b] n /, e lal A
Tréova Képdos Ov HUTUXEtTe Biov yyeiaOe Kai
/ \ 4 \ A a > ,
tovde Bpayiv écecOar, cat 7H ToHvde evKrELA
/ x \ / > / /
KkougitecGe. TO yap gdiroTiwov aynpwy povor,
rn / an / \
Kal OUK EV TO AYPELW THS NALKLAS TO KEpdaively,
@oTrep Tivés act, madrov TépTEl, AXA TO
Tiyac Oat.
3 r
XLV. ‘“Ilact & ad dco. tHvde wapeote 7
> A c rad , \ ’ fal \ \ >
adedgois op® peyav Tov ayava (Tov yap ovK
bd ef y > “a \ 4 x ]
ovta atas elmfev éetrawvety), Kai pordtts av Kal
e \ > A b e “ > ied , ,
UTEepBodnv apEeTHS OVX Omotot, GAN’ orALY@ YELpous

1 No one could be a member of the Boule or Senate till he
was thirty, when he was almost certain to be married ; and,
according to Deinarchus ($71), no man was allowed to speak in
the Assembly until he had legitimate male issue (Zimmern).

2 e.g Simonides. ¢f. Plut. Moral. 786 b: Suwvidns rcye
mpos Tous éykadovvtTas aiT@ piAapyupiavy, bt: Tay KAAwY ameE-

338

BOOK II. xturv. 2-xtv. 1

die in. It will be difficult, I know, to persuade
you of the truth of this, when you will constantly be
reminded of your loss by seeing others in the enjoy-
ment of blessings in which you too once took de-
light ; and grief, I know, is felt, not for the want of
the good things which a man has never known, but
for what is taken away from him after he has once
become accustomed to it. But those of you who are
still of an age to have offspring should bear up in
the hope of other children; for not only to many of
you individually will the children that are born here-
after be a cause of forgetfulness of those who are gone,
but the state also will reap a double advantage—it
will not be left desolate and it will be secure. For
they cannot possibly offer fair and impartial counsel
who, having no children to hazard,! do not have an
equal part in the risk. But as for you who have
passed your prime, count as gain the greater portion
of your life during which you were fortunate and re-
member that the remainder will be short; and be
comforted by the fair fame of these your sons. For
the love of honour alone is untouched by age, and
when one comes to the ineffectual period of life it is
not ‘gain’ as some say,“ that gives the greater
satisfaction, but honour.

XLV. “But for such of you here present as are
sons and brothers of these men, I see the greatness of
the conflict that awaits you—for the dead are always
praised—and even were you to attain to surpassing
virtue, hardly would you be judged, I will not say

orepnucvos 81a Td yipas Noovav bwrd wits Ett ynpoBookeitat, THs
and Tov Kepdalvery, Simonides replied to those who charged him
with love of money, that, deprived by old age of other pleasures,
he is still comforted by one, that of gain.

339

THUCYDIDES

a , \ a a \ \ > /
xpiletre. pOovos yap Tots [aot mpos TO avTt-
1 \ be Si. oe ba > , > /
maXov,: TO 5é 4) €uTrOOWY avaYTAYywVicTw EvVOLa
TETLULNTAL.
ce > / a \ y > fol ef
2 Ei dé pe def Kal yuvaixeias TL apeTihs, 0oat
lal “i a /
vov év xnpeia Ecovtar, pvnoOjvat, Bpayeta
Tapaweoel ATav onMava. THs TE yap vTapxov-
, / a
ons hvcews pi) XElpoor yevecOar vpiv peyary 7
/ I A 3.53) TNF ? a f a
S0fa Kat Hs av ém éXdytoTOv apeThs Tépt Ff
a =. 3
aroyou év Tois dpoect KEOS 7.
XLVI. “Eipyntar «al éwol AOy@ KaTa Tov
f \
yomov boa elyov Tpocdopa, Kal Epyw ot PatTo-
\ , \ a *
pevol TA ev ON KEKOTUNVTaL, TA OE AVT@V TOUS
16 \ b] 0 DOE } / e a / no
matdas TO a0 TOvSE Onpocia 7 TONS MEXpL HENS
> / / lal / Ta
Opérer, @hédipov otépavov toiadé TE Kai Tois
AevTroméevols TV ToL@vde aywvwY TpoTLOEica:
nr a / lal
GOda yap ols Keirar apeTis péyrota, Tols b€ Kal
” ” / a \ >
2 dvdpes Apiotot moduTevovowv. viv 6€ aTodo-
,
dhupapevos Ov TpoTHKEL EXATT@ ATLTE.)
/ bg lel
XLVII. Totdcde pév o Tados éyéveTo ev TO
Yyeuave TovT@* Kal OveNMMovTos avTov TpwToV
” lal / / I] / a \ /
2 ros TOU ToAéuou ToOUTOU éTEAXEUTA. TOU bé GE-
b] \ > / : / \ e /
pous evdus apyouevou IleXorrovynoror Kai ot Evp-
/ / \ lal
payor Ta Ovo pépn WoTEp Kal TO TPwTOV éce-
\ / a \
Banov és thy ’Artixny (jryeito b€ “Apyidapos o
,
Zevéidapov, Aaxedatpoviwv Bactrevs), kal xaGe-
\ n v fal
3 Cowevoe eOnovy THY yhv. Kal GyTwY avT@V Ov

1 mpds +d avtimadov, the reading of ABFM[G]; rdv ayri-
madkov CE. Hude reads ray avrimadwy, after Croiset,

340

BOOK II. xiv. 1-xivu. 3 a.

their equals, but even a little inferior. For there is
envy of the living on account of rivalry, but that
which has been removed from our path is honoured
with a good-will that knows no antagonism. -—-—-p
“Tf I am to speak also of womanly virtues, re-
ferring to those of you who will henceforth be in
widowhood, I will sum up all in a brief admonition:
Great is your glory if you fall not below the standard
which nature has set for your sex, and great also is
hers of whom there is least talk among men whether
in praise or in blame.
XLVI. “I have now spoken, in obedience to the
law, such words as I had that were fitting, and those
whom we are burying have already in part also
received their tribute in our deeds;! besides, the
state will henceforth maintain their children at the
public expense until they. grow to manhood, thus
offering both to the dead and to their survivors a
crown of substantial worth as their prize in such con- P
tests. For where the prizes offered for virtue are
greatest, there are found the best citizens. And
now, when you have made due lament, each for his Fatid
own ‘dead, depart.” an ee
XLVII. Such were the funeral ceremonies that took
place during this winter, the close of which brought
the first year of this war to an end. At the very _
beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their(420 ne
allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before,? in- —
vaded Attica, under the command of Archida son
of Zeuxidamus, king of, the he Lacedaemonians, , and
establishing themselves p pr roceeded to TAVERE- the _
_country... And before they had been many “days in — in
1 4.e. the honours shown them throughout the rest of the
ceremony, described in ch. xxxiv, as contrasted with the
words of the eulogist. * Gg. en. x &
341

%
.

THUCYDIDES

ToANaS Tw nuépas ev TH’ ATTLKH ) VOTOS TPATOV
npEato yevéoOar tots “AOnvaious, Aeyouevov péev
Kal TpoTepov ToAAaYocE eycaTacKH Yas Kal Tepl
Ajyvov cal év &dXots Xwptors, OU MEVTOL TOTOUTOS
ye NoLuos OVSE HOopa oUTHsS avOpar av ovdapod
ELT LOvEVETO yevéo Oat. ove yap t tatpol ipkovv
TO Tp@Tov Geparrevovtes ayvoia, aX» avtol pa-
Mota EOvncKkov bo@ Kal padioTa Tpooncar,
ovTe addy v0 pwreia TEXYT ovdepia: dca 7é
Tpos lepots ikéTevoay 7) wavTelots Kal Tots ToOLOV-
TOLS EXPHTAVTO, TavTa avwagpEery Hv, TEANEUT@VTES
> n > / € \ a a ,
TE AUTOY aTéTTNGAY UTO TOU KAKOD VIK@pMEVOL.
XLVIII. "HpEato 65é 76 pév mp@tov, ws Xé-
yetat, €& AiOromias THs UTép Aiydrtou, émeta
be Kal és AiyuTrov kat AtBinv KxatéBn Kal és
THY Bactréos yy THV TORAH. és dé Ty. ’A@n-
varay modw é€arivaiws éverrese, Kal TO 7 pa-
Tov év TO Tlecpacet ippato TOV avbporror, WOTE
Kab érdyOn UT avTaV ws ot Iedomovynavoe
pappaxa eo BeBArjovev és Ta ppéata: Kpyva
yap ove joav avTot. DoTepov dé Kal és
THY GVW OAL adbixero cal eOvnoKoV TONKX@
Haddov On. AEyeT@ pev OvV Teph QUTOU @S
ExaoTos yeyvodker Kal iat pos Kal iSvarns ag’
OTov eixos Hv} yeves Oar aUTO, Kal Tas aitias
aoTivas vopiter Too auTns peTaBorrs ikavas
elvae:” éy@ 6€ olov TE eyiryvero réEw Kal ad
@v av TIS CKOTOY, El ToTEe Kal avOis émumécot,

1 jv: Hude deletes.

2 Sivauw és Td petaotioa oxeiv, in the MSS. after efva,
deleted by Gesner; Hude deletes ixavas efva: and és 7d
peraotioa, with F. Mueller.

342

BOOK II. xvi. 3—xtviu. 3

Attica the plague 4 began for the first time to show
itself dmong the Athenians. It is said, indeed, to
have broken out before in many places, both in Lemnos
and elsewhere, though no pestilence of such extent
nor any scourge so destructive of human lives is on
record anywhere. For neither were physicians able
to cope with the disease, since they at first had to treat
it without knowing its nature, the mortality among
them being greatest because they were most exposed
to it, nor did any other human art avail. And
the supplications made at sanctuaries, or appeals to
oracles and the like, were all futile, and at last men
desisted from them, overcome by the calamity.
XLVIII. The) disease began, it is said,in Ethiopia |
beyond. Egypt, aiid then descended into Egypt and
Libya and spread over the greater part of the
King’s territory. Then it suddenly fell upon the
city of Athens, and attacked first the inhabitants ot
the Peiraeus, so that the people there even said that
the Peloponnesians had put poison in their cisterns ;
for there were as yet no public fountains there. But
afterwards it reached the upper city also, and from
that time the mortality became much greater. Now
any one, whether physician or layman, may, each
according to his personal opinion, speak about its
probable origin and state the causes which, in his
view, were sufficient to have produced so great a
departure from normal conditions; but I shall de-
scribe its actual course, explaining the symptoms,
from the study of which a person should be best able,

1 It is perhaps impossible to identify the plague of Athens
with any known disease. Grote describes it as an eruptive
typhoid fever. It has perhaps more symptoms in common
with typhus than with any other disease,

343

THUCYDIDES

pariot av EXO TL T poelo@s pi aryvoeiv, TavUTa
énioce avTos TE VoonaAas Kal avTOS (b@Y adXOUS
TATYOVTAS.

XLIX. To pev yap eros, @S @pororyetTo éx
TAVTOD, padiota 67) € exelvo avooov és Tas addas
acGeveias eT UY XavEeV ov: et € Tes Kal T pouKape
Tl, €S TOUTO TaVTA amex pin. TOUS O€ addous an’
ovdemlas Tpopacews, arr’ éEaidvys vrytets ovTas
Tp@Tov pev THS KEPAarS Oéppat ioxyupal Kal TOV
oplarpav épuOjpara Kal proyoous éXduBave,
Kal Ta evTOS, q Te papvé Kal 7 yrocoa, evOus
ai maroon nv Kal mvedua atom ov Kal dug woes
noier eTrelTa & aUT@V TTAppos Kab Bpayxos
ereyiyvero, Kal év ov TOAN@ xX povep KaTtéBawev € és
Ta arn 0 Tovos meTa Bnyos t loxupov- Kal o7roTe
eS TH Kapovay ornpigerev, avéaT pepe TE QUTNDY,
Kal anoxabapaets Xorms Tao aL Grau vo vee
avowac weve elaly émncav, Kal avTal pera Tahat-
Toplas peyarys, AVE Te ToL Teloow evéim Te
Kev omacpov evdiootca ia Xupor, TOUS pev peTa
TavTa Awgycavra, Tous bé Kal TOAA@ _botepov.
kal T@ pev eEwOev aT TOMEVD Tol capa ovuT
ayav Deppov jy ovTe xXdwpov, aX’ wmrépvOpor,

TENUTVOV, prvuKtaivass puKpats Kal EdXKeow e&nu-
Onkos" Ta O€ € évTos ovTas EKALETO Gate NTE TOV
Tavu AETTOV iuatiov Kal oLvdSovY TAS emuBoras

pnd adXo TL % yupvol avéxer Gat, Hoiota Te av és

Bop ux pov aopas avtovs pimtew (xal TONXOL

TOUTO TOV TEA LEVOV avOpwrev Kat edpacay é és

ppeara) TH divrn aTavere@ Evvexopevoe Kal €v TO

omol@ KaberoT KEL TO TE mréov kab €accov To-
1 Added by Hude,

344

BOOK II. xivmt. 3-xurx. 5

having knowledge of it beforehand, to recognize it
if it should ever break out again. For I had the
disease myself and saw others sick of it.

XLIX. That year, as was agreed by all, happened
to be unusually free from disease so far as regards the
other maladies; but if anyone was already ill of any
disease all terminated in this. In other cases from
no obvious cause, but suddenly and while in good
health, men were seized first with intense heat of the
head, and redness and inflammation of the eyes, and
the parts inside the mouth, both the throat and the
tongue, immediately became blood-red and exhaled
an unnatural and fetid breath. In the next stage
sneezing and hoarseness came on, and in a short
time the disorder descended to the chest, attended
by severe coughing. And when it settled in the
stomach, that was upset, and vomits of bile of every
kind named by physicians ensued, these also attended
by great distress; and in most cases ineffectual
retching followed producing violent convulsions,
which sometimes abated directly, sometimes not
until long afterwards. Externally, the body was not
so very warm to the touch; it was not pale, but
reddish, livid, and breaking out in small blisters and
ulcers. But internally it was consumed by such a
heat that the patients could not bear to have on
them the lightest coverings or linen sheets, but
wanted to be quite uncovered and would have liked
best to throw themselves into cold water—indeed
many of those who were not looked after did throw
themselves into cisterns—so tormented were they
by thirst which could not be quenched; and it was
all the same whether they drank much or little.

345

THUCYDIDES

Ud ea a , la) v € / ey ae
6 Tov. Kal 7 aropia Tov pn Novxalely Kal 7 aypuU-
, lal
mvia éréxeito 61a TaVToOS. Kal TO THpma, boovTrep
? \ id / > na > > , > >
xpovov Kal 7 vocos akudfoL, OVK EuapalveTo, arr
> nr \ & / fol / © aA
avreiye Tapa Sofav 7H TadatTwpia, Wate 7 die-
bOeipovto of TrcioToL évatator Kal EBSopaior iro
a “ v /
rod évtos Kavpatos)érs Eyovtés Te Suvdpews, 7 ef
ra lal /
Siadvyouev, emiKaTLovTOs TOD voonpaTtos és THY
, 4 4, mp lal
KOLMav Kal EAKWOEWS TE AUTH LayUpas éeyyLyvo-
/ cc A /
pens Kat Siappotas Gua axpatov énimimtovens
e \ A /
of moAXol VaoTEpor dia THY acHéveray died bei porto.
/ \ \ \ ial , BA > /
SveEner yap S1a TavtTos TOD cwpaTos avwbev ap—a-
\ A a fal e \ U
pevov TO év TH KEPAAH TP@Tov LOpvOev Kaxov, Kal
x “~ / / al
el Tis EK TOV peyloTwV TEpLYEVOLTO, TOV YE aKPw-
> la] /
Typlwv avTirnw is avTov emEecnpawev" KATETKNTTE
la vy a
yap Kal és aidoia Kal és.dxpas xetpas Kat Todas,
\ 5 \ / 4 / 3) ot
Kal ToANOL oTEplaKopevor TOVTaV dLépevyor, eicl
© la ’ lal \
8 of cal Trav 6b0aryav. Tovds dé Kai AHOn EXaBe
TO TapauTixa avacTdvTas TavT@Y Opmolws Kal
Ul al \ \
hyvoncay odds Te aUTOVS Kal TOUS ErriTNSELoUS.
\ “ , a
L. Tevouevov yap xpetocov Xoyou TO Eidos TIS
U /, w / x \ \ >
yogou Ta TE GANA YaXrETWTEPWS 7 KATA THY av-
/ / / lol
Opwrelay vow TpocémimTEv EXATTH Kal ev THEE
Ud x x a /
édnAwoe “adtoTAa aXXo TL OV H TOV EvyTpopav TL
Ta yap Opvea kal TeTpdTroba boa avOpwrwv ante-
a > / / xX > U a
Tal TOAA@Y aTadwy YyEvo“EevwY 7) OU TpOTHEL 1
, , / A lal
yevodpueva SvepOeipero. Texunpiov O€& TeV meV

346

BOOK II. xuix. 5-1. 2

They were also beset by restlessness and sleeplessness
which never abated. And the body was not wasted
while the disease was at its height, but resisted sur-
prisingly the ravages of the disease, so that when the
patients died, as most of them did on the seventh or
ninth day from the internal heat, they still had some
strength left; or, if they passed the crisis, the
disease went down into the bowels, producing there
a violent ulceration, and at the same time an acute
diarrhoea set in, so that in this later stage most of
them perished through weakness caused by it. For
the malady, starting from the head where it was first
seated, passed down until it spread through the
whole body, and if one got over the worst, it seized
upon the extremities at least and left its marks
there ; for it attacked the privates and fingers and
toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, though
some lost their eyes also.!. In some cases the sufferer
was attacked immediately after recovery by loss of
memory, which extended to every object alike, so
that they failed to recognize either themselves or
their friends.

L. Indeed the character of the disease proved such
that it bates description, the violence of the attack
being in each case too great for human nature to
endure, while in one way in particular it showed
plainly that it was different from any of the familiar
diseases: the birds, namely, and the fourfooted
animals, which usually feed upon human bodies,
either would not now come near them, though many
lay unburied, or died if they tasted of them. The
evidence for this is that birds of this kind became

1 Evidently as the result of gangrene, due to stoppage of
circulation. This after-effect of typhus was of common oc-

currence in the outbreak in the Balkans in 1915.
347

THUCYDIDES

/ ’ / > / \ 2 / \
TOLOUT@Y opVvidwy éemireris TaPNs eyEVETO, KAL
> e a ” ¥ 7 \ la OE .
ov éwpOVTO OUTE AAXwS OUTE TrEpL TOLOUTOV OVOEV
al ta lal >
of Se KUVES paddov aicOnow Tapetyov TOU aTro-
/ \ \ a
Baivovtos da 70 Evvdiartac Oat.
U \ A
LI. To pév ody voonpa, ToANa Kai ada Tapa-
/ /
AuTOVTL aTOTIAS, WS ExXdoTwH éeTVYKXAaVE TL diadge-
/ \ 7 , al
povtws éTépw Tpos ETEpov yLyvomeEvov, TOLOUTOV Hv
ee * n \ 3Q/ \ yy / ,
éml wav Thy idéav. Kal adAO TapeXvTEL KAT
>’ val \ / b] \ lal b / a \ \
éxelvov Tov Ypovov ovdev TOV EiwOdTwv: O Sé Kal
/ ’ rn b] / v \ € \
yévoito, és TovTO éTehevTa. EOvycKov dé of peEV
> / e \ \ / f. A
apereia, ot 5é Kai wavy Oepatrevopevot. Ev TE
/ ’ a io!
ovdev KatéoTn lama ws eitreiv 6 TL YpHVY TpocdgéE-
- lal \ \
ovtas @derety (To yap tw Evveveyxov adXov
p
ra ” an Vs 7 a > \
TovTO Brat TE), THUd Te aUTAapKEs Ov OvdEV SuE-
/ \ > XN > / / x > , > \
avn mpos avTo iaxyvos Tépt 7) acGeveias, adda
/ \ , ,
mavta Evynper Kal TA Tadoy OLaitn Oeparrevopeva,
, . \ fa) a
Secvotatov 5é TavtTos hv Tov KaKod 7} Te aOvpia,
¢ U ” / \ \ \ 9. pf
oToTe Tis alcOotTo Kapvev (Tpos yap 70 avén-
‘ fal lal lal
mTiaTov EvOvS TpATOMEVOL TH YV@"LN TOAAD pad-
/ lal nm
Rov mpolevto ohas avTovs Kal ovK avTeixoy), Kal
Sti Erepos ad éEtépov Oepareia avarriprdapevot
p pov Gepameta pda
oe \ / BA \ \ an
@oTep Ta TpoBata EOvncKoy: Kal TOV TELTTOV
U fal b] / v \ War Fc TL :
Odpov TodTo éverroier. elte yap pn “Bédorev Se-
SuoTes GAANHAOLS Tpoclévat, UTwNAUYTO EphjLol,
\ a of ocs , > , a
Kal oixiat ToAAaL éexevwOnoav azropia Tov Gepa-
/ » /
mevcovtos: eite Tpociorev, SuepOeipovto, Kal pa-

348

BOOK (IL) ni 2411. 5

noticeably scarce, and they were no longer to be
seen either about the bodies or anywhere else;
while the dogs gave a still better opportunity to
observe what happened, because they live with
man.

LI. Such, then, was the general nature of the
disease ; for I pass over many of the unusual symp-
toms, since it chanced to affect one man differently as
compared with another. And while the plague lasted
there were none of the usual complaints, though if
any did occur it ended in this. Sometimes death
was due to neglect, but sometimes it occurred in spite
of careful nursing. And no one remedy was found,
I may say, which was sure to bring relief to those
applying it--for what helped one man hurt another
—and no constitution, as it proved, was of itself
sufficient against it, whether as regards physical
strength or weakness,! but it carried off all without
distinction, even those tended with all medical
care. And the most dreadful thing about the
whole malady was not only the despondency of
the victims, when they once became aware that
they were sick, for their minds straightway yielded
to despair and they gave themselves up for lost
instead of resisting, but also the fact that they
became infected by nursing one another and died
like sheep. And this caused the heaviest mor-
tality ; for if, on the one hand, they were restrained
by fear from visiting one another, the sick perished
uncared for, so that many houses were left empty
through lack of anyone to do the nursing; or if, on
the other hand, they visited the sick, they perished,

1 z.e. ‘‘no constitution was of itself strong enough to
resist or weak enough to escape the attacks” (Jowett).

349

THUCYDIDES

e > A 4 > / \
Mata oi dpeTis TL peTAaTroLOvpevoL” aLoXYYD Yap
5 I , a > la > \ \ f-
nbeldovv ch@v avTav éalovtes Tapa Tous Pidous,
3 lal
érel kal tas ddodvpces TOV aTroyLyvopévwv Te-
lal \ e la / fa lo)
NEUTO@VTES Kal Ol OlKElor CEEKapvOV UTO TOV TOAAOU
fal \ / >
KaKkod viKkwpevol. él mAégov & Gpuws ot diaTre-
/ / / \
devydtes Tov Te OvyocKovta Kal Tov TovoUpeEVvoD
’ / \ \ dé \ > \ ” >
@xtitovto Sia TO mpoedévatr Te Kal avTol HON eV
= ‘al / 3 él \ \ > / if \
7@ Oapcaréw eivat’ dis yap TOV avTOV, WaTE Kal
/
KTEelvelY, ovK ereAduBavev. Kal éwaxapifovTo TE
e \ la BA \ > \ a a
UTO TOV AAAWY KAL AUTOL TW Tapaypyya TeEpt-
- \ Uj U /
yapel Kal és Tov ererta xpovoy EATLOos TL Eixor
/ >] x e- 7 ” , / »”
Kovoys pnd av vr addov voonuatos ToTE ETL
dradOaphvar.;
/ al \ A
LII. ’Eriece & avtovs wadXov pos TO UIrdp-
, \ A Qn = A
YOVTL TOVM Kal 1) Evyxouid) éx TOV aypav és TO
\ / a
Gotu, Kal ovx Hocov Tovs émehOovTas. oLKL@D
\ b) ¢e ca) b te | / a
yap ovxX UTapXovTar, GAN év KadvPaLs Treynpals
, e / /
@pa eTous StarT@pEvwv 0 hOopos éyiyveto ovdevi
Koop, GAda Kal vexpol éx’ arXAndoIs aTroOvy-
oKovTes éxewvto Kal év Tais obots éxadivdodvTo Kai
mept Tas Kpyvas amacas nuLOvires Tod bdatos
ériOupia. tad Te iepa év ois eoxnvnvTo vexpav
, 5 > Onc <9 Q : .
Trea HV, avToD evaTroCvnTKLVT@DV" uTepBialo-
lal a a b4
yévov yap TOU KaKod ol dvOpwrot, ovK ExovTes 6
/ / lal
TL YEVOVTAL, €S Odtywpiav éTpadTrovTo Kal Lepa@v
td /
cal dclwv opoiws. vopor Te TdvTes Evvetapa-
r / \ \ /
yOncav ols éxpa@vTo MpoTepoy TEpt Tas Tapas,

35°

BOOK II. ur. 5-11. 4

especially those who made any pretensions to good-
ness. For these made it a point of honour to visit
their friends without sparing themselves at a time
when the very relatives of the dying, overwhelmed
by the magnitude of the calamity, were growing
weary even of making their lamentations. But still
it was more often those who had recovered who had
pity for the dying and the sick, because they had
learnt what it meant and were themselves by this
time confident of immunity; for the disease never
attacked the same man a second time, at least not
with fatal results. And they were not only con-
gratulated by everybody else, but themselves, in the
excess of their joy at the moment, cherished also a
fond fancy with regard to the rest of their lives that
they would never be carried off by any other disease.

LII. But in addition to the trouble under which
they already laboured, the Athenians suffered further
hardship owing to the crowding into the city of the
people from the country districts; and this affected
the new arrivals especially. For since no houses
were available for them and they had to live in huts
that were stifling in the hot season, they perished in
wild disorder. Bodies of dying men lay one upon
another, and half-dead people rolled about in the
streets and, in their longing for water, near all the
fountains. The temples, too, in which they had
quartered themselves were full of the corpses of those
who had died in them; for the calamity which
weighed upon them was so overpowering that men,
not knowing what was to become of them, became
careless of all law, sacred as well as profane. And
the customs which they had hitherto observed re-
garding burial were all thrown into confusion, and

351

THUCYDIDES

éVattov 5€ ws Exactos edvvaTo. Kal ToAXOl és
avatayvvtous Onkas éTpadTovTo oTdve. TOV éT-
/ \ \ \ ” / ,
Tnoelwy Oia TO GUXVOS On TpoTeOVavaL odhicw*
» aes. \ \ b } / \ /
éml Tupas yap adroTpias POdcavtes TOvs vyncav-
/ La nr
Tas ol pev erriOevtes TOV EaUT@Y VvEexpoyv UdHATTor,
f
of 6€ Kalopévov aAXov érLiBadovtes avwOev dv
héporey atrncav.
lal \ s ~
LIII. Ilp@tov re jpEe Kai és TAXA TH Tore
ee rE > / \ , a 5a \ ’ or
él TA€OV avouias TO VOoNMAa. pdov yap éToApa
a , 5 , \ >
Tis & TpoTepov amexpUTTeTO pn Kal Hdovny
lal \ e lal al
Tove, ayxliaTtpopov THY meTaBorAnY opayTes TOV
/ Ld lal
Te evoarmoveyv Kal aipvidiws OvncKortay Kal TOV
oveevy mpoTepov KexTnpévwv, evOrs 5é TaKeivwr
/ \ /
€XOVTMY. WaTE TAXELAS TAS éTTAUpETELS Kal TPOS
\ / a /
TO TepTvoyv nElovy TroetcOaL, Ednuepa Ta TE TO-
\ \ lA e / /
Hata Kal Ta YpHU“ATA oOMoiws HYyoUpevoL. Kal TO
pev Tpotadaitwpeiv! To SoEavTt KAX@ OvSels TpO-
> + / > \ a... aN Ss val
Oupos nv, Adnrov vouifwv et mplv ém’ avTo €dOeiv
/ ef \ e \ /
SitapOapycetat, 6 Te dé On Te 750 TavTaydbev TE
a \ \
és avTO KEepdaXd€ov, TOTO Kal KadOV Kal YpHoLpov
, A \ , a“ , , ’
KkatéoTn. Oeav dé poBos 7} avOpw@rwv vomos ov-
ral \ / e /
dels aTreipye, TO meV KpLvOVTES Ev Opotw Kal oéBeww
fa) e lal
Kal fn €K TOU TavTas opav ev iow aTrOAAUpEVOUS,
n \ e / > \ > / / fal
Ta@v O€ auapTnudTwv ovdels EATriSMY pEexXpL TOU

1 With CE, the other MSS. mrpoorada:rwpeir.

1 ¢.e, they concealed the fact that they were acting after
their own pleasure (the uh being induced by the negative
idea in awexpUmrero).

$5?

BOOK II. in. 4—-Lm1. 4

they buried their dead each one as he could. And
many resorted to shameless modes of burial because
so many members of their households had already
died that they lacked the proper funeral materials.
Resorting to other people’s pyres, some, anticipating
those who had raised them, would put on their own
dead and kindle the fire; others would throw the
body they were carrying upon one which was already
burning and go away.

LIII. In other respects also the plague first in-
troduced into the city a greater lawlessness. For
where men hitherto practised concealment, that
they were not acting purely after their pleasure,!
they now showed a more careless daring. They
saw how sudden was the change of fortune in the
case both of those who were prosperous and _ sud-
denly died, and of those who before had nothing
but in a moment were in possession of the pro-
perty of the others. And so they resolved to get
out of life the pleasures which could be had
speedily and would satisfy their lusts, regarding their
bodies and their wealth alike as transitory. And
no one was eager to practise self-denial in prospect
of what was esteemed honour,? because everyone
thought that it was doubtful whether he would live
to attain it, but the pleasure of the moment and
whatever was in any way conducive to it came to be
regarded as at once honourable and expedient. No
fear of gods or law of men restrained; for, on the
one hand, seeing that all men were perishing alike,
they judged that piety and impiety came to the same
thing, and, on the other, no one expected that he

2 Or, reading rpocrada:twpeiv, ‘to take trouble about what
was esteemed honour.”

353

THUCYDIDES

, , \ A \ / > a
dixny yevecOar Biovs av THY Tiwwpiay avTidodvat,
/ / lal
morv O€ pelfm THY 76n KaTeWndioperny opav
nr a \ 3 fal
eTriKpewacOnvat, Vv Tpiv eumecelty eLKos Elvat TOU
Biov Tt avroXadoat.
\ e al
LIV. Torovtm pév aber ot “AOnvaio. trepitre-
, ] / ’ 4 D4 9 /
coves émélovto, avOpwTwv Tt évdov OvncKovtwv
\ a ” / ’ = lal al e rd \
Kal ys &Ew Snovpévns. év 58 TO KaK@ ola eiKos
al na e
aveuwncOncav Kai Tovde Tod érous, HdoKovTEs ot
/ 7 v ,
mpeaBvtepot Tadat adecbat ” HEer Awpiaxos 10-
Py \ * x re > oO ” b i \ > 4
ELLOS KAL AOLWOS Gp avT@. éyévEeTO meV Od EpLs
an , \ \ , is la
Tots avOpwrros pt) Aotwov @vouacOat ev TO Erret
e \ a la) > \ , > -F Nip oDLLA rn
UTO TOV TAAALMV, AANA ALMOP, éviknoe Oé Erk TOD
, su y \ I A € \ ”
TAPOVTOS ELKOTWS oLpov ELpHabat ot yap avOpo-
/ ral
TOL Tpos & ETAaTXOV THY pYHnuNnY eTroLODYTO. HY
ep Q
5€ ye olwat Tote aXXos TOAEMOS KaTAaNaBn Aow-
\ a ef \ a / ,
plixos tovde tatepos Kal EvpBH yevécOar Armor,
\
KATA TO €LKOS OUTWS dooVTaL. pun Oe éyévETO
n /, / a
kai Tov Aakedaipoviwy xpnotnpiou Tots eidocuyr,
4 al \ a
OTe ETEpwTHoW avTois Tov Oeov Eb YpH TONEMELY
rn n ‘4
aVetNe KATA KPaTOS TOAELOVGL ViKkny écecOat, Kar
\ Ss a
autos épn EvdAXrppecOat. TreEpl wév odv Tod ypn-
/ \ b) e al
oTNplLov TA yuyvoueva tKalov omota elvat: éoBe-
\ lal 4 € 4 ”
PrnxoTwv bé Tov IleXoTovynTiwv 7 vocos %}pEaTO
evOus. Kal és wev IleXotrovynoov ovK éanrOev, 6
\ ” > nr > / ee. / \
TL Kat afvov eitretv, émreveiwato de "AOnvas pev

1 of. I. cxviii. 3.

354

BOOK II. uit. 4-tiv. 5

would live to be called to account and pay the penalty
of his misdeeds. On the contrary, they believed that
the penalty already decreed against them, and now
hanging over their heads, was a far heavier one, and
that before this fell it was only reasonable to get
some enjoyment out of life.

LIV. Such then was the calamity that had befallen
them by which the Athenians were sore pressed,
their people dying within the walls and their land
being ravaged without. And in their distress they
recalled, as was natural, the following verse which
their older men said had long ago been uttered :

* A Dorian war shall come and pestilence with it.”

A dispute arose, however, among the people, some
contending that the word used in the verse by the
ancients was not XAomds, “pestilence,” but Arpds,
‘famine,’ and the view prevailed at the time that
“pestilence’”” was the original word; and quite
naturally, for men’s recollections conformed to their
sufferings. But if ever another Dorian war should
visit them after the present war and a famine
happen to come with it, they would probably, I fancy,
recite the verse in that way. Those, too, who were
familiar with it, recalled that other oracle given to the
Lacedaemonians, when, in answer to their inquiry
whether they should go to war, the god responded
that if they “warred with all their might victory
would be theirs,” adding that he himself would
assist them.! Now so far as the oracle is concerned,
they surmised that what was then happening was
its fulfilment, for the plague broke out immediately
after the Peloponnesians had invaded Attica; and
though it did not enter the Peloponnesus to any
extent, it devastated Athens most of all, and next

355

THUCYDIDES

udduoTa, émetta 5€ Kal TOY AAV YopioY Ta
To\vavOpwToTaTa. TavTa wey TA KATA THY VOTO
ryevouena.

LV. Of 6é Tlerorovynacor émrel6n eTeEHLOV TO
Tmedlon, Tapi Gor € és THY Udpanov yi Kadoupevny
HEX pL Aavpetov, ob Ta apyvpeva péTar|a coTW
"AOnvaiors. Kal Tp@TOv pev ETE{LOV TAUTNY D
qT pos Tlehorrovunaov opa, émerta dé THY pos
EvBorav te ral “Avs pov TET pampwevny. Tlepuxdfjs
6e oTpatnyos @v Kal TOTE mepl pev TOD 7) émeEt-
éva TOUS “AOnvatous THY AUTHVY yv@punv Elyev
MoTrEp Kal év TH TpoTepa éo Bon}.

LVI. "Ett 3 avtav év TO wedi OvT@V, T pW
és TV Tapariav édOeiv, ExaTov veov émim)houv
TH IleXotovyntm tapeoKevateto, Kal érrerdy
ETOLLA HV, aVNyETO. Hye O él TOV vedv OTALTAS
"AOnvatwy Tetpakicyirious Kal imméas TpLako-
cious €v vavolv intaywyols Tpa@Tov TOTE ek TOV
TARALOY veo mounbeia ats: Evvertparevovto dé
Kat Xiou Kal Aéo Bro TEVTHKOVTA vavoiv. OTe oe
aVIYETO 1) OTpAaTLA AUTH "AOnvaior, IleXozrop-
vnotouvs KatédLTOY THS “ATTLKIS Ovtas év TH
Tapania. ap Lk owEvoL d€ és ‘Emridaupov TAS TleXo-
TovyngOU ETEMOV THS YS THY TOANHD, kal 7 pos
THY TONW 7 poo Banovtes és éhmida pev mprOov
“TOD éheiv, ou pévToL Tpouxwpnaé ye. avayayo-
pevor O€ €K TAS. ‘Exridavpou € eTe MOV THY TE Tpobn-
vida yy kat “Adiada Kal ‘Epmwovida: éote O€
tavta mavta émiBardocta THs Ledotovyncov.
dpavtes 6€ am’ avTav adixovto és IIpacids, Tis

356

BOOK II. tiv. 5-tv1. 6 ‘

Fak

to Athens the places which had the densest popula- |

tion. So much for-the. history of the plague. )

LV. The Peloponnesians, after ravaging tleplain,

advanced into the district called Paralus} as far as .

Laurium, m, where are the silver mines of the Athe- X
nians. And first they ravaged that part of this
district which looked towards the Peloponnesus, and
afterwards the part facing Euboea and Andros. But
Pericles, who was general, still held to the same
policy as during the earlier invasion, insisting that
the Athenians should not take the field against

them.

LVI. InbPerces y had left the plain and entered
the Paralus,-Pericles liad begun to equip a fleet of a
hundred ships to sai against the-Peloponnésus, ‘and
when all was ready he put to sea. He took with
him on the ships four thousand Athenian hoplites
and three hundred cavalry in horse-transports, then
employed for the first time, which had been made
out of the old galleys. The Chians and Lesbians
also took part in the expedition with fifty ships.
And when this armament of the Athenians put to
sea, the Peloponnesians whom they left in Attica
were-alt ady in the Paralian district. On reaching
Epidaurus jn the Peloponnesus the Athenians ra-
Soin most of that land; they also attacked the city,
but, though they at first had hopes of taking it, they
did not succeed. Then, leaving Epidaurus, they went
to sea again, and ravaged the territory of Troezeny
~Halieis, and_Hermione, which are all on the Pélo-
ponnésian coast. ~ “Siting next from this region they
1 The plain referred to was that about Athens, while the

Paralian district was the sea-coast, or south-eastern part,
terminating in the promontory of Sunium,

357

THUCYDIDES

Aakwvinns trordtcpa émiOardootov, Kal THs TE
ys Etewov Kal avTO TO TOALTMA EiNOV Kal eTOp-
Oncav. tadta dé Toucavtes é€7 vixov avexo-
pncay. Tous 6€ Terorovyncious OUKETL KatéhaPov
€v TH ‘Arrixh 6 OVTAS, aXn’ avaxexopnKoras.

LVIL. “Ocov &é _Xpévov ot TE TeXomovynccoe
Hoav év TH oH TH ‘AOnvatov Kal OL "AOnvaior
eo TpaTevov érl TOY VEwY, 1) yoo os év Te 7H oTpa-
TUG TOUS ‘A@nvaious EbOerpe Kal év TH TOXEL, dare
Kal er€xOn TOUS Iedorovynaious deicavras TO
yoonpa, @s éemuvOavovro TOV aUTOMONY 6Te év
TH) TONEL ein kat Qantovtas dpa no Oavovro,
Oaacov €x TIS vis efedGeiv. ™] be ea Bony TaUTy
TAEeio TOV Te x povoy évéwetvav Kal THY YiVv TWacay
ETEMOV* Huepas yap TEToapaKoVTA adioTa ev TH
yn tH Attixn éyévovto.

LVIIL. Tod & atdtod Oépous”Ayvev o Nixiov
kai KXedroutos 0 KnXewiov, Evatpatnyor ovtes
Ilepixdé€ovs, AaBovtes THD oTpaTiapv HITEp €KELVOS
eXpncaro éoTpatevoay evOvs emt Xark«idéas Tous
eri Opakns Kal Tloretéavay ¢ eTL TON OPKOUMEVNY,
ah ixopevor dé pnxavas Té 7H Llotedaia mpoce-
pepov Kai Tavrl TpoTre eT ELPOVTO édelv. ™ pou-
ywpe. 5€ avtois ovTEe 7 alpeois THS TONES OUTE
TaAXNa THS TapagKevys akiws: emiyevoméevn yap
¢€ / > rn \ / >’ / \ ]

7) voros évtavla on mavu émlece TOUS A@n-
vaious, b0eipovea THY oT parlay, @OTE KAL TOUS
T poTepous oT paTLoTas vooncar TAV ‘AGnvaiwy
amo THs Ew “Ayvovt otpatias év T@ TPO TOD

1 On the expedition against the Peloponnesian coasts, cy.
ch. lvi. 8 of, ie bales

358

BOOK II. tv. 6-tvut. 2

came ito Prasiae,/a town on the coast of Laconia, \_
where they not-only_ravaged parts of the country, ~*
f but also captured the town itself™and’ pillaged ite.
After they had completed these operations they went /
_ back home, where they found that the Peloponne-
._Sians were no longer in Attica but had retired. _
~ LVII. During this entire period, While the Pelo-
ponnesians were in Attica and the fleet of the Athe-
nians was on the expedition, the plague was making
havoc among the Athenians, both in their fleet and
in the city. The statement was therefore made that
the Peloponnesians left Attica in haste because they
were afraid of the disease, since they not only heard
from deserters that it was in the city, but also could
see them burning their dead. In this invasion, how-
ever, they remained in Attica longer than at any
other time, and also ravaged the entire country ;
indeed they.were in Attica almost forty days.
~~LEVITI. In the.same summer Hagnon son ot
Nicias and Cleopompus son of Clinias; Colleagues
of Pericles, taking the armament which he had
employed,! at once set out on an expedition
against the Chalcidians in Thrace and against Poti-
festa wae ga under siegé;?” Sha OH their
arrival..they brought siege-engines to bear upon
Potidaea, and tried in every way to take it. But no
success commensurate with the appointments of the
expedition attended their efforts, either in their at-
_ tempt to capture the city or otherwise; for the
' plague broke out and sorely distressed the Athenians
“there, playing such havoc in the army that even the
Athenian soldiers of the first expedition, who had
hitherto been in good health, caught the infection

* The 3,000 soldiers of the first expedition ; cf. ch. xxxi. 2
and 1. lxi. 4.
359

:
:

THUCYDIDES

, e / / \ \ e-ie¢ ,
Ypove Uytaivovtas. Dopptwv dé Kat o1 eEaxdovor
| / > / = \ / ec A
Kal xidton ovKéTL Hoav Tepi Xadxioéas. oO pev
= ad > 4 la \ > \ > ,
otv “Ayvav aveywpnoe Tats vavolv és Tas A@n-
, e lal
vas, GTO TeETpAaKlaXtALwY OTALT@Y YLALOUS Kal
na / /
TEVTNKOVTA TH VOTW aTrOAETAS Ev TETTAPaKOVTA
/ fal
parloTa Npépais' ob S€ TpoTEpoL oTpaTLM@TaL
/ A
KaTa Yopav jévovTes erodLopKovy THY Ilotet-
dacav.
/ a
LIX. Mera 6€ tiv devtépay écBornv Ttav
/ ’ lal fal a
IleXorrovynciwyv ot “A@nvaior, as } Te yh avTov
/
érétunto To SevTEepov Kal 7) vooos eTéxetTO awa
\ e / > / 4.4 , \ \
Kat O TOAELOS, NAXOLWYTO TAS YyYWp"aS, Kal TOV
\ / > > / > e / al
pev Tlepixréa év aitia eixov ws Telcavta odds
moNeuety Kat OL éxetvov tais Evydopats trepr-
\
memTwKOTES, mpos O€ Tovs Aaxedatpoviovs wp-
a \ / \
unvto Evyywpeiv: Kal mpéoBes Tivas TréwWavTes
‘4
@s auToUs ampaxtor éyévovto. Tavtaxobev Te
a ’ / a
Th yvoun aropo. KabeotnKoTes evéxetvTO TO
lal e r
Tlepixre?. 0 O€ op@y avTov’s Tpds Ta TapovTa
yakeTalvovtas Kal TavTa ToLodYTAS aTrEp AUTOS
Hrmite, EVANoyov moijcas (éte 8 e€atpaTnyet)
bp] 4 a / \ > \ ‘ >? /
€BovreTo Oapcivai Te Kal aTayayav TO opy.fo-
a , \ \
pevov THS yvouNsS Tpos TO HrLw@TEpov Kai ade-
/ a \ a /
éotepov kataothoar trapedOwv dé EdeEe Tordoe.
LX. “Kal mpocdeyopév@ por Ta THs opyhs
cal \
tev & we yeyévntat (aicOdvopat yap Tas aitias)
Kal é€xxAnoiav tovtov évexa Evvynyayov, Sas
e / \ / y re, a a ? \
UTopvijcw Kal péurpopar el Te py oplas 7 epol
360

BOOK II. tvin. 2- Lx. 1

from Hagnon’s troops. Phormio, however, and his
sixteen hundred men, were no longer in Chalcidice.}
Accordingly Hagnon took his fleet back to Athens,
having lost by the plague in about forty days one
thousand and fifty out of a total of four thousand
hoplites ; but the soldiers of the former expedition
remained where they were and Es the or
of Potidaea.- '
LIX. After the second invasion of ct a a
_sians.the.Athenians underwent_a change of feeling,

now that their land had been ravaged a a second time _

while the plague and the war combined lay heavily
upon them. They blamed. Pericles for having per-
suaded them to go to war and held him responsible
for the misfortunes which had befallen them, and
were eager to come to an agreement with the Lace-
daemonians. They even sent envoys to them, but
accomplished nothing... And now, being altogether
at their wits’ end, they assailed Pericl And when——\
he saw that they were exasperated eth: si ca
situation and were acting exactly as he had himself
expected, he called a meeting of the assembly—for
he was still general—wishing to reassure them, and
by ridding their minds of resentment to bring them
to a milder and less timorous mood. So he came
forward and spoke as follows:

LX. “I have been expecting these manifestations
of your wrath against me, knowing as I do the causes
of your anger, and my purpose in calling an assembly
was that I might address to you certain reminders,
and remonstrate if in any case you are either angry

1 of. 1. lxiv. 2. Phormio’s departure must have occurred
before the events described in ch, xxxi.2, but is nowhere
mentioned.

VOL. I. n 36%

THUCYDIDES

2 yareraivete H Tails Evpdopais elxete. eyw yap
3 n / / , ’ , b]
Hyobpar TOALY TAELw EVuTTacay opfovpévynv we-
ety Tous idtoTas 7 Kal” ExacToVv TOY TONTAV

3 evrpayodoay, aOpoav 5é cdhadropévnv. Karas
pev yap hepopevos avnp To Kal” éavtov diadGerpo-

, a , OA e
pévns THS matpidoos ovdév Haocov EvvaTroddvTat,
Kaxotuxav 6€ éy evTUXovan TOAX@ paddov
e / ‘
4 diacwbetat. omdTe ovv ods pev Tas tdtas
\ / / Ka \ @ \ b] /
Evudopas ola Te héperv, els b€ Exactos Tas éxeivns
advvatos, TAS ov Xpn TaVTAS apvvEe AUTH, Kab
un 0 vov tues Opate, Tals Kat olKov Kaxo-
Tpaylars exTreTANYHEVOL TOD KOLVOD THS TwTHpLAS
b] / \ b] / \ / 6
adiecOe, kal éué TE TOV TapalvécavTa TroNEpEtY

/ 4

\ e a > \ \ / > ’
Kal vas avTtovs of Evvéyvwte Ov aitias éyere.
5 / b] \ / > 5 \ > he Q 0 i) ¥
Kaitot éuol TowovT@ avdpt opyiferbe Os ovdevos
a / \
oocwv olouar eivat yvavat te Ta Séovta Kai
e lal ca / / \ /
épunvedoat Tavta, pidoTroNls Te Kal YpnuaTov
, ec \ \ \ \ a 8 é /
6 Kpeicowv. 6 TE Yap YvouS Kai wn caps didakas
> ” \ > A» @ 10 + ce ” > Ul
év iow Kal ef pur) eveOusnOn 0 Te Exwv apdorepa,
rf \ / , > xX e i > /
TH 5€ modes SvavOUS, OVK AY OMolwS TL OlKELwS
/ , de \ DO 4 de
dpalor' mpocovtos o€ Kat Tovde, Ypnpmact de
7 \ lal
vikwpevov, TA EVYTavta TovTOU Eves av TwRoOtTO.
vf ’ v \ / e / an € /
7 @OT El [Ol KAL fLETWS NYOUMEVOL “MANXOV ETEPWV
ral al /
mpoceivat avTa Trodemety emelcOnTe, ovK ay
a lo) a 2 i? /
ELKOTWS VoV TOU ye abdLKElV aitiay hepoiuny.
362

BOOK II. ux. 1-7

with me or are giving way to your misfortunes with-
out reason. For in my judgment a state confers a

eater benefit upon its private citizens when as
a whole commonwealth it is successful, than when
it prospers as regards the individual but fails as a
community. For even though a man flourishes in
his own private affairs, yet if his country goes to
ruin he perishes with her all the same; but if he is
in evil fortune and his country in good fortune, he is
far more likely to come through safely. Since, then,
the state may bear the misfortunes of her private
citizens but the individual cannot bear hers, surely
all men ought to defend her, and not to do as you
are now doing—proposing to sacrifice the safety of
the commonwealth because you are dismayed by the
hardships you suffer at home, and are blaming both
me who advised you to make war and yourselves who
voted with me for it. And yet I, with whom you
are angry, am as competent as any man, I think,
both to determine upon the right measures and to
expound them, and as good a patriot and superior to
the influence of money. For he who determines
upon a policy, and fails to lay it clearly before others,
is in the same case as if he never had a conception
of it; and he who has both gifts, but is disloyal to
his country, cannot speak with the same unselfish
devotion ; and if he have loyalty also, but a loyalty
that cannot resist money, then for that alone every-
thing will be on sale. If, therefore, when you al-
lowed me to persuade you to go to war, you believed
that I possessed these qualities even in a moderate
degree more than other men, it is unreasonable that
I should now bear the blame, at any rate, of wrong-
doing.

363

THUCYDIDES

/

LXI. “Kai yap ois pev aipeois yeyévnrat
TaAXa EVTUXOUGL, TOA avoia ToAEuACAaL & S
> ral a A y > \ lal / e
avayKatov mv % elEavtas evOus Tols TéXAS UTTa-

a / e
Kovcal 1) KIvOuvEevoaYTas TepLyevéc Gal, 0 puyav
Tov Kivdvvoy TOD UTOTTAYTOS MEUTTOTEPOS. Kal
>. \ \ e I , > \ ’ ’ , e ~ \
éya@ pev 0 autos eis Kal ovK éFiotapat: vpets O€
peTaParreTe, every EvvéByn vpiv wercOjvar pev

\
aKepaiows, metauédew S€ KaKovpévols, Kal TOV
é“ov AOyo ev TO UpeTepw acUevet THs yvouns by
= \ , , \ \ ~ Mv A
opOov daiverGat, dudte TO pwev AVTTODY EXEL 7d

\ v ce y a \ > / bd
tThv aicOnow éxdoto, THs S€ @deNAS aTrEeoTLV
y € / ‘ae \ cal /
éte 7) OnX\wols Aract, Kal weTaBorANs peyarys,

, \ n
Kal TavTns €E& driyou, éuTrecovaons TaTrELYN ULaV
9) Olavola éeyKapTepely & Eyvwte. SovAol yap
dpovnua TO aidvidiov Kat aTpocddoKntov Kat TO

+ / X06 nr J aA r * rd
TrELTT@ Taparoywo EvuPaivov: 0 amiv mpos Tots

,
addols ovY HKLgTAa Kal KATA THY VOTOV yeyEvNnTaL.
fod \ / / > fal \ > Bl
Guws 6€ TOAW peydAnV oixoUYTas Kal év 7OecLV
avTiTadols avThH TeOpampévous ypewv kal Evp-
r rn , by / e / \
ghopais tais peylotais eOédhew wdiotacOar Kai

\ > , \ > / pI » \

Thy akiwow pn apavitery (ev iow yap ot avOpwrot
rn nr e | lal
dixalovar THS Te vTapyovons SoEns aitiacOat
OoTIs MaNakia éAXNELTEL KAL THS 2) TWeOTNKOVENS

yu 2 iS Ba) Tpoonkovon
Qr \ / >) , /
pucety Tov OpacvTyTL Opeyouevoy), aTaNynoavTas

1 Described by Pericles in the Funeral Oration, chs.
xxxvii-xlii.

364

BOOK II. tx1. 1-4

LXI. “For though I admit that going to war is
always sheer folly for men who are free to choose,
and in general are enjoying good fortune, yet if the
necessary choice was either to yield and forthwith
submit to their neighbours’ dictation, or by accepting
the hazard of war to preserve their independence,
then those who shrink from the hazard are more
blameworthy than those who face it. For my part,
I stand where I stood before, and do not recede from
my position; but it is you who have changed. For
it has happened, now that you are suffering, that you
repent of the consent you gave me when you were
still unscathed, and in your infirmity of purpose my
advice now appears to you wrong.’ The reason is
that each one of, you is already sensible of his
hardships, whereas the proof of the advantages is
still lacking to all, and now that a great reverse has
come upon you without any warning, you are too
dejected in mind to persevere in your former re-
solutions. For the spirit is cowed by that which
is sudden and unexpected and happens contrary
to all calculation ; and this is precisely the experi-
ence you have had, not only in other matters, but
especially as regards the plague. Nevertheless, see-
ing that you are citizens of a great city and have
been reared amid customs which correspond to her
greatness, you should willingly endure even the
greatest calamities and not mar your good fame.
For as all men claim the right to detest him who
through presumption tries to grasp a reputation to
which he has no title, so they equally claim a right
to censure him who through faintheartedness fails to
live up to the reputation he already enjoys. You
should, rather, put away your grief for private ills

365

THUCYDIDES

\ \ a fa n
5€ Ta ida TOU KoWOD THS CwTHpias avTiAapBa-
veoOa.
LXII. “Tov 5€ rovov tov cata Tov Todepor,
: / / \ \ > \ lat s
Hn YevnTal TE TOADS Kal Ovdev MaAXOV TreEpLyEeva-
sea, apKeLTo ev Vuiv Kal éxeiva év ols aNXOTE
/ \ > / > > la} - ee. e
ToAAaKLS ye 61 aTréderEa OvK OPO@S avTOV UTO-
, / \ x 7©e fod an
TTEvopevov, Onrwow Sé Kal TOde, 6 pot SoKEiTE
ouT avtol mwrote évOvunOnvar trapxov bpiv
x a
peyeOous mépt és THY apXnY OUT éyw év Tots pW
Noyoss ovd av viv éypnoduny KxouTwbdectépav
EyovTe THY TpocTrolnoLy, El 1) KATATETANYLEVOUS
2 Uuas Tapa TO elKos EWpwv. olecbe ev yap TOV
4 / 54 DJ \ \ >? / 7
Evpudywv povev adpyew, éy@ dé arodaivw dvo
Mep@v TOV és Yphow havepav, ys Kal Oardoons,
TOD éTépov vUuas TavTOS KUpLwTaTOUS dVTas, ed’
¢ fal , \ A rPyas. / a
dcov Te viv véyerOe Kat Hv él TrEéov BovAnOATe:
kal ovx éotiv Gots TH UTAapYOVeH TapacKevT
TOU VaUTLKOU TAEOVTAS Upas OUTE Bacirevs OUTE
bY 2Q\ 4 n > A / ,
@AXo ovdev EOvos TaV év T@ TApovTt K@AVCEL,
3 @OTE OU KATA THY THY OLKLOV Kal THS Yhs Kpelay,)
@y peydrwv vouibete eotepnabat, attn 7 Svvapis
daivetar' ovd eixds yareTas hépery aVT@Y par-
x > , \ > , ,
Nov 1) OV KNTLOY Kal eyKaXX@TICMA TrOUTOV
? a a
Tpos TavTNV vouicavTas OALYwpHoaL Kal yvavaL
> / / A > / >? nr
éLevOepiay pév, Hv avTiNapBavopuevor avThs S1a-
, € , an b / A \
cocwLEV, padiws TAVTA avadnWouerny, adrwv dé

1 cf. ch. xiii and I. exl-cxliv.

366 \ x oe

BOOK II. vx1. 4-Lx. 3

and devote yourselves to the safety of the common-
wealth.

LXII. “ As to the hardships involved in this war,
and your misgivings lest they prove very great and
we succumb after all, let those arguments suffice
which I have advanced on many other occasions! in
order to convince you that your fears are groundless.
But there is one point I propose to lay before you
on which, 1 think, you have never yourselves as yet
reflected, in spite of the advantage it gives you as
regards your empire and its greatness, and which I
have never previously dealt with in my speeches,
and should not have done so now—for it makes a ~
somewhat boastful claim—had I not seen that you
are unreasonably dejected. You think that it is only
over your allies that your empire extends, but I
declare that of two divisions of the world which lie
open to man’s use, the land and the sea, you hold
the absolute mastery over the whole of one, not
only to the extent to which you now exercise it,
but also to whatever fuller extent you may choose;
and there is no one, either the Great King or
any nation of those now on the earth, who will
block your path as you sail the seas with such a
naval armament as you now possess. This power,
therefore, is clearly not to be compared with the
mere use of your houses and fields, things which you
_ value highly because you have been dispossessed of
them; nor is it reasonable that you should fret about
them, but you should make light of them, regarding
them in comparison with this power as a mere flower-
garden or ornament of a wealthy estate, and should
recognize that freedom, if we hold fast to it and
preserve it, will easily restore these losses, but let

367

THUCYDIDES

\ a
UTakovoact Kal Ta TpoKexTnueval direiv édac-
lal “ \
covcGal, TOY TE TATEPWY p47) YElLpovs KaT apdo-
a "\ \ 4 \ > , v
Tepa havijvat, ol peta TOVMY Kal Ov Tap adwY
deEdwevo, Katéoyov Te Kal TpoTéeTL SiacwoaytTes
£5 Ci ee > / y be 4 >
Tapedocay vyuiv avTa (aicxtoy O€ ExovTas adat-
rn xX ra na
peOnvat KTwpévous atuxjaat), lévar bé Tols
a e /
€xPpots omoce pn dpovnpwate povov, adda Kal
KaTappovnuatis avynua pev yap Kal aro aua-
/ > lal \ fal >’ /
Gias evtvyovs Kal Sere tive eyyiyveta, KaTa-
/ rn
Ppovnas de Os av Kal yy@pun TLoTEVH T@V évavTiov
/ aA e an e / a’ \ / > \
TTEPLEVELV, O NULVY UTTAPYXEL.) KAL THY TOApaV aTro
fal e / / 4 lal P
THS omotas TUyNns 7 Evveris Ex TOV vTépppovos
/
éxupwtépav Tapéyetat, eXmid. TE HoTOV TLaTEvVEL,
hs €v TO aTOpwn iaxvs, yuoOun O€ ATO TOY UTAp-
4 2 / € j
YovTav, ns BeBaoTépa n Tpovora.
fol / lal A
LXIII. “Tis te rodkews buds eixos TO TLMO-
/ > \ la) v e iA >? /
HEV@ aTrO TOU apxXeEL, OTEP ATaVTES ayadreaOe,
i \ \ , \ / a \ \
Bonbetv, cat pr pevyerv Tovs Trovous 7 pndé Tas
\ / é
Tyas Si@Kerv’ unde vopicar Trept évos povov, Sov-
, /
elas avT édevOepias, aywviferPar, adra Kal
apXis TTEPHTEWS Kal KLVOUVOU @V ev TH APXT aT7-
Q » 1o. b] . »” e cal 5A 4
yOGecbe. 1s ovd éxorihvat Ett bpiv Eotwy, et Tus
\ , ) nw ‘ \ > ,
kal Tobe €v T@ Tapovte Sedi@s atpaypoovvyn

1 So most editors with Gmc; all other MSS. mpocexrn-
péva except M mpookexrnu€va.

368

BOOK II. vxu. 3-Lx111. 2

men once submit to others and even what has been
won in the past! has a way of being lessened.
You must therefore show yourselves not inferior
in either of these two respects to your fathers, who
by their own labours, and not by inheritance, not
only acquired but also preserved this empire and
bequeathed it to you (and it is a greater disgrace
to let a possession you have be taken away than
it is to attempt to gain one and fail); and you
must go to meet your enemies not only with con-
fidence in yourselves, but with contempt for them.
For even a coward, if his folly is attended with good
luck, may boast, but contempt belongs only to the
man who is convinced by his reason that he is superior
to his opponents, as is the case with us. And, where
fortune is impartial, the result of this feeling of con-
tempt is to render courage more effective through
intelligence, that—puts its trust not so much in
hepe,-which-is strongest in perplexity, as in reason
supported by the facts, which gives a surer insight
into the future.

LXIIT. “You may reasonably be expected, more- .
over, to support the dignity which the state has at-
tained through empire—a dignity in which you all
take pride—and_not to avoid its burdens, unless you
resign its honours also. Nor must you think that
you are fighting for the simple issue of slavery or
freedom; on the contrary, loss of empire is also in-
volved danger from the hatred incurred in your
sway. | From this empire, however, it is too late for
you even to withdraw, if any one at the present crisis,
through fear and shrinking from action does indeed

1 Or, reading ra mpocextnuéva, ‘‘freedom and all that
freedom gives” (= mpds tH @AcvOepla Kextnuéva, as Poppo
explains).

369

THUCYDIDES

/ \ ¥
avipayabiferary ws tupavvida yap dn eyete
> / aA a \ a é art? >? al
avTnyv, hv AaBety pev adixov Soxel eivat, adetvat

/ ° fal
dé émixivduvoy. TadyioT av TE TOXLVY OL TOLODTOL
> / ,
ETépoUS TE TELTAVTES aTTONETELAY Kal el Tov émt
a rn / > s \ \ ”
ThOV AVTA@V AVTOVOMOL OLKI;cELAY’ TO Yap aTpay-
\ \ a ,
pov ov ao@leTar pn peta Tov dSpactnpiov teTay-
7 U ,
pévov, ovdé év apxovon mrorer Evydéper, adr’ év
lal /
tmnkow, aoparas dSovrevewy.
e o \ lal lal
LXIV. “‘Twuets 5€ wnte vTd TOV ToL@vde TrONL-
a / b] A ] ’ a lj
Tov TapayerOe pute ewe du’ opyns EyeTe, @ Kal
> \ f - > A 42 fe ¢€
auto Evydséyvwte Trodepety, et Kal erred Oovtes ot
9 , ” ef 5 aN 3 Ve, 3 ,
évavtiot épacav atrep eixos Hv pty €OeXynoavTov
“ , , , 2
tpav UTaKovelv, eTlyeyevNTAL TE TEPAa WY TpOG-
/ r / \ cal
edeyouc0a 1 vooos de, Tpaypa jpovoy 5) TeV
mTavtTwy é€ATiOos Kpelacov yeyevnuevov. Kal Sv
Bus 9% sM , a ” rn >
aUTHY O10 OTL MEpos TL pAaAXAoOV ETL pLoovpMAL, Ov
\ . 4
Sixaiws, eb un Kal OTaY Tapa Noyov TL Ev TpaENTE
b] \ > Q / / be \ / Py /
euot avalnoete. epe O€ ven Ta TE OaLmovla
\ a /
avaykaiws Tad TE aTO TOV TodELioV avdpEiws:
al \ > »” lal a / ‘ ‘ @
taita yap év Ge: tHOE TH TOAEL TPOTEPOY TE HY
Lal al nw Lal \
vov Te 7 €v Luly KwWAVOH. vate O€ Gvoma péeyt-
oTov auTiv éxovoay év dtacw av petro. 81a TO
tais Evudhopais un elke, TrEtoTAa b€ cwOpuaTa Kal
Tovous avnrwxévat TOAEL, Kal SUVapLY pEeyioTNY
a / a
57) pméxpt TODSE KEKTNMEVHY, HS €s aldLov ToIs éTTL-

1 Dobree deletes, followed by Hude,
379

BOOK II, txt. 2-Lxiv. 3

seek thus to play the honest man; for by this time
the empire you hold is a tyranny, which it may seem
wrong to have assumed, but which certainly it is
dangerous to let go. \Men like these would soon
ruin a state, either here, if they should win others to
their views, or if they should settle in some other
land and have an independent state all to themselves ;
for men of peace are not safe unless flanked by men
of action; nor is it expedient in an imperial state,
but only in a vassal state, to ions ameioty by.
submission. 7 ph ee
LXIV. “Do not be led astray by Aas citizens as
these, nor persist in your anger with me,—for you
yourselves voted for the war the same as I—just be-
cause the enemy has come and done exactly what he
was certain todo the moment you refused to hearken
to his demands, even though, beyond all our expec-
tations, this plague has fallen upon us—the only thing:
which has happened that has transcended our fore-
sight. I am well aware that your displeasure with
me has been aggravated by the plague; but there
is no justice in that, unless you mean to give me also
the credit whenever any unexpected good fortune.
falls to your lot. But the right course is to bear with
resignation the afflictions sent by heaven and with™
fortitude the hardships that come from the enemy;
for such has been the practice of this city in the past,
and let it find no impediment in yourselves. And
realize that Athens has amighty name among all
mankind because she has never yielded to mis-
fortunes, but more freely than any other city has
lavished lives and labours upon war, and that she
possesses to-day a power which is the greatest that
ever existed down to our time. The memory of

37%

THUCYDIDES

a \ n r
ylyvomevols, HY Kal voV UTEvd@pév Tote (1dvTAa
\ ¥ A #2 ca) / ,
yap Tépuke Kal €Xaccovcbat), uynun KaTareNrel-
wetat, ‘EXXjvav te Ste “EXAnves TrELTT@V 67
> / /
npEAMEV KAL TTONEMOLS MEYLOTOLS AVTETYOMEY TPOS
> s lal
te Evyravtas Kal Kal’ Exdotovs, TOoAW TE Tots
~ /
TAGW EVTOPWTATHY Kal mEeylaTHY OKnTapEV. Kal-
lal ¢e \ > / I Se e \ A
TOL TAaUTa O fev aTpPayLoV péuratt’ av, o 6é Spay
\ > \ / 7 > / \
TL Kal autos Bovrdpevos Enrwoer ef O€ TLS pH
/ / \ \ al \
KéexTnTAal, POovnce. TO dé pioetcGar Kal AUTN-
lal / n \ a \
pous elvat ev TH TapovtTe Tao pev vaHpte 61)
id e? e / ’ / A 4 Ac 2 \
Soot Etrepor Etépwy jEiwoav ape Satis 6é érl
\ , 3 lal
peyiotos TO émidPovoy AapPaver, opOas Sov-
lal /
AeveTalL. juloos pev yap OUK ET TOAD aVTEYEL, 1
\
5€ mapautixa Te NapTrpoTNs Kal és TO érretta So~a
aleiuvnotos KaTaXELTETAL. pets OE Es TE TO MEA-
/ lj \ / \ > \
Rov KANOY TPOYVOVTES EF TE TO AUTLKA PN ALaX POV
an af) Q + 2 . , 0 l A -
TO 76n TpodUpwM audotepa KTHcacGe, Kai Nake
Satpoviors ponte emixnpvKevedbe prte EvdnroL EaTeE
ad A / A iA \
Tols Tapovet Trovols BapuVvopeEvol, ws OlTLVES TPOS
Tas Evpdopas yvoun mév HKioTa AVTODYTAL, Epyo
es ,
S€ pwddtoTa avtéxyovowy, ovTOL Kal TOhEWY Kai
a %”
iOvwT@v KpaTLoTOL Eiowv.
a e fol / a
LXV. Toratta o Uepixr7s rAeywr érrerpato
\ b] / fol ] > \ ’ n /
tous “AOnvaious THs TE és AUTOY Opyis Tapadveww
r , fal A ,
Kal a0 TOV TapovTay SeVvav atTayew THY yve-
unv. ot dé dnuoota pev Tois Noyos averreGovTo
/ v v
kal ovTe mpos Tos Aaxedatmovious Ett Emreutrov
al 4 297
és Te Tov Todeuov wadrAov Wpunvto, idia 4é

372

BOOK II. wxiv. 3—Lxv. 2

this greatness, even should we now at last give
way a little—for it is the nature of all things to
decay as well as to grow—will be left to posterity
forever, how that we of all Hellenes held sway over
the greatest number of Hellenes, in the greatest
wars held out against our foes whether united or
single, and inhabited a city that was the richest
in all things and the greatest. These things the
man who shrinks from action may indeed dis-
parage, but he who, like ourselves, wishes to accom-
plish something will make them the goal of his
endeavour, while every man who does not possess
them will be envious. Tobe hated and obnoxious for

the moment_has s always been the ‘lot of those who

a

have aspired to rule over - others; but he who, aim-
ing at the highest ends, | ‘accepts the odium, is well
advised. For hatred does not last long, but the
splendour of the moment and the after- “glory are
left in everlasting remembrance. Do you, then,
providently resolving that yours shall be honour in
ages to come and no dishonour in the present,
achieve both by prompt and zealous effort. Make
no overtures to the Lacedaemonians and do not let
them know that you are burdened by your present
afflictions ; for those who in the face of calamities
show least distress of spirit and in action make most
vigorous resistance, these are the strongest, whether
they be states or individuals.”

LXV. By such words Pericles endeavoured to cure
the Athenians of their anger toward him, and to di-
vert their minds from their present ills. And as
regards public affairs they were won over by his
arguments, sending no further envoys to the Lace-
daemonians, and were more zealous for the war; but

373

6

7

THUCYDIDES

a / lal e \ na e > >
tols TwaOnuacw é€dXvTovVTO, Oo pev SHhuos OTL atr
éXNaccovayv opympevos éaTépnTo Kal TOUTWY, OL

\ \
Sé duvatol Kaka xTypata Kata Thy xopav}
olkodomlats Te Kal ToAUTEAECL KATAGKEVATS aTrO-
, \ \ / , 2 “2 > ,
AwAEKOTES, TO OE péyLoTOV, TOAEMOY aVT ELpHnVNS
/
éyovtes. ov pévTos mpoTepov ye ot EvpTravTes
A /
éravcavTo év opyn ExovTes avTov piv e>nuimoav

, ef 2 5 > a
ypjpaciw. wUaotepov & avOis ov TOAAG, OrreEp Gi-
Nel Gutdos Tovety, oTpaTHYyOV etAovTO Kal TavTAa

\ > rn

Ta TpaymaTa éTéTpEWay, @V MeV TrEpl TA OLKELA
oe yA ? , ” v 2 \ e
Exactos HAyel auSAUTepor On dvTes, @v O€ 7

, al

Evutaca wos TpocedeiTo TWAELTTOU AELOV VoOpt-
e 4 a

Covtes elvat. Ocov TE yap Ypovov TpovaTN THs

Uy a > lad
ToAEws ev TH ELPHVN, pEeTPLWS EENYEITO Kal acda-

lal 4 > / \ b] 7 229 > /
ras StedvrAakev avtyv, Kat éyéveto em €xelvov

, 3 , e , / e be /
peyloTn, émerdy TE O TONEMOS KaTéTTH, O SE Hai-
\ \ /
VETAL Kal €v TOUT@ TpOYyvouUs THY duvamLy.
> / \ / 4 is es a ‘ > \
EqeBio dé dvo érn cal && phvas: kai érretdy
3 , > \ / 4 3 , e Ud > fol
améOavev, él Tréov Ett Eyv@TON 7) Tpovota avTOD
5 , € \
n €> TOV ToOAECu“OY. O pev yap novyalovTds TE
,
Kal TO vautixov OepatrevovTas Kal apyny py
a f \ a /
ET LKTWULEVOUS eV TO TOAEUM NSE TH TONEL KLVOU-
vevovtas ébyn treptécecOar: of O€ Ta’Ta Te TaVTA
> b] , ” \. bY4 fal /
és Touvavtiov érpatav Kal adda éEw Tov TroAEMoU
* \ \ 2Q7
Soxodvta elvat Kata Tas idias PiroTipias Kal
a cal \
idia Képdn Kakas és Te ohas avTovs Kal TovsS

1 Hude inserts év with Madvig.

1 Righty talents, according to Diod. x1. xlv.; but accord-
ing to Plut. Per. xxxv. estimates varied from fifteen to dtty

374

(

\

‘maintain a defensive policy, attend to their navy, and |

BOOK II. txv. 2-7

in private they were distressed by their sufferings ;
for the commons, having less to start with, had been
deprived even of this, while the upper classes had
lost their beautiful estates in the country, both
buildings and costly furniture, and above all they
had war instead of peace. Indeed one and all they
did not give over ai ir ent against him until
they had imposed a fine! upon hit, But not long
afterwards, as is the way with the multitude, they
chose him again as general and entrusted him with
the whole conduct Ofatars ; for they were now be-
coming individually less keenly sensible of their
private griefs, and as to the needs of the state as a
whole they esteemed him invaluable. For so long
as he presided over the-affairs of the state in time of
peace he pursued a moderate policyand kept the
city in safety, and it was under him that Athens
reached the height of her greatness; and, after the
war began, here too he appears to have made a far-
sighted estimate of her strength. ee
Pericles lived two years and six months beyond the
beginning of the war; and after his death his fore-

sight as tothe war was still m6réTullyTecognized. |

For he had told the Athenians’ that if they would”

y

}

eo P ae elle A
not seek to extend their sway during the war, or do \~

anything to imperil the existence of the state, they

trary to his advice™in all these things, but also“in
matters that apparently had no connection with the
war they were led by private ambition and_private
greed to adopt policies which proved injurious both
talents. The charge was embezzlement, according to Plato,
Gorg. 576 A.

375

\ would prove superior.| But they not only acted-con=

ae
a
Fd

10

11

THUCYDIDES

Evppuayous étroditevoar, & KaTopOovpeva pev Tots
/ Qn
idvoTats TYLn Kal wheria padrov Hv, cparévta
dé TH Tove és TOV TOAELOV BAGBn KafiotaTo.
aittov & mv ote éxetvos pev Suvatos Oy TO Te
a4 , lal
ati@uate Kal TH yvoun Xpnuatav Te diadavas
> , / An N 7 > tA
GOWPOTATOS yEevomevos KaTELYE TO TAHOOS EdevOE-
\ > »” cal e > > Lal a > \
PWS, KAL OUK NYETO fadXXrov vi avTOVU 7) aUTOS
AYE, OLA TO on KT@pEvos €E OV TPOTHKOVT@Y THY
/ \ 2 / / > > 4 , ’
Sivapiy mpos noovnv TL Eye, GAN Eyov er
akiwioer Kal Tpos Opynv TL avTELTEty. OmdTE youu
\ \ fn
aicOoito TL avTOvs Tapa Katpov UBper Papaoty-
Tas, Néywv KaTéTAnocey etl TO hoPeiacGar, Kal
’ O..- Sait 5) , s Fe 8 \
ded.oTas av anroyos avtixkabiatn TAaAW €TL TO
An , , / A
Oapceiv. éyiyveTo TE Aoyw per dnuoxpatia,
5M \ e \ cal , > \ J 7 e \
Eépyw d5€ vmTo0 Tov TpwToU avdpos apyn. ot dé
A \
totepov icor wadXov avtot Tpos GAANHAOUS GYTES
Kal dpeyouevot tod mpatos ExacTos yiyverOar
érpatrovto Kal’ noovas T@ SHuw Kal Ta TPaypaTa
, /
évdioovar. €& @Y aXa TE TOAAG, wS ev pEeyary
U \ >] \ ’ 4 e / \ 2 >
moder Kal apynv éxovon, nuapTnOn Kai o és
Lixediav Trovs, 65 Ov TocodTOY yvouNs apdap-
~ ¢
THUA HV Tpos ods ETHATAV, OooV ol ExTrEewraVTES
ov Ta Tpoachopa Tots oixXomevols ETLYLYVMoKOVTES,
adra Kata tas idias dsaBoras repli THs Tod

1 The reference is especially to the Sicilian expedition ;
the pernicious results were seen in the Decelean war.

376

BOOK II, txv. 7-11

as to themselves and their allies ; for these policies, so
long as they were successful, merely brought honour
or profit to individual citizens, but when they failed
proved detrimental to the state in the candiuct of
the war.! And the reason for this was th Pericles, /
WHO'OWER His Tifliience to his récsnized Standing and
ability, and had proved himself clearly incorruptible.

inthe highest degree, restrained the multitude while |

respecting their liberties, and led them rather than
wwas led by themf{bécause he did not résort to flattery,
“seeking power=by dishonest means, but was able
on the strength of his high reputation to oppose
them and even provoke their wrath. At any rate,
whenever he saw them unwarrantably confident and
arrogant, his words would cow them into fear; and,
on the other hand, when he saw them unreasonably
afraid, he would restore them to confidence again.
AAnd so \Athens, though in name a democracy,}«_
gradually became in fact a government ruled by its) ~
|foremost citizen./ But the successors of Periclés;
being moré~on-an equality with one another and yet
striving each to be first, were ready to surrender
to the people even the conduct of public affairs
to suit their whims. And from this, since it hap-
pened in a great and imperial state, there resulted
many blunders, especially the Sicilian expedition,?
wh ich was not so much an error Of judgment, when
we consider the enemy they went against, as of
management; for those who were responsible for it,
instead of taking additional measures for the proper
support of the first troops which were sent out, gave
themselves over to personal intrigues for the sake of

2 For the history of this expedition, see Books vi and vir.

377

THUCYDIDES

57} ov Tporracias Ta Te év To oTpatoTrédp ap
Brorepa € évrolovv Kal Ta TEpl THY TOAD 7 pe@Tov

12 e€v adj rOLS érapdxOnoav. oparertes éé€ &p

13

DiKxedta adr TE Tapa Key, Kal TOU vauTLKod TO
méove popiw Kal Kata THY Tod On év oTdoel
OVTES Guws déxal pev ern avTeixov Tous TE TTpo-
Tepov UTapXovct Toneutous Kab Tots amo YtKedas
feT aUTO@Y Kal TOV Evpuaxov ETL TOS TAEOTLY
aderTnKoot, Kuvpe TE DoTepov Bacvrréws Tarot
T POT YEVOLEVO, Os Tapeixe Xpnpara IleXoz7rov-
vnotous és TO VaUTLKOV, KAL OU 7 poTepov évédocay
) auTol év? odiow avtois Kata Tas tdtas bra-
gdopas TEplLTrET OVTES eo padycav. Too oUTOV TO
Tlepukret emeplaceuce ToTe ah wv auTos Tpoeyven
Kal Tavu ap padios Tmepuyever Bar THY TOLD
IleXorrovynciwy aitTav TO TOMELO.

LXVI. Of 88 AaxeSaipdvioe kab of Evupayor
Tov avtov Gépous éotpatevoay vavoly ExaTov €5
ZaxvvOov TV vo ov, ) KelTaL avTLTépas “HAc6os"
etal de “Ax arov TOV €K IeAorovyncou ATTOLKOL
Kal "AOnvators Evvewaxouy. érrémAeov 5é€ Aaxe-
Satpovtov yidwoe oTATAL Kal Kyfjwos Lraptiarns
vavapxos. arroBavtes dé és THY yHRY eOnwcay Ta
Todd. Kai éredn ov Evveyw@povy, amémrevoav
ém’ olkov.

LXVII. Kat rod avtod Gépovs teXevTavTos
"Apiotevs Kopiv@:os cat Aaxedaipovior mpéc Reus
"Avipiotos kat Nexodaos cat Iparodapos Kai

1 MSS. read rpla, but Hude follows Haacke in reading
3éxa. So also van H., Cl., Stahl, F. Mueller, Croiset,
Marchant. oxro is preferred by Shilleto, Aem. Mueller.

2 Deleted by van Herwerden, followed ‘by Hude,

378

anil

BOOK II. wtxv. 11-Lxvu. 1

gaining tie. popu yilar leadsiship and cansequently pot
only conducted the military operations with less

( rigout, but also brought about, for the first time, civil

\discord at home. And yet, after they had-met. with...
disaster-in Sicily, where they lost not only their army _

but also the greater part of their fleet, and by this
time Ral come tO DE in @ State oF 8€dition at home,
they neverthless held out ten years not only against
the enemies they had before, but also against the
Sicilians, who were now combined with them, and,
besides, against most of their allies, who were now
in revolt, and later on, against Cyrus son of the
King, who joined the Peloponnesians and furnished
them with money for their fleet; and they did not
finally succumb until they had in their private
quarrels fallen upon one another and been brought
to ruin. Such abundant grounds had Pericles at that
time for his own forecast that Athens might quite
easily have triumphed in this war over the Pelopon-
nesians alone.
LXVI. During the same summer the Lacedae-
monians and their allies made an expedition with a
hundred ships to the island of Zacynthus, which lies
over against Elis. The Za¢ynthians are colonists
of the Achaeans in the Peloponnesus and were in
alliance with the Athenians, On board the ships
were one thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites, and
Cnemus a Spartan was admiral. And making a
descent upon the land they ravaged most of it; but
as the inhabitants would not come to terms they

sailed back home. .

“LXVII. And at the end of the same summer
Aristeus a Corinthian, three Lacedaemonian envoys,
Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodamus, also Timagoras

379

4380 Bc.

THUCYDIDES

Teyedtns Teparyopas Kal ’Apyetos Lota ITorXus,
70 pevopevot és THY ’Aciav OS Baciréa, ¢ et TOS
TELTELAV AUTOV Xpnpare Te Tapacyely Kal Evp-
Tone peiy, adixvoovTat ws Duran ™p@tov TOV
Trpew és Opaxny, Bovdopevor Telcal TE AUTOV, eb
dvvalyTo, peTagTayra THS ‘AOnvateov Evppaxias
oTpatedoas él THY Totetéacay, ov 7D: oTpaTeupa
tov “A@nvat@v TodopKovy, Kal, HEP WpuNnvTo, OL
éxelvou TopevOnvat tépav tov ‘EXXnotovtTou ws
Dapvaxny tov PapvaBafov, ds avtovs Ewedrev
as PBaciréa avamepayety. TapaTuxovtTes O€
"A@nvatwv mpéc Pets A€apxos Kahvipaxou Ka
“A petviddys Pedsjpovos Tapa TO LuTarey Teéi-
overt Tov Zi8oxov TOV ‘yeyevnjéevov A Onvaior,
LiTahkov VLOV, TOUS avdpas eyxerpioar opiow,
oreo pn) OraBavTes ws Baothéa THY €KELVOU TONY
70 ju pos Brayoou. 0 Oe Teva Oels Topevopuevous
avTous dua THS Opaxns ert 70 TRotovy @ Ewedov
TOV “EX Ago TovT ov TEPALWoELV, TpIV ‘éoBaivew
EvArXauBaver, adrovs 67 Evytréuras peta tov
Aedpyov cat “Apewiddov, cat éxédevoev éxeivors
mapadovvar: ot 6€ AaBovTes Exomcav és Tas
"AOnvas. adixopévov 5é€ adtav Seicavtes ot
"AOnvatot tov “Apirotéa pn avdois odas ett TrELw
Kakoupyn Siadvywv, OTL Kal TPO TOVT@V Ta TIS
Ilotedaias cai Tov eri Opaxns wavta édaiveto
mpakas, aKpitous Kal BovAopévous éotiv a eitrety
avOnwepov améxteivay tTavTas Kal és ddpayya

1 Because Argos was a neutral state ; cf ch. ix. 2,
2 Then satrap of Dascylium ; ¢f. I. cxxix. 1.
e Ta On. -Xkix. G,

380

BOOK II. uxvir. 1-4

of Tegea and Pollis of Argos, the last acting in a
private capacity,! set out for Asia to the King’s court
to see if they might persuade him to furnish money
and join in the war. On their way they came first
to Sitalces son of Teres in Thrace, their desire being
to persuade him, if possible, to forsake the Athenian
alliance and send a force to relieve Potidaea, where
an Athenian army was conducting the siege; and
also, in pursuance of their object, with his help to
cross the Hellespont to Pharnaces? son of Pharna-
bazus, who was to escort them up the country to the
King. But two Athenian envoys, Learchus son of
Callimachus and Ameiniades son of Philemon, who
chanced to be visiting Sitalces, urged Sadocus son of
Sitalees, who had been made an Athenian citizen,?
to deliver the men into their hands, that they might
not cross over to the King and do such injury as
might be to his adopted city.4 To this Sadocus
agreed, and sending some troops to accompany
Learchus and Ameiniades, seized them as _ they
journeyed through Thrace before they embarked on
the boat by which they were to cross the Hellespont.
They were then, in accordance with his orders,
delivered to the Athenian envoys, who took them
and brought them to Athens. When they arrived,
the Athenians, in fear that Aristeus might escape
and do them still more harm, because he had evi-
dently been the prime mover in all the earlier
intrigues at Potidaea and along the coast of
Thrace, put them all to death on that very day
without a trial, though they wished to say something
in their own defence, and threw their bodies into a

‘ Possibly thy éxeivoy wéAw 7d wépos means ‘‘a city in a
measure his own,”

381

THUCYDIDES

>] / PS) a, al > fal > 4
écéBarov, Stxaodvtes Tols avtois apiverbar
olomep kal ot Aaxedaipomor trinpEav, Tovs éep-

7 A y- > / \ a ,
mopous ods éXaBov AOnvaior cai Tov Evppaxov
b] e / \ / / > ,
év oAKaot Tept IleXoTrovynoov TEOVTAS ATTOKTEL-
vavtes Kal és hapayyas éoBaXrovtes. mavtas
yap 8 Kat’ apxas Tod Trodepouv Aaxedatpoviot
Saous NaBovev év TH Oaddoon ws TrodEpious Sié-
bOepov, kal Tovs peta AOnvaiwv Evyrrod\epuobvTas
Kal Tous pnoé ped EtEpav.

LXVIII. Kara 6€ tods attots ypovous, Tod
Oépous TEAEVTHVTOS, kal “Aptrpaxi@tat avtoi Te
Kal tov BapBdpev TodXovs avactyoavtTes EoTpa-

“ee eee \ > \ \ \
tevoav ém Apyos to ApodidoxiKov Kat THY
addrnv "Apdiroxiav. EyOpa Sé mpos tovs "Ap-
yelous aro TOVdE avTois HpEaTO TPwTOV yevéo Oat.
"Apyos To "Apudiroxexoy kat “Apdiroyiay thy
” »” \ \ \ Ss bd >
Gddnv éxtice pev peta Ta Tpwika oixade ava-
Yopicas Kal ovK aperKopevos TH év "Apryet KaTa-
otace. Audiroyxos 0 "Audidpew év TO ‘“Aprrpa-
KLK@ KOATO, OMwOVUpOY TH avTOV maTptio. “Apyos
dvoudcas (Kal hv TOALS aUTN peEyioTN THS
° , 4 \ Py / s i > /
Audiroyias kal tovs duvvatwtdtous eixev oiKy-

e \ lal \ Qn re ev
Topas), uTo Evpopav dé 1roddais yeveais batepov
mucCopevor Apmpakiwotas opopous évtas TH “Ap-
diroyixh Evvoixovs érnydyovto, Kai nAXnvia On-
cay THY vov yA@ooay TpaTOY aTO THY ’AuTpa-

1 Alcmaeon, the elder brother of Amphilochus, had slain
their mother Eriphyle (¢f. ch. cii. 5). The foundation of

382

BOOK II. txvn. 4-Lxvirt. 5

pit, thinking it justifiable to employ for their own
protection the same measures as had in the first
instance been used by the Lacedaemonians when
they killed and cast into pits the traders of the
Athenians and their allies whom they caught on
board merchantmen on the coast of the Pelopon-
nesus. For at the beginning of the war all persons
whom the Lacedaemonians captured at sea they
destroyed as enemies, whether they were fighting \
on the side of the Athenians or not even taking
part on either side. J
LXVIII. About the same time, as the summer
was ending, the Ambraciots themselves, with many
of the barbarians whom they had summoned to their
standard, made an expedition against the Amphi-
lochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia. And
enmity between them and the Argives first began
from the following circumstance. Amphilochus son
of Amphiaraus, when he returned home after the
Trojan war, was dissatisfied with the state of affairs
at Argos,! and therefore founded Amphilochian
Argos on the Ambracian gulf, and occupied the
country of Amphilochia, calling the town Argos
after the name of his own fatherland. And this
city was the largest in Amphilochia and had the
wealthiest inhabitants. But many generations later
the Amphilochians, under the stress of misfor-
tunes, invited in the Ambraciots, who bordered
on Amphilochia, to share the place with them,
and these first became Hellenes and adopted their
present dialect in consequence of their union with

Amphilochian Argos is ascribed by other authors (Strabo,
vii. 326c; Apollod. 11. 7) to Alemaeon or to his son
Aimphilochus,

383

THUCYDIDES

kiotav Evvoixnodvtav: oi 68 dAroe "Appiroxot
/ , ? >) / Ss \ ,
BdpBapot eiow. éx8dddovowv odv Tovs Apryetous
of “Aumpaxi@tar ypove Kat adtol taxovar THv
/ e ae? / U 4 /
rorw. of & Apdiroyor yevouevou tovtou 6.60-
>] n
acw éavtois ’Axapvact, kal TpocTapaKkanéoar-
> / > , \ > lal f /
res duddtepor "AOnvatovs, of avtois Poppiwva
Te otpatnyov érepav Kal vats tpldKovta,
\ lal e a
adixopévou 89 ToD Popyiwvos aipovar KaTa Kpa-
\ ,
tos "Apyos Kal Tous Aumpaxiotas nvdparrodicay,
A \ r >, A
Koh Te @KLoaY a’TO Apudiroyot kat Axapvares.
fal / al
wea Sé TOOTO 7) Evppaylia mpwtov éyéveto AOn-
> cr id > a
vaio kat’ Axapvaow. ot d¢ Apmpaxi@tar THv
, lal
uev &yOpav és tovs "Apyelous amo Tov avopa-
Trosicwod chav avTav TpaTov éroujcavto, VarTe-
a Ny
pov S& év TO Toreum THvdE THY oTpatelav
motobvrat éauvT@v te Kal Xaovev Kal adrov
nr na , f. / \
TIWOV TOV TAncLoYapwov BapBapwr: édOovTes de
a % , /
mpos TO” Apyos THS bev XYwpas éxpatouy, THY O€
TodY Os ovK edUvavTO édelv TmpoaBaxdovTes,
’
dmeyapnaav er olkou Kal dvehvOnoav Kata €Ovn.
TocavTa pev ev TH Oéper éyéveTo.
a f lal >
LXIX. Tod & émiysyvopévov yeypa@vos “A@n-
vad la) ,
vaio. vads éoTetNav elkoct pev Tmepi LleXotrovynaov
/ e e f
kat Popuiova atpatnyov, 05 opwmpevos ex Nav-
, \ 5 ja ee A > ,
maxtou purakny eixe pnt éxTrreiv éx Kopiviouv
nw / / / ’ rad
kai Tod Kpicaiov xodrouv pndéva prt éeameiv,
d / ,
érépas 88 && émi Kapias wal Avxias cat Med»-
/ e/ a / a
cavdpov otpaTnyov, OTws TATA Te Apyupodoyace
Kal TO AnoTiKOv TaV LleXorovyyciov wn edowv
\ a fal
aitobev oppm@pmevov BraTTew Tov TAOVY TOY
c / lal > \ / \ , \
6dxddav tov ato PacnrLb0s Kal Powiens Kat

384

BOOK II. ctxvin. 5-Lx1x. 1

the Ambraciots; but the rest of the Amphilochians
are still barbarians. Now in course of time the
Ambraciots expelled the Argivés’ and themselves
seized the city. But the Amphilochians, when this
happened, placed themselves under the protection of
the Acarnanians, and together they called in the
Athenians, who sent to them Phormio as general
with thirty ships. On the arrival of Phormio they
took Argos by storm and reduced the Ambraciots to
slavery, and Amphilochians and Acarnanians settled
there together. It was after this that the alliance
between the Athenians and the Acarnanians was
first established. The Ambraciots first conceived
their enmity toward the Argives from this enslave-
ment of their own countrymen; and afterwards in
the course of the war they made this expedition,
which consisted, besides themselves, of Chaonians
and some of the other barbarian tribes of the neigh-
bourhood. And when they came to Argos, although
they dominated the country, they were unable to
take the city by assault; they therefore went home
and the several tribes disbanded. Such were the
events of the summer. __, a

LXIX. During the ensuing winter the Athenians
sent twenty ships round the Peloponnesus under the
command of Phormio, who, making Naupactus his
base, kept watch there, so that no one might sail
either out of Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf or in;
and six other ships were sent to Caria and Lycia,
under Melesander as general, to collect arrears of
tribute in these places and to prevent the Pelopon-
nesian privateers from establishing a base in these
regions and molesting the merchantmen sailing from
Phaselis and Phoenicia and the mainland in that

385

THUCYDIDES

A 3 lal > , > XN a 3
2 THs éxeiOev nr etpou. dvapas 5é otpatia *AOn-
’ lal > lal lal lal if >
valwv TE TOV ATO TOV VeoV Kal TOV Evppayer és
tv Avxiav 6 Mernjcavépos amoOvncKe Kat THs
oTpatias pépos Te dvepOerpe vixnGeis wayn.
LXX. Tod & aitod yewpovos ot Llotedeatar
émrelon OUKETL EOVVaVTO TroALOpKOUpEVOL avTéxe,
\
arn ai te ec Boral és thy “Attixny IeXotrovyn-
/ >O\ val > / \ > ld
ciwy ovdév padrov aravicotacay tovs "A@nvai-
ral ,
ous, 0 TE GiTOS évrEeNEAOITEL, Kal AANA TE TOAKA
érreyeyévnto avtobs H6n Bpwcews Tept avayKaias
/ \ > / > / ef \ /
Kal TLWes Kal GAAHAWD eyéyeUVYTO, OUTw 67 AOYoUS
/ a a
mpocdépovar mept EvuRacews Tots otpatnyots
lal lal ,
tav “A@nvaiwvy tois éml aodhict tetaypévots,
= cal , a ? / . .€ , a
Eevodarti te TO Evpimioov cai “Eotidaipo To
"ApiotoxAreloov cal Pavopdyw TO Kaddtpayov.
€ lal fol a
20. 6&€ mpocedé~avTo, opavTEes pev THS oTpaTLas
, a
Thy TaraiTwplay év Ywpi@ YELmEpLVe, avynro-
/ , eer 4 n , } 4 > \
kulas 6€ 76n THs TOAEws OicXiNa TaXavTa és THY
3 TodopKiav. éml Tolade ovv EvvéBnoav, éEeOeiv
avtous Kal Taiédas Kal yuvaixas Kal Tovs émiKov-
\ ShiWerwe / an \ ‘ al QA
pous Ebv évl (patio, yuvaixas bé€ Evy dvoiv, Kai
4 apyvplov TL pytov eéxovTas épcdiov. Kal ot pev
umocmovéot €EAAOov és TE THY Xadkidienyv Kal
4 > / 3 lal \ A
éxaatos édvvato: ’A@nvaio: Sé Tovs Te otTpaTn-
yous émrntidcavto é6te dvev avtav EvvéBnoav
Sti # \ A nr nr , eo 5] /
(€voutlovy yap av Kpathncat THs Twodews 7 ERov-
oe 7 nr
AovToO), Kal aTEpov EeTroiKous Evreurav éEavTav és
5 tHv Iloteioarav Kal KaTt@Kicay. TadTa pev ev TO
386

BOOK II. wxix. 1-Lxx. 5

quarter. But Melesander, going inland into Lycia
with a force of Athenians from the ships and of
allied troops, was defeated in battle and slain, losing
a number of his troops...

LXX. During the same winter/ the Potidaeans
found themselves Me rserG to endure the
siege; and the raids which the Peloponnesians made
into Attica did not cause the Athenians to raise the
siege any more than before.! Their grain had given
out, and in addition to many other things which by
this time had befallen them in their efforts to
get bare subsistence some had even eaten their
fellows. In this extremity they made proposals for a
capitulation to the Athenian generals who were in
charge of the operations against them, namely
Xenophon son of Euripides, Hestiodorus son of Aris-
tocleides, and Phanomachus son of Callimachus. And
the generals accepted their proposals, seeing the
distress which the army was suffering in an exposed
place, and taking into consideration that Athens had
already spent two thousand talents? on the siege.
So..acapitulation was made on the following terms,
thatthe Potidaeans, with their children and wives
and the mercenary troops,’ were to leave the city
with one garment apiece—the women, however, with
two—retaining a fixed sum of money for the journey.
So they left Potidaea under a truce and went into
Chalcidice or wherever each was able to go. ‘The
Athenians, however, blamed the generals for granting
terms without consulting them—for they thought
they could have become masters of the place on their
own terms; and afterwards sent settlers of their
own into Potidaea and colonized it. These things

1 of. 1. lviii. 1, 2 £400,000, $1,944,000. 4 cfix Ix. 1.
387

THUCYDIDES

XELOvE eyevero, kal devtepov! Eros TO TrOAELO
ETENEUTA THE OV Sovevo.dys Evvéyparber.
LXXI. Tod 8 emuytyvouevou Pépous ot LeXo-
movynotoe Kab ot EVpwpaxor és pev THY “ATTLKHY
ovx éa€Carov, éoTpatevoay dé éml Wndtaav:
HyetTo é “Apxtoapos 0 Zev&ivapov, Aaxedat-
provl@v Bacinrevs: Kal Kkabicas TOV oTpAaTOV EwEedrE
Snw@cew TV yay: ol 6¢ Tarachs evOus mpéa Reus
Téuraytes Tap aurov éXeyov ToLdde
‘“Apxioape Kal Aaxedarpovior, ov diKkata
ToveiTe ove aga oUTE UUaY OUTE TaTépov Ov
éate, és yqv tiv IdXatav@v otpatevovtes. av-
cavias yap 0 KXeouSpotov, Aaxedaipovios, édev-
Oepwoas tiv “EXAdda até Tov Mydav peta
‘ErAjvev tov eernoavtov Evydpacbat Tov Kiv-
Suvov THs maxns 1) Tap hiv éyéveto, Ovoas ev
tT IWnraraov ayope lepa Au édXevPepioa Kai
EvyKanréoas mavTas TOUS Evppaxous aTrecioou
Matacedor yi Kal TOALY THY odeTépav éyovtas
avTOvOLOUS oixely, oTparevoat Te pndéva TOTE
aSiKos em avTOUS und emt dovreta: el O€ 117,
a LUveLy Tous TApovTas Evppaxous KaTa Ovva wy.
TAGE MEV api TAaTépEs Ob UMETEPOL €docav apeThs
évexa Kal tpoOvpias THs ev éxelvols Tois KLVOU-
vous ryevOpevns, tpsis. dé TavavTia Spare pera
yap On Bator TOV jpiy ex Ola rev éml dovheig TH
7 LeTEPA TKETE. pdpTupas de Geos TOUS TE
opkiovs TOTE yevouevous TOLOUMEVOL Kal TOUS Due-
Tépous TaTpwous Kal HueTépous eyywplous, rE-
youev vpiv yhv thy IIdataitda pr) adixeiv nde

2 +d Sedrepoy in the MSS.; 7d deleted by Poppo.
388

BOOK II. uxx. 5—-Lxx1. 4

happened in the winter, and so ended the second 4303.4
year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the
history. : a |

LXXI. In the ensuing summer the Peloponnesians ~~~
and their allies did not invade Attica, but made an ~
expedition against Plataea. Their leader was Archi-
damus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedae-
monians, and when he had encamped his army he
was about to ravage the land; but the Plataeans
straightway sent envoys to him, who spoke as
follows :

“ Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, you are acting
unjustly, and in a manner unworthy either of your-
selves or of the fathers from whom you are sprung,
when you invade the territory of the Plataeans.
For Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedae-

~monian, when he had freed Hellas from the Persians,
together with such of the Hellenes as chose to share
the danger of the battle! that took place in our
territory, offered sacrifice in the market-place of the
Plataeans to Zeus Eleutherius, and calling together
all the allies restored to the Plataeans their land and
city to hold and inhabit in independence, and no
one was ever to march against them unjustly or for
their enslavement; but in that case the allies then
present were to defend them with all their might.
These privileges your fathers granted to us on
account of the valour and zeal we displayed amid
those dangers, but you do the very contrary; for
with the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, you are
come to enslave us. But calling to witness the gods
in whose names we then swore and the gods of your
fathers and of our country, we say to you, wrong not
the land of Plataea nor violate your oaths, but suffer

1 The battle of Plataea, 479 B.c.
389

THUCYDIDES

mapaBaive tovs SpKous, éav 8é oixeiv avtovo-
fous KaOatep Ilavoavias édixaiwoev.”

LXXII. Tocatta eitovtay tov Lndatacov
"Apyidapos troNaBwv eltrev:

“* Aixata NéyeTe, @ avdpes LAataris, Hv Toute
omota Tots Aovyous. Kabarep yap Uaveavias tiv
TApEOWKEV, AUTOL TE avTovopetae Kal TOUS an-
ous EvvehevOepodte 6 ocoL HETATXOVTES TOV TOTE
KLVOUV@Y Upiv TE Evvepocay Kal etal vov oT
’AOnvatois, TapacKkevn S€ Toonde Kal TrOAELOS
ryeyevnTau auTav évexa eal TOV addov ehevdepa-
EWS. nS padiara ev pETaaXovTES Kal aural
éupelvate Tols dpxois* et 5é mn, amep Kal ™ po-
TEpoOV 707 T povkaher ducla, novxiav GyeTe VELO-
[EVOL Ta vpéTepa avTav, Kal éoTe poe pel
éTépav, déverOe Oé aporepous pirous, emt TONE-
ho dé poeTepous. Kal TASE 7) jpiv dpKécet.”

bev ‘Apxisapos Toc atta eimrev' ot O€
TAatarov m peo Bers axovoavTes tadta éo7ndOov
€s THY TOMY, Kal TO THO EL Ta pnOévta Kowo-
TAVTES amex pivavTo avT@ 6TL advvata opiouw
ein Trotety a Tpoxaneirat avev "AO nvatov (wraides
yap opav Kal yuvaixes Tap exelvous elev), dedrévae
6€ Kal wepl TH TWaon TodEL py KElVOV aTox@pn-
cdvtav “AOnvaios édOdvtes odiow ovdx émutpé-
Twa, % OnBaior, ws EvopKot ovTes Kara TO
apudorépous déxe Oat, aves odhav THY TOMY
Telpag wor kataraBeiv. o 5€ Oapovvwv adtods
7 pos TavTa en’
““Yueis 6€ mod pev Kal oikias Hutv Tapaoote

1 Omitted by Hunde, with Lex. Vindob.
39°

BOOK II. vxxi. 4-.xxu. 3

us to live independent, according as Pausanias granted
that to us as our right.”

LXXII. When the Plataeans had so spoken, Archi-
damus answered and said:

«What you say is just, men of Plataea, if what
you do is consistent with your words. For according
as Pausanias bestowed that privilege upon you, so
do you assert your own independence and help us to
set free the others also who, having shared in the
dangers of that time, swore the same oaths with you,
and are now in subjection to the Athenians; for it is
to recover their freedom and that of the rest that
these great preparations for war have been made.
Therein you should take part, if possible, and your-
selves abide by the oaths; otherwise keep quiet, as
we have already proposed, continuing to enjoy your
own possessions ; take part with neither side, receive
both sides as friends but for hostile purposes neither.
And this will be satisfactory to us.”

Thus spoke Archidamus ; and the Plataean envoys,
on hearing him, went into the city, and after reporting
to the people what had been said, answered him, that
it was impossible for them to do what he proposed
without the consent of the Athenians—for their
children and wives were in Athens'—adding that
they feared for the very existence of the state; for
after the departure of the Lacedaemonians the
Athenians would come and veto the plan, or else
the Thebans, claiming that they were included in
the stipulations about receiving both sides, would try
again to seize their city. But he, endeavouring to
reassure them with regard to these matters, said :

“You need only consign the city and your houses

tof. ch. vi. 4.
391

THUCYDIDES

a / \ a i > 7
tois Aaxedatmoviots Kat ys Gpous atrodeiEaTte
\ w SIN > n \ e / \ ~ ”
kal dévdpa apiou@ Ta vuéTEpa Kal aro el TI

\ vad
Suvatov és aptOuov édOeiv: avtoi b€ petTaywpn-
7 4 xX c f zon BES \
cate drat BovreoOe, Ews Av o TOAEMOS G* eTTELOaY
\ / > / e lad A x /,
dé mapédOn, amrodacopev vulv & av Tapada-
Bopev. péxpe d€ Tovde EEopev TapakatabyKnpy,
> \ \ / aA x e tal /
epyalomevor Kal Popay hepovtes 7) av vuty pwedArH
ixavn écecOa.
> nm
LXXIII. Of & axotvcavtes éoArOov adOis és
\ / \ / ay ca /
THY TOAW, KAL BovAEevadpEvot ETA TOV TAHVOUS
. a ’
éreEav 6Tt BovrAovTat a TpoKarettat AOnvaiors
A lal / rad
KOLV@OAL TP@TOV Kal, HY TELOwWaLY AUTOUS, TroLEty
a 9
Tabta* péxpe € TovTOV oTelcacBar odiow éxé-
lot \ n ¢ \ f.
Nevov Kal TV Yyhv py Snovv. oO 5€ Huépas TE
éomelcato év ais eiKos HV KouLoOhvat Kal THY yHV
e a
ovK éteuvev. édOovtes 5é ot Xataijs mpéo Res
Af \ b ug \ / b bf
a@s tovs “A@nvaiovs cal BovrAevoedpevot peT av-
an / ° Ar
Tov Tad HAOov aTrayyéAXovTES TOs EV TH TOAEL
/ ‘ce A) b] A A tal sf = ” 5
rovaoe: *‘ OUT év TO TPO TOV Ypov@, w avdpes
fol / >? a
IlXataris, ad’ ob Evppayor éyevomeBa, “APnvaiot
dacw év ovdevi twas Tpoécbas adixovpévous ovTE
ra , / A \ 4
vov meptowecOat, BonOnceav Sé Kata duvapy.
émicknm@tTovel Te vulvy mpos TOV GpKwY ods ot
\ /
TAaTepes wWpocav pndev vewteplfery epi THY
3”.
Evupaytav.
LXXIV. Toraidta tév rpécBewyv atayyerav-
tov of IIXataiAs éBovrXevoavto “A@nvaiovs pH
r > ] > / \ fol /
Tpoo.ooval, GAN avéxecOar Kai yHv TE“vomerny,
lal c a
ei Sef, op@vTas Kal aXXo TaoxovTas 6 TL av

392

BOOK II. vxxu. 3-Lxxiv. 1

to us, the Lacedaemonians, pointing out to us the
boundaries of your land and telling us the number
of your trees and whatever else can be numbered;
then as for yourselves migrate to whatever place you
please, remaining there while the war lasts; but as
soon as the war is over we will give back to you
whatever we have received ; until then we will hold
it all in trust, working the land and paying you
whatever rent will satisfy you.”

LXXIII. With this answer the Plataean envoys
went again into the city, and after they had conferred
with the people replied that they wished first to
communicate his proposals to the Athenians, and if
they could gain their consent would do what he
proposed; but meanwhile they requested him to
grant them a truce and not to ravage the land. And
so he made a truce for the number of days within
which their representatives could be expected to go
and return, and did not lay waste their land. But
the Plataean envoys went to the Athenians and after
consulting with them returned with the following
message to the people at home: “ The Athenians as-
sure you, Plataeans, that as in times past, since you
became their allies,! they have never on any occasion
deserted you when you were being wronged, so now
they will not suffer you to be wronged, but will assist
you with all their might. They therefore adjure
you, by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to
break off the alliance.”

LXXIV. When the envoys reported this answer,
the Plataeans determined not to betray the Athenians,
but to endure even to see their lands laid waste, if
need be, and to suffer whatever else might happen ;

2 About 520 B.c, cf. m1. lxviii. 5.
VOL. I. O 393

THUCYDIDES

EvpBaivn é&eXOciv te pwndéva Ett, AAN aro TOU
Teiyous atoxpivacbat 6tTt advvata ohict Toteiv
b a / A e \
éotwy & Aaxedatudviot tmpokadovvtTar. ws 6€
aTrexpivavto, évtev0ev 89 Tp@Tov ev és émripap-
fal fal > /
tuplay Kal Oedv Kal jpowv TaV éyywpiov 'Apyi-
dauos 0 Bacirteds Katéctn Aéyov be3 “ Deol
6cot ynv thy Idataida eyete Kal Hpwes, Evv-
UA / bd e/ A \ b \ 29/7 > /
totopés éote OTL OUTE THY apynY adixws, éKdLTIOV-
tov 6€ Tavde Tpotépwy TO EvywpoTtov, él yhv
/ EA b a ¢ F e la > /
THvde HAGopEV, ev H OL TaTépes Nua@y evEduEVoL
tpiv Midov éxpatncav Kal rapéoxete avTiy
? a > , eae LA a
evuevhe evaywvicacOat Tois “EXXnow, ovTe vod»,
a \
HV TL TOLMMEV, AOLKNTOMEV* TpOoKAaXEcapEevor yap
TOANG Kal elKOTa Ov TUyYdvomer. EvyyvapoveEs
\ wv a \ > / / a e 7
dé ote THs mev abdixias KoradlecOar Tots vTap-
Youvct TpoTépols, THS S€ Tywwplas TUyXdvelv Tots
/ ”
émipépovor vopipas.
lo) ,
LXXV. Tocatta ériferdcas xabiotn és TOXe-
/ lal /
pov TOV OTPATOV. Kal TP®TOV pméeyv TEpLecTaUpw-
> \ a / A ” r a7
cuv avtous Tois Sévdpecty & Exoray, Tod wndéva
la \
émeEvéval, ETELTA Y@ma EXovv Tpos TiV OAL,
> , , \ 1 ¢/ ” Q 3
érrifovtes tayiotny Hv} aipecw écecOat ad-
TOV oTpaTEvpATOS TocoUTOU épyalopévov. Evra
pev odv Téuvovtes ex TOD KiOaip@vos TapewKosdo-
,
pouy éxatépwber, hopundov avtl toiywv tiWévtes,
OTs un Siayéorto etl TOAD TO YONA. Eepopovy
1 Added by Classen.
394

BOOK II. vxxiv. 1-Lxxv. 2

further, that no one should thereafter leave the city,
but that the answer should be given from the walls
that they found it impossible to do what the Lace-
daemonians proposed. And when they had made
answer, thereupon king Archidamus first stood forth
calling the gods and heroes of the country to witness
in the following words: “Ye gods and heroes who
protect the land of Plataea, be our witnesses that
we did no wrong in the beginning, but only after the
Plataeans first abandoned the oath we all swore did
we come against this land, where our fathers, in-
voking you in their prayers, conquered the Persians,
and which you made auspicious for the Hellenes
to fight in, and that now also, if we take any
measures, we shall be guilty of no wrong; for though
we have made them many reasonable proposals we
have failed. Grant therefore your consent, that
those be punished for the wrong who first began it,
and that those obtain their revenge who are seeking
to exact it lawfully.”

LXXV. After this appeal to the gods he began
hostilities. In the first place the Lacedaemonians,
using the trees which they had cut down, built a
stockade round Plataea, that in future no one might
leave the place; then they began raising a mound
against the town, hoping that with so large an army
at work this would be the speediest way of taking it.
So they cut timber on Cithaeron and built a structure
alongside the mound on either side of it, laying the
logs like lattice-work! to form a sort of wall, that
the mound might not spread too much. Then they

1 A frame was made like lattice-work or mat-work, the
timbers crossing each other at right angles (+£).

395

THUCYDIDES

5é BAnv és avo Kal ALGous Kal yhv Kab ef Te ddXrO
avutew pérroe erriBardropevov. nHuépas 5é Eyour
éBdounkovta Kat vuxtas Euvexds, Sinpnpévos
KaT avatravras, Bate Tors pev Pépew, Tovs Oe
imvov te Kab citov aipeicOar. Aaxedatpovior
re of Eevayol éxdotyns wodews Evvehertartes'
nvaykatov és TO épyov. of dé IINatasis opa@vtes
TO YOpa alpopevov, EvdAwov teiyos EvvOévtes Kat
ETLOTHCAVTES T@ EAUT@V TELYEL 7) TPOTEYXOUTO,
€sw@Kodomouy €s avTo TALvOous ex TOY eyyuUS ob-
kiav Kabatpoovtes. Evvderpos 8 Hv avtois Ta
Evra, Tod wn Unrov yeyvopevoy acOeves Eivat TO
oixodopnua, Kal Tpokarvppata eixe Sépoes Kal
SiupOépas, wate Tors épyalopuévous Kai Ta Evra
unte muppopos oiatots BadrecOar ev acdhareia
Te €lval. mpeTo O€ TO trvos TOD TEivous péeya, Kal
TO YOpua ov cxoraitepoy avtavye aVT@. Kab ot
Il\ataijs torovde te érwoovow: Sd1edXovTEs TOD
Teixous 7 TMpooénmiTTEe TO XOua écedopouvy THY
yi.

LXXVI. Of 6€ TleXorovyncioe aicopevor év
Tapaots KaNdwov mnrov éviddovTes EoéBadXovr &s
To Sinpnpevov, Straws wn SiaxXeomevoy WaTEP 1) Yi)
dopotto. of d€ TavTn amToKANOpEvOL TOUTO peEP
éréayov, UTovomov Sé ex THs TOAEwS OpveavTes
kai EvyTexuNpapmevol VTO TO YOua UpetrAKov avOts
mapa opas Tov xovv' Kat éXavOavoy emi TodV

1 With ABEFM and Suid. MHude reads, with CG, of

tevayol xal éxaoTns woAews <ol> épecTares,

396

BOOK II. txxv. 2—-Lxxvi. 2

brought and threw into the space wood and stones
and earth and anything else which when thrown on
would serve to build up the mound. And for seventy
days and nights continuously they kept on raising
the mound, divided into relays, so that while some
were carrying others might take sleep and food ; and
the Lacedaemonian commanders of auxiliaries to-
gether with the officers in charge of the contingents
from the several cities kept them at their task. But
the Plataeans, seeing the mound rising, put together
a framework of wood which they set on top of their
own wall at the point’ where the mound was being
constructed, and inside this frame they put bricks
which they took from the neighbouring houses. The
timbers served to hold the bricks together, pre-
venting the structure from becoming weak as it
attained height, and they were protected by coverings
of skins and hides, so that the workmen and wood-
work might be safe and shielded from incendiary
arrows. The wall was mounting to a great height,
and the opposing mound was rising with equal speed,
when the Plataeans thought of a new expedient.
They made an opening in that part of the city wall
where the mound came into contact with it, and
began to draw the earth in.

LXXVI. But the Peloponnesians became aware of
this, and threw into the breach clay packed in reed-
mats that it might not filter through like the loose
earth and be carried away. But the _ besieged,
thwarted in this direction, gave up that plan and
dug a mine from the town, and, guessing when they
had got beneath the mound, once more began to
draw away the earth to their side, this time from
underneath; and for a long time they worked

397

THUCYDIDES

Tovs €£w, Mote émiPadrovtas Hooov avuTew bTra-
youévou avtois KaTwOev TOD YouaTos Kai |Cdvov-
Tos alel éml TO Kevoupevov. SedoTes Sé p27) OVS
oUTw SUVwYTAaL GAlyoL Tpos TONNOVS aVTéXELD,
mpoceteEnvpoy Tdde* TO wey péya olKOoounma
érravoavto épyatouevo, TO KaTa TO Yopa, evOev
Sé kal évOev adtod apEdpuevor avd Tod Bpayéos
Telyous €x TOD evTOS pnvoErdes és THY TOALY Eo@-
Kooopour, SWS, EL TO pPéya TElYos aXLoKOLTO,
TOUT avTéxot, Kal déot Tovs évavTious avis Tpos
auto your, Kal mpoxwpotvtas éow Siumddotov TE
Tovov éxew Kat ev audtBor@ wadXov yiyvecOat.
dpa 58TH XOoEL Kal unYavas Tpociyyov ot IeXo-
TOVVNGLOL TH TOAEL, lav pmev *) TOU pEyaXov oLKo-
SounuaToS KATA TO YOua TpocaxOeica ert péya
Te Katécetce Kal Tors IlAataads EpoRycev, adXras
dé GAA TOU TElyous, Us Bpoxous Te TEptBddrov-
tes avéxrwv ot IlXatarqs, cab doxods peyddas
aptycavtTes advceot paxpais aidynpais amo THs
Touns exaTépwbev ato Kepai@y Svo émiKEeKALLEevOV
Kal UTEpTELVoUTaY UTép TOD TElyous avEAKVaaD-
Tes éyxapalas, oTOTE TpooTecciaOal Tn médXrOL 1)
unyavy, apiecav tiv dSoxov yarapais tais adv-
gear Kal ov Sia yerpos Exovtes, S€ PUN éuTri-
TTovea aTreKavrite TO Tpovdyov THs éuBorj7s.
LXXVII. Mera 6€ rodrto of HeXorovyyccos,
@s al Te unxyaval ovdev @pédovy Kal TO YOuaTL

398

BOOK LI. -txxvi. 2—-Lxxvu. 1

unnoticed by those outside, so that in spite of what
they heaped on these made less progress, because
their mound, as it was sapped from below, constantly
kept settling down into the hollow space. But fear-
ing that even so they would not be able to hold out,
few as they were against a multitude, they devised
this further expedient: they stopped working on the
high structure opposite the mound, and starting at
the low part of the wall on either side of it they
began building a crescent-shaped rampart on the
inward or city side of it, in order that, if the high
wall should be taken, this might offer resistance ; the
enemy would thus have to raise a second mound to
oppose the new rampart, and as they advanced and
came inside the crescent they would not only have
their labour twice over, but would also be more
exposed to attack on both sides. But the Pelopon-
nesians, while going on with their mound, also brought
up engines against the city: one was moved forward
over the mound, and shook down a great part of
the high structure, terrifying the Plataeans, while
others were brought to bear at different parts of
the wall. But the Plataeans threw nooses over these
and pulled them up. They also suspended great
beams by long iron chains attached at either end to
two poles which rested on the wall and extended
over it; then they hauled up the beams at right
angles! to the battering-ram and when it was about
to strike anywhere let go the beam by allowing the
chains to run slack and not keeping hold of them;
whereupon the beam would fall with a rush and
break off the head of the battering-ram.

LXXVII. After this, the Peloponnesians, seeing
that their engines were doing no good and that the

1 4.e. parallel to the wall 399

THUCYDIDES

TO GVTITELYLOMAa eyiyvETO, VouicayTes ATrOpoY Ei-
> \ cal / lal € a \ /
vat ato TOV TapovT@y dewav éEdely THY OAL
2 Tpos THY TepiTelytoW TapecKkevalovToO. TpoTeE-
\ \ 7 > al an ’ 7
pov O€ Tupt édofev avtots mevpacat et Svvawto
, / b] / \ 4 =
TVEVMATOS yEevopmevou eTipréEat THY TOALY OVaAD
> / rn \ A 9 / 3 , y
ov weyarnv: Tacav yap 51 idéav étevoour, El TAS
/ v / \ / ,
cdhiow avev darravys Kat ToMopKias TpocaxOein.
a A
3 dopovvtes Sé€ tAns axkédous tapéBadov aro
TOU yopaTtos és TO petakd TPaTOV TOD TELyous
Kal THS TpoTKX@TEws, TAXV SE TANPOUS yEevopevOU
\ / > / \ ipl ” /
dia ToAvYELplay éTLTApevnoAaY Kal THS aAANS TO-
News cov edvvaYTO ATO TOD peTEwPOV THELoOTOV
an lal ¥
emiayelv, éuBardvtes dé wip Evy Oeiw nal ticon
4 trav tTHv DAnv. Kal éyéveto PrOE TocavTn bonv
lal ,
ovdels Tw &S ye ExXEivoy TOV YpoVvoOY YELpoTrOiNToY
< 7 \ > v e/ a C..3. Puwk
eldev" 70n yap év Gpecw DAN TprdGeica br avé-
\ \ a
LV TPOS AUTHY aTrO TavTOMaTOU TUP Kal droya
5 aT avuTOvD avhKev. TOUTO O€ péya TE HY Kal TOUS
IIdatavas tadra Suaduyovtas éXayiotou édénoe
SiadGeipar: evTos yap TOAAOD Ywpiou THs TOAEwS
oUK HY TeA\doaL, TVEDUAa TE EL ETeyéveTO AUTH
> , ¢ \ y e > , > x
érigopov, OTep Kal HAmMLov of évavTiot, ovK av
fal / fol
6 dudpuyov. viv b€ Kal Tode Aéyetar EvuBFvat,
CAN \ \ \ / / \
tédwp tjorAv Kal Bpovtas yevouévas cBéoar THv
droya kal otTws TavoOivat Tov Kivdvvov.
400

BOOK II. vxxvir. 1-6

counter-wall was keeping pace with the mound,
and concluding that it was impracticable without
more formidable means of attack to take the city,
began to make preparations for throwing a wall
about it. But before doing that they decided to
try fire, in the hope that, if a wind should spring
up, they might be able to set the city on fire, as
it was not large; indeed, there was no expedient
they did not consider, that they might if possible
reduce the city without the expense of a siege.
Accordingly they brought faggots of brushwood and
threw them down from the mound, first into the
space between the wall and the mound; and then,
since the space was soon filled up by the multi-
tude of workers, they heaped faggots also as far
into the city as they could reach from the height,
and finally threw fire together with sulphur and
pitch upon the wood and set it afire. And a
conflagration arose greater than any one had ever
seen up to that time, kindled, I mean, by the
hand of man; for in times past in the moun-
tains when dry branches have been rubbed against
each other a forest has caught fire spontaneously
therefrom and produced a conflagration. And this
fire was not only a great one, but also very nearly
destroyed the Plataeans after they had escaped all
earlier perils; for in a large part of the city it was
not possible to get near the fire, and if on top of
that a breeze had sprung up blowing toward the city,
which was precisely what the enemy were hoping
for, the Plataeans would not have escaped. But as
it was, this also is said to have happened—a heavy
thunder-shower came on and quenched the flames,
and so the danger was checked.

401

THUCYDIDES

LXXVIII. Of 6€ LeXorovvnctoe erred) Kat
/ n
TOUTOU OLipMapTOV, epos MeV TL KATANLTIOVTES TOU
ca / / \
gTpaTov, TO O€ TAE€OV adévTes TEpLeTELyLfoV THY
/ y Ul \ , \
TOW KUKA® SveAomEvoL KATA TrOAELS TO Ywplor
s >
tapos 5€ évTds te HY Kal EEwOev €& Ho errdivOed-
\ rn / \
gavTo. Kal éedn av éeEelpyacto Tepl apKTov-
, A -
pov €miToNds, KaTAaNITTIOVTES GYAAKAS TOU HuiceEos
/ \ oe \ > LA > ,
TeLyous (TO de Hutov Botwrtot epvXacaov) avexo-
pnoav TO oTpaT@ Kai duedvOncav Kata TOES.
IIkataijs 6€ maidas péev Kai yuvatcas Kai Tovds
nr \ a lal
mpeaButatous Te Kai TANGos TO ayYpeiov Tav
f / Ss
avOpeT@V TPOTEPOV EKKEKOMLGMEVOL Noav és Tas
"AOnvas, avtol dé étoXLopKovvTO éyKaTadereELL-
, > \ >’
pévot TeTpaxoctol, AOnvaiwv b€ oydonxovta, yu-
vaixes 6€ Séxa Kal ExaTOov GiTOTFOLOL. TocovTOL
* e , ¢ > \ , ,
Hoav ot EvuTavTes OTE €s THY ToNOPKiav Kabi-
\ A 7) \ 3 > lol / Mv
GTAVTO, Kal ANdOS OvdEls Hv ev TO TEelyer ovTE
a ee) n
SodAos oT edXeVOEpos. ToLravTn pev 1) IlXatardv
TONLOpPKia KaTEcKEevacOn.
na >] a , A
LXXIX. Tod & avtod Cépovs Kxal aya TH
lal lal > / ? a , »
tav Idataayv ériatpateia AOnvaior dicyirious
e / Lal lal
oTALTALs EAUTMY Kal imTEVOL OtaKkoctols éTrecTpa-
- eee Ld \ 5, ditt! / \
Tevoav éml Xadkidéas tovs émt Opdxns xal
a / \
Bottialovs axuafovtos Tod citou: éstpatHyer Sé
Eevohbav o Evpitidov tpitos aitds. édOovtes b€
A \ A
to Xadptwrov THY Bottexny Tov citov dédOe-
Ud \
pav. édoxer d€ Kal Tpocywpncew » Tors UTE

402

BOOK [I]. uxxvin. 1-Lxxrx. 2

LXXVII1. When the Peloponnesians had failed in
this attempt also, they dismissed the larger part of
their army, leaving only a portion of it, and proceeded
to throw a wall around the city, apportioning the
space to the several cities; and there were ditches
both inside and outside the wall, out of which they
had taken the clay for the bricks. And when the
wall was entirely finished about the time of the
rising of Arcturus,! they left a guard to watch one
half of the wall (the Thebans guarded the other
half), and withdrew the main army, the troops dis-
persing to their several cities. But the Plataeans
had previously had their children and wives, as well
as the oldest men and the unserviceable part of the
population, removed to Athens, and the men left be-
hind to undergo the siege were only four hundred of
their own number and eighty Athenians, besides one
hundred and ten women to prepare the food. This
was the number all told when the siege began, and
there was no one else within the walls, slave or free-
man. Such were the conditions under which the
siege of the Plataeans was established.

LXXIX. During the same summer, when the corn
was in full ear,? while the expedition against Plataea
was in progress, the Athenians with two thousand
hoplites of their own and two hundred cavalry
marched against the Chalcidians in Thrace and the
Bottiaeans, under the command of Xenophon son of
Euripides and two others. And coming to Spartolus
in Bottice they destroyed the grain. It was be-
lieved, moreover, that the city would be delivered
over to them by a party inside the town which was

1 About the middle of September.
* In the month of May.

403

THUCYDIDES

y ' , ——
tivev évdobev TpaccovT@y: mpoTremrpavTav O€ és
nr a /
“OnrvuvOov tav ov Tav’Ta BovrAopLEéevwv oTXiTal TE
4
ArOov Kal otpatia és dvrakyy Hs éreEeNGovons
> an / b] / , ae
éx THS Xmaptwrov és waynv KabictavtTat ot AOn-
al a fl , ¢ a
vaio. UT avThH TH TONE. Kal ob wéev oTAiTAL TOV
, a fa)
Xarkidéwv kal érixovpot tives wet avT@V ViKaDv-
tat Td Tov AOnvaiwv Kal avaywpodow és TIV
a nr /
Srdptoroy, of dé ints Tav Xarkidéwv Kab Worot
r \ n i / e / \ W
vikK@ot Tors TOV "AOnvaiwy imméas Kal >ridovs.
> / > \ \ > na
eiyov 5€ Twas ov ToAACUS TEATATTAS EK TIS
a a ,
Kpovoidos yijs cadoupévns. apts dé THs paxyns
/ ’ la vy \ 3
yeyernuéevns émiBonPovtow adXor TEATATTAL ex
ths ‘OdwvOov. «Kal oi ék THs Yrapt@dov Widrot
al ,
w@s eloov, Japanacavtes Tols TE TpocyLyvopeEvols
Kal OTL TpOTEpOV OvY Hoonvto, émiTiPevTar avis
\ a / e / \ cal
peTa TOV Xadrkidéwyv imméwv Kal THY Tpoc Bon-
lal Lal \
Oncavtwv toils “A@nvators: Kat avaywpovdet TpOs
Tas Ovo Takes as KaTéALTOY Tapa Tots oKEVO-
, Ka a8: / \ > 4 e.3 a >
opos. Kal omdte pev érriovey ot A@nvaior, éve-
didocav, dvaywpodar Oé évéxewvto Kal érnxovTiCov.
of te immns Tov Xadrxidéwv mpooimmevovtes 7
Soxoin écéBarAov, Kal ovy Hatota hoBycavtes
étpevrav tovs “AOnvaious kal érediwEav én) tronv.
\ e \ ’ a b] \ / 4
kai of ev “AOnvator és tHv Llotetdarav natadgev-
youval, Kal votepov Tovs vexpors wvroamTovdous
Kopicdpevot es Tas AOnvas avaywpodat TO TreEpt-
ovTL TOU oTpaTov amréGavoy S€ av’TaV TpLaKoVvTA

404

BOOK II. uxxix. 2-7

negotiating with them; but the opposite faction
forestalled this by sending word to Olynthus, and
some hoplites and other troops arrived to garrison the
place. Now when these made a sally from Spartolus,
the Athenians were drawn into a battle with them
under the very walls of the city, and although the
hoplites of the Chalcidians and some mercenaries
with them were defeated by the Athenians and re-
treated into Spartolus, the cavalry of the Chalcidians
and the light-armed troops defeated the Athenian
cavalry and light-troops; for the Athenians had a few
targeteers from the land called Crousis,! and just after
the battle was over another force of targeteers came
from Olynthus to the help of the garrison. And when
the light-armed troops in Spartolus saw them, em-
boldened by these accessions and because they had
not been worsted before, they again, assisted by the
Chalcidian cavalry and those who had newly come to
their support, attacked the Athenians, who now fell
back upon the two companies which they had left
with their baggage. And whenever the Athenians
advanced, they gave way, but when the Athenians
retreated they kept close at their heels, hurling
javelins at them. Then the Chalcidian cavalry, riding
up, kept charging the Athenians wherever opportu-
nity offered, and throwing them into utter panic
routed them and pursued them to a great distance.
The Athenians took refuge in Potidaea, and after-
wards, having recovered their dead under a truce,
returned to Athens with what remained of their
army; and they had lost three hundred and thirty

1 This is evidently a remark in explanation of the presence
of light-troops with the Athenians, for there had come from
Athens only heavy-armed infantry and cavalry ; ¢f. § 1 above.

405

THUCYDIDES

f e
Kal TeTpaKoolo, Kal ol oTpaTnyol TavTes. ol bé
Fe (ol nm al
Xark«idns Kal Bottiatos tpotraiov te Eotncav Kai
lal /
TOUS VEKPOLS TOUS AaUT@YV avEromevoL StEAVONTAY
\
KATQ TONELS.
LXXX. Tod & aitod Gépous, od TOAD BoTe-
/ >’ a \ / /
pov tovtayv, Apumpaxiatar Kat Xaoves, Bovdo-
pevo. Axapvaviay thy Tacav Kataotpévacbat
\ 2 , > a /
kat ‘“A@nvaiwy amocthcat, teiBovat Aaxedat-
/ a
fLovious vauTLKOV TE TapacKevacar éx THS Evp-
, AS / / / eae
paxidos Kal omXitTas yidtous Téurar er >Axap-
vaviav, A€yovTes OTL, WV vaval Kat meld aya
al > 4 al
peta chav EXOwour, advvatov dvtwv EvyBonOety
r > \ / ’ /, € / 3
Tov amo Oardcons "Akapvavov padios *Axap-
f ) L tHs ZakxvvO tap 8
vaviavy axovtes xal THs ZaxvyOov Kai Kedar-
e
Anvias KpaTHTOoVGL, Kal O TeEpitrAOUS OUKETL
4 ’ , € / \ ,
écoito “A@nvaiors opotws rept IeXorrovyncor:
/ a
éxmioas 8 elvar kat Navwaxktov raBeiv. of bé
/ a \
Aaxedarpoviot TeroGévtes Kvtjov pev vavapyov
ry 4 / b ’ ,
éTL VTA Kal TOUS OTrALTAS é7Tl vavoly OdLYAaLS
> \ / A \ a /
evOls méutovcl, TH O€ vaUTLK@® TrEpLnyyelNav
/ ¢ 7 lal > /
TAapacKevacapevo ws TUXLOTA TreEtv és AEevKdoa.
> \ oes , A /
jaoav 6é€ KopivOro. Evytpolvpovpevoe pddtoTa
trois "Aumpaxiwtais atroixols oval. Kal TO peD
vavtikov &€k Te KopivOov nai Suxva@vos kal tov
fal ]
TavTn xwplov év TapacKkevh tv, To 6 é« Aeved-
, \ ,
Sos kat "Avaxtopiov kai ’Aurpaxias mportepov
> / > / / na \
adixopevov ev Aevxdds trepréwevev. Kytyos 6é
Kal of eT avTOD yirLot OT AiTAaL ETELO) errEpalo-
/ lal
Oncav raGovtes Voppiwva, os Hpye ToV elkoct

406

BOOK II. txxrx. 7-Lxxx. 4

men and all their generals. The Chalcidians and
Bottiaeans set up a trophy, and then, after they had
taken up their own dead, dispersed to their several
Part: awe

LXXX. During the same summer, not long after
these events, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, wishing
to subdue the whole of Acarnania and detach it
from Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to fit
out a fleet from the countries of the Doric alliance
and to send a thousand hoplites against Acarnania,
saying that, if they joined forces with them, bringing
ships and infantry, it would be an easy matter first
to occupy Acarnania since the Acarnanians on! the
seacoast would be unable to aid those inland, and
then to make themselves masters of Zacynthus and
Cephallenia also: after that the Athenians would no
longer be able to sail round the Peloponnesus in the
same way as before ; and there was a chance of taking
Naupactus also. The Lacedaemonians agreed and at
once despatched Cnemus, who was still admiral,? and
the hoplites on a few ships, and sent round orders to
the allied fleet to make their preparations and sail as
soon as possible to Leucas. And the Corinthians were
especially eager to support the enterprise of the
Ambraciots, who were colonists of theirs. The con-
tingent of the fleet to come from Corinth and Sicyon
and the places in that quarter was still under pre-
paration, but that from Leucas and Anactorium and
Ambracia, arriving first, waited at Leucas. As for
Cnemus and the thousand hoplites, as soon as they
had succeeded in crossing over without being de-
tected by Phormio, who was in command of the

1 ¢.e. because of the presence of the Peloponnesian fleet
along their coast. = of. ch. lxvi. 2.

407

THUCYDIDES

veav tov Atrtixav al mept Navraxtov éppou-
povv, ev0v’s tmaperxevafovto THY KaTa viv
orpareiay. Kal avT@ Tapio av “EXMjvev ev
“Apt pacar ar Kal "Avacrdpuou Kat Aevxdd.or
Kal ods auTos eX@v mrAGE xiMor Tleorrovynator,
BapBapor dé Xaoves XiAvou aBacinevtol, Ov
Hyobvto éTeTNTLO mpoorareig €x TOD apxLKov
ryévous Portis Kat Nexavep. Evvertpatevovto
dé peta Xadvov cat @ecrpwtol aBacirevtor.
Modocaovs 6é Hye kal “Ativtavas LaBvrwGos
éritpotos av OdpuTos Tov Bacidéws Ett traidos
OvTOS, Kal Tlapavatous “Opotdos Baotrevor.
‘Opéarac dé xi Avot, av é€Bacinevev ‘Avtioyos,
pera Tapavaioy EvveotpatevovTo Opoide "Av-
TLOXOU eet perav Tos. emeurve dé Kal Tlepdixras
pupa TOV “AOnvatov XALouS Maxedover, ot
UoTEpoV mrOov. TOUT 78 oTpaT@ emropeveTo
Kyijpos ov Tepiuetvas TO amo KopivOou VaUTLKOD,
Kal dua THS “Apyetas iovtes Acuvaiav, K@unv
ATELY LOTOD, em opOnoar. agixvovyTat Te €TL
2Tpatov, TOMY peyloTny THs “Axapvavias, vo-
pitovtes, el TavTnvy mpeTnv AdPotev, padiws
odiot TAAXA TpoTYwpHcev.

LXXXI. ’Axapvaves 6€ aicOopuevot Kata Te
yv mwoAAnY aotpatiav éoBeBXyKviav ex Te
Oardoons vavoly dua TOUS ToNElous Taper o-
pévous, ouTE EvveBorovv epuracaov TE TA AUTOV
éxaoTo, mapa TE Popyiova em euTov KENEVOVTES
auvve' o d€ advvatos én Eivat vavTiKoD éK
Kopiv@ov pédXovtos éextXetvy Navrraxtov épnunv
atvroAiTetv. of 5€ IleXotrovynaion Kal ot Evppa-

408

BOOK II. uxxx. 4-Lxxx1. 2

twenty Athenian ships that were on guard off Nau-
pactus,! they began at once to prepare for the ex-
pedition by land. He had with him, of Hellenic
troops, some Ambraciots, Anactorians and Leuca-
dians, and the thousand Peloponnesians whom he
himself brought; of barbarians, a thousand Chao-
nians, who, having no king, were led by Photius and
Nicanor of the ruling clan who had the annual presi-
dency. With the Chaonian contingent were also some
Thesprotians, who likewise have no king. A force
of Molossians and Atintanians were led by Saby-
linthus, the guardian of king Tharyps, who was still
a boy, and of Paravaeans by their king, Oroedus.
With the Paravaeans were a thousand Orestians
whose king, Antiochus, had entrusted them to
Oroedus. And Perdiccas also sent, without the
knowledge of the Athenians, a thousand Macedo-
nians, who arrived too late. With this army Cnemus
set out, not waiting for the fleet from Corinth; and
as they passed through the territory of Argos? they
sacked Limnaea, an unwalled village. Finally they
arrived at Stratus, the largest city of Acarnania,
thinking that if they could take this first, the other
places would readily come over to them.

LXXXI. Now when the Acarnanians perceived
that a large army had invaded them by land and
that the enemy would soon be at hand with a fleet
by sea as well, they did not attempt combined re-
sistance, but guarding severally their own possessions
they sent to Phormio urging him to aid them. But
he said that he could not leave Naupactus unpro-
tected, as a hostile fleet was about to sail from
Corinth. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians and their

1 of. ch. lxix. 1. # Amphilochian Argos; cf. ch. Ixviii. 1.
409

“THUCYDIDES

yor Tpla TédXyn TrorncavTes chav avTav eEywpovy
\ a / , ei
Tpos THY TOV YTPATiwy TOW, OTwS eyyUs oTpa-
/ > x / /
TOTECEVTAMEVOL, EL LN OY TELOOLEV, Epyw TeEt-
An rn / \ \ / \
p@VTO TOU TELYOUS. Kal TO pécov eV ExovTES
al / \ 4 A / b]
mpocnaav Xaoves Kat of adrot BdpBapo, éx
5 cal 8 > lal A 1 b 4 s \
efias 8 attav Aeveddiot cat “Avaxtoptoe Kal
\ ca \ a
oi peta TovTwV, év apiotepa 5é Kyvjuos kai ot
\ > fal rt
IleXotmrovynciot Kat Apmrpaxiotar: dietyov dé
\ > >. / \ yy ¢ 2O\ € A
ToAU aT adAndwv Kal EoTLV OTE OVE EWPHVTO.
7 / ~
Kal of pev” EXXnves TeTAypEeVOL TE TPOTHTAV Kal
dua hurakhs eyovtes, ws éotpatoTedevcavto év
/ / lal £
émritnoei@’ ot 6€ Xaoves opiat TE avTois TLoTEV-
/ \ a 2} cal
ovtes Kal akiovpevor UTO TaV exEivn NTELPwWTaV
/ a
aX LuwoTaToL Eivat OUTE ETET YOY TOD GTpaTOTEdoY
a / f / \ a
KaTaraPety, YwpnoavTées TE PUN META TOV Ad-
/
ov BapBdpov evopigav avToBoel av thy Tory
éXely Kal aAUT@V TO Epryov yevérOar., ‘yvoures é
QUTOUS Ob >Tparvor ete mpoovovras Kat nyne a
{EVOL, MELOVOMEVWY EL KpaTHoELAV, OVK av ETL
‘ ec / a
odict tos “EXAnvas omotws mpocedOeiv, mpodo-
/ \ \ \ \ / > / \ > \
yifovet 67 TA Tepl THY TOL evédpats, Kal éTrELOH
r , € /
éyyus Roav, ék TE THS TOAMEWS OMOTE YwpHcavTES
Kal 逫 TOV évedp@v TpoomimTovaw. Kal és
/ lal
dhofov catactavtwv StapGetpovtat Te ToAXO! TAY
Xaovwv, cai of dAdo BadpBapot a@s eidov avdtouvs
> ’ oi > sty > 2 3 \ ,
évdovtas, ovKEeTL UTEéwEeWaV, AAX €s huynyv KaTé-
lal \ ¢m a / 2Q7
otncav. Ttav dé ‘EXAnuKav otpatorédwy ovdé-
v fol / Ps \ \ \ al
Tepov nabeTo THS maxXNS, La TO TOV TpoEdOeEtW
auTovs Kal oTpatoTedoy oinPjvat KaTadnwope-

410

BOOK II. txxxi. 2-7

allies, dividing their troops into three divisions,
advanced towards the city of the Stratians, their
purpose being to encamp near by, and then, if they
could not prevail upon them by parleying, to assault
the wall. As they advanced, the centre was held by
the Chaonians and the other barbarians, while on
their right were the Leucadians and Anactorians
and those who accompanied them, and on the left
Cnemus with his Peloponnesians and the Ambraciots ;
and the divisions were far apart from each other,
sometimes, not even in sight. And the Hellenic
troops as they advanced maintained their ranks and
were on their guard until they encamped in a suit-
able place; but the Chaonians, who were not only
confident of themselves but were also recognised as
very excellent fighting men by the inhabitants of
that part of the mainland, did not halt to make
camp, but advanced with a rush along with the other
barbarians, thinking that they could take the town
at the first assault, and thus gain the glory for them-
selves. But the Stratians noticed that they were
still advancing, and thinking that, if they could
overcome them while isolated, the Hellenes would
no longer be as ready to attack them, set ambushes
in the outskirts of the town, and as soon as the
barbarians were close at hand, closed in upon them
from the city and from the ambushes and fell upon
them. Thrown into a panic, many of the Chaonians
were slain, and the other barbarians, seeing them
give way, no longer held their ground, but took to
flight. But neither of the Hellenic divisions was
aware of the battle, because their allies had gone far
ahead of them, and they thought that they were

411

THUCYDIDES

8 vous étreiyerOar. érrel & evéxewTo pevdyovres ot
BapBapou, averduBavov Te avTous Kal Euvaya-
youres Ta otparomeba novxatov avTov THV HUE-
pay, és xEtpas pev ovK tovt@v odpiot TOV LtTpaTtiwv
61a TO pnTrw@ TOVS adXovUS ‘Axapvavas EupSeBon-
Onxéva, aTwbev 5é opevdovevTov Kal és atropiay
KabioTavTov ov yap Hv dvev oT A@V xan Ofvar.
Soxover 5€ ot "Axapvaves KpaTLaToL elvan TOUTO
Tovetv. LXXXIl. emeLon dé vv§& eyevero, ava-
Xopngas 0 Kviyos TH oTparea KaTa TAaXOS én
tov "Avatrov TOTA}LOV, Os aT@éxet oT adious o7/80%-
KovTa 2Tpatov, TOUS TE vexpous Kopivetar TH
baTepata vmoamovdous Kal Oiviadav Evpmapa-
Yevowevov KaTa pirtay avayopel Tap avTovs
mp THY EvpBonbevav érOeiv. KaKelOev err’
oikov anipOov € ExaoTol. ot dé 2TpaTvou TpoTraiov
ETTNTAV THS MAYNS TAS 7 pos TOUS BapBdpovs.

LXXXIII. To 8 é« ris Kopiv@ov Kal TOV
adXov Suppaxov TOY €x TOD Kpicaiou KONTrOU
VaUTLKOD, O &deu maparyevér at TO Kone, 6 OTWS
[1) EvpBonbdow oi amo Bardcons a avo ‘Axapva-
VES; ov TapaylyveTar, ann’ jvaykacOnoav mepl
TAs auras Tepas ™ €v 2Tpar@ HaXn VAVLAXT-
cat pos Poppiova Kal Tas elKOCL vads TOY

2 “A@nvaiwy al éppovpovy év Navraxro. 0 yap
Dopytov TapaTA€ovTas avTovs é&eo Tov KOXTFOU
eT pel, Bovdopevos ev TH evpuxopia émiBeo Bau.

3 ot O€ Kopiv@vor Kal ol Evupaxor émheov bev ovy
@S ETL vavpaxia, avnra OT PATLOTLKOTEPOV mape-
TKEVAT HEVOL és THY ‘Axapvaviay Kal ovK av ol0-
pevo. mpos émTa Kal TET TApaKovTa vavs Tas
ofetépas ToAuHoaL Tos "AOnvaious eixoat Tais

412

BOOK II. txxxi. 7-Lxxxi1. 3

pressing on in order to find a camp. But when the
barbarians in their flight broke in upon them, they
took them in and uniting their two divisions kept
quiet there during the day, the Stratians not coming
to close quarters with them, because the rest of the
Acarnanians had not yet come to their support, but
using their slings against them from a distance and
distressing them ; for it was not possible for them to
stir without armour; and indeed the Acarnanians are
famous for their excellence in the use of the sling.
LXXXII. But when night came on, Cnemus hastily
retreated with his army to the river Anapus, which
is eighty stadia distant from Stratus, and on the
following day took up his dead under a truce; and
since the Oeniadae had joined his expedition in token
of their friendly feelings, he withdrew to their
country before the combined forces of the Acar-
nanians had arrived, and from there they returned
severally to their homes. As for the Stratians, they
set up a trophy of their battle with the barbarians.
LXXXIII. Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and
from the other allies on the Crisaean Gulf, which
was to have joined Cnemus in order to prevent the
Acarnanians on the sea-coast from aiding those in the
interior, did not arrive, but was obliged, about the
day of the battle at Stratus, to fight with Phormio
and the twenty Athenian ships which were on guard
at Naupactus. For Phormio was watching them as
they sailed along the coast out of the gulf, pre-
ferring to attack them in the open water. Now the
Corinthians and their allies on their way to Acarnania
were not equipped for fighting at sea, but rather for
operations on land, and they had no idea that the
Athenians with their twenty ships would dare to

413

THUCYDIDES

a \ /
éavT@v vavpaylay toijcacOar: émrerdn pévTor
¢ 7 / \ a
aVTITAPATACOVTAS TE EWPWY AUTOUS, Tapa YHV
lal / » ioe a a > A
chav Koutfouevarv, cat ex Llatpa@yv ths “Ayaias
\ \ > / a / Re
mpos THY avtitépas Hmetpov StaBadrrovtes et
> , a \ > / > \ fal
Axapvavias kateidov tovs "A@nvaious ato Tis
a a /
Xadkidos cal tod Ev7jvou rotayov mpoomXéovtas
/ \ > + @ \ > /, 1
opigt Kal ove eXalov vuKTOS adoppicodpevot,
al / \
ovTw 6 avayxafovTat vavpaxety KaTa écoVv TOV
, \ \ od \ \ \
4 mwopOuov. otpatnyol S€ joav pev Kal Kata
/ c vA \ / /
Toes ExdoTwV Of TapecKeudlovTo, KopivOiwr
\ / \ ’ / A 2 /
5€ Maydov kai ‘Iooxpatns kai “Ayabapytéas.
\ e \ / b] “A / lal
5 kai of pev IleXotovvnoios éraEavto KUKXOV TeV
n , > 6 \ /
VE@V MS péyloToV olol T Hoav pn SLdovTeEs dLéK-
\ / \ v »” \ \ /
TXovy, Tas Tpdpas pev &Ew, Ecw Se TAS TpU-
\ / \ Lal a / b] \
pvas, Kal Ta Te AETTTA TrOLa A EvvEeTrrEL EVTOS
lal r ¥ /
To.ovuvTar Kal TévTE VAS Tas AploTa TEOVGAS,
, »
Stas éxtréorev d1a Bpayéos Tapayryvopevat, et
, /
Tn TpooTimTToLev Ol €vavTioL.
al / lal
LXXXIV. Oi & ’A@nvaio. cata piav vady
/ ‘ a
TETAYMEVOL TEPLETTAECOY AUTOS KUKAW Kal EvVH-
a /
yov €$ OXlyov, ev xp@ alel TapamrheovTes Kai
/ o /
Soxnow TapéxyovTes avtixa éuParelv: mpoeipynto
8 avtots uo Poppiwvos pr émixerpety mpiv av
lal “ \
2 avtos onpunvyn. HAmioe yap avT@v ov pevety THY

1 Bloomfield’s correction for ipopuioauevar of the MSS.

1 Or, retaining bpopuioaduevor, ‘‘they had tried to anchor
under cover of night, but had been detected.”

ahs

BOOK II. txxxim. 3-Lxxxiv. 2

bring on an engagement with their own forty-seven.
When, however, they saw that the Athenians kept
sailing along the opposite coast as long as they them-
selves continued to skirt the southern shore, and
when, as they attempted to cross from Patrae in
Achaia to the mainland opposite, making for Acar-
nania, they observed that the Athenians were bearing
down upon them from Chalcis and the river Evenus,
and finally when, during the night, they had tried to
slip their moorings! and get away but had been
detected, under these circumstances they were forced
to fight in the middle of the channel.? Their fleet
was commanded by generals from the several states
which contributed contingents, the Corinthian squad-
ron by Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The
Peloponnesians drew up their ships in as large a
circle as they could without allowing the enemy an
opportunity to break through,’ prows outward, sterns
inward ; and inside the circle they placed the light
boats which accompanied them, and also five of their
swiftest ships, in order that they might have only a
short distance to sail out and bring support at any
point where the enemy attacked.

LXXXIV. As for the Athenians, drawn up in
single column they kept sailing round the Pelopon-
nesian fleet in a circle, hemming it into a narrower
and narrower space, always just grazing by and
giving the impression that they would charge at any
moment. But orders had been given by Phormio
not to attack until he should give the signal; for he
hoped that the enemy’s ships would not keep in line,

2 7.e. in the open water between Patrae and the mouth of
the Evenus, as opposed to the regions along the shore of the

Gulf, where their fleet might run into a harbour.
3 See note ont. xlix. 3.

415

THUCYDIDES

taki, woTep ev yn wetnv, adda Evpreceiabat
mpos adXAnAaS Tas vats Kal Ta TAOCIa Tapayny
3 n \
Tapékew, el T éxTVvEevoeev EX TOD KOATTIOV TO
Tvevpa, OTEp Avapevwv Te TepléTTAEL Kal eiw@Oet
, \ /
ylyvecOar érri tiv &w, ovdéva ypovoy navxKacew
> Me \ \ > / 3 52 e n b] /
avrous: Kal Thy emixeipnow éd aiT@ Te évopt ev
elval, oTrOTaV BovANnTaL, TOV VEewV GApLeLVOV TEOU-
r / ,
oav, Kal TOTE KaANoTHY yiyverOa. ws 5é TO TE
fa) e a /
TVEULA KATHEL KAL ai VHES Ev OALYM HON OvoaL
? an / lal
tm’ apuhotépwy, TOU Te avé“ov T@Y TE Tolar,
dua tTpockepevav étapacaovto, Kal vads TE vl
mpooémimte Kal Tots KovTois OvewOodvTo, Bon Te
, \ X 3 / 3 A \
Ypwmevol Kal TPOS GNANAOUS avTLpvAaKH TE KAL
AoLdopia ovdév KaTHKOVOY OTE THY TapayyedAo-
Hév@Vv OUTE TOV KEAEVOTOV, Kal TAS KOTAS advVa-
Tot ovTes ev KAVOMVL avadépety aVOpwTrOL aTeELpoL
r A a oF
tois KuBepvyntais amreectépas Tas vads Tapel-
\ rn
xov, TOTE O12) KATA TOY KaLpOVY TOUTOV onpaivel,
a , lal
kal of A@Onratot mpoomEecovTEes TRWTOV meV KaTa-
SvoveL TOV CTpaTHnylOwy vedv piav, erretta O€ Kai
\ yA - / 5 / \ /
Tas ddXas 7 Ywpyoeav OvepOerpov, Kal KaTEéEoTN-
nr X\
cay é> adxKiy pev pndéva TpétrecOat adta@v v7r0
an al / \ b] / \ /
Ths Tapayns, pevyew Oe és Ilatpas Kai Avpny
a b ce e be > lal 5 , \
ths Axaias. ot d€ A@nvaio: catadim€aytes Kat
rn , 4 4 ” > > a
vats d@dexa AaBovTes TOUS TE avdpas éF avTaV
\ F > , > * / > /
Tous mA€laTous avedopevor €s MorXuvxperov arré-
\ al \ a
TEV, Kal TpoTaloy oTHaarTEs Evi TO ‘Pim Kal
vabv avabévtes TO Llocerdau avexwopnoav és
Navraktov. wapémdevoav 5€ cai oi Iledotrov-

416

BOOK II. txxxiv. 2-5

like infantry on land, but would fall foul of one
another, and also be thrown into confusion by the
small boats, and then if the breeze for which he was
waiting while he sailed round, which usually blew
from the gulf towards dawn, should spring up, they
would not remain steady for any length of time. As
for the attack, he thought that was in his power
whenever he chose, since his ships were better
sailers, and that then was the most favourable
moment for it. So when the wind began to come
up, and the ships, already hemmed in a narrow
space, were being thrown into confusion both by the
violence of the wind and the pressure of the small
boats, when ship was dashing against ship and the
crews were trying to push them apart with poles, all
the while keeping up such shouts and warning
cries and abuse of one another that they could not
hear either the word of command or the coxswains’
calls, and, finally, when the inexperienced rowers,
unable to get their oars clear of the water in a heavy
sea, were rendering the ships less obedient to the
helmsmen, then at this critical moment Phormio
gave the signal. Thereupon the Athenians fell upon
them; first they sank one of the admirals’ ships,
and then destroyed the rest as well wherever they
came upon them, reducing them to such straits that
in their confusion no one turned for defence, but
all fled to Patrae and Dyme in Achaia. But the
Athenians gave chase, and after they had captured
twelve ships and had taken on board most of their
crews sailed away to Molycreum; then they set up a
trophy on Rhium, dedicated a ship to Poseidon, and
returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians also

417

THUCYDIDES

/ > \ val , lal A > ol
vnoot evOds tails TeptNolToLs TAY VvEe@V EK TIS
rn , I
Avpns cai Ilatpav és Kuddjvny to Hero émt-
nr e /
vetov' Kat amo Aeveddos Kvijyos cal at éxevov
An a cal \
ves, as eer TavTais EvppetEar, apixvodvTar peta
THV ev LTpaT@ wayyy és THY KvrAdyvyD.
’
LXXXV. I[léurover 8€ rai of Aaxedatpovior
n / / > \ \ na /
TO Kvjuw EvpBovrous eri tas vads Tipoxpaty
/ / 7
kal Bpaciéav cat Avucodpova, Kedevovtes aXANV
/ \ » Cee. ’
vavpayiav BéXtiov TapacKevadlecOar Kal wn UT
b] , lal ” 6 na - / 280 \
drAiyov vewv elpyecOar THS Padacons. edoKer yap
auTois G\XwS TE Kal TP@TOV vavpaylas TeLpaca-
s \ t
pévols TOAUS O TapaXoyos elvat Kal OV TOTOUT@
@ovTo chav TO vauTLKOY eiTrecOaL, yeyevnT Iau
/ / b] > / A > ,
dé Twa paraxtap, ovK avtiTiOévtes THY AOnvatwy
> a > / a / b] 3. 7
ék ToAAOD éurretpiay THs aodetépas 62’ oréiyou
peréTns. Opym ovv améotedXov. ot 5é adixo-
pevot peta ToU Kynuov vads Te mpoomepinyyethav
KaTa TOAELS KAL TAS TpovTapYoVaas €EnpTUOVTO
@s él vavpaxyiav. téutrer 6€ Kal 0 Doppiwr és
tas “AOnvas thy Te TapacKeuny avTaY ayyEedouv-
Tas Kal Tepl THs vavpayxlas Hv éviknoav Ppacov-
Tas Kal KeXevwv avT@® vads OTL Treiotas Sea
/ b] a e ? e / e / >
TAXOUS ATOODTELAAL, WS Kad NuEpaV EKATTHV Ed-
moos ovons aiel vavpayryoev. of dé atroTép-
TOVGL EiKOTL VAS ALTO, TO O€ KOmifovTL avTas
TpooevéaTerav és Kpytynvy mpatov adixécOat.
, \ > le | / /
Nixias yap Kpys Toptuvios wpokevos av reid

418

BOOK II. exxxiv. 5-Lxxxv. 5

sailed away immediately with the ships that were
left, proceeding from Dyme and Patrae along the
coast to Cyllene, the shipyard of the Eleans; and
Cnemus likewise, coming from Leucas together with
the ships from that quarter! which were to have
joined the Corinthian fleet, came to Cyllene after the
battle at Stratus,

LXXXV. The Lacedaemonians now sent to the
fleet Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron as ad-
visers to Cnemus, directing them to make better
preparation for another sea-fight, and not to be
driven off the sea by a few ships. For the issue of
the recent battle seemed to them utterly incompre-
hensible, especially since this was their first attempt
at a sea-fight, and they could not believe that their
fleet was so greatly inferior, but thought that there
had been cowardice somewhere, failing to take into
account the long experience of the Athenians as
compared with their own brief practice. In a rage,
then, they dispatched the advisers. And these on
their arrival, acting in conjunction with Cnemus,
sent round a call to the allied cities for additional
ships, and set about equipping those already at hand,
with a view to a sea-fight. And Phormio on his
part sent messengers to Athens to give information
of the enemy’s preparations and to tell about the
battle which they had won, urging them also to send
to him speedily as many ships as possible, since
there was always a prospect that a battle might be
fought any day. So they sent him twenty ships,
but gave the commander in charge of them special
orders to sail first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of
Gortys, who was a proxenus? of theirs, persuaded

1 The contingents from Leucas, Anactorium, and Am-
bracia, ch. lxxx. 2, 3. 2 See ch. xxix. 1, note. 419

THUCYDIDES

avtovs émi Kudwviay mredoat, dacxwv mpoc-
TOLnoELV AUTHVY ovoav Torepiav: ériye Sé Ilo-
Auxvirass xapilomevos omopous TOV Kudovarav.
Kal ° jev AaBov TAS vavs @ByETO €s K pyrny Kal
pera | TOV Torryver av edrov THD yay TOV Kvdo-
viaTaVv, Kal UT avéwov Kal aolas évdréTpiver
oUK OYOV YXpovoV.

LXXXVI. O: & &v tH Kurrjvn Tedorrovyncros
év TovTo, é€v © ot “A@nvaior wept Kpytny Kxatet-
YOVTO, TapeTKEevacMEeVvoL WS éTl VaVpAaXiaV TaApe-
mrevoav és dvoppov tov ’Ayaixov, ovrep avtois
0 KaTa yhv TT patos TOV Tledorrovynatay T poo -
eBeBonOnxee. TapeTrEVTE dé Kal 0 Poppion ¢ etl
TO ‘Piov TO Monduxpixov Kal @ppicato éEw avrod
vavaly elKOoL, alonep Kab evavpLaXnoeD. Dy b€
TOUTO pev TO “Piov pidtov Tots ‘AGnvaiors, TOO
érepov ‘Piov éotlyv avtimépas TO év TH IeXoTov-
vno@" OvexXeTOV éé ar add ov oTAOLOUS pddiora
era TAS Oaracons, TOD dé _Kpioaiou KOANTTOU
oT Opa TOUTO éoTLD. ent ovv TO ‘Pio TO "Axaixd
OL eorrovynovoe am eXOVTL ov Trond TOU Tavop-
Lov, ev @ avTots o Telos HV, @ppicavto Kal avTol
vavoly érta Kal EBdounKovra,! erred) ral TOUS
"AOnvaious eidov. Kal éml pev && 4 éxta tpépas
av wpyouv GXA1 OLS HeAETOVTES Te Kal Tapa-
oKxevalopevor THY vaupaxian, yepny EYOVTES OL
bev pL) ex ely &&o tov “Piwv és THY evpuxepiar,
poBovpevor TO ™poTepov dB 0s, ol dé pa éomAety
és Ta oTeVa, voutSovres T pos exelvov elvan THY ev
oALy@ vaupaxiar. erecta 0 Kytuos cat o Bpact-
das Kal ot aot TOV Tlerorovynaiwy oTparnyol,
Bovdopevor ev TaYE THY Vavpayiay TovhoaL Tpiv

420 1 Hude reads revthxovra, with C

BOOK II. ixxxy. 5—Lxxxvi. 6

them to sail against Cydonia, a hostile town, promis-
ing to bring it over to the Athenians; but he was
really asking them to intervene to gratify the people
of Polichne, who are neighbours of the Cydonians.
So the officer in charge took the ships, went to
Crete, and helped the Polichnitans to ravage the
lands of the Cydonians, and by reason of winds and
stress of weather wasted not a little time.
LXXXVI. Meantime, while the Athenians were
detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene,
equipped and ready for a battle, sailed along the
coast to Panormus in Achaia, where the land-forces
of the Peloponnesians had come to their support.
And Phormio also sailed along the coast to the
Molycrian Rhium and anchored outside with the
twenty ships with which he had fought before.
This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians, and
opposite is the other Rhium, that in the Pelopon-
nesus; and the distance between them is about
seven stadia by sea, constituting the mouth of the
Crisaean Gulf. Accordingly the Peloponnesians,
when they saw the Athenians come to anchor, like-
wise anchored with seventy-seven ships at the Achaian
Rhium, which is not far from Panormus, where their
land-forces were. And for six or seven days they
lay at anchor opposite one another, practising and
preparing for battle, the one side resolved not to
sail outside the two Rhia into the open water, fear-
ing a recurrence of their disaster, the other not to
sail into the straits, thinking that fighting in a
narrow space was in the enemy’s favour. At last
Cnemus and Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian
commanders, wishing to bring on the engagement

421

THUCYDIDES

Te kal amo Tov “A@nvalwv ériBonOjaoat, Evvera-
Necav TOUS OTPATLWTAaS TPHTOV, Kal oOpwVvTES
avT@v Tovs Todos bia THY TpoTépay ocav
7
foBovpévous xal od tpofvpovs dvtas Tapexedev-
cavto Kal éreEav Torabe.
LXXXVII. “‘H peév yevouévn vavpayia, @
A / ” BA =] > \ e lal
dvdpes HeXorrovynorot, et Tis dpa Ov avtTny Uuav
a \ lé > \ / yy /
hofeitas THv pédAdovaar, ovyt Sixaiav Eyer TEK-
a a \ A
papow TO éexpoBhjoar. TH TE yap TapacKev7
/ o
évdens éyéveto, waTrep late, Kal ovxl és vavpa-
, a xX > \ / 4 / /
xiav padrov 7 él otpateiay émreopev EvvEe8y
Sé Kal Ta ATO THs TUXNS OVK OAIya evayTLwWOHVaL,
, / a a
Kat Tov TL Kal 1) aTELpla TP@TOV vavpayodvvTas
todyrev. @oTe ov KaTa THY hweTépav KaKiay TO
ca) , a
hoocdobar Tpoceyéveto, ovde Sikaoy THs yvoOuns
TO pi) KATA KpaTos wKNOEr, yor 5é Twa ev av’T@
avtinoyiav, THS ye Evydhopas TO aTroBavTt ap-
Brvvecbat, vowicar Sé tats pév TUYaLs Evdéyer Pat
/ \ > , A \ ,
cpharrecbat tovs avOpwrovus, Tais dé yvopats
Tovs auTovs alel dp0as! avdpetous eivat, Kal p71)
ametplav Tod avdpetov Tapovtos mpoBaddopévous
eixoT@s av év Tit KaKoUs yevécOa. tpav dé ovd
cr am
) ameipla ToooUTOV AElTETAL SoOV TOAMYy TpOv-
yeTe: Tavde O€ 7) ErloTHUN, hv waddoTa go-
Beicbe, avipeiav pev éxovoa xal priunv e€eu ev
a ro , 7 A »” v \ > ,
To Sew@ émiterelvy & Ewalev, avev O€ evyvyias
> /, / \ \ /, > / /
ovdeuia TéyVN TpPOS TOUS KLVdUVOUS LaxvEL. hoBos
yap uvnunv exTrAHToEL, TEXYN OE AVEV ANKIIS Ov-
1 Hude writes épovs and deletes avdpelous (with Badham).
422

BOOK II. txxxvi. 6-Lxxxvil. 4

soon, before reinforcements came from Athens, first
called their soldiers together, and seeing that most
of them were frightened on account of their previous
defeat and not eager for battle, encouraged them
and spoke as follows :

LXXXVII. “The recent sea-fight, Peloponne-
sians, if possibly it has caused any man among
you to be afraid of the one before us, affords no
just grounds for your alarm. For our preparation
was deficient, as you know, and the object of our
voyage was not so much to fight at sea as operations
on land; and it happened, furthermore, that not a
few of the chances of war were against us, and
doubtless also our inexperience had something to do
with our failure in the first sea-fight. It was not
then our cowardice that brought about defeat, nor
is it right that the spirit, which force cannot con-
quer, but which has in it something defiant, should
be dulled and blunted by the outcome of mere
chance ; rather you ought to reflect that although
men may suffer reverse in their fortunes, yet in
their spirit brave men are rightly considered always
brave, and when courage is present no inexperience
can properly be urged as an excuse for being cowards
under any circumstances. And, after all, your inex-
perience is more than counterbalanced by your
superiority in daring; and though the enemy’s skill,
which you particularly dread, will indeed, so long as
bravery goes with it, have the presence of mind. in
the moment of danger to put into effect the lessons
it has learned, yet without valour no amount of
proficiency avails against such dangers. For fear
drives presence of mind away, and skill without

423

THUCYDIDES

5 dév @herel. pos pev ody TO éumrerpoTepov aUTaV
TO ToApnpoTepov avtTitaEacGe, mpds S€ TO Sia
THY Nooav Sedsévat TO ATAapdoKEVOL TOTE TUXELD.

6 Tepiyiyvetas 5é nuivy wAHOs Te vVedv Kal Tpos TH
Y oixeia oven OTITOV TapovT@Y vavuayeElV’ TA
d€ TOAAa TOV TAEOVoY Kal duEeLVOY TapecKevac-

7 pévav TO Kpatos éotiv. @aote ovdé Kal’ Ev evpi-
oKOMEV ELKOTMS AV Has oharropmévoUS Kal boa
HuapTOMEV TpOTEpoV, VOV ad’Ta TadTAa Tpocyevo-

8 peva StOackariav TwapéEet. Oapcodvtes obv Kai
kuBepyyntat Kal vadtas TO Kal’ éavTov ExacTos
érecOe, Y@pav fn TporEiToVTES 7 AV TLS Tpoc-

9 TayOR. Tov dé TpOTEpOVY HryE“oveY Ov YElpov THY
eTLyeElpnolw HuEels TapacKevacopey Kal ovK Evew-
couev tpohaciw ovdevl Kax@ yevéoOar: hv Sé Tis
dpa kat BovrnOh, KodkacOjceTat TH TpeTTOVTN
Enuia, ot de ayalol tiuncovta: Tois mpoonKkovow
aOXoLs THS apEeTAs.”

LXXXVIII. Tovadta pév tots eXotrovynciots
of apxovTes Tapexedetcavto. o 5é€ Poppiov
Sedv@s Kal avtTos THY TOV oTpaTLWTaY Oppwdiav
Kat aiaOopevos Ott TO TAOS THY Vvedv KaTA
adas avtous Evyictapevor efhoSovvto, éBovreTo
Evycarécas Oapcivat te nal rapaiveow év TO

2 TapovTe moinocaclat. mpoTepov pev yap aiel
avtois éXeye Kal TpoTrapecKkevate Tas yvopas ws
ovdev avTtots mAnGos vedv ToToUTOV, HY éTiTAEN,
6 TL ovN Umopevetéov éoti, Kal of oTpaTi@Tat x
TohkXNov €v odhicw avtois tiv akiwoww tavTny

424

BOOK II. vxxxvi. 4—-Lxxxvul. 2

intrepidity is of no avail. Therefore, against their
greater experience set your greater daring, and
against the fear caused by your defeat set the
accident of your being at the moment unprepared.
You have the advantage, both in number of ships
and in fighting close to the land, which is friendly
to us, and you are supported by hoplites; and victory
is generally on the side of those who are the more
numerous and better prepared. There is accordingly
not a single reason that we can find why we should
fail; and as to our earlier mistakes, the very fact
that they were made will teach us a lesson. Be of
good courage, then, and let each man, both helms-
man and sailor, follow our lead as best he can, not
leaving the post to which he may be assigned. We
shall prepare for the attack at least as well as your
former commanders, and shall give no one an excuse
to act like a coward; but if anyone should be in-
clined that way, he shall be punished with the pen-
alty he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured
with rewards such as befit their valour.”

LXXXVIJI. With such words the Peloponnesian
commanders encouraged their men. But Phormio,
being himself also uneasy about the apprehension
felt by his troops, and observing that they were
gathering in knots amongst themselves in alarm at
the superior number of the enemy’s ships, wished
to call them together in order to hearten them and
make an exhortation to suit the present emergency.
For in the past he had always told them, by way of
bracing their minds, that there was no number of
ships, however great, whose attack men such as they
could not withstand ; and his sailors had long since
held among themselves the conviction that they,

VOL. I. p 475

THUCYDIDES

/ A
ei\Andecav pndéva oxrov "AOnvaior dvtes TeXo-
/ a a /
Tovvnci@y veav vToxXwpely' ToTEe O€ Tpos THY
a ” Chore > \ > fo) ] 7
Tapovacay ori opa@v avtovs aOupuodvtas éBov-
/ nw Lal
AeTO UTOMYnoW Tolncacbat Tov OBapceiv, Kal
Evyxadécas Tovs "AOnvaious édeye Tordbe.
¢€ a lal =
LXXXIX. “‘Opav ipas, @ avdpes oTpatTioTat,
\ fel ca) ,
mepoBnuevous TO TANGos THY EevavTiov EvvEKa-
Neca, ovx akiav Ta pn Sewa év oppwdia exe
ca, ya) pposia éyew.
nr ¥ fo)
ovTOL yap TpaTov pev Sia TO TpovertKHaOaL Kai
2 bg \ ” e tad — >. X a
pnd avtol olecPat opotor nuiv elvar TO TAROOS
TOV VeOV Kal OVK ATO TOD loov TapecKevdcarTo:
éreiTa © paAloTa TLOTEVOVTES TPOTEPYOVTAL, WS
iN /
mpoonKov adicw avopelots eivat, ov dc ado Tt
a a 5 a A > A Ph, ot / \
Gapcodow 4 dia tHv ev TO elo eurrerpiav Ta
‘4 A \ ” , aed a
mrelw KaTopOodvtes Kal olovtat odicr Kai év TO
lal \ a
VAUTLK@ Tolnoew TO avTO. TOO éK TOD StKaiov
Hptv wadXov viv reptéatat, elmep Kal ToUTOLS év
\ A
éxeiv@, émel evrpuxia ye ovdev mpopépovat, TO Sé
ExaTepot Te evar €utrerpotepot Opacvtepoi eopev.
, , e of > lal \ A
Aaxedatpoviot te Hryovpevor attav da thy ode-
/ sf 7 / \ \
tépav ddfav akovtas Tpocdyovct Tovs TOAXOUS
,
és Tov xivduvov, érel ovK ay rote évexeipnoay
a \ \
joonGéevtes Tapa TOAD avis vavpaxeivy. pn dn
by a A / / ‘\ \ ¢e a b] ,
avuT@v THY TOAMaV Seionte. Toru Oé vpels Exel-
4 / / \ , /
vous TAeiw hoBov Tapéxete Kal TicTOTEpoV KaTa
426

BOOK II. txxxvitt. 2-Lxxxix. 5

being Athenians, must never give ground before any
number of Peloponnesian ships. But at this time,
seeing that they were dispirited by what they saw
before their eyes, and wishing to remind them of
their old-time confidence, he called them together
and spoke as follows:

LXXXIX. “Observing that you have become
alarmed, soldiers, at the numbers of the enemy, I
have called you together, because I do not want you
to be in dread of imaginary dangers. For, in the
first place, it is just because these men have been
beaten before, and do not even themselves believe
that they are a match for us, that they have provided
themselves with this large and disproportionate num-
ber of ships; then, too, as regards their courage,—
the thing on which they chiefly rely when they
come against us, as if it were their peculiar pro-
vince to be brave,—the only reasonable ground
they have for confidence is that their experience in
fighting on land has generally brought them success,
and so they think this will achieve the same result
for them at sea as well. But in all reason the ad-
vantage to-day will rather be ours, if they on their
side have it on land; for in valour assuredly they
are nowise superior, but we are both more confident
just as in any way we have more experience.
Besides, since the Lacedaemonians lead their allies
for their own glory, the majority of them have to
be dragged into battle against their will, for other-
wise they would never, after their decisive defeat,
have attempted to fight a second time at sea.
Hence you need not fear their daring. On the
contrary, you inspire in them a dread far greater
and better justified, both because you have already

‘ 427

THUCYDIDES

Te TO TMpovevixnkévat Kab StL ovK av HyodvTar wn
pédrovtas Te aktov TOU Mapa TOAD Tpakew avOt-
e a BJ / \ \ $e F /
otacbat Upas. avTit@anot pev yap ol” TAELOUS,
e ze A 5 / \ / , a a
@omep ovTol, TH Suvawer TO TAEOV TLoVVOL fH TH
, SaaS. a be 2 fre lh ,
yvopun emépyovtat of O€ Ex TOAN@ VTodecc TEpwV
/ an
Kal Gua ove avayxalopevot, péya Te THS Stavotas
To BéBatov Exyovtes avTiToApaawv. & Noyrfouevos
e a > ee, ’ ’ Caton tek ~
oUTOL T@ OvVK EiKOTL TAEOV TEPOPHVTAaL HuaS H TH
KaTa AOYOY TapacKeuy. TOANG O€ Kal oTpaTo-
BA ” ¢e 2. > / A > , v
Teda Hon erecev UT EMaToOVaY TH aTrELpLa, EoTL
be a \ A b a fae 2 ") f e a aA
é & kal TH GToApia’ wv ovdeTepou els vov
/ \ Nei 3 a > > a Ld ie 9
peTéyomev. Tov O€ ay@va OVK EV TO KOATO EXOD
3 / SQW id / > > , e A
Eval TOLnTOMat OVO eoTAEVTOMAL EF AUTOV. Opa
\ isd \ \ A > “3 b] 7
yap OTL Tpos TOANaS VaUs aveTLATHMOVAS OALYALS
vavow éutretpors Kal Apewvov TAEoVTAaLsS 4 TTEVO-
, > / ” \ A > A ,
yopia ov Evudéper. ovTe yap av emimdAEevoese
\ \ . 2 \ /
Tis @s xp és euBorrnv pH EXoV THY TpoTorpLy
A / 3 rn P97 KR b] /
TOV TOAELLWV EX TONAOV, OVT AV ATTOXWPNTELEV
év Séovts mieCopevos: SuéxTAor Te ovK eiciv ovd’
> , e a bla a 54
dvactpodal, atep vey apevov mEoVTHY Epya
> , > X\ > ‘dé x yy \ /
éotiv, GAXa avayKn av ein THY vavpaxtay Trefo-
a / @ \ > / e ,
payiav nabiotacOa, Kal év TovT@ ai TdreLouS
a / \
pies Kpelacous yiyvovtal. TovT@Y meV ov eyw
1 Hude adopts Madvig’s conjecture # for oi.

428

BOOK II. ixxxix. 5-9

defeated them and because they think that you
would not be facing them at all unless you ex-
pected to achieve a result commensurate with the
very great odds. For most men, when, like our
present opponents, they are equal to their foes, rely
more upon their strength when they advance to the
attack than upon their resolution; whereas those
who dare oppose them with greatly inferior num-
bers, and at the same time without being compelled
to do so, must possess in a high degree the quality
of unwavering resolution. Taking all these things
into consideration, our enemies have come to fear
us more on account of what is amazing in our con-
duct than they would if our preparations were less
out of proportion to their own. Furthermore many
an army has before now been overthrown by smaler
numbers through its own want of experience, and
some too through a deficiency of daring, and at this
moment we can be charged with neither. As for
the contest, I will not risk it in the gulf if I can
help it, nor will I sail into the gulf. For I am
aware that a confined space is not an advantage to a
fleet of a few ships which are better sailers and
have experienced crews, when it is opposed to a
large number of ships which are badly managed.
For one cannot charge properly upon an enemy ship
to ram her side, through not having a clear view of
her a long way off, nor can one retire at need when
hard pressed; and there is no chance for such
manoeuvres as breaking through the line or whirl-
ing around to ram, though these are precisely the
proper tactics of fast sailing ships, but the sea-fight
would have to be turned into a land-battle, and in
that case it is the larger fleet that wins. For these

429

10

11

THUCYDIDES

é&w tHv mpovotavy Kata TO Svvatov' bpels Fé
EUTAKTOL Tapa Tats vaval pEvovTes Ta Te mapay-
yeddopeva o&€ws dexerbe, & addws TE Kal by odiyou
Tis epopunrens ovens, Kal év TO EPpy? KOo LOV
Kal ouyiy Tepl WAEloTOU jyetobe, 6 O é$ TE 7a.
TOA T@V ToOAEuLKo@Y Evpdéper Kav VAULAX LG
ovy KL Ta, apuverbé Te Tovabe akios rev T po-
e_pyacuevav. o € ayov péyas vpiv, i) Katano-
oat Tlehomovynatay THY EAXTLOG TOD vauTtKob q
eyyuTéepo KaTaCTH OAL "AOnvators TOV poBov
mept TAS Garacons. ava pine Keo & av buds
OTL VEVLK KATE avuT@Y TOUS Todovs* oonpwevov
dé avdpav OUK eGehovew ai yv@muat pos TovS
AUTOUS KLVOUVOUS O omotas eval.
XC. Toradta 8 Kai o Popptov TapeKereVTATO.
ol dé Tlehorrovyjo vor, émrel0n avtois ol ‘AOnvaior
OvK é7rémrA€OV €S TOV KOATIOV Kal Ta oTEVa, BovXdO-
pevol AkoVTAaS ~ow Tpoayayely avTOUS, avayayo-
pevot awa Ew em eor, em Teco dpov Tabapevot
Tas vaus, mapa? THY EauT@v yi éow ents TOU
KONTOU beEv@ KEpa HYOULEVO, OoTEp Kal @ppyouv"
emt é auT@ cixoot ératav Tas apiora Teovoas,
Omws, Eb dpa vopioas él THY Navraxtov avtous
mreiv 0 Dopuiwv Kal avtos émiBonOav tavTn
1 Hude reads roAenlwy, with C.

2 With CG; the other MSS. and the Schol. ézi,
8 Hude deletes evi, after Kriiger.

1 In the first sea-fight the Peloponnesians had forty-
seven ships (ch. lxxxill. 3) against Phormio’s twenty (ch.
lxxxiii. 1); in the second battle the Peloponnesians had
seventy-seven ships (ch. lxxxvi. 4). Since the Pelopon-
nesians lost twelve ships in the first battle (ch. lxxxiv, 4),
the expression ‘‘ most of them” is not quite exact here,

430

BOOK II. txxxix. 9-xc. 2

matters, however, I shall make provision to the best
of my ability. As for you, keep good order, stay
near your ships, give heed sharply to the word of
command, especially since the two fleets are at
watch so near one another; and when it comes to
action, regard discipline and silence, which are
generally advantageous in warfare, but especially
so at sea, as all important, and ward off the enemy
yonder in a manner worthy of your past exploits.
The contest is a momentous one for you—whether
you are to shatter the hopes which the Peloponnesians
have in their fleet, or to bring closer home to the
Athenians their fear about the sea. Once more I
remind you that you have beaten most of them?
already ; and when men have once suffered defeat,
their spirit is never the same as before if they are
called upon to face the same dangers.”

XC. Such were the words with which Phormio
also encouraged his men. And the Peloponnesians,
when the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and
the narrows to meet them, wished to draw them
in against their will; so they put out to sea at
dawn, and, after lining up their ships four deep,?
sailed along their own shore towards the inner part
of the gulf, in the same order as they had lain at
anchor,’ their right wing leading the way.4 Upon
their right wing they had placed their twenty
best sailing ships, in order that, if Phormio got
the impression that their objective was Naupactus

2 Or, as some take it, ‘‘ in a column four abreast.”

$ Only now the four ships which had lain at anchor one
behind the other sailed, after the turn to the right, abreast.

* Or, retaining én) instead of rapa, ‘‘ after lining up their

ships four deep against their own shore (t.e. with it at their
backs), sailed toward the inner part of the gulf.. ..”

431

THUCYDIDES

/ /
TAPATAEOL, 7 SLadhvyovevy TEOVTES TOV érrimAOUY
cdav of "A@nvaio Ew tod éavt@v Képws, GAN
a / € a
avTat ai vies TepixAnoerav. oO 6, Strep exeivor
\ lal ,
mpocedéxovto, poBynGeis Epi TO Ywpio épnuw
OVTL, WS EWPA avayouévoUS aUTOUS, akwv Kal KaTa
\ > / »” \ \ a 4 ve
oTovdny éuBibdoas emer Tapa THY YhV* Kal oO
melos dua tov Meconviwy mapeBonGer. idovtes
Sé of HeXotrovvncios Kata piav éri Képws trapa-
mA€ovtas Kal On OvTas évTOS TOU KOATOU TE

\ \ A r ° ’ / / > \
Kal Tpos TH YH, Strep EBovAOVTO paddLoTA, a7ro
onpelou évos Apyw éemioTpéWavTes TAS vads peET-
womnoov éTAEOV WS Elye TAYOUS ExaaTos él TOS
3 / » ee / \ a > /
A@nvatous, Kai nATLEOV Tagas Tas Vas aTrONN-
WecGat. tev dé Evdexa pév TiVEs aittep HYyodVTO

\ a
umexpevyouct TO Képas Tov IleXoTOvynciwy Kal

\ F | \ > \ > / \ > AS
THY eTLOTPOPHY Es THY EUPUYwplav: Tas 8 dAXas
ériuxataraBovtes ¢éwody Te Tpos THY yh U1o-

/ \ / BA A 3
devyovoas Kal drépVerpav, dvdpas te tav *AOn-
/ na
vaiwy amréxtevav boot pn eFévevoay avtav. Kat
lal la) 1A
TOV veav TiVas avadovpevot elXxov KEevas (piaV

\ b] lal > / F A \ , e
5€ avtols avdpaow eixyov 76n), tas Sé Tivas ot
Meconviot tapaRonOnoartes Kai eres Baivovtes

\ lal e b] \ / 3 /
Evy Tots 6mAols és THY POdrXaccav Kal émiBavtes
ato TOV KATATTPOLATOV paYomevol adeidovToO
éAKOMEeVvas 707.

XCI. Tavtn pév odv ot HWeXorovvnoiot éxpa-
touv te Kal duédOeipav tas “Artixas vads: ai bé
ElKOoL VES AVT@V al amo TOU SekLod Képws EdI-
w@xov tas évoexa vats tov ’AOnvaiwy aimep

432

BOOK II. xe. 2-xc1. 1

and should, following the coast, sail in that direc-
tion to its aid, the Athenians might not be able
to escape their attack by sailing outside their wing,
but might be enveloped by these ships. Now he
did just what they expected him to do; when he
saw them put to sea, fearing for the safety of the
place, which was unprotected, he reluctantly and
in haste embarked his crews and sailed along the
coast, the Messenian army moving along the shore
to support him. And when the Peloponnesians
saw that they were skirting the coast in single
file and were already inside the gulf and close to
shore, which was just what they most desired, at
one signal they suddenly veered about, bore down
with ships in line as fast as each could upon the
Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships. But
eleven of these, which were in the lead, got past the
Peloponnesian wing, as it swung round, and escaped
into the open water; but the rest were overtaken,
driven ashore as they attempted to escape, and dis-
abled, and all the Athenians on them who did not
succeed in swimming ashore were slain. Some of
the ships they made fast to their own and proceeded to
tow away empty—though they had already captured
one with its crew—but some others, which were
already in tow, were taken from them by the Mes-
senians, who came to the rescue, rushed armed as
they were into the sea, boarded the ships, and fought
from their decks.

XCI. In this quarter, then, the Peloponnesians
were victorious and had disabled the Athenian ships ;
but the twenty ships covering their right wing were
pursuing the eleven Athenian ships which had got

433

THUCYDIDES

e / A > \ > \ > ,
imekéhuyov tHv émiatpodny és THY evpuxwpiav.
\ \ a
kat bOdvovo adtovs TANVY plas vews TpoKaTa-
a \ , a
guyotcat tpos THY Navmaxtov, kal cxovoar
“wae: X . 9 , -
avtimpwpor Kata TO “AmoAN@YLOY TapecKeud-
4 xX > \ an a
Covto apuvvovpevol, nv és tiv yhv él odds
/ e
mréwow. of Sé Tapayevouevor VaoTEpov éTraid-
vitov Te Gua TEoVTES ws vEviKNKOTES, Kal THY
, a a > / \ e / 207
uiav vadv tov ’AOnvaiay thy bTrodoToy édiwxe
Aevxabia vads pia TOAD Tpd TOV GrAX@v. ETUXE
e nq /

S& éAKds Oppodca peTéwpos, Tepl Hv H ’ArTiKN
a / \ / A ?
vads dOdcoaca Kal TepitrEVcaca TH Aeveadia
Su@xovon éuBdrrE pécn Kal Katadvel. Tots ev

,
otv IleXorovvynctos yevouévov tovTov ampocdo-
/ \ \ / / > / \
Kytov te Kal Tapa royov PoBos euTimte, Kat
dma atdxtos Si@xovtes Sia TO Kpateiv ai pev
lal al a \ ,

TIves TOV vew@v Kabeical Tas KoTTAaS éTécTNCOAV
lal la) > ¥ a \ \ ? bd /
ToD TAOV, a€vpdopov Spavtes pos THY EE OdLYOU

/ \ / an
dvteEopunoty, BovdAdpevor Tas TAELOUS TepLpetvaL,
ai 5¢ Kal és Bpdxea atreipia xwpiov oxKelrav.

XCII. Tots & "AOnvaious idovtas tadta yuyvo-
, ”- \ > \ EN A
peva Odpaos Te éraBe Kal amo Evos KEedeVTpATOS
5 / > > 3 \ 4 € \ \ X
éuBoncavres em avtovs Mpunoav. ot O€ dia Ta
SmapYovTa apapTHwata Kal THY Tapodcay ata-
Flav édlyov pev xpdvov iméuewav, émerta e
érpdmovto és Tov [dvoppov, 60evmep avnyayovto.
- , ra ag a , 3 \ ”
émudsw@xovtes 5é€ of “AOnvaior tds TE éyyus ovcas
/ lo) A é \ \ e a 2 /
udrdiota vads éXaBov && Kai Tas eavToV aget-
a > a \ lol A / \
RAovto as éxeivor mpos TH yH StapGeipavtes TO
434

BOOK II. xcr. 1—xcr. 2

past them as they swung round and had escaped
into the open water. And all the eleven except one
reached Naupactus ahead of them, and riding at
anchor off the Temple of Apollo, prows outward,
made ready to defend themselves if the enemy put
in toward the shore to attack them. When the
Peloponnesians came up they were singing the paean
as they rowed as if they were victorious already, and
one Leucadian ship, far ahead of the rest, was chasing
the single Athenian ship which lagged behind. But,
as it chanced, a merchantman was lying at anchor in
deep water and this the Athenian ship succeeded in
reaching first and, sailing round it, rammed the
pursuing Leucadian vessel amidships and sank her.
At this unexpected and amazing feat consternation
fell upon the Peloponnesians, who were, moreover,
pursuing in disorder because they had the upper
hand ; on some of their ships the rowers sank their
oars into the water and checked the headway of
their vessels, intending to await the main body of
their fleet—a serious mistake to make in the face of
an enemy lying near and ready for the charge—
while others, unfamiliar with the waters there, ran
aground in the shallows.

XCII. As for the Athenians, when they saw what
was happening, they took courage, and at a single
word of command gave a shout and dashed at them.
But the Peloponnesians had made so many mistakes
and were at present in such disorder, that, although
they resisted a little while, they soon turned and
fled to Panormus, whence they had put to sea. The
Athenians gave chase, and not only captured the six
ships that were nearest, but also recovered their own
ships which the enemy had disabled in the beginning

435

THUCYDIDES

mpatov avedicavto: avépas Te TOUS mév aTéKTEL-
\ \ \ 347 : et \ a
vav, Twas 5é Kal éS@ypynoav. émt dé THs AevKa-
bt , a \ \ ¢ / / /
tas vews, 1) Tepl THY OAKdoa KaTébu, TipoKpaTns
¢ U 4 e e a ,
6 AaxeSatpovios TAéwV, WS 7 Vads SLEepOetpeTo,
+ e a , / > \ ,
és hakev éautov, cai e€érrecev és Tov Navtaxtiov
Nipéva. avaywpynoartes 5é of “AOnvator tpoTatov
/
értncav d0ev avayayouevot éxpatnoay, Kal Tous
\ a a
vexpovs Kal TA vavayla boa TpOs TH EavToV Hv
dveiNovto, Kal Tolls évaytiows Ta éxeivwv bTO-
bd Ui BA \ \
otrovea amédocav. éotncav 6é Kai IleXomov-
violoL Tpotratov ws vEeviKNKOTES TIS TpoTHS, as
\ a A / n Wes: 4 »-
mpos TH yn SvépOerpay vais’ Kal HvTEep EXaBov
~ 3 ‘ > \ pees , X +9 line. \ \
vaov, avébecav él To ‘Piov To Axaixov Tapa TO
tTpotaiov. peta dé tavTa PoBovpevor Ty ame
r > / / e \ p. Db] /
tav A@nvaiwy Bonferavy uo vuKTa éoeTTAEVCAaV
> \ ’ \ a \ , ¢
és Tov KOATrOY TOV Kpioaiov Kat KopivOov aravtes
mrAnv Aeveadiov. Kali ot €x ths Kpntns ‘“A@n-
vatot Tals elxoot vavaiv, als &der TPO THS vav-
A , a
paxlas TO Dopuiwv tapayevéoGar, ov TOrArA@
nr / nr lal nw
ictepov THS avaywpncews THV vey adixvodyvTat
9 \ , ACTOR , 3 ,
és thy Navraxtov. Kat To Gépos éTedevTA.
XCIII. IIpiv 6€ duadicas 76 és KopivOov te
kal tov Kpicaiov xoATov avaywpicav vavttKor,
ec a \- = / \ cs ”
6 Kvfjpos nal 0 Bpacidas kal of &ddXow apyovTes
tov LleXotovynciwy apxouévov Tov YELmavos
éBovrAovto Sidakavtwvy tov Meyapéwv azrotet-
pacar Tov Ile:paras tod Auwévos Tov ‘APnvatwr:
4 LA
Fv dé advAantos Kal axkAnoTos eiKoTws Sia TO
436

BOOK II. xc. 2-xcm. 1

of the fight near the shore and taken in tow; and
of the men they killed some and took others alive.
But Timocrates the Lacedaemonian, who was on
board the Leucadian ship which was sunk near the
merchantmen, slew himself when he saw that his
ship was lost, and his body was washed up in the
harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians now withdrew
and set up a trophy at the place? from which they
had set out and won the victory; and they took up
their dead and such of the wrecked ships as were
close to their own shore, giving back to the enemy
under a truce those which belonged to them. But
the Peloponnesians also set up, in token of victory, a
trophy for the defeat of the ships which had been
disabled near the shore. And the ships which they
had taken they dedicated on the Achaean Rhium by
the side of the trophy. And after this, fearing the
reinforcements expected from Athens,” they sailed
under cover of night into the Crisaean Gulf and
to Corinth, all except the Leucadians. And not long
after their retreat the twenty Athenian ships from
Crete,* which were to have joined Phormio in time
for the battle, arrived at Naupactus. And so the
summer ended.

XCIII. However, before dispersing the fleet which
had retired to Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf, at the
beginning of the winter Cnemus and Brasidas and
the other Peloponnesian commanders, instigated by
the Megarians, wished to make an attempt upon the
Peiraeus, the port of Athens; for it was unguarded
and unclosed, and quite naturally, since the Athen-

1 The point is not certain; either near the Molycrian
Rhium (ch. lxxxvi. 2), or off the Apollonium (ch. xci. 1).
2 of. ch. Ixxxvi. 6, 3 of. ch. Ixxxv. 5.

437

THUCYDIDES

2 érixpateiy TOAU TO vavTLK@. €ddKer O¢ AaBovta
Tov vauT@v &xacTov THY KoTny Kal TO UmNpéatov
Kal TOV _TpOTeTHpA meth tévar €x KopivOov émrl
THD T pos "AOnvas Odraccav, Kal ad ikopevous
Kara TAX OS és Méyapa cabehxvoartas ex Nu-
gaias TOU vewpiov av’T@Y TeccapaxorTa vads, al
éTUYov avrob oveas, TAedo at evOvs éml Tov Tlev-

3 para ouUTE yap VaUTLKOY HY mpopuhaocov év
aut ovdev ovTE mpoa Soxia ovdepia BI) av TOTE
of Trodépwor eLarrivaiws obtws érimdedoevay, ered
ovT amo Tod Tpodavods ToAUHoaL av, KAO’ Hav-

iav 6} é& Siavooivto, a) ouK av TpoatabecGar.

4 ws d€ cdokev autos, Kal €Xx@pouv evO vs" Kab agi
KOMEVOL VUKTOS Kal Kabeduvoartes € €x THS Nicaias
Tas vavs émdeov éml péev tov Llecpard ovxétu,
dorep SievoobvTo, KaTadelo aves TOV xivduvov
(kai Tis Kal dvepos avTous AeyeTaL Korea), ert
d€ THs Larapivos TO aK pwn pLov TO ™ pos Méyapa
opav: Kal ppovptov ® ét avtTov jv Kal veadv
TpL@v PvrAaKn TOD pn éomAciv Meyapedor pode
éxTAely pundév. TO Te hpoupiw mpocéBarov Kat
Tas Tplnpes adeihxucav Kevas, THY Te ANAHV

arapiva am poo SoKntous ETLT ET OVTES erropGouv.

XCIV. "Es dé Tas “AOnvas PpvKToL TE HpovTo
TONEMLOL Kal éxmrAnkis é eyeveTo ovdeueas TOV Kara
TOV TONE Lov éXdoowv. ol bev yap év TO AoTeL
és TOV Hecpard govto TOUS Tohepious éorremev-
Kévat ON, ol & ev TO Tlerparet THY TE Lahapiva
jphobat kal mapa opas bcov odx éaTelv avtous:

1 So Hude, adopting Madvig’s conjecture & (for ov3’) and
punctuating after roAujoa ay.

2? Hude inserts ydp after gpovpiov, with van Herwerden,
and includes in parentheses poovoiov. . . undév.

438

BOOK II, xcuu. 1-xciv. 1

ians were decidedly superior at sea. And it was
determined that each sailor, taking his oar and
cushion and oar-loop, should go on foot from Corinth
to the sea on the Athenian side and hastening to
Megara should launch from the docks at Nisaea forty
ships of theirs which chanced to be there, and then
sail straight for the Peiraeus. For there was no
fleet on guard in the harbour, nor was there any ex-
pectation that the enemy would ever suddenly attack
it in this way, since they would not dare such a
thing openly, and if they should plan it secretly
they would not fail to be detected in time. But
once they had determined upon the scheme they set
to work immediately. Reaching Nisaea at night
they launched the ships and sailed, not now to the
Peiraeus as they had intended, since they were ap-
palled by the risk—and a wind, too, is said to have
prevented them—but to the promontory of Salamis
that looks towards Megara. ‘There was a fort here
and a guard of three ships to prevent anything from
entering or leaving the harbour of the Megarians.
This fort they assaulted, towed away the triremes
without their crews, and ravaged the rest of Salamis,
falling on the inhabitants unawares.

XCIV. Meanwhile fire-signals indicating a hostile
attack were flashed to Athens, where a panic was
caused as great as any in this war.! For the
inhabitants of the city thought that the enemy
had already entered the Peiraeus, and those of
the Peiraeus that they had taken Salamis and
were all but sailing into their own harbour—as

1 This must refer to the so-called Decelean War (or last ten
years of the Peloponnesian War), for in vil. xcvi. 1 we

read that a panic occurred greater than any before (rots
*AOnvalois .. . ExmAntis peylatn 5) Tay mpivy wapéorn).

439

.

THUCYDIDES

érep av, et €BovrAnOnoay i) KaTOKVACAL, padlws
p av, nOnoar pi) float, po
> / \ > bat ” > , /
éyéveto* Kal ovK av dvewos éexddAvoev. BonOn-
ef = 3 ‘te / \ e 9 A \
cavtes 6€ dw nuépa Ttavonpel ot "A@nvaior és Tov
Tlecpard vads te Kabetdxov kai éoBavtes Kata
\ A an / a \ \ > \
cmovdiy Kab TOAX@ OopuvBw tats pev vavoiv Er
THv Larapiva érreov, TO Telo 5€ Gurakas Tod
Iletparas xabioravto. ot b€ IleXorovynoiot as
>’ / \ A / n
noOavovto tiv Bonbeav, katadpapovtes THs La-
Aapivos Ta Toa Kal avOpwTovs Kal relay
AaBovtes Kal Tas TpEls vads éx TOD Bovddpou Tod
, \ , $1:V>Aanliine , 9 try
dpoupiov Kata Tayos émt THS Nucaias amém)eov
€oTs yap & TL Kal ai vies avtovs bia ypovov
kaGerxucbeicat Kal ovdév atéyoucar époBeour.
/ a
adixopevor O€ és Méyapa traruv éml THs KopivOov
a > a
ameyopnaoav teln of & “AOnvatos ovKéte Kata-
AaBovtes mpos TH Larapive améwrevcay kat
> 4 \ \ a \ 4 a fal
avtol’ Kal peta TodTO dvrAakny dyn Tod Tepards
al QA \ 3 lal / td
faNXov TO OLTOY ETTOLOVYTO ALMEVwWY TE KANTEL
\ yt 8 b] /
Kal TH AAXAN ETrepEELa.
XCV. ‘Td 5é rods adTovs ypovous, Tod yer-
cal €
B@vos TovToU apyopuévov, YTddrAKns Oo Typew
"05 4 e a / > 4 > \
pvons, Opaxdv Bacirevs, éotpdtevoev ert
Tlepdixcav tov ’AdeEdvdpov, Maxedovias Bact-
Aéa, Kal ert Karxidéas tovs él Opaxns, dvo
itocxérers THY ev Bovropevos avarrpaEat, THY
5é avtos amododvar. & Te yap Llepdixxas atdTo
g U _ = 4 / e x
itor Komevos, et "APnvaios Te dvaddakerev EavTov
2o's \ A / s \ f
KAT apXas TO TOAEU@ TLEfopEevoy Kal Didirrov

440

BOOK II. xctv. 1—xcv. 2

indeed might easily have happened if the enemy
had resolved that there should be no flinching;
and no mere wind would have prevented them.
But at dawn the Athenians hastened down to
the Peiraeus with all their forces, launched ships,
and embarking in haste and with much confusion
sailed with the fleet to Salamis, setting their land-
forces to guard the Peiraeus. The Peloponnesians
had already overrun most of Salamis and had taken
prisoners and booty and the three ships at the fort
of Budorum, when they saw the relief expedition
coming, whereupon they sailed in haste toward
Nisaea; to some extent too there was apprehension
about their own ships, which had not been drawn
down into the sea for a long time and were anything
but water-tight. On reaching Megara they with-
drew on foot to Corinth, and the Athenians, finding
them no longer at Salamis, likewise sailed back.
After this they kept stricter guard over the Peiraeus,
closing up the harbour! as well as taking other
precautions.

XCV. About the same time, at the beginning of
this winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, a son of Teres, king
of the Thracians, made an expedition against Perdiccas
son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and against the
Chalcidians of Thrace, wishing to exact fulfilment of
one promise and to make good another. For when
Perdiccas was being hard pressed at the beginning
of the war he had made Sitalces a promise on condition
that he should reconcile him to the Athenians and
should not bring back his brother Philip, who was

1 i.e. by prolonging the walls at the entrance so as to leave
only a narrow passage in the centre, which could be closed
by a chain.

Vou. IL. Q 44!

THUCYDIDES

\ b] \ > ~ / ov \ 4
TOV abeXdhov avTOD ToAguLoy dvTa py KaTayayo.
> \ / aA e / > > / a
él Bactrela, & uTedéEato ovK éreTEeEL* TOIs TE
’ r > \ e S, a \ /
AOnvaios avTos wporoynKer OTE THY Evppaytav
’ rn \ > » 4 ‘ \ /
€moveito Tov él Opaxns Xarkidseov Todenov

, 5 / 9 ¢ ‘ y
KaTadvoew. appotépwv ody évexa tHv Epodov
> a \ , / e\ b] / e
émovetto Kal Tov te Diditrov viov ’Apvyrav ws
/ nr i aA
évt Baciheia Tov Maxedover ire cal Tov ’AOn-
valov Tpéa Pets, ob ETUXOV TapoVTEs TOUTMY EveKa,
\ure f d ” x \ a >
Kal nyewova “Ayvwva: éer yap Kal. tovs °AOn-
/ / fal
VALOUS VAUVOL TE KAL OTPATLA WS TrELTTH ETL TOUS
Xarkidéas Tapayevéc Oa.
> / lal > lal e
XCVI. “Aviotnaw obv éx Tav ‘Odpuvcadv oppo-
lal \ \ lal
HEevos TP@TOV pev TOUS évTOs TOD Aiwou TE GpousS

L THs “Poderns Opa 5 ji typ. Oa-
kat ths Podorns Opdxas bcwv hpxe wéxpt Oa

/ > \ U / / \ \
Aadoons és Tov EKveewov te movtov Kat Tov
¢ \

EnXrnjorovtov,: erecta tovs vmepSavtt Atpov

/ \ a Mw
Tétas kai 6ca adda pépn evtos Tov “Iatpou To-
Qn al + a
Tauov Tpos OaXacoay madrov THv Tov Evéeivou
movtov Kat@Knto: eat O ot état nai ot Tavtn
¢ la €
6uopot te Tols LKevOats Kal opocKevor, Tavtes
\ lal a
immotogotat. mapexdder O€ Kal THY opetvav
rat \ lal > / \
Opaxav Tohovs TOV avTOVOMwY Kal pwayYaLpo-

’ ° a a \ € , e a
hopwv, ot Aior carodvtat, THv “Podomny ot Trei-

a an ?

OTOL olKOUVTES* Kal TOUS meV pLcO® ErrecBev, oi 6
2 > a

éGerovtal EvvnkorovOovv. aviortn dé Kat Aypia-

1 és... ‘EAAnhomovtov deleted by Hude and others as not
read by the Schol. (uéxp: @ardoons, ws tov Evfeivou mévtov
kal tov ‘EAAnondvtov). Classen understands the Schol. to
support the text reading.

442

BOOK II. xcv. 2—xev1. 3

hostile, to make him king; but Perdiccas would not
fulfil his promise. On the other hand, Sitalces had
made an agreement with the Athenians,! at the
time he entered into the alliance with them, to bring
to an end their war with the Chalcidians in Thrace.
For both these reasons, then, he now began the in-
vasion, and he took with him Philip’s son, Amyntas,?
with a view to making him king of the Macedonians,
as well as some Athenian envoys who had come to
see him on this business, and Hagnon as com-
mander?; for the Athenians were to furnish a fleet
and as large an army as possible‘ for the war against
the Chalcidians.

XCVI. Sitalces, accordingly, beginning with the
Odrysians, summoned to his standard, first the
Thracians under his sway between the mountains
Haemus® and Rhodope® and the sea,—as far as
the shores of the Euxine and the Hellespont,—
then, beyond Haemus, the Getae, and all the other
tribes that are settled south of the river Ister?
in the general direction of the seaboard of the
Euxine sea; and the Getae and the people of
that region are not only neighbours of the Scythians
but are also equipped like them, all of them
being mounted archers. And he summoned also
many of the mountain Thracians who are independ-
ent and wear short swords, who are called Dii, most
of them inhabiting Rhodope; and some of these
were won to his service by pay, while others came
along as volunteers. He called out, further, the

1 cf. ch. xxix. 4. 2 Philip died meanwhile.

8 As commander of expected Athenian troops, which
however failed to come (ch. ci. 1)

* of. ch. oi. 1. 5 The modern Balkans.
6 Now Despotodagh. 7 Danube.

443

THUCYDIDES

vas Kal Aataious Kal ddXrKa boa eOvn _Hasowead,
av PXE" Kal eoxaror TIS apxiis ovTOL joa:
HEX pl Yap Aataiov Ilarovev Kal TOU 2 Tpvpovos
ToTapod, Os éK Tob 2xouBpov ¢ Gpous br “Aypia-
vov Kal Aatatov pec, apifeto 7 appx) TQ TpOs
4 Ilaiovas avTovopous 718. Ta 6é€ Tpos TpeBanr-
Aous, Kal TOUTOUS avTovopuous, Tptjpes a@pfov
Kal Trarator: oixodar 5° ovtTos T pos Bopéav TOU
ZKouPpov ¢ dpous Kab TapyKouat mpos nAtov Svaw
HEX pe TOU ‘Ocxiou ToTapod. pet & ottos éx TOD
Gpous ddevrep Kal o Néotos kal o “E8pos: gore O€
éphuov TO Opos Kal péya, éxouevov THs “Poddzys.
XCOVII. “Eyévero 58 4) apy 7 ’Odpucdy pé-
yeOos él pev Oddaccay xadnxovea aro ‘AB-
onpov TONEWS & TOV Evfewov TOVTOV expt
“‘Iorpov TOTAMOD" _abtn mepiThous early 7 Y)
ta Evytowwrata, Hy aiel KaTa Tpvuvay LoTnTAaL
TO TvEeDLAa, VHl OTpOYYUAN Tecodpav Huepav Kal
icwy vuxTt@v: 06@ 6€ Ta EvyTouwtata é& *AB-
Srpev és "Iatpov avnp evfwvos evdexaratos TENE.
2 Ta wey T™ pos Odhacoayv TOTAUTN 7V, és ‘AyTreypov
dé aro Bufavtiov és Aataiovs kal em TOV
= Tpupova (TavTy yap 61a wAeioTov amo Oa-
Adoons avo éyiyveto) TEPOV. avdpl evlave TPL@V
3 Kat déxa avicau. opos Te éx mdons THs Bap-
Bdpov xat tav “EXAnvidwy torewv Scwvtrep

1 of, in the MSS. before api(ero, deleted by Arnold.

1 Paeonian tribes that dwelt in the mountain regions
bordering on Macedonia, watered by the Upper Strymon
and the Axius; most of them were afterwards subject to
Macedonia.

444

BOOK II. xcv1. 3—xcvi. 3

Agrianians and Laeaeans, and all the other Paeonian
tribes which were under his sway. These peoples
were at the outer limits of his empire ; for the bounds
of his empire extended, on the side towards the
Paeonians, who are independent, as far as the
Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon,? which
flows from mount Scombrus through the country of
the Agrianians and the Laeaeans. On the side to-
ward the Triballi, who also are independent, the
boundary is formed by the Treres and Tilataeans ;
and these dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and
extend toward the west as far as the river Oscius.?
This river has its source in the same mountains as
the Nestus* and the Hebrus®—a mountain range of
great extent and uninhabited that is adjacent to
Rhodope.

XCVII. Now the empire of the Odrysians® in
respect to its size extended along the sea-coast from
the city of Abdera to the Euxine Sea as far as the
river Ister. This stretch of coast constitutes a
voyage for a merchant-vessel, if the shortest course
is taken and the wind keeps steady astern, of four
days and as many nights; but the journey by land
from Abdera to the Ister can be accomplished by an
active man, taking the shortest route, in eleven
days. Such was its extent on its seaboard; but
inland the distance from Byzantium to the Laeaeans
and the river Strymon—for this was its inland point
farthest distant from the sea—it is possible for an
active man to cover in thirteen days. As for the
tribute which came in from the barbarian territory
and from all the Hellenic cities over which the

2 Now Struma. 3 Now Isker.
4 Now Masta. 5 Now Maritza.
§ Coinciding in the main with modern Bulgaria.

445

THUCYDIDES

4 a
ApEav ért LevOov, 65 baotepov YraddrKov Bacu-
a \ 4
Aevoas TAelotov 67 éroince, TeTpaKociwy Ta-
/ 4
AdvTwy apyvpiov pddiota Svvauls, A ypuads
Kal apyupos neu Kal d@pa ovK éhacow TOUT@Y
a \ /
ypucod Te Kal apyvpov mpocepépeto, xwpis Oe
e ‘ s \ a Pineiro iS ,
dca vpavTa TE Kal Ela KaL ) AXAN KATACKEVN,
/ A \ \ a
Kal ov povoyv avT@, GAAA Kal Tols Tapadvuva-
, > a
otevoval Te Kal yevvaiots Odpvcay. Kxateotn-
- / fo] lal
cavto yap Tovvaytiov THs Llepoav Bacireias
\ , v \ \ n ” \
TOV vouovy dvTa pev Kal Tois adrdots Opaki
r a /
AapwBavery padrrov 7H didovar (Kat aicyiov Hy
ral a b] A a
aitnOévta pn Sovvar aitnoavTa pn TvxELV),
? \ Ce Spa r a oe ,
dumws O€ KaTa TO OvvacAar eT TEOV AUTO €xp7)-
5 \ 9S a WY: A 8 56 rn
cavto* ov yap Hv mpakar ovdev py StdovtTa Spa.
ef ’ \ fe ¢€ , = > / lal
@oTe ert péya 7 Bacirela nAOEv Ltaxvos. TeV
yap év tH Evpomn boat petakv tov ‘loviov
lal / , A
KOMTrov Kal Tov Ev£eivov movtou peyloTn éyéveto
/ lol ¥
XpnudTov mpocodm Kal TH adrdn evdaimovia,
’ 7 \ , \ aA / \ ,
loxvr 6€ payns Kal oTpatod TAGE Tord SevTépa
\ \ Ss a / be OU > lal
peta THY XKvoav. TavTn O€ advvaTa eEicovaPat
a > lal
ovy oT: Ta ev TH Evpworn, adr ovd év tH ’Acia
4 a \ a > 5Y4 fxd \ F
€Ovos ev mpos év ovK Ectw 6 TL duvatov YKvOas
Ouoyvomovotalt Tac aYTLCOTHVAaL. ov pHVY ovd

1 Nephew and successor of Sitalces ; ¢f. ch. ci. 5, 6 ; IV. ci. 5.

2 £81,000, $388,800.

8 Among the Persians the monarch gave rather than re-
ceived presents: cf. Xen. Cyrop. VIII. ii. 7, diawéver Ett kal vor
Tois BaciAevow 7 ToAvd«pla,

446

BOOK II. xcvit. 3-6

Odrysians acquired sway in the time of Seuthes 1—
who, succeeding Sitalces on the throne, brought
the revenues to their maximum—its value was about
four hundred talents? in coin, and was paid in gold
and silver; and gifts equal in value to the tribute,
not only of gold and silver, but besides these all
manner of stuffs, both embroidered and plain, and
other articles for household use, were brought as
offerings to the king, and not for him only, but also
for the subordinate princes and nobles of the Odry-
sians. For these kings had established a custom
which was just the opposite of that prevailing in the
kingdom of the Persians,? namely, to take rather
than to give; indeed it was more disgraceful for a
man not to give when asked than to ask and be
refused. This custom was observed among the
other Thracians also; but the Odrysian kings, as
they were more powerful, followed it more exten-
sively; indeed it was not possible to accomplish
anything without giving gifts. Consequently the
kingdom attained to a great degree of power. For
of all the kingdoms in Europe between the Ionian
Gulf and the Euxine Sea it was the greatest in
revenue of money and in general prosperity; but
as regards the strength and size of its army, it was
distinctly inferior to the Scythian kingdom.* With
that not only are the nations of Europe unable to
compete, but even in Asia, nation against nation,
there is none which can make a stand against the
Scythians if they all act in concert. However, with

‘ Contradicting Hdt. v. iii.: Opnlkwv 3& vos péyiordy ears
peta ye Ivdovs ravtwy avOpadmwv ei de bm’ Evds Upxoito f) ppovéo
Kata TwuTd, Guaxov 7 by en Kal moAAG KparioTov mavTwy
COvéwy Kata yvouny Thy euhy.

447

THUCYDIDES

és thy addnv evBovrtav Kat Evveow tepl trav
/ > \ , A € a
Tapovt@y és Tov Biov adXols omotodvTat.
XCVIII. Setarkns pév ody yopas tocavtns
Bacitevwv wapecxevadfeto Tov oatpatov. Kal
érreto) avT@ ETotua Hv, dpas éropeveto eri rHv
/ al \ \ na a n
Maxedoviay mpatov pev Sta THs avtod apyjs,
y \ , > /, ” ~~ ,
érecta dua Kepxivns épnjwou dpous, 6 éote peo-
A \ / > 4 7 >
ptov wTav Kail adver. érropevero be &
a a fQa ‘
avTov TH 0d@ tv mWpoTepoy avTos émrotncato
\ \ ef id 9K / > ,
Teu@v tHv DAV, Ste ert Ilaiovas éotpatevcer.
\ Me = Ae, ? ? a , > a \
TO 5€ dpos €& ’Odpucav Suovtes ev SeEia pev
Ss / > > As \ \ \
eiyov Ilatovas, €v apuctepa S€ Xwvrodvs kal
J ,
Matdots. SdreXOovtes 5€ auto adixovto és Ado-
/ a
Bnpov thy Ulacovixny. tropevopéva 5€ avT@ arre-
\ a a >
ylyveto pev ovdéy TOD OTPATOD EL fH TL VvOTo,
\ lal
mpoceyiyveto 5é. ToAXol yap TOV avToVvop“wr
A 3
Opaxay arapakryTa eb aptaynv nKodovGour,
oe \ a a / > »- /
@aoTe TO TaV TAHOOS A€yeTar OVK EXATCOY TéVTE
/

Kal déxa pupiddov yevécOar Kal TovTov Td pev
/ \ e , \ / e ,
Tréov TeCov HY, TPLTHMOpPLOV O€ aALOTA iTTLKOV.
a > € la) \ lal > \ > 7
too 8 inmixod TO mWAEicTov avTol ‘Odpicat
TapetyovTo Kal pet’ avtous T'étar. rod dé refod
of maYalpoPopor maXluwoTaToL “ev Hoav ot eK Tis

€ / ? / / ¢ \ ” e
Podorns avtovouot kataBavtes, 0 6€ adXos Spe-
Los Evppecxtos TANGE HoBepwtatos nKorover.
XCIX. HuvnOpoifovto otv év tH AoBypw xai
mTapecKkevalovto bTws Kata Kopudny ésBarovaw
/
és tThv Kato Makedoviar, hs o Llepdixxas hpyev.

448

BOOK II. xevu. 6—xcix. 1

reference to wise counsel and intelligence about the
things that belong to the enrichment of life the
Scythians are not to be compared with other nations.

XCVIII. Such then was the extent of the country
over which Sitalces ruled at the time when he was
preparing his army. But when everything was
ready, he set out for Macedonia, proceeding first
through his own territory, then through the deso-
late range of Cercine, which lies between the Sinti
and Paeonians. And he passed over this mountain
by the road which he himself had constructed before,
when he made an expedition against the Paeonians,
cutting a path through the forest. As his army
crossed the mountain, leaving the country of the
Odrysians, they had the Paeonians on the right
and on the left the Sinti and Maedi; and when
they came out on the other side they arrived at
Doberus in Paeonia. On the march his army
suffered no loss, except from sickness, but rather
was augmented; for many of the independent
Thracians joined the expedition unsummoned, in
the hope of plunder, so that the whole number is
said to have been not less than a hundred and fifty
thousand, the greater part being infantry, about one-
third cavalry. Of the cavalry the Odrysians them-
selves furnished the largest contingent, and next to
them the Getae; while of the infantry the sword-
wearers, independent tribes that came down from
Mount Rhodope, were the best fighters, the rest ot
the army that followed, a miscellaneous horde, being
formidable chiefly on account of its numbers.

XCIX. So Sitalces’ army was being mustered at
Doberus and preparing to pass over the mountain
crest and descend upon lower Macedonia, of which

449

THUCYDIDES

2 Tav yap Makedovev eicl cal Avyknotai Kai
"EXimia@tar Kal Ara EOvn évravwber, a Evumaya
/ b] J A e 4 / Dis aw
Hév €oTL TOUTOLS Kal UTIKOa, Bacidelas O° Eye
3 xaQ avta. Thy 6€ Tapa Odraccayv vov Make-
> €, ,
doviay “AnréEavdpos o Llepdtcxov twatnp Kat ot
a \ °
mpoyovor avtod Tnuevidar To apyatov ovtes &&
v nw” > / \ b] /
Apyous mp@tot extyicavto Kat éBacidevoav
> , / > \ , / e\
avactycavtes payn éx pev Ileepias Iltepas, ot
totepov wo 7d Ildyyatov tépav XTpupovos
oxnoav Paypnta Kat dddXa yopia (Kal étt Kal
KN YPN XP
rn \ , an ee \ A ,
vov Ivepexos xoXzros Kadettas 9 UTO TO Llayyaiw
mpos Odraccay yh), éx dé THS BotTias KaXoupe-
/ \ cal ccd / > la
vns Bottiaious, of viv Guopot Xarkidéwv otKovd-
fol / x
4 oi. tTHS O€ Ilatovias mapa tov “A€vov totapov
/ / A / /
otevny tia Kabynxovoay avwblev péype IléeAXns
\ / > / \ / > /, /
kal Oardoons éxtTHcavTo, Kal tépav A€iou péypt
\ > a
Xtpvpovos tHv Murydoviay cadovpévnv ‘Hoavas
> , / by / \ 4 bd A
5 éFeNacayTes vé“ovTal. avéoTnaay O€ Kal Ex TIS
an > / / > / 2 e \
vov *Eopdias xadovpévns ‘Eopdovs, oy ot pep
Toro €bOapnoav, Bpayd b€ Te avTav Trepi
DicKxav catoxntat, kal €€ Adporias” AXpowras.
6 é€xpatnoay S€ Kal TOY GdAXAwv EOvav oi Maxedoves
otto: a Kal vov Ets Exovat, Tov Te “AvOeuovvTa
kat T'pnotwviay cat Bicadtiav cat Maxedovev
avT@v TOAAnY. TO O€ EUuTtav Makedovia Kanrel-
/ a
ta. kal Llepdixxas ’AXeEavdpov Bacidevs adTtov
s x4 / b /
Hv OTE DTAAKNS ETHEL.

450

BOOK II. xcix. 2-6

Perdiceas was ruler. For the Macedonian race
includes also the Lyncestians, Elimiotes, and other
tribes of the upper country, which, though in alli-
ance with the nearer Macedonians and subject to
them, have kings of their own; but the country by
the sea which is now called Macedonia, was first
acquired and made their kingdom by Alexander, the
father of Perdiccas, and his forefathers, who were
originally Temenidae from Argos. They defeated
and expelled from Pieria the Pierians, who after-
wards took up their abode in Phagres and other
places at the foot of Mount Pangaeus beyond the
Strymon (and even to this day the district at the
foot of Mount Pangaeus toward the sea is called
the Pierian Valley), and also, from the country
called Bottia, the Bottiaeans, who now dwell on the
borders of the Chalcidians; they acquired, further,
a narrow strip of Paeonia extending along the
river Axius! from the interior to Pella and the sea;
and beyond the Axius they possess the district as
far as the Strymon which is called Mygdonia,
having driven out the Edonians. Moreover, they
expelled from the district now called Eordia the
Eordians, most of whom were destroyed, but a small
portion is settled in the neighbourhood of Physca;
and also from Almopia the Almopians. These
Macedonians also made themselves masters ot
certain places, which they still hold, belonging to
the other tribes, namely, of Anthemus, Grestonia,
Bisaltia, as well as of a large part of Macedonia
proper. But the whole is now called Macedonia,
and Perdiccas son of Alexander was king when
Sitalees made his invasion.

1 Now Vardar.
45!

THUCYDIDES

‘ €

C. Kai of pév Maxeddves oboe éridvtos Trod-

hod otpaToD advvato. ovTes GuvvecOar &s TE TA

Kaptepa Kal Ta TeLYyN boa HY ev TH XWPA EvEKO-

4
ptoOnoav: Av dé ov TOAAG, GAA DoTepov Apyxeé-
\

aos oO Llepdikxov vies Bacireds yevomevos Ta
a > a , > , \ ¢ \

viv ovta év TH xKX@pa @Kodounoe Kai odovsS
> / ” \ = 6 / i | \ %

ev0elas éreue Kal TAaAXA SieKdopunce TA’ KATA TOV

/ / \ iA \ iol v

TONEMOY ITTOLS Kab OTTAOLS Kal TH AAAN TApa-
= / . 7 e v an

aKxevn Kpeiccove H Evprravtes of addow BacirAs
A / ¢€ a

OKT® OL TPO AVTOD yevomevot. O O€ GTPATOS TaV
lal b n / > / la \ >

@paxay ex THs AoBnpov éo¢Bane TPATOV MeV €8

tnv Diriwmov TpoTEepov ovcav apyny, Kal elrev

Eiéopeviy pév kata xpatos, Toptuviay be Kai

’ / \ yy yy / e , \

Ataddvtnv kal ddXa ATTA Ywpia oporoyia dia

/ a a /
thy Apuvytov didtav tpocywpovvta, Tov Didit-
¢ \

mou viéos, mapovtos: Edpwov dé érodopxnaav
/ tay a Sh cD hs Pe 4 \ iS. \

ev, éreiv b€ ove EdvvavtTo. émecta Sé Kai és THY

bY / , ‘ 2 ? 5

Gdrnv Maxedoviay mpovywper THY ev apioTepa

Tléxrns Kat Kuppov. éow 8 tovtwy és tH

Bottiatav Kal Ilepiav od« adixovto, adda THP

/ \ , ee a
te Muydoviay cai Tpnotwviay cai ’Av@epodvta
/ al lol
éSjouv. ot dé Maxedoves wef pev ovdé dvevoovv-
\
To apvvecOar, imrmous S€ mpocpeTaTreuypdpevot
\ lal a /
aro Tav avw Evppayeor, Orn SoKxoin, ddiryou pos
\ al
moAnrovs €céBaddrov és TO oTpadtTevpwa Tov Opa-
lal /
KOU. Kal pev Wpootrécorev, ovdels wrémevev
\
dvSpas imméas te ayabovs Kai TeAwpaxicpévous,
/
bro Sé mAnOovs TEepiKANOMEVOL aUTOVS TOANA-
1 +é, in the MSS. after ra, deleted by Haacke,

452

BOOK II c. 1-6

C. The Macedonians of this region, unable to
defend themselves against so great an_ invading
army, betook themselves to the strong places and
fortresses that were in the country. These were
not many; but subsequently Archelaus son of
Perdiccas, when he became king,} built those that
are now in the country, and cut straight roads, and
in general organized his country for war by provid-
ing cavalry, arms and other equipment beyond any-
thing achieved by all the eight kings who preceded
him. But the Thracian army, advancing from
Doberus, invaded first the province which before
had belonged to Philip, and took Idomene by storm ;
but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places
capitulated voluntarily out of friendship for Amyntas
son of Philip, who accompanied Sitalces ; moreover
they laid siege to Europus, but were unable to take
it. Next they advanced into the other part of
Macedonia, which is to the west of Pella and Cyr-
rhus. Beyond these places, however, into Bottiaea
and Pieria, they did not penetrate, but ravaged
Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Mace-
donians, on the other hand, did not even think of
defending themselves with infantry, but calling upon
their allies in the interior for additional cavalry,
though few against many, they dashed in among
the Thracian army wherever they chose. And
wherever they charged no one could withstand
them, for they were good horsemen and protected
by cuirasses ; but since they were constantly being
hemmed in by superior numbers and found themselves

1 413-399 p.c. He was as famous for the splendour and
success of his reign as for the crimes by which he obtained
the throne.

453

4

5

THUCYDIDES

, eo > / , 4
TAATLO TO O-lrw és Kivduvoy Kalictacay’ Hate
TédX0s HovYlav Hyov, ov voulfovTes ikavol elvar
Tpos TO TWAEOV KLVOUVEVELD.

CI. ‘O 6& YutddrKxns mpds te Tov Lepdixxay
Aoyous €mroLetTO MY évexa éeoTpatevce, Kal éreELdy
ot A@nvaio: od Taphoav tais vavoly atioToUrTES

A A an
avutov un H&ew (S@pa S€ Kal tpécRes Erreprpay
> A 4 \ » 4 66 \ B /
avT@), é Te Tovs Xadrkidéas cai Bottiatovs
pépos TL TOU OTPATOD TéuTrEL, Kal TELYNPELS TOLN-
n >] a
cas é€dyov THy yhv. KaOnpuévov & avtov epi
TOUS Ywpovs TOUTOUS OL TpPOS VOTOV oiKOdVTES
@cccarol cat Mayvntes Kal of addXoL UTHKOOL
Ococarav kat of péxpt OepuotrurAa@v “EAXAnves
> / \ A vs \ an e \ ,
époBnOncav pn Kal él ohas 0 OTPATOS KWpPNON,
ice > / \ \ €
Kal év TapacKkevn joav. époByOncay Sé Kai ot

/ / \ / a ef ,

mépav XTpupovos mpos Bopéav Opaxes Goo. tredia
2 ~ A > / \ nw \
elyov, Ilavuior cai “Odopavtor cat Apo: kai

a >]

Aepoaio: avtovopor 8 eioi Tavtes. mapéoxe Oé

, lal ?

Noyov Kal él tovs trav ‘AOnvaiwy TroXepmious

"EAAnvas py Ur’ ad’Tav ayouevot Kata TO Evp-

‘ » ES ood a / e \ /
payixov Kal él ohas ywpnowow. o 8& THY TE
\ /
Xar«ibixnv cat Bottixny cal Maxedoviay dua
> / »” @ Kab > € 6? > a Oe b] / "i
érréxau edOerpe, €vrelon avT@ ovdév émpac
A cal ,
ceto wy évexa écéBare, kal oTpaTLa oiTOV TE
A \ A
OUK ElYev AUT@ Kal UTO YELuwmvos eTAaXaLT@pEL,
/ la! /
avareiOetat UTO YevGov Tod Xmapacoxov, aded-

454

BOOK II. c. 6-ct. 5

imperilled by the horde that was many times
their own number, they finally desisted, thinking
that they were not strong enough to fight with the
larger force.

CI. Sitalees now began to hold parleys with
Perdiccas about the matters for which he had under-
taken the expedition; and since the Athenians
(who did not believe that Sitalees would come,
though they sent gifts and envoys to him) had not
arrived with their promised fleet, he despatched
part of his army into the territory of the Chalcidians
and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up within their
walls ravaged their lands. But while he was staying
in the neighbourhood of these places, the peoples
which dwell to the south—the Thessalians, the
Magnesians and other subjects of the Thessalians,
and the Hellenes as far south as Thermopylae—
became frightened lest the host should come against
them also, and so were making preparations. The
same alarm was felt also by the Thracians who
inhabit the plain beyond the Strymon to the north,
that is, the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and
Dersaeans, independent tribes. He gave occasion
also to a rumour which spread even to the Hellenes
hostile to Athens, that the Thracians might be led
on by the Athenians in accordance with the terms
of their alliance and come against them too. But
meanwhile Sitalces kept on ravaging at one and the
same time Chalcidice, Bottice, and Macedonia; and
then, since none of the original objects of his in-
vasion was being accomplished, and his army was
without food and was suffering from the winter, he
was persuaded by Seuthes son of Sparadocus, a

455

THUCYDIDES

a \ , a e \ 8 ,
didod dvtos Kal péyitotov pe® Eavtov Suvapévor,
a \ \
aor év Taye ameOeiv. tov dé LevOnv xpida
, n ,
Tlepdixxas trocyduevos abdeApay éavtov dwcew
> lot lal e
Kal ypnuata ém avTH Mpootoeitar. Kal oO pep
\
mevoOels Kal peivas TpLadKoVTa Tas Tdcas HMEpas,
I$ \ bd \ > la) > , rn
Tovtay S€ oxT@ év Xadxidevdowv, avexwopnoe TO
a ?
oTpaT® Kata taxos ém oixov: Ilepdixxas Se
a \
ictepoy Ytpatovicny THv éEavtov abergiy didwcr
\ \ =
LevOn, Bowep UméacxXeTO. TA pev OVY KATA THY
LuTadrKov oTpateiav ovTas éyéveTo.
CII. Oc 8 év Navrdet@ “A@nvaior tod avtod
Yelwavos, émeo1 TO TOV TleXoTovynciwy vav-
\ YA ld e , b /
tixov dteAvOn, Doppimvos tryoupmévou éeoTpatevaay,
Tapatrevoartes ém’ 'Aotakod Kal amoBavtes
, a > ,
és THv pecoyerav THs “Axapvavias TeTpaxocioss
> lal nr a
pev omAttats “AOnvaiwy tov amd TOV Vvedr, Te-
, \ ¥ ee / \
tpaxocios 6€ Meconviwr, Kai Ex TE {tpatov Kal
Kopovtav cal adX\ov xwpiov avdpas od Soxotvtas
/ > 3 4 \ 4 \
BeBaious eivas €Endacav, Kai Kuvnta tov @eo-
AUTov és Kopovta Kkatayayovtes avexopnoay
/ > \ a > \ > / > me!
Tadw éml Tas vats. €s yap Oinddas alet Tote
/ bl / > / > 297
modeulous ovtas povous "Axapvdvav ovK éddxet
Suvatov elvar Yet@vos GvTos oTpaTevey oO yap
; A \ cr > / v \
Ayed@os totauos péwv éx Ilivdou épovs dia
/ /
Aodotrias kal ’Aypaiwv cal "Audiroyov cal dia
n 3 a / v \ \ /
tov Axapvavixod rediov, dvwbev pév Tapa {tpa-
>
Tov ToALv, és Odraccav 8 é€tels map Oivddas
/ a a
cal THY TOALY AUTOLS TrEpLALUValwY, ATOpoOY TroLeEt

456

BOOK II. ci. 5-c. 2

nephew and next to him in power,! to go back home
at once. Now Seuthes had been secretly won over
by Perdiccas, who had promised to give him his
sister in marriage and a dowry with her. So
Sitalces yielded, and after a stay of only thirty days
in all, eight of which had been spent among the
Chalcidians, returned home with his army with all
speed. And Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister
Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such,
then, is the history of the expedition of Sitalces.
CII. During the same winter the Athenians in
Naupactus, after the Peloponnesian fleet had been
disbanded, made an expedition under the command
of Phormio. They first skirted the coast in the
direction of Astacus, and then, disembarking, in-
vaded the interior of Acarnania with four hundred
Athenian hoplites from the ships and four hundred
Messenian. And after they had expelled from
Stratus, Coronta, and other places such men as were
regarded as disloyal, and had restored Cynes son of
Theolytus to Coronta, they returned again to their
ships. For it seemed impracticable in winter to
make a campaign against Oeniadae, whose inhabi-
tants alone of the Acarnanians were always hostile ;
for the river Achelous, which rises in Mount Pindus
and flows through the country of the Dolopians,
Agraeans, and Amphilochians and then through the
Acarnanian plain, passes by the city of Stratus high
up the stream, but by Oeniadae empties into the
sea, where it surrounds the city with marshes, thus
rendering military operations there impossible in
1 Sadocus, Sitalces’ own son, who had been received into
Athenian citizenship (ch. xxix. 5; Ixvii. 2), must have died

before this time. The nephew Seuthes succeeded to the
throne in 424 B.0. (Iv. ci. 4).

457

THUCYDIDES

3 Ud TOD VdaTtos Ev YElwavL OTpaTEvELY. KElVTAL
al al ’
dé xal Tov vyowy Tov ‘“Eywvddwv ai Toddai
\ > a an? , n > a
KatavtTikpv Oivadav tod “Ayedwou Tav éxBorav
e
ovdéy améxXoucal, @oTE péyas MY O ToTAapmoS
ra 4 ¢ ,
Tpocyol alel Kal elol TOV ViTwY al HITrElpwvTaL,
\ \ \ / > b] a x ,
érmis 6€ kal wdcas ovK év TOAX@ Tit AY ypove
al lal \ lal
4 TovUTo TaGeiv: TO Te yap pevud éoTe péeya Kai
\ \ , 7 a , 3 ,
ToXv Kal Gorepov, at TE VTOL TWUKVAL, Kal adAN-
a \
als THs Tpotywcews TO wn TKEddvvVaAaL) Evp-
\ a
Seo pot yiyvovtat, TapadrAak Kal ov KaTa oTOtyoV
/ 7»? » ? / / a ¢e¢
Kelpmeval, OVS EYovaat EevOeias Stdd0us TOD VdaTos
> \ f 2 testy a. ’ >. \ > /
5 és To méXayos. éphuor 8 eicl Kal ov peydran.
A >
AéyeTar O€ Kal "AXAkpéwre TO “Amdidpew, Ste 67
rn \ / ipl
aradcbar a’tov peta TOY hovoy THs pNTpos, Tov
"AmoAAw TavTHnY THY YY Xphoat oiKelv, vTeEL-
TovTa ovK elvat AVOW TOV SeyudtTwv mp ay
A /
evpov év TAUTH TH XHOPA KaToLKionTaL HTS OTE
EXTELVE THV LNTEPA Tw UTO HALoU EWPAaTO wNdE
a n > a id >
6 yf Hv, @S THS ye AAANS aVT@ pewlacpevys. o 8
a / , A /
aTOp@V, WS Pact, MONS KATEVONTE THV TPT Yo-
fal / a
oi tTavTnv Tov Ayedwou, Kal édoKxes avT@ (Kav?
av xey@o0ar Siaita TH cwpatt ad’ obTeEp KTELVAS
/ a
THY pNTépa ovK ONLyYOV Xpovov éTaVaTO. Kal
\ b] \ \ ’ / , > /
Katoiktabels és TovUs Tept Oividdas TOTOUs édvva-
otevaé TE Kal aTTO "Axapvavos Trados EavTOD THs
YoOpas THY eTwvUpmLaY éyKaTédiTEV. TA pev OdY
pe | / fal / ,
wept AdXKkpéwva ToLavTa NEeyOuEva TrapeaBopev.
1 Hude brackets 7d wh ocxedavvveGa, following Stahl.
458

BOOK II. ci. 2-6

winter by reason of the water. Besides, most of the
Echinades islands lie opposite to Oeniadae at no great
distance from the mouths of the Achelous, so that
the river, which is large, keeps making fresh deposits
of silt, and some of the islands have already become
part of the mainland, and probably this will happen
to all of them in no great while. For the stream is
wide and deep and turbid, and the islands are close
together and serve to bind to one another the bars
as they are formed, preventing them from being
broken up, since the islands lie, not in line, but
irregularly, and do not allow straight channels for
the water into the open sea. These islands are
uninhabited and not large. There is a story that
when Alcmaeon son of Amphiaraus was a wanderer
after the murder of his mother,! Apollo directed him
by oracle to inhabit this land, intimating that he
would have no release from his fears until he should
find and settle in a country which at the time he
killed his mother had not yet been seen by the
sun, and was not even land then, for all the rest
of the earth had been polluted by him. And he,
in his perplexity, at last, as the story goes, ob-
served this sand-bar formed by the Achelous, and
he surmised that during the long time he had been
wandering since he had slain his mother enough
land would have been silted up to support life in.
So he settled there in the region of Oeniadae,
founded a principality, and left to the country its
name Acarnania, after that of his son Acarnan,
Such is the tradition which we have received
concerning Alcmaeon.

1 Eriphyle.
459

THUCYDIDES

CIII. Oc 6é ‘AOnvaior Kal O Poppiov apayres
ex THS ‘Axapvavias Kal adiKopevor és THY Nav-
TAKTOV dua pl KaTémAevoay és TAS "AOijvas,
TOUS TE ehevGepous TOV aixPaharov éK TOV
VAUAXLOY ayOvTEs, ob avip avT avd pos édv-
Onoav, Kal Tas vais as elAov. Kal o XElpov
éTeNevTa ovTOs, Kal Tplitov éTos TO TOAEL@
éreAevTa THdE Ov Oov«vdidns Evvéyparbev.

460

BOOK II, ci, 1-2

CIII. The Athenians and Phormio set out from
Acarnania and arrived at Naupactus, and later, at
the beginning of spring, sailed back to Athens,
bringing with them the captured ships and also the
prisoners of free birth whom they had taken in the
sea-fights. These were exchanged man for man.
And this winter ended, concluding the third year of
this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

461

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Martian. W.C. A. Ker. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 5th Imp., Vol. IL.
4th Imp. revised.)

Miyor Latiy Porers: from Pusiitivs Syrus to Rurtitivs
NamatTIANvus, including Gratrius, CatpurNius SiIcutus,
NEMESIANUS, AVIANUS, and others with “ Aetna” and the
‘“ Phoenix.” J. Wight Duff and Arnold M. Duff. (3rd Imp.)

Ovip : THE Art oF LOVE AND OTHER Poems. J. H. Mozley.
(3rd Imp.)

Ovip: Fastr. Sir James G. Frazer. (2nd Imp.)

Ovip: HerorpEes and Amores. Grant Showerman. (5th Imp.)

Ovip: Meramorpnosses. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 10th
Imp., Vol. IL. 8th Imp.)

2

Ovip: Tristra and Ex Ponto. A. L. Wheeler. (3rd Imp.)

Prersius. Cf. JUVENAL.

Prerronius. M. Heseltine; SENECA APOCOLOCYNTOSIS.
W. 4H. D. Rouse. (9th Imp. revised.)

Puavutus. Paul Nixon. 5 Vols. (Vol. I. 6th Imp., Il. 5th Imp.,
II. 3rd Imp., IV. and V. 2nd Imp.)

Pury: Lrerrers. Melmoth’s Translation revised by W. M. L.
Hutchinson. 2 Vols. (6th Imp.)

Puuyy: Naturat History. H. Rackham and W. H. 8S. Jones.
10 Vols. Vols. 1.-V.andIX. H. Rackham. Vols. VI. and VII.
W.H.S. Jones. (Vols. 1.-III. 3rd Imp., Vol. IV. 2nd Imp.)

Propertivus. H. E. Butler. (6th Imp.)

PrupEntivus. H.J. Thomson. 2 Vols.

Quintimian. H. E. Butler. 4 Vols. (3rd Imp.)

REMAINS OF Otp Latin. E. H. Warmington. 4 Vols. Vol. 1.
(ENNIUS aND Caxrciuius.) Vol. II. (Livrus, NAEVIUvs,
Pacuvius, Acctus.) Vol. III. (Lucrnius and Laws or XII
TaBLEs.) Vol. 1V. (2nd Imp.) (Arcuatic InscriPTIons.)

Satitust. J.C. Rolfe. (4th Imp. revised.)

Scriptores Histor1ar AucustTar. D. Magie. 3 Vols. (Vol. 1.
3rd Imp. revised, Vols. Il. and III. 2nd Imp.)

SENECA: ApocoLocynTosis. Cf. PETRONIUS.

SenEcA: Episrutar Moraes. R. M. Gummere. 3 Vols.
(Vol. I. 4th Imp., Vols. II. and III. 2nd Imp.)

Seneca: Morat Essays. J. W. Basore. 3 Vols. (Vol. IL.
3rd Imp., Vols. I. and III. 2nd Imp. revised.)

SenEcA: TraGcepies. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Imp.,
Vol. Il. 3rd Imp. revised.)

Sipontus: Porms anp Lerrers. W. B. Anderson. 2 Vols.
(Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)

Situs Iraticus. J. D. Duff. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.,
Vol. Il. 3rd Imp.)

Statius. J. H. Mozley. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

Suretonius. J.C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 7th Imp., Vol. IL.
6th Imp. revised.)

Tacitus: Driatocus. Sir Wm. Peterson. AgGRIcoLA and
GERMANIA. Maurice Hutton. (6th Imp.)

Tacitus: Histories anp ANNALS. C. H. Moore and J. Jack-
son. 4 Vols. (Vols. I. and Il. 4th Imp., Vols. III. and IV
3rd Imp.)

TERENCE. John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. (7/h Imp.)

TERTULLIAN : APpoLoGiA and De Sprcracuuis. T. R. Glover.
Minvucius Ferrx. G. H. Rendall. (2nd Imp.)

VaLERIus Furaccus. J. H. Mozley. (2nd Imp. revised.)

Varro: De Lineva Latina. R. G. Kent. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.
revised. )

VELLEIUS PaTERCULUS and Res GresTaE Divi Aucusti. F. W.
Shipley. (2nd Imp.)

Vireit. H.R. Fairclough. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 19th Imp., Vol. II.
14th Imp. revised.)

Virruvius: Dr Arcuirectura. F. Granger. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1.
3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp.)

3

Greek Authors

Acuitues Tatius. 8S. Gaselee. (2nd Imp.)

AENEAS TactTicus, ASCLEPIODOTUS and ONASANDER. The
Illinois Greek Club. (2nd Imp.)

AESCHINES. C. D. Adams. (2nd Imp.)

ArscHyLus. H. Weir Smyth. 2 Vols. (6th Imp.)

ALCIPHRON, AELIAN, PHILOosTtRATUS LETTERS. A. R. Benner
and F. H. Fobes.

ANDOCIDEs, ANTIPHON. Cf. Minor Atric ORATORS.

ApoLttoporus. Sir James G. Frazer. 2 Vols. (Vol. L. 3rd
Imp., Vol. Il. 2nd Imp.)

APOLLONIUS Ruopius. R.C. Seaton. (5th Imp.)

THe Apostotic FatrHers. Kirsopp Lake. 2 Vols. (Vol. L.
8th Imp., Vol. IL. 6th Imp.)

AppIAN: Roman History. Horace White. 4 Vols. (Vol. lL.
4th Imp., Vols. Il. and IV. 3rd Imp., Vol. III. 2nd Imp.)

Aratus. Cf. CALLIMACHUS.

ARISTOPHANES. Benjamin Bickley Rogers. 3 Vols. Verse
trans. (5th Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: ART OF RHETORIC. J. H. Freese. (3rd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, EupEMIAN ETHICS
Vices AND VirtTuEs. H. Rackham. (3rd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE : GENERATION OF AniImats. A. L. Peck. (2nd Imp.

ARISTOTLE: Metapnuysics. H.Tredennick. 2Vols. (Vol. I. 4h
Imp., U1. 3rd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: Merrreorotocica. H. D. P. Lee.

ARISTOTLE: Minor Works. W. S. Hett. On Colours, On
Things Heard, On Physiognomies, On Plants, On Marvellous
Things Heard, Mechanical Problems, On Indivisible Lines,
On Situations and Names of Winds, On Melissus, Xenophanes.
and Gorgias. (2nd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: NICOMACHEAN Etuics. H. Rackham. (6th Imp
revised.)

ARISTOTLE: OEcoNoMIcA and Maena Moratia. G C. Arm.
strong; (with Metaphysics, Vol. I1.). (3rd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: ON THE HEAvENS. W. K. C. Guthrie. (3rd Imp
revised.)

ARISTOTLE: On Sophistica! Refutations, On Coming to be and
Passing Away, On the Cosmos. E. S. Forster and D. J. Furley.

ARISTOTLE: ON THE Sout, Parva NatTuRALIA, ON BREATH.
W.S. Hett. (2nd Imp. revised.)

ARISTOTLE: ORGANON. CATEGORIES: On Interpretation, Prior
Analytics. H. P. Cooke and H. Tredennick. (3rd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: Parts oF Anrmats. A. L. Peck; MorIon anp
PROGRESSION OF ANIMALS. E. 8. Forster. (3rd Imp. revised.)

ARISTOTLE: PHysics. Rev. P. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford
2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 2nd Imp., Vol. Il. 3rd Imp.)

ARISTOTLE: PorTics and Loneinus. W. Hamilton Fyfe;
DEMETRIUS ON StyLeE. W. Rhys Roberts. (5th Imp. revised.)

ARISTOTLE: Pouitrics. H. Rackham. (4th Imp. revised.)

ARISTOTLE: ProsLeMs. W.S. Hett. 2Vols. (2nd Imp. revised.

4

ARISTOTLE: RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM (with PROBLEMS.
Vol. IT.). H. Rackham.

ARRIAN: History oF ALEXANDER and INpica. Rev. E. [liffe
Robson. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 2nd Imp.)

ATHENAEUS: DeErpNosopHisTaE. C. B. Gulick. 7 Vols
(Vols. I., IV.-VIL. 2nd Imp.)

St. Basu: Letrrers. R. J. Deferrari. 4 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

CaLLmmacuus, Hymns and Epigrams, and LycopHron. A. W
Mair; Aratus. G. R. Mair. (2nd Imp.)

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Rev. G. W. Butterworth. (3rd Imp.)

CotitutTHus. Cf. OPPIAN.

DaPHNIs AND CHLOE. Thornley’s Translation revised by
J. M. Edmonds: and ParrHenius. S. Gaselee. (4th Imp.)

DEMOSTHENES [: OtynrTutacs, PHitippics and Minor Ora-
tions. I|-XVII. anp XX _ J.H. Vince. (2nd Imp.)

DEMOSTHENES II: Dg Corona and De Fatsa LEGATIONE.
C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince. (3rd Imp. revised.)

DEMOSTHENES III: MeErp1as, ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES,
TrmocratTes and ARISTOGEITON, [. aNnp II. J. H. Vince.
(2nd Imp.)

DEMOSTHENES [V-V1: PrivaTE ORATIONS and IN NEAERAM.
A. T. Murray. (Vol. 1V. 2nd Imp.)

DEMOSTHENES VII: FuNrERAL SPEECH, Erotic Essay, Exorpia
and Letters. N. W. and N. J. DeWist.

Dio Cassius: Roman History. E. Cary. 9 Vols. (Vols. L.
and II. 3rd Imp., Vols. 111.-IX. 2nd Imp.)

Dio Curysostom. J. W. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby. 5 Vols.
Vols. I.-IV. 2nd Imp.)

Dioporvus Sicutus. 12 Vols. Vols. 1.-VI. C. H. Oldfather.
Vol. VII. C. L. Sherman. Vols. IX. and X. R. M. Geer.
(Vols. I-IV. 2nd Imp.)

DioGENEs Laertius. R. D. Hicks. 2 Vols. (Vol. L. 4th Imp..
Vol. Il. 3rd Imp.)

Dionysius oF HaAticarNnassus: Roman ANTIQUITIES. Spel.
man’s translation revised by E. Cary. 7 Vols. (Vols. I.-V
2nd Imp.)

Epictetus. W.A. Oldiather. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 3rd Imp., II. 2nd
Imp.)

Euripipes. A. S. Way. 4 Vols. (Vols. I. and Il. 7th Imp.,
Ill. and IV. 6th Imp.) Verse trans.

EvsEBIus: EccLesiasticAL History. Kirsopp Lake and
J. E. L. Oulton. 2 Vols. (Vol. [. 3rd Imp., Vol. II. 4th Imp.)

GALEN : ON THE Natural Facutties. A.J. Brock. (4th Imp.)

THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY. W. R. Paton. 5 Vols. (Vols. I. and
II. 5th Imp., Vol. L11. 4th Imp., Vols. 1V. and V. 3rd Imp.)

GREEK ELEGY AND IAMBUS with the ANACREONTEA. J. M.
Edmonds. 2 Vols. (Vol. Ll. 3rd Imp., Vol. IL. 2nd Imp.)

THE GREEK Bucotic Ports (THEOcRITUS, Bion, Mosouvs).
J. M. Edmonds. (7th Imp. revised.)

GREEK MaTHEMATICAL Works. Ivor Thomas. 2 Vols. (2nd
Imp.)

Heropes. Cf. THEOPHRASTUS: CHARACTERS.

5

Heropotus. A. D. Godley. 4 Vols. (Vols. L.-III. 4th Imp.,
Vol. IV. 3rd Imp.)

Hxestop AND THE Homeric Hymns. H. G. Evelyn White.
(7th Imp. revised and enlarged.)

Hippocrates and the FracMENTS oF Heracteitus. W. H.S&.
Jones and E. T. Withington. 4 Vols. (3rd Imp.)

Homer: Inrap. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 7th Imp.,
Vol. Il. 6th Imp.)

Homer: Opyssey. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (8th Imp.)

Isarus. E. W. Forster. (3rd Imp.)

IsocratTes. George Norlinand LaRue Van Hook. 3Vols. (2nd
Imp.)

Sr. Jonn DAMASCENE: BarLAaM AND IoasapH. Rev. G. R.
Woodward and Harold Mattingly. (3rd Imp. revised.)

JosEpuus. H. St. J. Thackeray and Ralph Marcus. 9 Vols.
Vols. I.-VII. (Vol. V. 3rd Imp., Vols. I.-IV., VI. and VII.
2nd Imp.)

Jutian. Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols. (Vols. 1. and Il. 3rd
Imp., Vol. III. 2nd Imp.)

Luctan. A. M. Harmon. 8 Vols. Vols. I.—-V. (Vols. I. and
Il. 4th Imp., Vol. III. 3rd Imp., Vols. IV. and V. 2nd Imp.)

LycorpHron. Cf. CALLIMACHUS.

Lyra Grarca. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. (Vol. L. 4th Imp..
Vol. Il. revised and enlarged, and III. 3rd Imp.)

Lystas. W.R. M. Lamb. (2nd Imp.)

Manetuo. W. G. Waddell: Protemy: Trrrasrstos. F. E.
Robbins. (3rd Imp.)

Marcus AurEtius. OC. R. Haines. (4th Imp. revised.)

MENANDER. F.G. Allinson. (3rd Imp. revised.)

Mrxor Artic Orators (ANTIPHON, ANDOCIDES, LycuRGUS,
DemMaADES, DivarcHus, HyPEREIDES). K. J. Maidment and
J. O. Burrt. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)

Nonnos: Dionystaca. W.H. D. Rouse. 3 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

Oppr1an, ComtuTHus, TRyPHIODORUS. A. W. Mair. (2nd Imp.)

Papyri. Non-Lrrerary Sextectrions. A. 8. Hunt and C. C.
Edgar. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.) Lirerary SELECTIONS.
Vol. I. (Poetry). D. L. Page. (3rd Imp.)

ParTHENIvs. Cf. DAPHNIS AND CHLOE.

PAUSANIAS: DESCRIPTION OF GREECE. W. H. 8. Jones. 5
Vols. and Companion Vol. arranged by R. E. Wycherley.
(Vols. I. and III. 3rd Imp., Vols. II., IV. and V. 2nd Imp.)

Punto. 10 Vols. Vols. I1.-V.; F. H. Colson and Rev. G. H.
Whitaker. Vols. VI.-IX.; F. H. Colson. (Vols. I.-III.
V.-IX. 2nd Imp., Vols. I. and IV., 3rd Imp.)

PuHiIto: two supplementary Vols. (Translation only.) Ralph
Marcus.

Puimostratus: THE Lire or APPOLLONIUS oF TyaNna. F. C.
Conybeare. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Imp., Vol. Il. 3rd Imp.)

Puimostratus: IMAGINES; CALLISTRATUS: DESCRIPTIONS.
A. Fairbanks.
PHILostRATUS and Eunapius: LiIvEs OF THE SOPHISTS.

Wilmer Cave Wright. (2nd Imp.)
6

Pinpar. Sir J. E. Sandys. (7th Imp. revised.)

PLaToO: CHARMIDES, ALCIBIADES, Htpparcnus, THE LOvERs,
THEAGES, Minos and Eptnomis. W. R. M. Lamb. (2nd
Imp.)

PLato: CRatTyLus, PARMENIDES, GREATER Hippias, LESSER
Hrepras. H.N. Fowler. (4th Imp.)

Prato: EutrnypHro, APpoLoGy, Criro, PHAEDO, PHAEDRUS.
H. N. Fowler. (11th Imp.)

PLtato: Lacues, Proracoras, MENo, EurHypremus. W. R. M.
Lamb. (3rd Imp. revised.)

Puato: Laws. Rev. R.G. Bury. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp.)

Puiato: Lysis, Sympostum, Goraras. W. R. M. Lamb. (5th
Imp. revised.)

Piato: Repusiic. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 5th Imp.,
Vol. Il. 4th Imp.)

Puiato: STaTESMAN, Puitesus. H.N. Fowler; Ion. W.R. M.
Lamb. (4th Imp.)

Puato: THEAETETUS and Sopuist. H. N. Fowler. (4th Imp.)

Pxtato: Trmarus, Critias, CLITOPHO, MENEXENUS, EPISTULAE.
Rev. R. G. Bury. (37rd Imp.)

PiurarcH: Moraria. 14 Vols. Vols. 1.-V. F. C. Babbitt;
Vol. VI. W.C. Helmbold; Vol. X. H. N. Fowler. (Vols.
I-VI. and X. 2nd Imp.)

PLtutTarcH: THE PARALLEL Lives. B. Perrin. 11 Vols.
(Vols. L., I1., VI., VII., and XI. 3rd Imp. Vols. III.-V. and
VIII.-X. 2nd Imp.)

Potysius. W.R. Paton. 6 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

Procopius: History or THE Wars. H. B. Dewing. 7 Vols.
(Vol. I. 3rd Imp., Vols. II.-VII. 2nd Imp.)

PTroLEMy: TETRABIBLOS. Cf. MANETHO.

Quintus SmyrnaEus. A. 8. Way. Verse trans. (3rd Imp.)

Sextus Emprricus. Rev. R. G. Bury. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd
Imp., Vols. II. and III. 2nd Imp.)

SopHoctes. F. Storr. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 10th Imp. Vol. II. 6th
Imp.) Verse trans.

Straso: GEoGRAPHY. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. (Vols. L., V.,
and VIII. 3rd Imp., Vols. II., I11., [V., VI., and VII. 2nd Imp.)

THEOPHRASTUS: CHARACTERS. J. M. Edmonds. HERopsgs,
ete. A. D. Knox. (3rd Imp.)

THEOPHRASTUS: ENQutRY INTO Ptuants. Sir Arthur Hort,
Bart. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

TuucypipEs. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. (Vol. I. 5th Imp., Vols.
Ii., IT1., and IV. 3rd Imp. revised.)

TrypHioporus. Cf. OPPrAN.

XENOPHON: CyYyROPAEDIA. Walter Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. L. 4th
Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp.)

XENOPHON : HELLENICA, ANABASIS, APOLOGY, and SyMPOSIUM.
C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols. (Vols. I. and III.
3rd Imp., Vol. Il. 4th Imp.)

XENOPHON : MEMORABILIA and Orconomicus. E. C. Marchant.
(3rd Imp.)

XENOPHON: Sorrpra Minora. E. C. Marchant. (3rd Imp.)

4

IN PREPARATION

Greek Authors

AELIAN: ON THE NATURE OF ANImMAts. A. F. Scholfield.
ARISTOTLE: History or ANIMALS. A. L. Peck.
CALLIMACHUS: FRAGMENTS. C. A. Trypanis.

Pitorinus: A. H. Armstrong.

Latin Authors

Sr. AUGUSTINE: CiITy OF Gop.

Cicero: Pro Ssestio, In Vatrnium. J. H. Freese and R. Gardner.

CicERO: Pro Cartio, DE PrRovinctis CONSULARIBUS, PRO
Batspo. J.H. Freese and R. Gardner.

PHaEpRvus. Ben E. Perry.

DESCRIPTIVE PROSPECTUS ON APPLICATION

London WILLIAM HEINEMANN LT
Cambridge, Mass. HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRES

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